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noting that it "is well established . . . that the court has wide discretion in granting extensions to litigants"
Summary of this case from Oji v. Soc. Sec. Admin.Opinion
01 Civ. 797 (RCC) (MHD)
February 25, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se plaintiff Joseph Garcia, by letter-motion dated February 1, 2002, seeks a default judgment against the defendants in this action, alleging that they failed to respond to the Complaint by the court-imposed deadline of January 26, 2002. Magistrate Judge Dolinger, who is supervising pre-trial proceedings in this matter, issued a Report and Recommendation dated February 6, 2002 (the "Report"), recommending that the motion be denied. For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees and adopts the Report in its entirety.
I. BACKGROUND
Judge Dolinger granted two extensions of the defendants' time to submit an answer in this case. First, by endorsed order dated October 29, 2001, Judge Dolinger extended the deadline three months until January 26, 2002. Because that date was a Saturday, Judge Dolinger calculated the actual due date to be the following Monday, January 28, 2002. On January 29, 2002, counsel for the defendants requested a short extension nunc pro tunc, citing computer failures and a family emergency as the justification for the additional time. Judge Dolinger granted the request and directed the defendants to respond to the Complaint by January 31, 2002. The defendants complied with the deadline by filing a summary judgment motion. See generally Report at 1.
II. DISCUSSION
Given the additional extension, Magistrate Judge Dolinger determined that the defendants were not in default and therefore recommended that plaintiffs motion be denied. Id. at 2. Plaintiff disagrees with Judge Dolinger's recommendation and has submitted timely objections to the Report by letter dated February 12, 2002 ("Objections"). This Court is therefore required to "make a de novo determination upon the record, or after additional evidence, of any portion of the magistrate judge's disposition to which specific written objection has been made. . . ." Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). The Court ten may "accept, reject, or modify the recommended decision, receive further evidence, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions." Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(c).
After undertaking a de novo review of the record, this Court finds that the default judgment properly was denied because Judge Dolinger extended defendants' time to answer until January 31, 2002. Plaintiff argues that the extension was unwarranted because the defendants already had ample time to file their response, or, alternatively, had the opportunity to request a further extension prior to the due date. Objections ¶ 3. It is well established, however, that the court has wide discretion in granting extensions to litigants, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b), and it is clear from the record that the extensions were granted for good cause. Plaintiff filed a lengthy Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and named over seventy (70) persons as defendants. The State of New York requested the first extension in order to (i) investigate the facts alleged in the Complaint; (ii) obtain the necessary documents to permit representation of all defendants; and (iii) prepare a consolidated response. See Letter to the Court from Bruno v. Gioffre, Jr. dated October 26, 2001. Moreover, many of the named defendants had not yet been served at that time. Id. The second extension was necessitated by computer failures and a family emergency. See Letter to the Court from Valerie Singleton dated January 29, 2002. Magistrate Judge Dolinger was well within his discretion to extend the deadline briefly on that basis.
Although the defendants arguably should have requested additional time prior to the expiration of the first extension, there is no indication that the lapse was willful or malicious, nor is plaintiff prejudiced by the short delay. A default judgment is a "weapon of last, rather than first, resort," and this case does not warrant that "extreme" sanction.Meehan v. Snow, 652 F.2d 274, 277 (2d. Cir. 1981) (per curium); See also Sony Corp. v. Elm State Elecs., Inc., 800 F.2d 317, 319 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that courts regularly exercise their discretion to deny motions for default even where technically valid).
III. CONCLUSION
The Report is therefore adopted in its entirety and plaintiffs motion for a default judgment is hereby DENIED.