Opinion
No. 2:14-cv-02730 JAM CMK
07-20-2015
DREW GARDNER, Plaintiff, v. CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL; CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL OFFICER J.J. FISCHER; TEHAMA COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; TEHAMA COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT DEPUTY INVESTIGATOR ED McCULLOUGH; KENNETH MILLER; and DOES 1 - 50, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART STATE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART COUNTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter is before the Court on Defendants California Highway Patrol ("Defendant CHP") and J.J. Fischer's ("Defendant Fischer") (collectively, "State Defendants") motion to dismiss (Doc. #34) Plaintiff Drew Gardner's ("Plaintiff") First Amended Complaint ("FAC") (Doc. #33). Also before the Court is Defendants Tehama County ("Defendant County") and Ed McCullough's ("Defendant McCullough") (collectively, "County Defendants") motion to dismiss (Doc. #36) the FAC. Plaintiff opposed both State Defendants' (Doc. #35) and County Defendants' (Doc. #41) motions. Both State Defendants and County Defendants replied (Doc. #42; Doc. #43). For the following reasons, State Defendants' motion is granted in part, and denied in part, and County Defendants' motion is granted in part, and denied in part.
This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled for June 3, 2015.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 2, 2014, Plaintiff was riding as a passenger in a Jeep Wrangler that had been reported stolen. FAC ¶¶ 17-18. Upon seeing a police car, the driver of the Jeep abandoned the car and told Plaintiff to do the same. FAC ¶ 19. Defendant Fischer, an officer with Defendant CHP, apprehended Plaintiff and took him into custody. FAC ¶ 20. Soon thereafter, Plaintiff was booked into Tehama County Jail. FAC ¶ 27.
Following Plaintiff's arrest, Defendant Fischer wrote a Patrol Report ("Report"). FAC ¶ 21. In the Report, Defendant Fischer wrote that, during Plaintiff's booking, he had confiscated a "clear white baggie with a white crystalline substance" - which tested positive for methamphetamine - from Plaintiff's jacket. FAC ¶ 27. Plaintiff alleges that this statement was one of many lies that Defendant Fischer made while writing the Report. FAC ¶¶ 21-28.
The following day, January 3, 2014, Defendant McCullough - a deputy investigator with the Tehama County Sheriff's Department - was tasked with conducting an investigation of this incident. FAC ¶ 31. Defendant McCullough interviewed Plaintiff, who told him that he was a passenger in the car and had been offered a ride by Charles Jacob Steele, whom "he had just met at a mutual friend's house." FAC ¶ 33. Plaintiff informed Defendant McCullough that, prior to his arrest, they had stopped at a car dealership and a gas station, and that witnesses at both locations could confirm that he was not the driver of the stolen vehicle. FAC ¶¶ 34-35. McCullough followed up on both of these leads, and spoke with a witness at the car dealership. FAC ¶ 36. The witness picked Plaintiff out of a photo line-up, and identified him as the passenger of the vehicle. FAC ¶ 37. At this time, Defendant McCullough "failed to alert anyone at the Tehama [County] District Attorney's office, the Tehama County Jail, or the Shasta County Sheriff's department" of these exculpatory findings. FAC ¶ 38.
On January 6, 2014, Plaintiff was charged with: (1) unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle; (2) receiving stolen property - motor vehicle; (3) driving under the influence; (4) bringing contraband into the jail; (5) possession of a controlled substance; and (6) carrying a dirk or dagger. FAC ¶ 41. Plaintiff was arraigned on these charges, Defendant Miller was assigned to be his public defender, and the Court ordered him detained on $315,000 bail. FAC ¶ 43.
On January 8, 2014, Defendant McCullough resumed his investigation and visited the gas station at which Plaintiff claimed to have stopped before his arrest. FAC ¶ 44. He obtained video surveillance from the date of the incident, and observed that Plaintiff was the passenger in the vehicle. FAC ¶¶ 44-45. Defendant McCullough wrote up a report of his findings ("the McCullough Report"), but this report "was not sent or was not timely sent" to the Tehama County District Attorney's Office. FAC ¶ 45. Plaintiff further alleges that the McCullough Report "failed to make its way to the Tehama County District Attorney's Office" during the period that Defendant Miller represented Plaintiff, which ended on February 25, 2014. FAC ¶¶ 48-49.
On January 21, 2014, Plaintiff (represented by Defendant Miller) waived his right to a preliminary hearing. FAC ¶ 48; Doc. #40, Ex. B. On February 7, 2014, Plaintiff's mother retained private counsel to represent Plaintiff. FAC ¶ 50. On February 25, 2014, Plaintiff fired his public defender, Defendant Miller. FAC ¶ 48.
Plaintiff's retained counsel conducted an investigation and discovered substantially the same exculpatory information that Defendant McCullough had learned through his official investigation. FAC ¶¶ 50-54. On March 12, 2014, Plaintiff's retained counsel sent a letter summarizing his findings to the Tehama County District Attorney's Office. FAC ¶ 55. That same day, the Tehama County District Attorney provided Plaintiff - and retained counsel - with a copy of the McCullough Report. FAC ¶ 56. On March 17, 2014, the three vehicle-related counts against Plaintiff were dropped. FAC ¶ 57. Plaintiff remained in custody on the three booking-related pending charges. FAC ¶ 58.
On April 1, 2014, Plaintiff "persuaded Sargeant [sic] Baulkin at the Tehama County Jail to look at the booking video." FAC ¶ 59. The video showed that Plaintiff was not wearing the jacket in which Defendant Fischer claimed to have found a "baggie of meth" during booking. FAC ¶ 59. Instead, the video showed that Defendant Fischer carried the jacket into the booking room. FAC ¶ 59. On April 21, 2014, the remaining counts relating to Plaintiff's booking were dismissed. FAC ¶ 60. Plaintiff was released that same day, after spending 110 days in custody. FAC ¶ 60.
On March 30, 2015, Plaintiff filed the FAC, which includes the following causes of action:
(1) Fourteenth Amendment due process violation for deprivation of liberty against Defendant Fischer and Defendant McCullough, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
(2) Fourteenth Amendment due process violation for deprivation of liberty against Defendant CHP and Defendant County, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
(3) Fifth Amendment due process violation for unlawful arrest against Defendant Fischer and Defendant McCullough, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
(4) Fifth Amendment due process violation for unlawful arrest against Defendant CHP and Defendant County, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
(5) Eighth Amendment violation for cruel and unusual punishment against Defendant Fischer and Defendant McCullough, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
(6) Eighth Amendment violation for cruel and unusual punishment against Defendant CHP and Defendant County, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
(7) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant CHP;
(8) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant County;
(9) intentional withholding of evidence against Defendant McCullough;
(10) intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") against Defendant Fischer;
(11) negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NIED") against Defendant Fischer, Defendant Miller, and Defendant McCullough;
(12) false imprisonment against Defendant CHP, Defendant Fischer, Defendant McCullough, and Defendant County;
(13) professional negligence against Defendant Miller; and
(14) malicious prosecution against Defendant Fischer. As Defendant Miller is not a moving party on the motions before the Court, only the facts relevant to the State Defendants' motion and the County Defendants' motion are summarized above.
II. OPINION
A. Judicial Notice
County Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of two documents which are not attached to the FAC: (1) Defendant Fischer's Probable Cause Declaration, dated January 2, 2014; and (2) Plaintiff's Waiver of Preliminary Hearing, dated January 21, 2014. County Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice ("CDRJN"), Doc. #37. Plaintiff opposes County Defendants' request, arguing that the consideration of documents not included in the complaint is improper on a motion to dismiss. Opp. at 3.
As a general rule, the Court "may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion." Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). However, the Court may take judicial notice of "matters of public record," provided that they are not subject to reasonable dispute. Id. at 689. Similarly, on a motion to dismiss, the Court "may consider evidence on which the "complaint necessarily relies if: (1) the complaint refers to the document; (2) the document is central to the plaintiff's claim; and (3) no party questions the authenticity of the copy attached to the 12(b)(6) motion." Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted).
The first document offered by County Defendants - Defendant Fischer's Probable Cause Declaration - meets the standard set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Daniels-Hall: it was referenced in the FAC at paragraph 30, it is central to Plaintiff's claim, and its authenticity is not questioned. The second document offered by County Defendants - Plaintiff's Waiver of Preliminary Hearing - is a public court record and is not subject to reasonable dispute. Accordingly, County Defendants' request for judicial notice is GRANTED.
B. Discussion
1. State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
a. Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of Action - § 1983 Claims against Defendant CHP
State Defendants argue that Plaintiff's second, fourth, sixth, and seventh causes of action against Defendant CHP must be dismissed because CHP is not a "person" amenable to suit under § 1983. State Mot. at 5. State Defendants note that, for purposes of a § 1983 action, states and state agencies are not defined as "persons" and therefore cannot be sued under the statute. State Mot. at 6. Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendant CHP is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983, but maintains that CHP can be sued under Monell, as a governmental entity. Opp. to State at 2. In their reply, State Defendants argue that Monell applies only to municipal entities, and not to the State of California or its agencies, including CHP. State Reply at 2.
In pertinent part, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads as follows:
Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]The Supreme Court has held that Congress intended "municipalities and other local government units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). However, in Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, the Supreme Court expressly limited the reach of Monell, noting that "it does not follow that if municipalities are person then so are states." 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989). Thus, the Court held that "neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983." Id. at 71. Therefore, neither the State of California nor its state agencies can be subject to a § 1983 Monell claim. See Orsoco v. Cal., 2013 WL 3146820, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 18, 2013) (holding that "defendants State of California and CHP cannot be sued under section 1983," even under a Monell theory of liability); Townsend v. State of Cal., 2010 WL 1644740, at *6 (E.D. Cal. April 21, 2010) (noting that "the State and CHP, an arm of the State, are not subject to section 1983 claims.").
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The parties do not dispute that CHP is an agency of the State of California. Cal. Gov. Code § 11000. As a state agency, CHP is neither a "person" within the meaning of § 1983, Will, 491 U.S. at 71, nor amenable to suit under Monell.
State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's second, fourth, sixth, and seventh causes of action, to the extent those claims are brought against Defendant CHP, is therefore GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. See Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not appropriate unless it is clear on de novo review that the complaint could not be saved by amendment." (citing Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1996)). b. Tenth and Eleventh Causes of Action - IIED and NIED - against Defendant Fischer
State Defendants argue that Plaintiff's tenth and eleventh causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") and negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NIED") against Defendant Fischer must be dismissed because he is immune from liability under California Government Code § 820.2. State Mot. at 6-7. Specifically, State Defendants argue that, under § 820.2, Defendant Fischer is not liable for the injuries that result from his discretionary decisions, including his decision to arrest Plaintiff. State Mot. at 6-7. Plaintiff argues that Defendant Fischer is not entitled to immunity under § 820.2, because that statute applies only to discretionary policy decisions and not to operational decisions, such as decisions to arrest. Opp. to State at 6-7. In reply, State Defendants note that Plaintiff's authority only concerns § 820.2 immunity for false arrest, not IIED or NIED. State Reply at 3. However, State Defendants do not provide any additional authority, and appear only to have repeated their argument, verbatim, from their opening brief in support of the motion to dismiss. Compare State Reply at 3 (lines 15-20), with State Mot. at 7 (lines 7-13).
California Government Code § 820.2 provides that, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused." The Ninth Circuit has held that "section 820.2 immunity does not apply to an officer's decision to detain or arrest a suspect." Liberal v. Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064, 1084 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Gillan v. City of San Marino, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 158, 174 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)). In so holding, the Ninth Circuit reasoned as follows:
Immunity is reserved for those basic policy decisions [which have] . . . been [expressly] committed to coordinate branches of government, and as to which judicial interference would thus be unseemly. A police officer's decision to detain or arrest a suspect is not a basic policy decision, but only an operational decision by the police purporting to apply the law.
Id. at 1084-85 (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted).
As such, it is beyond dispute that § 820.2 immunity does not apply to false arrest or false imprisonment. See Opp. at 6; reply at 3. However, the Ninth Circuit has not reached the precise issue of whether § 820.2 immunity applies to claims for IIED or NIED, when such claims arise from false arrest or false imprisonment. See Liberal, 632 F.3d at 1091.n2.
The cases cited by State Defendants do not support their argument that § 820.2 immunity applies to IIED and NIED claims. See Mot. at 7 (citing Posey v. State, 180 Cal. App. 3d 836 (1986) and Bonds v. Sate of Cal. (ex rel. Cal. Highway Patrol), 138 Cal.App.3d 314 (1982)). In Posey, the court held that the "inspection and removal of disabled vehicles are discretionary acts and are therefore covered by the statutory immunities as set forth in Government Code section 820.2." Posey, 180 Cal.App.3d at 848. Similarly, in Bonds, the court held that a "decision to remove or not to remove a stranded vehicle, without more, is thus a discretionary action and comes within the immunity described in Government Code section 820.2." Bonds, 138 Cal.App.3d at 322 (citations omitted). Neither of these cases involved IIED or NIED (or even false arrest) claims and they are inapplicable to the case at bar.
Given the lack of applicable Ninth Circuit authority on this point, and in light of State Defendants' failure to cite any authority addressing the applicability of § 820.2 to IIED and NIED claims, the Court finds that State Defendants have failed to meet their burden in moving to dismiss the IIED and NIED claims arising from false arrest.
State Defendants' reliance on § 818.8 is also misplaced. California Government Code § 818.8 provides that "[a] public entity is not liable for an injury caused by misrepresentation by an employee of the public entity, whether or not such misrepresentation be negligent or intentional." However, § 818.8 immunity applies only to misrepresentations that interfere with financial or commercial interests. See Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 800 (1968) ("In short, 'misrepresentation,' as a tort distinct from the general milieu of negligent and intentional wrongs, applies to interferences with financial or commercial interest."). Neither party claims that a misrepresentation occurred regarding a financial or commercial interest, and § 818.8 is, therefore, inapplicable. See Opp. at 7; Reply at 3.
Similarly, State Defendants' reliance on § 820.8 is unavailing. California Government Code § 820.8, in pertinent part, provides that, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury caused by the act or omission of another person." However, State Defendants do not explain which other person's act or omission Defendant Fischer is seeking immunity from. Opp. to State at 7; see also State Reply at 3. Therefore, § 820.8 also does not apply.
For the reasons stated above, State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's tenth and eleventh causes of action, to the extent those claims are brought against Defendant Fischer, is DENIED.
c. Twelfth Cause of Action - False Imprisonment - against Defendant CHP
State Defendants argue that Plaintiff's twelfth cause of action for false imprisonment must be dismissed, to the extent it is brought against Defendant CHP, because Plaintiff fails to identify a statutory basis for liability against Defendant CHP as required by California Government Code § 815. State Mot. at 6. In his opposition, Plaintiff argues that California Government Code § 815.2(a) provides a statutory basis for liability against Defendant CHP under the doctrine of respondeat superior, such that it can be held liable for Defendant Fischer's false imprisonment of Plaintiff. Opp. to State at 4-5.
California Government Code § 815(a) provides that, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute: . . . [a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person." Accordingly, "in California all government tort liability is dependent on the existence of an authorizing statute or 'enactment.'" Searcy v. Hemet Unified Sch. Dist., 177 Cal.App.3d 792, 802 (1986) (citations omitted). The existence of a statutory duty (along with all other facts essential to the existence of statutory liability) must be pleaded with particularity. Id. (citing Susman v. City of L.A., 269 Cal.App.2d 803, 809 (1969)). Accordingly, "[s]ince the duty of a governmental agency can only be created by statute or 'enactment,' the statute or 'enactment' claimed to establish the duty must at the very least be identified" in the complaint. Id.
With regard to the twelfth cause of action against Defendant CHP, Plaintiff has failed to identify a statutory basis for Defendant CHP's tort liability. Comp. ¶¶ 112-20. This deficiency is fatal to his claim. See Ramsey v. City of Lake Elsinore, 270 Cal. Rptr. 198, 205 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (approving dismissal of claim where the plaintiff "did not identify any statute, ordinance or resolution on which the City's liability could be based"); see also Helstern v. City of San Diego, No. 13-cv-0321, 2013 WL 3515963, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. July 11, 2013) (dismissing claim, noting that, although the plaintiff "identifie[d] the statute her complaint is missing" in her opposition brief, "these statutes belong in [her] complaint, where the negligence claim is actually asserted").
Accordingly, State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's twelfth cause of action, to the extent it is brought against Defendant CHP, is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
2. County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
a. First Cause of Action - § 1983 (Fourteenth Amendment - Due Proc e ss Clause) against Defendant McCullough
To the extent that Plaintiff sues Defendant McCullough in his official capacity, these are claims against Defendant County. Similarly, to the extent that Plaintiff sues the Tehama County Sheriff's Department, these are claims against Defendant County. For purposes of consistency, the Court reads any claims asserted against Defendant McCullough in the FAC as claims against him in his individual capacity. Although Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does permit a plaintiff to plead potentially inconsistent claims for relief, it does not permit him to plead duplicative claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8; Fontana v. Alpine Cnty., 750 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1155 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
County Defendants argue that Defendant McCullough is entitled to qualified immunity with regard to Plaintiff's first cause of action, which alleges a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, brought pursuant to § 1983. County Mot. at 7. Specifically, County Defendants argue that neither Plaintiff's procedural due process claim, nor his substantive due process claim, is cognizable, because Defendant McCullough is entitled to qualified immunity. County Mot. at 7. Plaintiff responds that Defendant McCullough is not entitled to qualified immunity, because his conduct violated Plaintiff's clearly established constitutional rights. Opp. to County at 5.
The doctrine of qualified immunity "protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1244 (2012). In evaluating a defendant's claim of qualified immunity, district courts consider two related questions: First, "taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, [whether] the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Second, if the allegations establish that a constitutional violation occurred, courts must consider whether the right was "clearly established" at the time of the violation. Id.
Accordingly, the Court first considers whether Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that Defendant McCullough violated his constitutional rights. In the context of Plaintiff's first cause of action for violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiff's claims are two-fold: (1) procedural due process; and (2) substantive due process. In light of Plaintiff's waiver of his right to a preliminary hearing, his procedural due process claim is a non-starter; it cannot be said that "the procedures attendant upon [Plaintiff's pretrial detention] were constitutionally insufficient." Kentucky Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S. Ct. 1904, 1908 (1989). Rather, Plaintiff merely failed to take advantage of the procedures to which he was entitled. For this reason, Plaintiff cannot maintain a procedural due process claim against Defendant McCullough, and County Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's first cause of action is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, insofar as Plaintiff has attempted to state a procedural due process claim against Defendant McCulllough.
However, Plaintiff's substantive due process claim warrants a closer look. The Ninth Circuit has held that the Fourteenth Amendment provides "a constitutional right to be free from continued [pretrial] detention after it was or should have been known that the detainee was entitled to release." Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 683 (9th Cir. 2001). In a recent case - discussed at length in both parties' briefs - the Ninth Circuit considered a pretrial detainee's substantive due process claim in factual circumstances both similar to, and different from, the case at bar. Mot. at 9; Opp. at 6 (both citing Tatum v. Moody, 768 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2014)).
In Tatum, the plaintiff (Walker) had been detained, pre-trial, for over two years on robbery charges that were eventually dismissed. Tatum, 768 F.3d at 809. Walker brought a § 1983 action against the investigating police officers, alleging that their failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to prosecutors violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 809. At his civil trial, Walker presented evidence that two investigating police officers had failed to inform prosecutors that robberies - strikingly similar to those allegedly committed by Walker - continued to occur after Walker was taken into custody. Id. at 809-811. The investigating officers also made affirmative misrepresentations to the court and the prosecutor that the string of similar robberies had ceased since Walker's arrest, and failed to inform prosecutors when another man was arrested for the subsequent robberies. Id. at 812. The Tatum court held that a due process violation may occur when an individual is subject to "prolonged detention when the police, with deliberate indifference to, or in the face of a perceived risk that, their actions will violate the plaintiff's right to be free of unjustified pretrial detention, withhold from the prosecutors information strongly indicative of his innocence[.]" Id. at 814-815. However, the court specifically noted "the narrowness of the constitutional rule we enforce today, which is restricted to detentions of (1) unusual length, (2) caused by the investigating officers' failure to disclose highly significant exculpatory evidence to prosecutors, and (3) due to conduct that is culpable in that the officers understood the risks to the plaintiff's rights from withholding the information or were completely indifferent to those risks." Id. at 819-820. In Tatum, the Ninth Circuit went on to discuss each of these "limitations," as they applied to the specific circumstances of Walker's detention. Id. at 820-821.
As Plaintiff's § 1983 claim for a substantive due process violation entails a necessarily fact-intensive inquiry, the application of Tatum to the present case requires a comparison between the circumstances of Plaintiff's detention and that of Walker in Tatum. With regard to the first element, Plaintiff was detained for 110 days. FAC ¶ 60. Although this period is substantially shorter than the 27 months of pretrial detainment seen in Tatum, it is of sufficient length to "carr[y] constitutional implications." See Tatum, 768 F.3d at 820 (noting that "a 68-day detention [was] lengthy enough to 'carr[y] constitutional implications'") (citing Russo v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196, 209 (2d Cir. 2007)). As noted by the Supreme Court, "[t]he consequences of prolonged detention may be more serious than the interference occasioned by arrest . . . [because] [p]retrial confinement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family relationships." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975). County Defendants acknowledge that the length of Plaintiff's confinement "appears constitutionally significant." Mot. at 10. The first Tatum "limitation" is no bar to Plaintiff's substantive due process claim.
With regard to the second element, Plaintiff alleges that the McCullough Report contained the following information: (1) Plaintiff's claim that he was the passenger, not the driver, of the stolen vehicle; (2) an eyewitness' testimony that Plaintiff was the passenger, not the driver, of the stolen vehicle; (3) physical evidence that listed the name and address of the man the eyewitness believed to be the driver; and (4) surveillance video from a gas station, showing Plaintiff exiting and re-entering the passenger seat of the stolen vehicle. FAC ¶¶ 33, 36, 37, 44. This information was "not merely material but strongly indicative of the plaintiff's innocence." Tatum, 768 at 820 (emphasis in original). Just as in Tatum, the relevant charges were dismissed quickly after the information contained in the McCullough Report was brought to the attention of the prosecutor. FAC ¶ 57; Tatum, 768 at 820 (noting that, "with minimal further investigation, the evidence prompted the prosecutor to drop all charges against Walker and led the judge to declare Walker factually innocent"). Although it was ultimately Plaintiff's private investigator who brought the information to the prosecutor's attention, the information was largely the same as that contained in the McCullough Report, and the eventual dismissal of the vehicle-related charges supports Plaintiff's argument that the report was strongly exculpatory. As County Defendants acknowledge, the second Tatum factor "weighs in [Plaintiff's] favor." Mot. at 10.
Before moving to the third Tatum element, the Court briefly notes that Plaintiff was not immediately released from custody upon the dismissal of the vehicle-related counts. These counts were dismissed on March 17, 2014, but Plaintiff remained in custody for approximately one additional month, on the booking-related charges. FAC ¶¶ 57-58. Plaintiff alleges that, on April 1, 2014, he "persuaded Sargeant [sic] Baulkin at the Tehama County Jail to look at the booking video," which disproved allegations that the booking officer "found the baggie of meth in the jacket pocket." FAC ¶ 59. (The video shows he was not wearing a jacket.) FAC ¶ 59. Finally, on April 21, 2014, the booking-related counts were dismissed and Plaintiff was released from custody. FAC ¶ 60. At this early stage in the litigation, it is simply too early to determine whether the dismissal of the vehicle-related charges had a "domino effect," making it easier for Plaintiff to access the booking video and ultimately be released from custody. What is clear from the face of the FAC is that between January 2, 2014 (when Plaintiff was taken into custody) and March 12, 2014 (when the exculpatory information finally made its way to the prosecutor) Plaintiff was largely ignored by those that had placed him in custody. After this date, events unfolded quickly and Plaintiff was released within a matter of weeks. The question of whether Defendant McCullough's failure to disclose the exculpatory evidence "caused" Plaintiff's prolonged pretrial detention may well become a question for the jury; at the very least, it is an issue that is better addressed at the summary judgment stage, after full discovery has been conducted.
As to the third Tatum element, the Ninth Circuit noted that, "[i]n the context of a § 1983 suit against police officers for a due process violation, official conduct violates due process only when it shocks the conscience, a standard satisfied in circumstances such as these by conduct that either consciously or through complete indifference disregards the risk of an unjustified deprivation of liberty." Tatum, 768 at 820-821 (citations omitted). In this case, as in Tatum, "the decision whether to disclose or withhold exculpatory evidence is a situation in which actual deliberation is practical, such that deliberate indifference to individual rights - rather than intent to injure - is enough. Id. at 821 (citations omitted). In Tatum, the Ninth Circuit suggested that the issue of an individual officer's mens rea is generally a question for the jury. Id. at 821 (noting that "[t]he jury's determination that [the individual officer defendants] acted with deliberate indifference or reckless disregard for Walker's rights . . . satisfies the standard applicable to violations of due process"). Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant McCullough acted with either "deliberate indifference . . . [by making] a conscious choice to disregard the consequences" of his acts, or with "reckless disregard for Plaintiff's rights and the truth, either by a complete indifference to his rights or acting in the face of a perceived risk that their actions would violate Plaintiff's rights under federal law." FAC ¶ 65. These allegations are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, and the third Tatum "limitation" does not bar Plaintiff's substantive due process claim against Defendant McCullough.
Under the three-prong Tatum inquiry, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to show that Defendant McCullough's conduct violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. However, because Defendant McCullough has asserted a defense of qualified immunity, the Court must next consider whether the constitutional right in question was "clearly established" at the time of the violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Plaintiff appears to argue that it has long been "clearly established" that a criminal defendant's "due process rights are implicated [when] the state withholds exculpatory evidence from the defense." Opp. at 6 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). This characterization of the right at issue is too broad, especially given the fact that Brady concerns post-conviction, not pretrial, confinement. See Fontana v. Alpine Cnty., 2011 WL 676922, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2011) (noting that "plaintiffs who prevail in an underlying criminal action have no Brady-related due process claims under § 1983"). As County Defendants correctly note, the inquiry into whether a right is clearly established "must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition." Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004). Moreover, Plaintiff cannot rely on the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Tatum, as that opinion was filed on September 17, 2014, six to eight months after the alleged violation occurred.
Nevertheless, well before the time of the alleged violation, the Ninth Circuit had clearly established the "constitutional right to be free from continued [pretrial] detention after it was or should have been known that the detainee was entitled to release." Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 683 (9th Cir. 2001). This right is stated in a sufficiently narrow manner, and, taking Plaintiff's allegations as true, Defendant McCullough's conduct violated this clearly established right. Despite County Defendants' attempt to muddy the waters, this is not a complicated case: if Plaintiff's allegations are correct, Defendant McCullough learned that Plaintiff was most likely not the driver of the stolen vehicle on January 8, 2014, and sat on this information, while Plaintiff languished in Tehama County Jail. The right to be free from continued pretrial detention, after it is known the detention is unjustified, is clearly established, both in Ninth Circuit case law and in basic principles of common humanity. At the motion to dismiss stage, Defendant McCullough is not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity on Plaintiff's substantive due process claim.
County Defendants' attempt to distinguish Tatum on the grounds that Defendant McCullough did not affirmatively misrepresent facts to the prosecutor - is unpersuasive. County Mot. at 11. In Tatum, the investigating officers did affirmatively misrepresent the fact that the string of similar robberies had ended. Tatum, 768 at 817. However, by incorporating "failure to disclose highly significant exculpatory evidence to prosecutors" into its ultimate three-part inquiry, the Ninth Circuit indicated that this fact was not integral to its ruling. Id. at 819. Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant McCullough did precisely that. Under Tatum, it is immaterial whether Defendant McCullough affirmatively told the prosecutor that he had confirmed that Plaintiff was the driver of the stolen vehicle, or merely failed to disclose the information he had learned that proved the contrary. Either is sufficient to establish that he violated Plaintiff's rights.
County Defendants argue that Plaintiff's waiver of his right to a preliminary hearing bars his substantive due process claim. County Mot. at 10. However, as noted above, Plaintiff's waiver of the preliminary hearing bars his procedural due process claim, but not his substantive due process claim. In Tatum, the Ninth Circuit noted that due process claims based on prolonged pretrial detention generally "fall into at least one of the two categories: (1) the circumstances indicated to the defendants that further investigation was warranted, or (2) the defendants denied the plaintiff access to the courts for an extended period of time." Tatum, 768 at 816. The Court went on to characterize Walker's claim as a "variant of the first of those two categories," noting that the officers' "silence in the face of compelling exculpatory evidence breached their duty of disclosure to authorities competent to act on the information." Id. at 816. In light of this bifurcated approach, a plaintiff need not allege that he was denied "access to the courts for an extended period of time" while being detained pre-trial. Rather, a separate and cognizable due process claim can be stated by alleging that investigating officers withheld compelling exculpatory evidence. Thus, the availability (and waiver) of a preliminary hearing in this case is immaterial as to the substantive due process claim; Plaintiff's allegations that Defendant McCullough failed to promptly inform the prosecutor of the exculpatory information he obtained in his investigation are sufficient to establish a substantive due process claim.
Finally, to the extent that County Defendants invoke the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity on Defendant McCullough's behalf, this argument is misplaced. County Mot. at 5. In this context, quasi-judicial immunity applies to ministerial officers, such as jailors or prison officials, who carry out a court order of confinement. Engebretson v. Mahoney, 724 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2013); Rivera v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 745 F.3d 384, 391 (9th Cir. 2014). Unlike a ministerial prison official, Defendant McCullough had a duty to investigate the facts underlying the court's order of confinement. It is the breach of this duty which supports Plaintiff's substantive due process claim, and the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity is inapplicable.
For all of these reasons, County Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's first cause of action, brought pursuant to § 1983 for violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, is DENIED, insofar as Plaintiff states a substantive due process claim against Defendant McCullough.
b. Second Cause of Action - § 1983 (Fourteenth Amendment - Due Process Clause) against Defendant County
County Defendants argue that Plaintiff's second cause of action, brought pursuant to § 1983 and alleging that Defendant County violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, must be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege his Monell claim. County Mot. at 13. Specifically, County Defendants argue that Plaintiff's "conclusory and formulaic allegations that a policy, custom or practice exists, without more, [are] insufficient" to satisfy the requirements of Monell. County Mot. at 13. Plaintiff maintains that the allegations are not conclusory and argues further that, even if they were, conclusory allegations as to a municipal policy are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Opp. to County at 9-10 (citing Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993)).
Although a municipality can be sued under § 1983, "it cannot be held liable unless a municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional injury." Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 166. Accordingly, to state a claim for municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that an official policy or custom existed; (2) that the plaintiff suffered constitutional injury; and (3) the existence of a causal link between the policy/custom and the plaintiff's injury. Id. Moreover, each of these elements must be alleged with "sufficient particularity" and general or conclusory allegations will not suffice. See, e.g., Estate of Brooks ex rel. Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999) (approving the dismissal of a Monell claim, on the grounds that "the complaint did not allege a deliberate County policy with sufficient particularity"); see also, Hass v. Sacramento Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 2014 WL 1616440, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2014) (granting motion to dismiss where one element of Monell claim was alleged in conclusory manner).
In support of his second cause of action, Plaintiff makes the following allegations:
70. The actions described above committed by Defendants J.J. Fisher and Ed McCullough either (1) flowed from an explicitly adopted or a tacitly authorized municipal policy of Defendants California Highway Patrol and the Tehama County Sheriff's Department; (2) implemented or executed a policy, statement, ordinance, regulation or decision officially adopted or promulgated by those entity Defendants; or (3) were pursuant to a custom of said entity Defendants.
FAC ¶ 70.
In support of his eighth cause of action (which, as discussed below, is not viable as a stand-alone § 1983 claim because it fails to name a specific constitutional right that has been violated, but nevertheless contains allegations which can support Plaintiff's other Monell claims), Plaintiff makes the following allegations:
96. Both before and after January 2, 2014, the Tehama County Sheriff's Department tolerated, permitted, failed to correct, and exonerated practices on the part of their deputies including Deputy McCullough and others in their unjustified, unreasonable, unconstitutional, and illegal uses of police protocol resulting in the deprivation of Plaintiff's, and other persons similarly situated, constitutional rights, especially their liberty rights, as hereinabove described.Contrary to Plaintiff's argument, these allegations are conclusory. Although Plaintiff uses Monell buzzwords, such as "policy" and "custom," he supplies no supporting factual allegations whatsoever. Conspicuously absent from the FAC are any detailed allegations as to the specific policy or custom that Defendant County implemented or allowed to exist, or how exactly Defendant County's training program was constitutionally deficient. In the absence of supporting factual allegations, Plaintiff's Monell claim for violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not viable. See Brooks, 197 F.3d at 1247 (approving the dismissal of a Monell claim, on the grounds that "the complaint did not allege a deliberate County policy with sufficient particularity").
97. Defendant Tehama County Sheriff's Department took no steps to appropriately discipline, remediate, counsel, retrain or terminate the employment of, or otherwise correct the officers and employees with regard to the safe an[d] appropriate use of police procedures regarding traffic stops, arrests, and detentions. As a result, the Tehama County Sheriff's Department, under color of law, approved or ratified such conduct, and maintained the custom and practice of deliberate indifference to unjustified, unreasonable, and illegal deprivation of constitutional rights and other forms of unconstitutional conduct.
FAC ¶¶ 96-97.
Leatherman, cited by Plaintiff, merely holds that a "heightened pleading standard" - akin to that applied to claims grounded in fraud, pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure - does not apply to Monell claims. This does not contradict the requirement that a plaintiff plead a municipal policy in a non-conclusory manner, and, to the extent it does, Leatherman was overruled by the Supreme Court's subsequent rulings in Twombly and Iqbal. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
Accordingly, County Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's second cause of action, brought pursuant to § 1983 for violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, insofar as Plaintiff has attempted to state a Monell claim against Defendant County. c. Third and Fourth Causes of Action - § 1983 (Fifth Amendment) against Defendant McCullough and Defendant County
County Defendants argue that Plaintiff's § 1983 claims, which allege a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, must be dismissed because claims for unconstitutional pretrial detention are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment alone. County Mot. at 7. Plaintiff does not respond to this argument. Because "post-arrest incarceration is analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment alone," County Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's third and fourth causes of action is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, to the extent these causes of action are brought against Defendant McCullough or Defendant County. Rivera v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 745 F.3d 384, 389-90 (9th Cir.).
d. Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action - § 1983 (Eighth Amendment) against Defendant McCullough and Defendant County
County Defendants argue that Plaintiff's § 1983 claims, which allege a violation of the Eighth Amendment, must be dismissed because the Eighth Amendment only protects those who have been convicted of a criminal offense. County Mot. at 7. Plaintiff does not respond to this argument. Because "[c]laims by pretrial detainees are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, rather than under the Eighth Amendment," County Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's fifth and sixth causes of action is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, to the extent these causes of action are brought against Defendant McCullough or Defendant County. Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). e. Eighth Cause of Action - § 1983 - against Defendant County
County Defendants argue that Plaintiff's eighth cause of action must be dismissed because it is brought pursuant to § 1983 but is "not based on any identifiable constitutional or statutory provision, and thus is without legal foundation." County Mot. at 13. Plaintiff does not respond to this argument. It is well-established that "Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Tatum, 768 F.3d at 814. Without naming a specific constitutional right that has been violated, Plaintiff's eighth cause of action cannot stand on its own, and County Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's eighth cause of action is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. However, the allegations contained therein - which roughly take the shape of a "failure to train" Monell claim - can be (and were) considered with regard to the sufficiency of Plaintiff's Monell claim, alleging a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
f. Ninth Cause of Action - Intentional Withholding of Evidence - against Defendant McCullough
County Defendants argue that Plaintiff's ninth cause of action for intentional withholding of evidence must be dismissed because Defendant McCullough is immune under California Government Code § 821.6. County Mot. at 15. Plaintiff responds that Defendant McCullough is not immune under § 821.6 because he was not "instituting or prosecuting" a judicial proceeding. Opp. to County at 13.
Section 821.6 of the California Government Code provides that "[a] public employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable cause." As noted by one California court, "the provision encompasses conduct during an ongoing prosecution and not solely that leading up to the institution of a prosecution." Randle v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 186 Cal.App.3d 449, 456 (Ct. App. 1986). Accordingly, public employees are entitled to immunity under § 821.6 for "the suppression of evidence . . . by the [investigating] police officer in failing to bring the report to the prosecutor's attention[.]" Randle, 186 Cal.App.3d at 457. As this is exactly what Plaintiff alleges Defendant McCullough did, County Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's ninth cause of action is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
g. Eleventh Cause of Action - NIED - against Defendant McCullough
County Defendants argue that Plaintiff's eleventh cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress must be dismissed because Defendant McCullough is immune under California Government Code § 821.6. County Mot. at 15. Plaintiff responds that the "injuries caused by [Defendant McCullough] were not from 'instituting or prosecuting'" a judicial proceeding within the meaning of §821.6. Opp. to County at 13.
As noted above, § 821.6 of the California Government Code immunizes public employees from suits for injuries caused by the employee's "instituting or prosecuting" a judicial or administrative proceeding. Randle, 186 Cal.App.3d at 456. One California court has noted that "[a]n investigation before the institution of a judicial proceeding is part of the prosecution of a judicial proceeding for purposes of the statute[.]" Gillan v. City of San Marino, 147 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1048 (2007), as modified on denial of reh'g (Feb. 21, 2007). Moreover, immunity under § 821.6 "extends to other causes of action arising from conduct protected under the statute, including . . . intentional infliction of emotional distress." Id. at 1048. As Defendant McCullough's investigation is the source of Plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, he is entitled to immunity under § 821.6. County Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's eleventh cause of action is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, insofar as the claim is brought against Defendant McCullough.
h. Twelfth Cause of Action - False Imprisonment - against Defendant McCullough and Defendant County
County Defendants argue that Plaintiff's twelfth cause of action for false imprisonment must be dismissed because County Defendants were "entitled to rely on CHP Officer Fischer's facially-valid probable cause declaration to detain Gardner in jail" until his arraignment and, after Plaintiff's arraignment, he "was held in jail pursuant to a court order requiring bail for release, and was promptly released after the charges were dismissed." County Mot. at 14. County Defendants cite California Code of Civil Procedure § 262.1 and California Penal Code § 847(b) in support of their argument. Plaintiff responds that these statutes only pertain to "peace officers making an arrest," and argue that "Plaintiff's claims are based on McCullough's investigatory actions, not any alleged 'arrest' of Plaintiff by this defendant." Opp. to County at 12.
Under California law, false imprisonment is the "unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another, the interference being absolutely unlawful and without color of legal authority." Novoa v. Cnty. of Ventura, 133 Cal.App.3d 137, 142 (Ct. App. 1982). In relevant part, California Penal Code § 847(b) provides immunity to "any peace officer . . . [for] false imprisonment arising out of any arrest [if] the arrest was lawful, or the peace officer, at the time of the arrest, had reasonable cause to believe the arrest was lawful." Section 262.1 of the California Code of Civil Procedure provides that a "sheriff or other ministerial officer is justified in the execution of, and shall execute, all process and orders regular on their face and issued by competent authority, whatever may be the defect in the proceedings upon which they were issued."
Prior to Plaintiff's arraignment, County Defendants could reasonably rely on the probable cause declaration submitted by Defendant Fischer, which appeared valid on its face. CDRJN, Ex. A. As a jailer is only "liable for false imprisonment if he knew or should have known of the illegality of the imprisonment," County Defendants are entitled to immunity for the time Plaintiff spent in custody until his arraignment. Sullivan v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 12 Cal. 3d 710, 717-18, (1974); see also, Cal. Pen. Code § 847(b) (quoted above). Contrary to Plaintiff's argument, this short-term, pre-arraignment detention did arise from Plaintiff's arrest.
After Plaintiff's arraignment, the Tehama County Superior Court ordered Plaintiff held on $315,000 bail. FAC ¶ 43. Accordingly, as Plaintiff did not make this payment, County Defendants were entitled to execute this court order by continuing to detain Plaintiff. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 262.1.
Plaintiff does not provide any authority for his position that the protections of § 262.1 are limited to "peace officers making an arrest pursuant to process that is regular on its fac[e]." Opp. to County at 12. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has applied § 262.1 to a sheriff executing an order of confinement, finding that immunity applied because the sheriff had no duty to investigate the facts underlying the order of confinement. Clemmons v. City of Long Beach, 283 F. App'x 487, 488 (9th Cir. 2008). In light of the Tehama County Superior Court's order that Plaintiff be detained, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for false imprisonment against the Sheriff or any other County officer with the authority to release Plaintiff.
Although Defendant McCullough certainly had a duty to investigate the facts underlying the order of confinement, Plaintiff has not - and cannot - allege that the deputy sheriff tasked with investigating the underlying charges had the authority to release him. Rather, Defendant McCullough's duty was to turn over compelling exculpatory information to the prosecutor, and the alleged breach of this duty is appropriately raised in Plaintiff's substantive due process claim. For this reason, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for false imprisonment against Defendant McCullough.
Although Defendant County can be held liable pursuant to § 815.2(a) of the California Government Code, on a theory of respondeat superior liability, such a claim must be supported by a valid state law claim against an individual County employee. As Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant McCullough for false imprisonment, he has necessarily also failed to state a claim against Defendant County. Therefore, County Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's twelfth cause of action is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, insofar as the claim is brought against both Defendant County and Defendant McCullough.
III. ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, as to Defendants CHP and Fischer, the Court GRANTS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND State Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's second, fourth, sixth, and seventh causes of action against Defendant CHP; DENIES State Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's tenth and eleventh causes of action against Defendant Fischer; GRANTS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND State Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's twelfth cause of action against Defendant CHP;
As to Defendants Tehama County and McCullough, the Court DENIES County Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's first cause of action insofar as Plaintiff states a substantive due process claim against Defendant McCullough; GRANTS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND County Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's second cause of action against Defendant County; GRANTS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND County Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's third and fourth causes of action against Defendant McCullough and Defendant County; GRANTS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND County Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's fifth and sixth causes of action against Defendant McCullough and Defendant County; GRANTS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND County Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's eighth cause of action against Defendant County; GRANTS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND County Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's ninth cause of action against Defendant McCullough; GRANTS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND County Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's eleventh cause of action against Defendant McCullough; and GRANTS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND County Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's twelfth cause of action against Defendant McCullough and Defendant County.
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint must be filed within twenty (20) days from the date of this Order. Defendants' responsive pleadings are due within twenty (20) days thereafter. If Plaintiff elects not to file a Second Amended Complaint, the case will proceed consistent with this Order:
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 20, 2015
/s/ _________
JOHN A. MENDEZ,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE