Opinion
No. CV00-0162660S
July 12, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiff instituted this action seeking damages against her former employer and its employee for defamation. The case was tried to the court. Pursuant to the agreement of the parties, evidence regarding issues of liability and damages was taken during a single trial, but the issues were bifurcated. By memorandum of decision dated August 9, 2006, the court found that the evidence clearly established that the plaintiff was falsely accused of theft and that the defendants made and published the false statement with actual malice. The parties submitted briefs on the issue of damages. Oral argument took place on March 22, 2007.
The plaintiff seeks an award of general damages, special damages and punitive damages based on the evidence. Based on the same evidence, the defendants urge the court to award nominal damages only. The court addresses each category of damages separately.
GENERAL DAMAGES
The defendants stated that the plaintiff was fired because she stole property that belonged to the corporate defendant. Theft is a crime involving moral turpitude. "Moral turpitude involves an act of inherent baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which man does to his fellow man or to society in general, contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty between man and law." (Citations omitted.) Lega Siciliana Social Club, Inc. v. St. Germaine, 77 Conn.App. 846, 853, 825 A.2d 827 (2003). This was defamation per se. "When the defamatory words are actionable per se, the law conclusively presumes the existence of injury to the plaintiff's reputation. He is required neither to plead nor to prove it . . . The individual plaintiff is entitled to recover, as general damages, for the injury to his reputation and for the humiliation and mental suffering which the [defamation] caused [her]." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted.) Devito v. Schwartz, 66 Conn.App. 228, 234-35, 784 A.2d 376 (2001).
The defendants, however, suggest that the plaintiff has suffered merely a technical legal injury and has not offered any evidence that she suffered any injuries. They state that there is a "dearth of any direct evidence that plaintiff's professional reputation had been compromised as a result from any defamatory statement" and that she "failed to present any evidence that she had been denied prospective employment as a result of the defamatory statement or that she suffered professionally in any way."
The plaintiff was accused of the crime of theft and fired. The accusation was false. Those facts alone, without more, are sufficient to support an award of general damages because injury is presumed. There was additional evidence, however, to support an award of general compensatory damages. The fact of the plaintiff's discharge and the reason for it became known in the community. Other employees at the Waterbury Extended Care Facility knew the reason she was fired. The plaintiff became aware of the fact that other people in town knew about it and discussed it. The plaintiff's daughter learned about it from a friend. The plaintiff's credible testimony and that of her family established that she suffered extreme humiliation, shame, and embarrassment as a result of the defendants' false accusation and action. She stated that, at first, she did not want to live. She could not bring herself to speak with anyone about it. She was depressed. A plaintiff who has suffered such humiliation, shame and embarrassment is "entitled to recover, as general damages, for the injury to [her] reputation and for the humiliation and mental suffering which the [defamation] caused [her]." Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 234 Conn. 1, 35, 662 A.2d 89 (1995).
SPECIAL DAMAGES
The plaintiff seeks special damages in the amount of $ 13,314 plus interest which sum represents the loss of salary from May 25, 2000 to February 28, 2001 offset by her collection of 26 weeks of $ 411 in unemployment compensation benefits. The defendants do not dispute the calculation but suggest that the plaintiff was not as diligent as she might have been in pursuing new employment. The plaintiff's testimony that she was very depressed because of the false accusation and could not immediately look for another job was credible.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Having established that there was actual malice on the part of the defendants, the plaintiff seeks an award of punitive damages. Our appellate courts have held that "punitive damages are appropriate in a defamation action where the court has found that the defendant acted with actual malice when publishing the defamatory material." Lyons v. Nichols, 63 Conn.App. 761, 769, 778 A.2d 246 (2001); Triangle Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Silver, 154 Conn. 116, 127, 222 A.2d 220 (1966); Proto v. Bridgeport Herald Corp., 136 Conn. 557, 571, 72 A.2d 820 (1950).
The defendant argues that no punitive damages should be award and, if such damages are awarded, such an award should be restricted to the costs for the trial before this court. The defendant contends that the attorneys fees for the prior proceedings (first trial and the appeal resulting in these proceedings) should be considered, if at all, as special damages. Defendant argues that the fees for the prior proceedings should not be awarded as special damages inasmuch as they were not introduced into evidence. The plaintiff counters that all of the fees were necessarily incurred in finally achieving the resolution by way of this court's judgment. In addition, the plaintiff points out that the defendants agreed that all the fees are reasonable.
It is true that our Supreme Court has held that "[i]f awarded, [punitive damages] are restricted to cost of litigation less taxable costs of the action being tried and not that of any former trial . . ." (Citations omitted.) Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald Co., 275 Conn. 72, 93, 881 A.2d 139 (2005). The court also noted that "[l]imiting punitive damages to litigation expenses, including attorneys fees, fulfills the salutary purpose of fully compensating a victim for the harm inflicted on him . . ." (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 92-93, quoting Label Systems Corp. v. Ahgamohammadi, 270 Conn. 291, 335, 852 A.2d 703 (2004). The dual purpose of punishing the wrongful and compensating the victim has long been recognized by Connecticut courts. "Although it is said [punitive damages] are not nominally compensatory, the fact and effect has been declared to be the contrary. Consequently, following such a concept, it was held that such damages may not exceed the amount of the expenses of litigation in the suit, less taxable costs." (Internal citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 488, 234 A.2d 825 (1967). Punitive damages "thus serve a function that is both compensatory and punitive." Bodner v. United Services Automobile Ass'n., 222 Conn. 480, 492, 610 A.2d 1212 (1992). "[C]ommon law punitive damages serve primarily to compensate the plaintiff for his injuries . . . We [recognize], moreover, that our rule, when viewed in the light of the increasing costs of litigation, also serves to punish and deter wrongful conduct . . . In recent years, we have continued to adhere to the view that our traditional rule remains viable . . ." (Internal citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786, 827, 614 A.2d 414 (1992). In Vandersluis v. Weil, 176 Conn. 353, 359, 407 A.2d 982 (1978), the Supreme Court stated that "[a]ny cost of litigation in a former trial less taxable costs would be compensatory damages suffered by a plaintiff by reason of the former suit."
If the court accepts the defendant's argument, the plaintiff would not be fully compensated for the harm inflicted on her.
Moreover, although this case has involved two trials and an appeal, the fact is that only one case is involved. Vandersluis was an action for vexatious litigation. The Supreme Court held that any litigation costs incurred in a former trial (the one resulting in this vexatious litigation lawsuit) were compensatory but not punitive damages. In Zitkov v. Zaleski, 102 Conn. 439, 444, 128 A. 779 (1925), an action for malicious prosecution, the court distinguished between the sixty-five dollars the plaintiff had paid in defending against the criminal accusation and the attorneys fees for the malicious prosecution, the latter allowed as punitive damages. Unlike the cases cited, the case before the court does not involve attorneys fees for an earlier case giving rise to this cause of action. All attorneys fees were incurred in a single action. Accordingly, the court finds that the punitive damages requested by the plaintiff properly include the attorneys fees for all proceedings in this case.
In the present case, the plaintiff submitted the affidavit of her attorney in which he set forth the amounts charged to the plaintiff to represent her in the first trial, the appeal, and the trial before this court. The total legal fees incurred by the plaintiff during six years of litigation are $ 111,167.
CONCLUSION
The court awards the following damages:
General Damages: $100,000.00
Special Damages: 13,314.00
Punitive Damages: 111,167.00
Total Damages: $224,481.00
Plus Costs of $3,176.00