Opinion
CV 00-1468-AS
October 17, 2001
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
This action is before the court on defendant's motion (#54) to compel arbitration of plaintiffs' Title VII and O.R.S. 659.030 retaliation claims. Controlling precedent prohibits mandatory arbitration of these claims. Accordingly, defendant's motion (#54) should be DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Five former officers of defendant Chrome Data Corporation ("Chrome"), an Oregon company providing automotive data and software for selling vehicles on-line, originally brought this action against Chrome, Robert Navarre, the Chief Executive Officer of Chrome, and James Adkisson, Chrome's President and a member of the Board of Directors. Plaintiffs have withdrawn all claims except for their claims that Chrome is liable for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. ("Title VII"), and for violation of the parallel state claim, O.R.S. 659.030. Chrome now moves to arbitrate these claims, arguing that both are arbitrable under Circuit City v. Adams, 121 S.Ct. 1302 (2001). Plaintiffs dispute the arbitrability of these claims, and further argue that if this court holds that the state claim is arbitrable, the arbitration should be stayed pending resolution of the Title VII claim.
DISCUSSION
The issue can be framed as follows: whether the Supreme Court's opinion in Circuit City overruled the Ninth Circuit opinion in Duffield v. Robertson Stephens, 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998). Defendant argues that both of plaintiffs' claims are arbitrable under Circuit City, because the Supreme Court opinion essentially overruled Duffield. Plaintiffs argue that their claims are not arbitrable under Circuit City, because Duffield is still good law and, thus, future Title VII claims, and parallel state claims, are prohibited from mandatory arbitration.
In Duffield, the Ninth Circuit held that employees may not be required, as a condition of employment, to waive their right to bring future Title VII claims in court. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1190. The Duffield court further noted that the parallel state claims should be arbitrable to the same extent as Title VII claims. Id. at 1187, fn. 3. In Circuit City, the Supreme Court held that the terms of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") exempt only employment contracts of transportation workers from the Act's coverage, overruling Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999). The court ordered arbitration of the plaintiff's state claims. Two judges in this district have held that Circuit City did not overrule Duffield. See Melton v. Philip Morris, 01-93-KI (August 9, 2001) (currently stayed pending appeal of the opinion and order); LeLouis v. Western Directory, et al., 00-1719-JE (August 10, 2001).
I agree that Circuit City did not overrule Duffield. Circuit City reinforced the "liberal policy favoring arbitration agreements," but did not directly address Duffield. As noted by Judge King in Melton, a particular statute may either preclude or limit the enforcement of arbitration agreements with regard to claims arising under that statute. Kummetz v. Tech Mold, Inc., 152 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 1998). Circuit City considered the narrow issue of whether Section 1 of the FAA exempts only transportation workers from that statute. The court did not specifically consider, or address, whether a Title VII claim, or a parallel state claim, in the employment context should be arbitrated.
Duffield's holding that Title VII is unique and that the legislative history demonstrates Congress' intent that future Title VII claims should receive the attention of the courts is not incompatible with Circuit City. While Duffield may later be overruled or abandoned, because the Supreme Court did not address Duffield either directly or indirectly, Duffield should be considered controlling precedent over this court. Borg-Warner v. EEOC, 245 F.3d 831, 835 (D.C. Cir. 10-17-2001).
Defendant seeks to compel arbitration of plaintiffs' Title VII claim according to the arbitration agreement between the parties to resolve all disputes arising in connection with their employment with, or termination from, Chrome. Duffield is clear that employees may not be required to waive their right to bring future Title VII claims in court. Accordingly, plaintiffs cannot be required to submit their Title VII claim to arbitration.
O.R.S. 659.030 is patterned after Title VII, and generally resolution of a claim pursuant to this Oregon statute is identical to the resolution of it's Title VII counterpart. See Heller v. Ebb Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1437 fn. 2 (9th Cir. 1993). Moreover, because parallel state anti-discrimination laws are explicitly made part of Title VII's enforcement scheme, the state claim should be arbitrable to the same extent as the Title VII claims. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1187, fn. 3. Accordingly, arbitration of plaintiff's claim pursuant to O.R.S. 659.030 is inappropriate.
The argument advanced by Chrome that Circuit City impliedly overruled Duffield to the extent that Duffield prohibits mandatory arbitration of state claims that are parallel to Title VII is not without merit. However, any questions I might entertain regarding the merits of this argument are outweighed by a desire for uniformity, and I accordingly adhere to Judge King's holding in Melton.
CONCLUSION
Circuit City did not overrule Duffield. Applying Duffield to the facts of this case, arbitration of plaintiffs' Title VII claim is inappropriate. Accordingly, arbitration of plaintiffs' state claim is similarly inappropriate. Defendant's motion to compel (#54) should be DENIED.