Opinion
No. 72-295
Decided August 14, 1973.
Assessing driver 12 penalty points for his conviction for failing to report an accident, department of revenue suspended his driver's license. In action to review, district court affirmed the suspension, and driver appealed.
Affirmed
1. AUTOMOBILES — Report Accident — Violation — Included — "Leaving Scene of Accident" — Penalty Points Assessment. A violation of statutory provision relative to a driver's duty to report an accident is included within the meaning of the term "leaving scene of accident" as that term is used in statutory provision determining number of penalty points which are to be assessed against driver for various motor vehicle violations.
Appeal from the District Court of Mesa County, Honorable William M. Ela, Judge.
Nelson, Hoskin, Groves Prinster, P.C., John W. Groves, for plaintiff-appellant.
John P. Moore, Attorney General, John E. Bush, Deputy, James K. Tarpey, Assistant, for defendant-appellee.
Division II.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court affirming an order of the State Department of Revenue which suspended the driver's license of Dorman Gammon under the authority of C.R.S. 1963, 13-4-23. The basis of the license suspension was Gammon's conviction for failing to report an accident in accordance with 1965 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 13-5-22. As a result of this violation, the Department of Revenue after a hearing, assessed 12 penalty points against Gammon's license, which under the law resulted in the suspension of his license. Gammon appeals contending that the Department lacked authority to assess 12 penalty points for violation of this particular section of the statute. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
I.
C.R.S. 1963, 13-4-23, sets forth a "Point System Schedule" to be used in determining whether or not a license shall be suspended and that section of the statute lists "Leaving scene of accident" as a 12-point violation. The question raised here is: Is the violation of the "duty to report accidents" section of the Motor Vehicle Statute encompassed within the meaning of "Leaving scene of accident"?
The text of 1965 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 13-5-22, under which Gammon was convicted is as follows:
"13-5-22. Duty to report accidents. — (1) The driver of a vehicle involved in a traffic accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or any property damage shall after fulfilling the requirements of section 13-5-18 and 13-5-19 (1), give immediate notice of the location of such accident and such other information as is specified in section 13-5-19(2) to the nearest office of the duly authorized police authority and, if so directed by the police authority, shall forthwith and without delay return to and remain at the scene of the accident until said police have arrived at the scene and completed their investigation thereat."
Placing this section of the statute in the context of the entire Chapter 13, Article 5 of C.R.S. 1963, we note that Sections 13-5-17 through 13-5-22 all list specific duties placed upon a party involved in an automobile accident before he can finally leave the scene of an accident. While Section 13-5-22(1) initially grants authority to a driver to leave the scene of an accident (assuming he has complied with the provisions of Sections 13-5-18 and 13-5-19(1), he must immediately report the accident to a proper authority and must receive specific permission from that authority before he is excused from any further presence at the scene of the accident.
[1] Our review of all the sections of the statute regarding duties to be performed by drivers involved in an accident convinces us that the legislature intended that a violation of 1965 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 13-5-22, be included within the meaning of the term "Leaving scene of accident" as used in C.R.S. 1963, 13-4-23 (5) (a). We agree with the conclusion of the trial court on this issue when it stated:
"The case turns upon legislative intent expressed in the motor vehicle regulation Statutes. The overriding intent in the pertinent sections is to require that no accident on the highways occur without law enforcement and the Department of Revenue having notice of the parties involved, so that the public and private remedial rights may be enforced."
II.
Gammon further contends that, while Sections 13-5-17 through 13-5-21 may come within the meaning of Section 13-4-23 (5)(a), it was obviously not intended that Section 13-5-22(1) should be included since it was amended after the enactment of Section 13-4-23(5)(a). We find no merit in this contention.
Judgment affirmed.
JUDGE ENOCH and JUDGE SMITH concur.