Opinion
C/A No. 9:18-1590-TMC-BM
08-31-2018
Eduardo Garcia, Plaintiff, v. Colleton County Jail, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a civil action filed by the Plaintiff, Eduardo Garcia, pro se, and is before the Court for pre-service review. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); In re Prison Litigation Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir.1997)[pleadings by non-prisoners should also be screened]. Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se complaint herein pursuant to the procedural provisions of § 1915, and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir.1995) (en banc); and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983).
Section 1915 permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without paying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. However, to protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action "is frivolous or malicious," "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A finding of frivolousness can be made where the complaint "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. at 31. Hence, under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319. Further, while this Court is also required to liberally construe pro se documents, holding them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990). Such is the case here.
Background
In a letter, which has been filed as the Complaint in this action, Plaintiff alleges that he was sentenced in November 2017 to a one-year term of imprisonment in the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) for violating his probation. He claims that Defendant released him from custody the day after his sentencing instead of sending him to SCDC. Plaintiff contends that he suffered post-traumatic stress because Defendant failed to comply with the court's order which caused him to relapse and abuse drugs and thereafter he was accused of committing more crimes. Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 1-2. In the "facts" section of his letter, Plaintiff claims that on March 5, 2018, Detective King signed Plaintiff out of Colleton County Jail for questioning, put Plaintiff in the front passenger seat of his unmarked government SUV with Plaintiff's hands and feet still shackled together, failed to secure Plaintiff with a seat belt, backed up at a high rate of speed, and slammed into another unmarked government SUV. Plaintiff asserts that in the following days he requested (via the CCDC kiosk) medical attention because of his injuries from the accident and a correctional officer acknowledged that Plaintiff was in an accident with King, but Defendant failed to give him any medical attention and instead sent him to prison on March 15, 2018 to serve his November 2017 sentence.
Detective King has not been named a defendant to this action.
Records from Colleton County indicate that Plaintiff pled guilty on August 1, 2017 to possession of less than one gram of methamphetamine or cocaine base (indictment number 2017GS1500757) and was sentenced to three years, suspended to one year of probation with credit for 30-days time served, and that on December 1, 2017 a Form 9 Order (which appears to be a probation revocation form) was issued. On November 16, 2017, Plaintiff pled guilty to a charge of unlawfully carrying a pistol and was sentenced to time concurrent to the drug possession case. See Colleton County Fourteenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Colleton/PublicIndex/CaseDetails.aspx?County=15&CourtAgency=15001&Casenum=2017A1510100409&CaseType=C&HKey=1161197275100788610373107746810111683808711412211687112688012198104528583987065110701091158148785111852; https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Colleton/PublicIndex/CaseDetails.aspx?County=15&CourtAgency=15001&Casenum=2017A1520300397&CaseType=C&HKey=804352431227656525598111495487103119101121511141047912152116811129855102495350117103878252971115249119 (last visited Aug. 31, 2018).
Collecton County records also indicate that Plaintiff was arrested in March 2018 on his pending charges of receiving stolen goods, value more than $2,000 but less than $10,000; burglary- 2nd degree; burglary -1st degree; armed robbery; burglary/safecracking; and unlawful carrying of a pistol. See Colleton County Fourteenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Colleton/PublicIndex/CaseDetails.aspx?County=15&CourtAgency=15001&Casenum=2018A1510100040&CaseType=C&HKey=1219711681668610880746778118535311868787469836956758488577056475579113844889785311584518910285; https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Colleton/PublicIndex/CaseDetails.aspx?County=15&CourtAgency=15001&Casenum=2018A1510100042&CaseType=C&HKey=551165376675273849011751781228984535010011080798265577284888966651018411580658312111954109568448; https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Colleton/PublicIndex/CaseDetails.aspx?County=15&CourtAgency=15001&Casenum=2018A1510100044&CaseType=C&HKey=73981141187753104556890112112118100695182113755411552725784851011027288122881047651475184122122111104119; https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Colleton/PublicIndex/CaseDetails.aspx?County=15&CourtAgency=15001&Casenum=2018A1510100045&CaseType=C&HKey=12082431227410051818411052708011212253745174985357438311548116116104118861046856835080791195184117115; https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Colleton/PublicIndex/CaseDetails.aspx?County=15&CourtAgency=15001&Casenum=2018A1510100046&CaseType=C&HKey=1001171051051045110710054811115781104122729811588874889778571798269116117861011151226897109116698510110773; https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Colleton/PublicIndex/CaseDetails.aspx?County=15&CourtAgency=15001&Casenum=2018A1510100118&CaseType=C&HKey=7610078886575791171227479541041005176111491078710553855511947735510870501071151071145411143991206786111(last visited Aug. 31, 2018).
Discussion
The Complaint filed in this case is subject to summary dismissal without service of process because it fails to state a claim which this Court may consider under its federal question jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or its diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Plaintiff appears to have filed this action pursuant to § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States," Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012); and to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Defendant Colleton County Jail (or Colleton County Detention Center) is subject to to dismissal because it is not a person subject to suit under § 1983. Courts have routinely held that an inanimate object such as a building, facility, and grounds does not act under color of state law, and is not a "person" subject to suit under § 1983. See Allison v. California Adult Auth., 419 F.2d 822, 823 (9th Cir. 1969)[California Adult Authority and San Quentin Prison not "person[s]" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983]; Nelson v. Lexington Cnty. Det. Ctr., C/A No. 8:10-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at *1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) [Finding that a detention center, as a building and not a person, was not amenable to suit under § 1983]; Preval v. Reno, 57 F. Supp. 2d 307, 310 (E.D. Va. 1999)["[T]he Piedmont Regional Jail is not a 'person,' and therefore not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."]; Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail, 722 F. Supp. 1294, 1301(E.D.N.C. 1989)["Claims under § 1983 are directed at 'persons' and the jail is not a person amenable to suit."].
Additionally, Plaintiff's claims that Colleton County Jail violated some unspecified duty by not putting him in the custody of SCDC fails to state a claim. Plaintiff fails to assert any plausible claim that Defendant violated any of his federal rights or a federal law by failing to do so. To the extent that Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's actions or inactions constituted negligence, such claims are not actionable under § 1983. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 345-48 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328-36 & n. 3 (1986).
This action is also subject to summary dismissal because Plaintiff fails to assert a cognizable request for relief. Were this Court to find that Plaintiff's rights have been violated, but order no remedy, it would, in effect, be rendering an advisory opinion; such action is barred by Article III of the Constitution. Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975); see also Bowler v. Young, 55 F. App'x 187, 188 (4th Cir. 2003); Norvell v. Sangre de Cristo Dev. Co., 519 F.2d 370, 375 (10th Cir. 1975) [federal courts do not render advisory opinions].
To the extent that Plaintiff is requesting release from prison (he states that he wants to go home), Plaintiff can not obtain such relief in this § 1983 action as such relief may only be obtained in a habeas action. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)[complaint or petition challenging the fact or duration of confinement should be construed and processed as a habeas corpus petition, while a complaint or petition challenging the conditions of confinement should be construed and processed as a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983]. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Fourth Court reiterated that release from prison is not a remedy available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Heck, 512 U.S. at 481 [stating that "habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983"].
Plaintiff may be requesting that this Court intervene in his pending criminal cases in Colleton County. However, absent extraordinary circumstances, federal courts are not authorized to interfere with a State's pending criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 50-53 (4th Cir. 1989). In Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that federal district courts should abstain from constitutional challenges to state judicial proceedings, no matter how meritorious, if the federal claims have been or could be presented in an ongoing state judicial proceeding. Id. at 52. Here, Plaintiff is not foreclosed from raising issues concerning his ongoing state criminal prosecution by a state court judge. Moreover, the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, expressly prohibits this court from enjoining such proceedings. See Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1331, 1336 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc)["Congress and the federal judiciary have consistently recognized that federal courts should permit state courts to try state cases, and that, where constitutional issues arise, state court judges are fully competent to handle them subject to Supreme Court review."]; cf. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983)[federal courts cannot review state court proceeding in appellate sense]; Gurley v. Superior Court of Mecklenburg Cty., 411 F.2d 586, 587-88 & nn.2-4 (4th Cir. 1969)[federal courts may not issue writs of mandamus against state courts]. Thus, this action should also be dismissed because this Court should not intervene in Plaintiff's pending criminal proceedings.
As noted above, Plaintiff may be attempting to assert a state law claim for negligence. As Plaintiff fails to state any federal claim, only Plaintiff's state law claim(s) would remain, and federal courts are allowed to hear and decide state-law claims only in conjunction with federal-law claims, through the exercise of "supplemental jurisdiction." See 28 U.S.C. §1367; Wisconsin Dep't of Corrs. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 387 (1998). Of course, a district court may have jurisdiction of a civil action "where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000...and is between-(1) citizens of different States...". 28 U.S.C. § 1332. In order to maintain an action based upon diversity jurisdiction, complete diversity between the plaintiffs and defendants must exist at the time the complaint is filed. Martinez v. Duke Energy Corp., 130 F. App'x 629, 634 (4th Cir. 2005). However, Plaintiff has not alleged complete diversity of the parties or an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000. See Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-374 (1978) [Complete diversity of parties means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same State as any party on the other side]. Therefore, as Plaintiff has asserted no valid federal claim and there is no diversity jurisdiction, this Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; see also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Tigrett v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 290 F.3d 620, 626 (4th Cir. 2002) [affirming district court's dismissal of state law claims when no federal claims remained in the case]. Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 1999) ["[T]he Constitution does not contemplate the federal judiciary deciding issues of state law among non-diverse litigants"].
Notably, because at least some of Plaintiff's pleading deficiencies could possibly be corrected by amendment, see, e.g., Brockington v. South Carolina Dept. of Social Service, No. 17-1028, 2017 WL 1531633 (4th Cir. April 28, 2017) [Noting that pro se Plaintiff should be provided an opportunity to amend his complaint to cure defects prior to a dismissal]; Evans v. Richardson, No. 17-1144, 2017 WL 2294447 (4th Cir. May 25, 2017) [same]; Breyan v. All Medical Staff, No. 17-6186, 2017 WL 2365232 (4th Cir. May 31, 2017) [same], Plaintiff was given an opportunity to file an amended complaint. In an order dated August 6, 2018, Plaintiff was specifically warned that the Defendant is not a person subject to suit under § 1983, the Complaint failed to give the Defendant adequate notice of any claim against it, and that Plaintiff has failed to make a request for relief. He was directed to file any amended complaint within twenty-one (21) days, and was specifically warned that if he failed to file an amended complaint, a recommendation for dismissal would be entered. Order, ECF No. 7. However, Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint or otherwise responded.
Finally, it should be noted that Plaintiff has failed to bring his case into proper form. In the order dated August 6, 2018, Plaintiff was given an opportunity to pay the filing fee or submit an Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Affidavit (Form AO 240) and to provide the necessary information and paperwork, to include forms necessary to effect service, to bring the case into proper form for evaluation and possible service of process. ECF No. 6. Plaintiff failed to provide the necessary documents or to otherwise respond. Plaintiff was specifically warned that failure to provide the necessary information within the timetable set forth in the Order would subject the case to dismissal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41. Thus, in the alternative, it is recommended that this action be dismissed, without prejudice, in accordance with Rule 41, Fed.R.Civ.P. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962); Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93, 95-96 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom, Ballard v. Volunteers of America, 493 U.S. 1084 (1990) [holding that district court's dismissal following an explicit and reasonable warning was not an abuse of discretion].
Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
/s/_________
Bristow Merchant
United States Magistrate Judge August 31, 2018
Charleston, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).