Opinion
No. 4-05-00311-CR
Delivered and Filed: February 22, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH.
Appeal from the County Court of Law No. 11, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 877717, Honorable Jo-Ann S. De Hoyos, Judge Presiding. Affirmed.
Sitting: Sarah B. DUNCAN, Justice, Karen ANGELINI, Justice, Sandee Bryan MARION, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Alfredo Garcia was charged with misdemeanor driving while intoxicated. Garcia moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of an alleged illegal arrest. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Garcia and the State then entered into a plea-bargain agreement. Pursuant to that plea-bargain agreement, Garcia was sentenced to six months confinement and a $700.00 fine. His sentence was suspended, and he was placed on community supervision for one year. On appeal, Garcia argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
On February 21, 2004 at about 3:15 a.m., Officer Reeves was dispatched to a one-vehicle accident at Highway Loop 410 and Culebra in San Antonio, Texas. Soon thereafter, Officer Clayton joined him in order to investigate the accident. When Officer Reeves arrived at the scene, he observed a maroon vehicle on the right-hand shoulder of the highway. The vehicle seemed to be inoperable due to the left-front tire being flat. Because the hood of the car was still warm, Officer Reeves determined that the vehicle had been driven recently. There was nobody inside the car. When Officer Reeves came in contact with the witnesses who had called the police, they informed him that the driver of the vehicle was "kind of chunky," wore a white shirt, and was possibly intoxicated. Officer Reeves stayed at the scene of the accident and wrote the accident report, while Officer Clayton left the scene to look for the driver of the maroon vehicle. Officer Clayton found Garcia, who matched the description given by the witnesses, with another person (the passenger of Garcia's car) under the bridge of Highway 410 at Ingram Road, about three quarters of a mile away. Garcia did not deny driving the maroon vehicle. Officer Clayton transported Garcia and the other person to the location of the accident. Officer Reeves testified that although Garcia had not been read his Miranda rights, at that point, Garcia was not free to leave. Thereafter, for safety purposes, the officers and Garcia moved to a parking lot which was about fifty yards away from the accident. Garcia told the officers that he was the driver of the vehicle, that the car belonged to his mother, and that he was coming back from a local bar when the accident occurred. According to Officer Reeves, he and Garcia had "a long talk." The officers performed field sobriety tests on Garcia, which indicated that Garcia was under the influence of alcohol. Officer Reeves confirmed that he was the one to arrest Garcia for driving while intoxicated. The encounter between the officers and Garcia was recorded on videotape and shown during the suppression hearing.Standard of Review
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated standard of review, giving almost total deference to a trial court's determination of historical facts and reviewing de novo the court's application of the law. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 88-89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). When, as here, the trial court does not make explicit findings of historical fact, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327-28.Discussion
Garcia argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because "all evidence resulted from an improper arrest." Garcia frames the issue as follows:whether there is an exception to the warrant requirement, when a person can be arrested for a misdemeanor offense, without a warrant, when a police officer did not witness the person driving, and merely relied on hearsay offered by a witness, that someone matching the description of defendant was the driver of the automobile involved in the accident, therefore giving the officer probable cause that the defendant committed the offense of driving while intoxicated.The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized the following three categories of interaction between police officers and citizens: (1) encounters, (2) investigative detentions, and (3) arrests. State v. Perez, 85 S.W.3d 817, 819 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). In an encounter police are not required to possess any particular level of suspicion because citizens are under no compulsion to remain. Francis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). Thus, police officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking that individual if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions. Id. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has expressly recognized that police officers do much more than enforce the law, conduct investigations, and gather evidence to be used in criminal proceedings. Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148, 151 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). Part of their job is to investigate accidents (where there is often no claim of criminal liability), to direct traffic and to perform other duties that can be best described as community caretaking functions. Id. "As part of an officer's duty to serve and protect, a police officer may stop and assist an individual whom a reasonable person — given the totality of the circumstances — would believe is in need of help." Id. Such a community caretaking function is an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Id. In contrast, an investigative detention is a seizure under which the citizen is not free to leave, at least for some period of time. Francis, 922 S.W.2d at 178. In an investigative detention, the officer must have specific articulable facts that, in light of his experience and personal knowledge, together with inference from those facts, would reasonably warrant the intrusion on the freedom of the citizen stopped. Id. There must be a reasonable suspicion by the officer that some unusual activity is or has occurred, that the detained person is connected with the activity, and that the unusual activity is related to the commission of a crime. Id. Here, Officer Clayton initially contacted Garcia not because of an investigative detention but because of his duty to assist and investigate accidents. In assisting and investigating an accident, he was informed by witnesses that Garcia was possibly driving while intoxicated. Finding Garcia under the highway bridge at 3:30 a.m., coupled with information from those witnesses and his personal observations, gave Officer Clayton the authority to temporarily detain Garcia in order to investigate possible criminal activity. Upon transportation of Garcia to the accident scene, the officers continued their investigation by questioning Garcia. After Officer Reeves conducted field sobriety tests, he determined that Garcia was under the influence of alcohol. At that point, Officer Reeves had probable cause to arrest Garcia for driving while intoxicated without an arrest warrant. See Francis, 922 S.W.2d at 178 (explaining that what may begin as a consensual encounter can readily become an investigative detention, which may evolve into an arrest). Garcia argues that an officer must personally witness facts giving rise to criminal activity before arresting a person without a warrant. However, the factual basis for stopping a vehicle or questioning a suspect need not arise from the officer's personal observation, but may be supplied by information acquired from other persons. Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255, 258-59 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). "To require officers who are apprised of detailed facts from citizen-eyewitnesses to observe suspects and wait until additional suspicious acts are committed, would be foolish and contrary to the balance of interests struck in Terry and its progeny." Id. at 259. Here, the witnesses who observed the accident informed the officers that given the driver's actions, they believed him to be under the influence and gave the officers a rather detailed description of the driver's appearance. Along with the information supplied by the witnesses, considering that the accident occurred around 3:00 a.m. and that the driver had been involved in one-car accident, the officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative detention. Next, Garcia contends that because Officer Clayton failed to obtain Garcia's consent, Officer Clayton wrongfully transported him from the location where he was found back to the scene of the accident. However, Garcia did not include this argument in his motion to suppress; as such we cannot consider it on appeal. See Tex.R.App.P. 33.1(a). Moreover, even if Garcia had preserved this issue for appeal, as explained, Officer Clayton had reasonable suspicion to temporarily detain Garcia in order to investigate whether Garcia was intoxicated. Even though Garcia was not arrested for public intoxication, he further argues that the officers did not have the authority to arrest him for public intoxication because "the officer did not witness [Garcia] committing any criminal offense." Garcia's argument is meritless. He was not arrested for public intoxication. He was arrested for driving while intoxicated. Next, Garcia points out that he made incriminating statements to the police while in custody without first being given the Miranda warnings. A DWI investigation that includes questioning and field-sobriety tests does not, without more, rise to the level of a custodial interrogation. State v. Stevenson, 958 S.W.2d 824, 828-29 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440-41 (1984). Safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442. Determinations of custody are made on a case-by-case basis, considering all the objective circumstances. Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 255 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). A person is in custody only if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that his freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with formal arrest. Id. at 254. A routine traffic stop is a seizure, but it does not by itself give rise to custody for Miranda purposes. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440. A traffic stop is similar to an investigative detention or " Terry" stop. Id. at 439. This is because a traffic stop is public in nature and also is presumptively temporary and brief. Id. However, a traffic stop may escalate into a custodial interrogation depending on subsequent events. Id. Here, as discussed above, Garcia made statements and was subjected to field sobriety tests when he was not under arrest, but was under investigative detention. Reviewing the record, it does not appear that Garcia's detention escalated to a custodial interrogation which would require Miranda warnings, but was more akin to a traffic stop. As such, Garcia was free to refuse to answer the officers' questions and the officers were not required to read Garcia the Miranda warnings. The seizure of Garcia did not evolve from an investigative detention into an arrest until after Garcia failed the field sobriety tests, thus providing Officer Reeves with probable cause to arrest Garcia.