Opinion
No. CV 08-404537S
July 2, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO STRIKE
In this one-count employee discrimination action brought pursuant to general statutes § 31-290a plaintiff alleges that his employer, the State of Connecticut retaliated against him for filing a Workers' Compensation claim by wrongfully discharging him, claiming, inter alia, emotional damages.
Defendant State on March 18, 2009 moved to strike this complaint on six alternative grounds, which are summarized as follows: that the requisite allegations for negligent and intentional infliction of emotion damages have not been alleged; that plaintiff has failed to allege that he was an employee or that defendant was an employer; and that there is an insufficiency of alleged facts as to the circumstances of his employment and the retaliatory discharge.
-I-
In Ford v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, Inc., 216 Conn. 40, 62, 578 A.2d 1054 (1990), the Supreme Court considered the issue of whether § 31-290a provides for the recovery of damages for emotional distress. Specifically, the Supreme Court concluded "that according to the plain language of § 31-290a, the trial court properly submitted to the jury the plaintiff's claim for damages for emotional distress." Id., 63.
In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges emotional distress as part of his damages. Therefore, pursuant to the reasoning articulated in Ford, the plaintiff's claim for damages based upon emotional distress is permissible under § 31-290a.
-II-
In Castelot-Cascone v. Bridgeport Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No., CV 05-4007828 (October 18, 2005, Doherty, J.), the court summarized the requirements of a § 31-290a action. "[I]n order to state a claim pursuant to § 31-290a, the plaintiff would need to allege (1) that the defendant was an employer as defined, (2) that the employer was subject to the provisions of the compensation act, and (3) that [the plaintiff] was an employee as defined in § 31-274 . . . Furthermore, because a motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged . . . a mere conclusory statement that a defendant is the plaintiff's employer without more, is insufficient."
In his complaint, the plaintiff fails to allege that the defendant was an employer as statutorily defined. However, he does allege that the employer was subject to § 31-290a, and that he was injured "in the course and scope of his employment for the Defendant, State of Connecticut." The plaintiff's only other references to his relationship to the defendant are that the defendant "wrongfully discharged the plaintiff" and "the plaintiff has suffered loss of him employment with the State of Connecticut." The plaintiff fails to specify what his position was with the defendant, what department he worked for, the supervisor who fired him, or any facts which would suggest that such firing was retaliatory in nature. Due to the insufficiency of the conclusory statements made in the complaint, the defendant's motion to strike is granted.