Opinion
Civil No. 1:18-CV-00661
01-17-2019
GAIL J. GALLOWAY, Plaintiff, v. KATHLEEN KANE, et al., Defendants.
(Chief Judge Conner)
( ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Gail Galloway, a pro se plaintiff, brought this action against the defendants—former Pennsylvania Attorney General Kathleen Kane, the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General ("OAG"), and Agents Mark Sinisi and Albert Adams—alleging violations of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO" Act), 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et. seq. Galloway alleges that he was wrongfully arrested and subjected to criminal prosecution based on false information given by a confidential informant ("CI") to agents of the Huntingdon County Drug Task Force. He contends that this information, which the agents allegedly knew was false, was used to secure an arrest warrant for him and charge him with drug trafficking crimes. Galloway further alleges that this incident was part of a larger conspiracy perpetrated by the agents of the Task Force and the OAG to arrest innocent people and charge them as drug dealers.
While there are several other named defendants, those defendants have not yet accepted service of process as of the date of this Report and Recommendation and are not represented by counsel filing the instant motion to dismiss.
The defendants now move to dismiss Galloway's complaint. (Doc. 17). The motion is fully briefed and ripe for resolution. For the following reasons, we recommend that the defendants' motion be granted in part, dismissing Galloway's RICO claims, but denied with respect to Galloway's false arrest and malicious prosecution claims.
II. BACKGROUND
The background of the instant case is taken from the facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint, which this court must accept as true when deciding a motion to dismiss.
Mr. Galloway owned and operated a business known as Big Chief Enterprises in Alexandria, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1, ¶ 1). As part of his business, he had hired a woman named Deidra Endres for part-time work. (Id., ¶ 2). Galloway alleges that on November 10, 2014, he received a call from Chelsea Mease, a confidential informant for the Huntingdon County Drug Task Force, who had called looking for Endres. (Id., ¶ 7). When Galloway and Endres arrived at the shop that afternoon, Mease was waiting for them in her car, accompanied by an unknown man. (Id.) Mease asked to speak with Endres, and the two went into a camper that was parked inside the shop to talk. (Id., ¶ 8). After Mease left his shop, she allegedly informed agents of the Task Force that she had purchased heroin from Endres, gave them bags that she claimed contained heroin, and informed them that Galloway knew about the drug deal. (Id.) Galloway claims that the bags Mease gave to the Task Force did not test positive for heroin. (Id.)
Galloway asserts that he did not know anything about the alleged "fake" drug deal until March 24, 2015, when Pennsylvania State Police troopers arrived at his shop with a warrant for his arrest. (Id., ¶ 9). He was charged with four counts: manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver; intentionally possessing a controlled substance by a person not registered; criminal use of communication facility; and conspiracy to manufacture, deliver or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver. (Id.) Galloway was incarcerated for 18 days before receiving a bail hearing, and he was forced to appear in court every 30-60 days to defend himself while the Commonwealth repeatedly requested a continuance. (Id., ¶ 11). Finally, on September 8, 2016, the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County entered a nolle prosequi and dropped all the charges against Galloway. (Doc. 17, at 3).
In addition to the incident on November 10 that led to his own arrest and Endres' arrest, Galloway alleges that Mease and the agents of the Task Force used the same "scam" to arrest other innocent individuals and charge them with drug trafficking crimes. Galloway contends that Mease and the agents set up controlled buys to purchase heroin on at least three other occasions. (Id., ¶ 15(1)-(4)). It is alleged that Mease actually fabricated evidence, using make-up and other powder substances in place of heroin, and passed this off as heroin that was supposedly purchased at the controlled buys. (Id., ¶¶ 14-15). The Task Force then arrested the individuals who supposedly sold heroin to Mease, even though they allegedly knew about Mease's actions. (Id., ¶ 15(1)-(4)). Galloway then alleges that two of the individuals were "coerced" into taking plea deals, (Id., ¶ 15(2), (4)), while the third individual took his case to trial and was acquitted of all charges. (Id., ¶ 15(3)). Galloway claims that the agents knowingly made false statements in order to obtain arrest warrants for these individuals. (Id., ¶ 14).
Galloway initially brought this case in the district court on May 22, 2015, a few months after his arrest. (No. 1:15-cv-01007, Doc. 1). He alleged essentially the same claims as he alleges now—false arrest and malicious prosecution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and claims under the RICO Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d). (Id.) This court adopted the Report and Recommendation of the undersigned and exercised its discretion to abstain from the case and dismiss Galloway's claims without prejudice, due to the state criminal proceedings that were ongoing at the time. (Id., Docs. 5, 6). The court granted Galloway leave to amend his complaint, but such leave was never taken and the case was closed on July 30, 2015. (Id., Doc. 7).
After the charges against him in state court were dropped, on March 2, 2017, Galloway moved to have his case reopened. (Id., Doc. 8). He argued that he was unaware that the case had been dismissed due to issues with his mail and a brief stint of incarceration for failure to pay support. (Id.). This court denied the plaintiff's motion on March 8, 2017. (Id., Doc. 9). Galloway filed the instant complaint with this court on March 26, 2018. (Doc. 1).
Galloway's complaint alleges civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising from his unlawful arrest, detention, and prosecution. He also alleges that the defendants conspired to falsely arrest and charge innocent individuals by fabricating physical evidence and giving false statements, acts which he contends amount to a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) and (d). The defendants, in their motion to dismiss, argue that Galloway's claims are time-barred. Alternatively, they argue that he fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Finally, they assert that the Task Force agents are entitled to qualified immunity.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The defendants have moved to dismiss the claims against them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." With respect to this benchmark standard for legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)] and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal —U.S.—, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court "need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not "assume that a ... plaintiff can prove facts that the ... plaintiff has not alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do." Id. at 555. "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should "begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 679. According to the Supreme Court, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.Id. at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a complaint must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief." In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to "show" such an entitlement with its facts.Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis: "First, the court must 'tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675. Second, the court should identify allegations that, 'because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Id. at 679. Finally, 'where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.' Id." Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
The test for the legal sufficiency of a complaint is one of plausibility. As the Court of Appeals has observed: "The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the 'plausibility' standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings 'allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.' Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing 'more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.' Id. A complaint which pleads facts 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, [ ] 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of "entitlement of relief." ' " Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1861, 182 L. Ed. 2d 644 (U.S. 2012).
In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which defines what a complaint should say and provides that:
(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the
court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a plaintiff's complaint must recite factual allegations which are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a "short and plain" statement of a cause of action.
IV. DISCUSSION
The defendants move to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on several grounds. First, with respect to the RICO claims, they contend that Galloway does not have standing to bring these claims. However, if the court finds that Galloway does have standing, they argue that his RICO claims fail on the merits because he has not alleged predicate acts that constitute "racketeering activity." The defendants next argue that Galloway's § 1983 claims are barred by the statute of limitations, as the complaint was filed more than two years after his arrest. Alternatively, the defendants claim that the § 1983 claims fail on the merits because malicious prosecution claims cannot be brought against law enforcement officers, and furthermore, Galloway has failed to allege that the agents lacked probable cause to arrest him. Finally, the defendants assert the defense of qualified immunity.
While we are required to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003), we agree with the defendants that the complaint in its current form does not allege sufficient facts to support claims under the RICO Act. However, in our view, the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts for his claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution to survive the motion to dismiss.
A. The Plaintiff's RICO Claims Should Be Dismissed.
Galloway brings claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) and (d), alleging that the defendants engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity which ultimately cost him to lose his business and injured his reputation. The defendants contend that Galloway lacks standing to bring claims under the RICO Act, as he has not alleged acts which constitute "racketeering activity" under the statute. Alternatively, it is argued that the failure to plead predicate acts of racketeering activity is fatal to Galloway's RICO claims on the merits.
Section 1962(c) makes it unlawful for an individual, who is employed by or associated with an enterprise that is engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate in the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Section 1962(d) prohibits a person from conspiring to violate any provision of section 1962. § 1962(d). In order to have standing to bring a claim under § 1962, a plaintiff must show that he suffered an injury to his business or property, and that his injury was proximately caused by the defendants' violation of § 1962. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 483 (3d Cir. 2000). An injury in this context "requires proof of a concrete financial loss and not mere injury to a valuable intangible property interest." Maio, 221 F.3d at 483 (internal quotations omitted).
To state a civil claim for a violation of § 1962, a plaintiff must set forth allegations showing: "(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity." In re Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litigation, 618 F.3d 300, 362 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Lum v. Bank of America, 361 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2004)). "Racketeering activity" is defined in § 1961, which provides an exclusive list of offenses that constitute predicate acts of racketeering activity. See § 1961; Annulli v. Panikkar, 200 F.3d 189, 200 (3d Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549 (2000) ("RICO's list of acts constituting predicate acts of racketeering activity is exhaustive"); see also Harvey v. Harvey, 931 F. Supp. 127, 130 (D. Conn. 1996) ("The offenses which may serve as predicate acts for a RICO claim are listed in [] § 1961. This list is exclusive").
Here, Galloway claims that he suffered a concrete financial loss when he was forced to sell his business for a loss of over $100,000.00, and his complaint alleges in general terms acts of fabricating physical evidence and falsifying sworn and unsworn documents to procure arrest warrants. (Doc. 1, at 10). However, these acts do not appear in the exclusive list of predicate acts that constitute racketeering activity set forth in § 1961. Where the acts alleged by a plaintiff do not constitute predicate acts of racketeering activity, as defined by the RICO statute, dismissal of a complaint is warranted. See Annulli v. Panikkar, 200 F.3d 189, 200 (3d Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549 (2000); Bealer v. Mut. Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.04-5915, 2005 WL 1819971, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2005), aff'd, 242 F. App'x 802 (3d Cir. 2007). Likewise, it is unclear from Galloway's complaint what the plaintiff deems the racketeering enterprise to be. Furthermore, to establish a violation of § 1962(c), a plaintiff must allege that the defendant committed at least two predicate acts of racketeering activity. See In re Brokerage Antitrust Litigation, 618 F.3d at 362. Therefore, Galloway should be required to describe with more particularity both the alleged racketeering enterprise, the parties' alleged participation in that enterprise, and specify the nature of the predicate racketeering acts which fall within the ambit of this statute. Moreover, because Galloway currently has not established a violation of 1962(c), it follows that he cannot establish a violation of § 1962(d). See Sarpolis v. Tereshko, 26 F. Supp. 3d 407, 430 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (quoting Lightening Lube Inc., v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1191 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Any claim under section 1962(d) based on a conspiracy to violate [any of] the other subsections of section 1962 necessarily must fail if the substantive claims are themselves deficient"). Accordingly, we recommend that the plaintiff's RICO claims be dismissed.
We recognize, however, that pro se plaintiffs should often be provided an opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed in its entirety, See Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007), unless granting further leave to amend would be futile or result in undue delay. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). While Galloway's civil RICO claim currently fails to meet federal pleading standards for this particular cause of action, it is recommended that this count be dismissed without prejudice to permitting Galloway to attempt to amend this claim, provided that he acts in a timely manner.
B. The Plaintiff's § 1983 False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution Claims Should Survive the Motion to Dismiss.
The defendants also challenge Galloway's § 1983 claims on several grounds. First, they contend that the § 1983 claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Alternatively, if the claims are not time-barred, it is argued that the claims fail on the merits. With respect to the malicious prosecution claim, the defendants argue that Galloway cannot bring such a claim against law enforcement officers. Additionally, they contend that Galloway has failed to plead facts showing that the agents lacked probable cause to arrest him as it pertains to both the malicious prosecution and false arrest claims. Finally, the defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity. We will address each argument in turn.
(1)The Statute of Limitations Does Not Bar Galloway's § 1983 Claims at This Stage.
It is well-settled that claims brought pursuant to § 1983 are governed by the state's statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Sameric Corp. of Delaware v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998). In Pennsylvania, personal injury claims must be brought within two years from the date the cause of action accrued. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524. A cause of action under § 1983 accrues when the plaintiff knows, or reasonably should know, of his injury and its cause. Sameric, 142 F.3d at 599; see also Nelson v. County of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010 (3d Cir. 1995). In addition to the plaintiff's pleading requirements, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated that a statute of limitations defense may only be raised in a motion to dismiss if "the time alleged in the statement of a claim shows that the cause of action has not been brought within the statute of limitations." Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 135 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Hanna v. U.S. Veterans' Administration Hospital, 514 F.2d 1092, 1094 (3d Cir. 1975)).
With respect to Galloway's malicious prosecution claim, it is clear that this claim is not time-barred. A prerequisite to a malicious prosecution claim is that the proceedings being challenged are terminated in the plaintiff's favor. Merkle v. Upper Dublin School District, 211 F.3d 782, 791 (3d Cir. 2000). Moreover, the statute of limitations begins to run when "the underlying criminal proceedings are terminated in plaintiff's favor." Wiltz v. Middlesex County Office of Prosecutor, 249 F. App'x 944, 949 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 348 (3d Cir. 1989)). Here, the state proceedings against Galloway were terminated on September 8, 2016, and this complaint was filed on March 26, 2018. Thus, this claim was brought within the applicable two-year limitations period.
As a prerequisite to filing a malicious prosecution claim, the state proceedings must have been terminated in the plaintiff's favor. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 474, 484 (1994) (emphasis added). While the defendants do not challenge this aspect of the plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim at this stage, we note that in this case, the court entered a nolle prosequi, which constitutes termination in the plaintiff's favor only where the plaintiff is "innocent of the crime charged in the underlying prosecution." Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154, 156 (3d Cir. 2000).
As for the false arrest claim, although we regard this as a close case, we cannot say that it is clear from the face of the complaint that this claim is time-barred. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the statute of limitations begins to run on a false arrest claim "once the victim becomes held pursuant to [the legal] process—when, for example, he is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges." Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 390 (2007) (emphasis in original); Dique v. New Jersey State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2010). Here, Galloway was arrested on March 24, 2015 and arraigned on July 9, 2015. (CP-31-CR-000172-2015). Thus, the statute of limitations for his false arrest claim began to run on July 9, 2015. Galloway did not file the instant complaint until March 26, 2018.
However, this is not the end of our inquiry. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recognized principles of equitable tolling in § 1983 cases, stating that "[f]ederal courts may toll statutes of limitations for federal laws where the plaintiff 'in some extraordinary way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights.'" Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 370 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1022 (3d Cir. 1997)). Here, there are additional matters to be considered in this case that may work to toll this limitations period, such as the original filing of the claim in May 2015, or Galloway's motion in March 2017 to reopen his case. On this score, we find that these matters would be more appropriately addressed at a later stage, such as a motion for summary judgment, as a discussion of whether the limitations period was tolled would require us to consider matters outside the pleadings—something we cannot do at the motion to dismiss stage. Therefore, we find that, at this stage, the statute of limitations does not bar Galloway's § 1983 claims.
(2) Galloway is Permitted to Bring a Malicious Prosecution Claim Against the Task Force Agents.
The defendants next contend that Galloway may not bring a malicious prosecution claim against the Task Force agents. They argue that, although there is a limited exception in which law enforcement officers may initiate criminal proceedings, that exception does not apply in this case. We disagree.
The Court of Appeals has held that a malicious prosecution claim may be brought against law enforcement officers if the officers "furnish[] false information to, or conceal[] material information from, prosecuting authorities." Gallo v. City of Phila., 161 F.3d 217, 220 n.2 (3d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). Although prosecutors are typically responsible for initiating criminal charges, a law enforcement officer "may . . . be considered to have initiated a criminal proceeding if he or she knowingly provided false information to the prosecutor or otherwise interfered with the prosecutor's informed discretion." Henderson v. City of Phila., 853 F.Supp.2d 514, 518 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (quoting Brockington v. City of Phila., 354 F.Supp.2d 563, 569 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
In the instant case, Galloway alleges that his arrest and prosecution were based on the false statements of Agent Adams and another Task Force Agent. He claims that these agents received information from a CI that they knew was false. Nevertheless, it is alleged that they used these false statements in order to obtain a warrant for his arrest. Finally, he claims that there was no other evidence from which these agents could have gotten probable cause for an arrest warrant. Thus, at this stage, it can be plausibly inferred from the complaint that the Task Force agents were responsible, at least in part, for initiating the criminal proceedings against Galloway.
(3)Galloway Pleads Sufficient Facts to Establish a Lack of Probable Cause for his False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution Claims.
Finally, the defendants argue that Galloway's § 1983 claims fail because both claims require him to show that the agents lacked probable cause to arrest him, and his pleading does not meet this requirement. This contention is inextricably intertwined with the defendants' assertion of qualified immunity, as the Court of Appeals has recently held that, "since false arrest and malicious prosecution hinge on probable cause, the constitutional violation in question is whether a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest the plaintiff at that time." Andrews v. Scuilli, 853 F.3d 690, 697 (3d Cir. 2017).
"Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct." Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012). A qualified immunity analysis involves two questions: whether the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and whether that right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). Lower courts have the discretion to decide which question to analyze first. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). The Supreme Court has cautioned courts to "think carefully before expending scarce judicial resources to resolve difficult and novel questions of constitutional or statutory interpretation that will have no effect on the outcome of the case." Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 735.
An official's conduct violates clearly established law when, "at the time of the challenged conduct, '[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear' that every 'reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that right.'" al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). The Supreme Court has stated that this standard does not require a case directly on point, but requires that "existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. "When properly applied, [qualified immunity] protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Id. at 743 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)); see also Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015).
The dispositive question that the court must ask is "whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established." Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742). The inquiry "must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition." Id.; see also Davenport v. Borough of Homestead, 870 F.3d 273, 281 (3d Cir. 2017). This "clearly established" standard ensures that an official can reasonably anticipate when his or her conduct may give rise to liability, and "protects the balance between vindication of constitutional rights and government officials' effective performance of their duties." Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664. As we have noted, in the context of false arrest and malicious prosecution claims, the question is "whether a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest the plaintiff at that time." Andrews, 853 F.3d at 697.
As the defendants correctly assert, to state claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution under § 1983 a plaintiff must plead facts showing that the agents lacked probable cause to arrest him and to initiate criminal proceedings against him. See Watson v. Witmer, 183 F.Supp.3d 607, 612 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (citing Groman v. Twp. F Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1995)); Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003) (setting forth the elements of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim). When the alleged false arrest was made on a valid warrant, the court should focus its analysis on whether the officer "knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create[d] falsehood in applying for a warrant." Andrews, 853 F.3d at 697 (quoting Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997)). Additionally, the plaintiff must show that the false statements were "material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause." Dempsey v. Bucknell University, 834 F.3d 457, 469 (3d Cir. 2016). The existence of probable cause for an arrest is typically a question of fact for a jury, unless the evidence "reasonably would not support a contrary factual finding," in which case the court may determine the existence of probable cause as a matter of law. Basile v. Twp. of Smith, 752 F.Supp.2d 643, 651 (W.D. Pa. 2010).
Turning to the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint, Galloway claims that his arrest and subsequent prosecution for drug trafficking charges was made on the basis of false statements made by Mease and the Task Force agents. He asserts that Mease made false statements to the Task Force agents when she told them that Galloway knew about the drug deal in his shop. Galloway also alleges that the agents knew these statements were false but used them to secure an arrest warrant anyway. In our view, construing the pro se complaint liberally and viewing the facts in a light favorable to the plaintiff, Galloway has alleged enough facts at this stage to support the inference that his arrest was made without probable cause, and accordingly, that the criminal proceedings against him arising out of that arrest were initiated without probable cause.
The defendants contend that Galloway's claims fail because he has not pleaded with specificity the false statements made by the agents that were used to obtain his arrest warrant, and thus he fails to show that the statements were "material or necessary" to find probable cause. However, the plaintiff avers the following in his complaint:
At no time was any so-called drug "BUY" ever observed by any member of the Task Force and no marked money was ever found to be in the possession of any person Chelsea [Mease] said she made a "buy" from that was arrested by the Task Force on March 24, 2015 during their alleged drug sweep. The drug arrests involving Chelsea were based solely on what Chelsea told the Task Force with NO one else seeing anything and NO independent confirmations.(Doc. 1, ¶ 6). Thus, fairly construed, the plaintiff's complaint asserts that the false statements were the only basis from which the agents could have obtained probable cause to secure his arrest warrant. In our view, this is sufficient at the motion to dismiss stage to show that the alleged false statements were necessary to find probable cause.
The defendants also point out that courts will reconstruct the challenged affidavit word-by-word in order to determine whether an officer had probable cause for the arrest warrant. See Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 470. Indeed, the Court of Appeals and district courts in this circuit have undertaken the task of reconstructing an affidavit of probable cause in order to determine if probable cause existed, and accordingly, if the officer in the case was entitled to qualified immunity. See Andrews, 853 F.3d at 698-705; Newsome v. City of Newark, 297 F.Supp.3d 515, 524 (D.N.J. 2017). However, unlike in Andrews and Newsome, where the cases were before the court on motions for summary judgment, the present case is before us on a motion to dismiss. Consequently, we do not have the benefit of a complete record from which we could undertake the task of reconstructing the affidavit of probable cause that was used to secure Galloway's arrest warrant. All we have at this stage are the plaintiff's allegations that the warrant was obtained by false statements.
We are mindful of the Third Circuit's warning that "it is generally unwise to venture into a qualified immunity analysis at the pleading stage as it is necessary to develop the factual record in the vast majority of cases." Williams v. Papi, 30 F.Supp.3d 306, 314 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (quoting Newland v. Reehorst, 328 F. App'x 788, 791 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted)); see also Martucci v. Borough, 2018 WL 1641232, at *13 (M.D. Pa. April 5, 2018) (reserving the determination of qualified immunity until the record is fully developed through discovery). On this score, we believe that a determination of qualified immunity at this stage is premature, and as such we cannot find that qualified immunity exists as a matter of law. Accordingly, we recommend that the motion to dismiss be denied with respect to the plaintiff's § 1983 claims.
V. RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the Defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint (Doc. 17) be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows: IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the motion be GRANTED with respect to the plaintiff's RICO claims, but that the motion be DENIED with respect to the plaintiff's false arrest and malicious prosecution claims.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which
objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 17th day of December, 2018.
/s/ Martin C . Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge