Opinion
NO. 4-17-0031
08-24-2017
MICHAEL GALARDY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LEON STENNETT, Defendant-Appellee.
NOTICE
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from Circuit Court of Champaign County
No. 15L95
Honorable Jeffrey B. Ford, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Turner and Justice Holder White concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The trial court did not err in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment where the record failed to show he had actual or constructive knowledge of an allegedly defective or dangerous condition on his property.
¶ 2 In December 2015, plaintiff, Michael Galardy, filed an amended complaint against defendant, Leon Stennett, seeking to recover for injuries he sustained as the result of a roof collapse on defendant's property. In November 2016, the trial court granted summary judgment in defendant's favor, and plaintiff appealed. We affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 In July 2013, plaintiff, an Ameren Illinois (Ameren) employee, was tasked with performing electrical work at defendant's residence in Champaign, Illinois. To perform his work duties, plaintiff climbed onto a portion of roof that extended 49 inches away from the side of de
fendant's house. The portion of roof, also referred to in the record as an awning, was 74 inches wide and 7 inches thick. It covered a door to defendant's home and was attached to the home, at least in part, with wire cables and turnbuckles. As plaintiff was working, the awning gave way, and plaintiff fell approximately 10 feet to the ground.
¶ 5 In December 2015, plaintiff filed an amended complaint against defendant to recover for personal injuries he allegedly sustained as a result of his fall at defendant's home. Relevant to this appeal, count I of plaintiff's amended complaint alleged negligence by defendant. Plaintiff asserted he climbed onto defendant's roof to reconnect power cables and had been given permission by defendant to stand on the roof. Plaintiff maintained, however, that "[d]efendant's house had a defect in the roof" and "collapsed," causing him to fall 10 feet to the ground and be "punctured *** with nails." Plaintiff alleged defendant had a duty to inform all licensees and invitees on his property that "there was a defect in his roof that could potentially cause serious injury." However, contrary to that duty, defendant failed to inform plaintiff of any defects. Plaintiff alleged he sustained serious and permanent bodily injuries as a proximate result of defendant's negligence.
¶ 6 In count II of his amended complaint, plaintiff raised a claim of premises liability. He asserted that, under the Premises Liability Act (740 ILCS 130/1 to 5 (West 2012)) defendant owed him "a duty of reasonable care regarding the state of [defendant's] premises." Plaintiff further maintained defendant had a duty to properly maintain his roof and to discover and repair the defect in the roof. He alleged defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, of the defect in his roof. Plaintiff asserted defendant breached his duty by failing to properly maintain or repair the roof, failing to take proper precautions to protect or warn persons lawfully on his property
about the defect in the roof, and "[c]arelessly and negligently inspect[ing] and control[ing] the roof." Again, plaintiff asserted that he fell and sustained injuries as a direct and proximate result of defendant's acts or omissions.
¶ 7 In January 2016, defendant filed an answer to plaintiff's amended complaint, denying his negligence and premises liability claims. Defendant also raised affirmative defenses that (1) he owed no duty to plaintiff because the condition complained of was open and obvious and (2) plaintiff failed to exercise ordinary care for his own safety.
¶ 8 The record contains the discovery depositions of defendant, plaintiff, and Michael Dilger, a home inspector. Defendant testified he moved to the property at issue in July 2012. He stated a home inspection was performed at the time he purchased the property that identified an issue with "the roof proper, not the awning." Specifically, the inspector "thought [the roof] might have some puddling" and that the seller of the property should "coat it." Defendant stated he did not have to negotiate for any repairs when buying the house as "[t]he sellers fulfilled everything that the inspector designated." He testified the sellers fixed the "puddling problem" on the roof and provided an invoice or receipt to demonstrate repairs that were made as a result of the home inspector's recommendations. Aside from the "puddling" issue, defendant was aware of no other defects in the roof or awning. He testified he never looked at the top of the awning prior to when it fell.
¶ 9 In July 2013, defendant contacted Ameren about electrical issues at his home, and Ameren employees informed him that he needed to have his meter base replaced. Defendant testified he hired a company called Remco Electrical Corporation (Remco) to perform the work recommended by Ameren. On July 22, 2013, two Remco employees performed work at defend
ant's home and asked if they could work from his roof. Defendant testified he acquiesced but was reluctant because he "didn't want them kicking around on it and knocking shingles off." The same day, plaintiff came to defendant's home to reconnect power cables. Defendant stated he believed plaintiff also asked for permission to work from his roof. Defendant did not want plaintiff on his roof for the same reason he did not want the other workers up there; however, he also "didn't want to deny him." He agreed that he gave permission to both the Remco employees and to plaintiff to stand on the awning. Defendant testified he trusted the workers as "professionals who routinely do high work *** to know how safe they wanted to be."
¶ 10 Defendant testified plaintiff went up to the roof to perform his work. He recalled standing by the awning and asking plaintiff a question about his electrical issues. Defendant stated plaintiff answered his question, and "seconds after that, he came down." He stated he heard a noise and saw plaintiff on the ground with part of the awning on top of him.
¶ 11 Plaintiff testified he arrived at defendant's house at approximately 3 p.m. on the day of his accident. He observed two electrical workers at the home, one on defendant's roof and one on a ladder. Plaintiff identified the roof he was referring to as a "small piece of overhang over [a] door." He spoke with the electrical workers, who stated they needed more time to finish their work, and he agreed to return in about 30 minutes. Upon plaintiff's return, the electrical workers were gone. Plaintiff testified he retrieved his ladder and proceeded to the "roof awning" to perform his work. He denied asking defendant's permission to stand on the awning. Additionally, plaintiff testified he stood on the awning to "do the reconnect." He stated defendant did not tell him where to stand or direct how he was to perform his work duties.
¶ 12 Further, plaintiff testified that when using his ladder to climb onto the roof, he did
not notice how the awning was attached to the house. He also did not pay attention to the condition of the shingles on the awning. Plaintiff stated he assumed that the awning would support his weight because he observed the other workers standing on it, and they were bigger than him. He asserted he did look at the awning before he stood on it and believed it was safe; however, he did not do a "complete physical survey" of the awning. Plaintiff agreed that, as a "trained professional lines man," he felt he was proceeding with his work in a safe manner.
¶ 13 When asked by defendant's counsel whether he had any conversation with defendant "[p]rior to going up on the ladder," plaintiff responded that the only conversation he could recall was defendant "asking [him] a question about, something to the effect that [defendant] never had any problem until [Ameren] replaced a pole in the next door neighbor's yard or something." Later, he testified his conversation with defendant occurred while he was working on the awning. Plaintiff testified as follows:
"And I was stripping the wires getting ready to do the reconnect. And that is when he asked me, you know, I didn't have any problems here until your guys replaced a pole in the neighbor's yard. And I remember saying, well, that wouldn't have anything to do with what went on here. And that's basically all I remember."
¶ 14 Plaintiff testified the next thing that happened was that he was "on the ground with the roof awning on top of [him]." He did not know whether his fall was caused by the awning disconnecting from the house or because it collapsed. Additionally plaintiff testified he did not know what the defect in defendant's roof was, "but obviously there was one." Finally, plaintiff provided testimony regarding whether he was distracted while performing his work. The following colloquy occurred between plaintiff and defendant's counsel:
"Q. You talk about you may have been distracted.
A. No, I was concentrating on what I was doing.
Q. Okay. And before you started doing what you were doing, you were going up the ladder, so you were concentrat[ing] on that?
A. Correct.
Q. Then you were concentrat[ing] on doing your assessment of the risks of doing the job from that platform as trained, right?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. And you weren't distracted then while you were doing that risk assessment?
A. [Defendant] was speaking to me. I was talking to him.
Q. Well, then did you tell him hold on a minute, I've got to do my job?
A. No, [I] didn't do that.
Q. Okay. Did you disregard what he was saying and complete your risk assessment as trained?
A. Yeah, I looked it over and I went up where the workers had been working to [do] the reconnect.
Q. So you were not distracted while you were doing your risk assessment of whether or not you could safely stand on that platform, were you?
A. I don't recall."
Plaintiff later clarified that his conversation with defendant took place when he was already on the awning and in the process of tying off new wires. He agreed that he had already gone up the
ladder, inspected the awning, determined the awning was a safe place to stand, and stepped onto the awning.
¶ 15 Dilger testified he provided residential home inspection services, and he inspected defendant's residence in 2012. The purpose of his inspection was to look for conditions that were in need of repair or some kind of maintenance or upkeep and to bring those to the attention of defendant, who wanted to buy the house. Dilger identified an inspection report he prepared for defendant, dated June 28, 2012. The report was attached to his deposition as an exhibit and shows Dilger inspected defendant's roof by walking on it. He referred to two parts of the roof in his report, a "main roof," which he described as a "Built Up Roof," and a "secondary roof," described as having "rolled roofing." Dilger found the main roof to be in "fair" condition, noting areas of "ponding" and "cracking and blistering." He did not detect any direct leaks or signs of leaking and recommended monitoring the areas, routine maintenance, and patching to address the issues.
¶ 16 Dilger's report shows he found the secondary roof to be in "poor" condition. His report states as follows:
"There are signs of moisture entry under the porch roof as evidenced by wood rot at the soffit and fascias. I cannot tell if the leaks are active at this point. The roll roofing is installed incorrectly with many nails exposed. Although they have been covered with roofing cement, the effectiveness of this installation is questionable. I recommend locating the source of the water penetration, stopping it (this may require replacement of roofing material) and repairing any damaged wood by a qualified roofing contractor."
Dilger testified that when he referenced the "secondary roof" in the report, he was referring to the back porch of defendant's home and not the awning at the location of plaintiff's fall. He stated he did not specifically identify or mention the awning in his report and, if he had, he "probably would have either called it an awning or listed its location specifically."
¶ 17 Dilger further testified as follows:
"I didn't mention [the awning] specifically. However, there are comments that are vague enough that would include a structure similar to this such as *** the soffit areas. [The report] says: [']The soffit and fascias have missing, peeling paint and some rot. In my opinion these should be repaired by a qualified contractor. Routine *** painting and staining should be completed to prevent deterioration and/or rot and prolong the life of the materials.[']
So there were areas around the house that I mentioned that had visible issues. Also, that, in my mind, would be cause enough for certain [sic] about the soffit and fascia materials around the house, but not specifically the top of that particular roof surface."
He agreed that it appeared that the same type of material was used for both the secondary roof and the awning. Dilger further agreed that, if the secondary roof and the awning were installed at the same time, the issues he noted with the secondary roof could also have applied to the awning. However, he denied that he observed any "structural issues" with the connection of the awning to the house "at the time that [he] was looking at it."
¶ 18 At his deposition, Dilger was asked to look at photographs taken of the awning after plaintiff's fall, and he identified areas of damage to the awning. He testified he would have
noted those areas at the time of his inspection if he had seen them. The following colloquy then occurred:
"Q. And is that something that you could have observed if you had been standing on the roof and looking down onto [the awning]?
A. Potentially. I'm looking at Exhibit 2 here. I would have probably walked on the main roof here. This would have been the back porch, and then this would have been the awning. I may not have been able to visually see that that clearly, although from the top of this area [the damage on the back porch] was certainly visible and recorded as defective."
¶ 19 Dilger further testified that the purpose of the awning was "[u]sually *** to guard the entrance to the door from debris or rain." He stated he would not consider it a platform for someone working on the house; however, "to replace the roofing materials it should be sturdy enough for someone to presumably walk on."
¶ 20 In September 2016, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and a memorandum in support of his motion. Attachments to his filings included the parties' depositions, Dilger's deposition, and a stipulation of facts entered into by the parties that contained a description of the awning. In their stipulation of facts, the parties agreed as follows:
"a) [The awning] was 74 inches wide.
b) It was 49 inches deep (distance it extended away from the side of the house).
c) It was 7 inches thick.
d) The top was covered by a rolled tar roofing type of material.
e) The bottom was constructed of plywood with a cut-out for an electric light with
cover.
f) To one facing the door, the hook on the wall to which the right side turnbuckle and cable was attached was 41 inches above the top of the roof.
g) To one facing the door, the hook to which the left side turnbuckle and cable was attached was located 29 1/2 inches above the top of the roof."
¶ 21 Defendant raised three arguments in support of his motion for summary judgment. First, he argued there was no evidence of a defect in the awning that rendered it unreasonably dangerous when viewed in light of its intended use, i.e., providing protection from the elements and illumination to those using the doorway beneath it. Second, defendant argued that, if a defect in the awning existed, it was a latent defect of which he had no actual or constructive knowledge. Third, he alternatively argued that any defect in the awning was open and obvious and he had no duty to warn against it.
¶ 22 In October 2016, plaintiff filed a response to defendant's motion for summary judgment. He asserted defendant's collapsed roof "was the result of a defect in construction, or due to disrepair and deterioration," presenting a question of material fact. To support his contention, plaintiff attached the affidavit of John Frauenhoffer, a forensic engineer. Frauenhoffer asserted that, in Champaign, a roof had to be constructed to support a "snow load" or "minimum roof load." A "snow load" required that a roof support "load magnitudes as large as 50 pounds per square foot," while a "minimum roof load" required a roof to be built to support a minimum of "20 pounds per square foot." Frauenhoffer maintained that "[a]ll roofs must be able to support, at minimum, the weight of a 200-pound person." Using the dimensions set forth in the parties' stipulation of facts, he determined "the roof in question" measured approximately 25 square
feet and was, therefore, required "to support, at minimum, a load of 500 pounds." Frauenhoffer averred that "[i]f a roof of those dimensions collapsed after a 200[-]pound man stepped onto it, then there was a defect or severe deterioration and disrepair in the roof because of the aforementioned minimum load-bearing requirements."
¶ 23 Plaintiff further asserted that defendant knew, or should have known, of defects in his roof from the home inspection report conducted prior to his purchase of the property and because "the general condition of the premises and the roof is known and should be known to the homeowner." Further, in response to defendant's alternative contention that the condition of the awning was open and obvious, resulting in no duty owed by defendant to plaintiff, plaintiff argued the distraction exception applied. Specifically, he argued he was distracted from the dangerous condition of the awning because he was "reconnecting power cables," and defendant was questioning him "as he got on the roof to reconnect the cables."
¶ 24 In November 2016, the trial court granted defendant's summary judgment motion and entered judgment in his favor. The court's written order shows that it agreed with defendant's arguments that plaintiff failed to identify or provide evidence of a defect in the awning, and that the record failed to show defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of any alleged defect. Additionally, in addressing defendant's alternative open-and-obvious claim, the court found plaintiff's testimony "at odds" with his contention that he was distracted.
¶ 25 In December 2016, plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider. Initially, he maintained the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard when addressing defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff argued the court's written decision showed that it viewed the material in the record "in the light most favorable to the moving party," rather than the nonmoving party
as it was required to do. He further contended that the parties' deposition testimony showed that defendant distracted plaintiff with "a hostile, confrontational conversation" while plaintiff was working.
¶ 26 The same month, the trial court entered an order denying plaintiff's motion to reconsider. In so holding, the court stated it made a "scrivener's error" when setting forth the standard of review in its previous order. However, it maintained that, when ruling on the motion, it utilized the appropriate standard and "considered the facts in the light most favorable to the non[]moving party."
¶ 27 This appeal followed.
¶ 28 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 29 On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment. He maintains numerous issues of material fact existed, precluding summary judgment, including whether a defect existed in defendant's roof and whether plaintiff was distracted by his conversation with defendant. Plaintiff also argues defendant had actual or constructive notice of the defective condition of his roof through the home inspector's June 2012 report.
¶ 30 "Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and exhibits on file, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, reveal that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Valfer v. Evanston Northwestern Healthcare, 2016 IL 119220, ¶ 20, 52 N.E.3d 319 (citing 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2012)). "A genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment exists where the material facts are disputed or, if the material facts are undisputed, rea
sonable persons might draw different inferences from the undisputed facts." Mashal v. City of Chicago, 2012 IL 112341, ¶ 49, 981 N.E.2d 951. "[U]nsupported conclusions, opinions, or speculation are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact." Valfer, 2016 IL 119220, ¶ 20, 52 N.E.3d 319.
¶ 31 "[T]o survive a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff need not prove [his] case, but [he] must present a factual basis that would arguably entitle [him] to a judgment." Bruns v. City of Centralia, 2014 IL 116998, ¶ 12, 21 N.E.3d 684. A trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Wade v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2015 IL App (4th) 141067, ¶ 12, 39 N.E.3d 1141.
¶ 32 "In a negligence action, the plaintiff must plead and prove the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and injury proximately resulting from the breach." Bruns, 2014 IL 116998, ¶ 12, 21 N.E.3d 684. "Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court to decide." Id. ¶ 13. Factors used to determine the existence of a duty include: "(1) the reasonable foreseeability of the injury, (2) the likelihood of the injury, (3) the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and (4) the consequences of placing that burden on the defendant." Id. ¶ 14.
¶ 33 "Pursuant to the theory of premises liability, an owner or occupier of land *** owes a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances to all entrants upon the premises except to trespassers." Choate v. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co., 2012 IL 112948, ¶ 24, 980 N.E.2d 58.
" 'A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condi-
tion, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.' " Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 62 Ill. 2d 456, 468, 343 N.E.2d 465, 472 (1976) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965)).
¶ 34 "[T]here is no liability for a landowner for dangerous or defective conditions on the premises in the absence of the landowner's actual or constructive knowledge." Tomczak v. Planetsphere, Inc., 315 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 1038, 735 N.E.2d 662, 666 (2000). "If the gist of a complaint is that the landowner did not create the condition, the plaintiff must be required to establish that the landowner knew or should have known of the defect." Id. Generally, when asserting that a defendant had constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition, the plaintiff "must establish that the dangerous condition existed for a sufficient time or was so conspicuous that the defendant should have discovered the condition through the exercise of reasonable care." Smolek v. K.W. Landscaping, 266 Ill. App. 3d 226, 228-29, 639 N.E.2d 974, 977 (1994). "One will be considered to have constructive knowledge if he receives facts that would make the dangerous condition known to any ordinary prudent person." Stackhouse v. Royce Realty & Management Corp., 2012 IL App (2d) 110602, ¶ 30, 970 N.E.2d 1224.
¶ 35 Initially, we note plaintiff presents an argument on appeal that the trial court erred by denying his motion to reconsider and that it mistakenly applied an incorrect legal standard. However, because our standard of review is de novo and we give no deference to the trial court,
we find it unnecessary to address these specific claims. See Hollenbeck v. City of Tuscola, 2017 IL App (4th) 160266, ¶ 34, 72 N.E.3d 880 (holding that because no deference is given to the trial court's summary judgment ruling and we analyze its ruling anew, it was unnecessary to address the plaintiff's argument that the court improperly weighed witness testimony). After examining the record, we agree that summary judgment in defendant's favor was appropriate.
¶ 36 In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleged defendant's house "had a defect in the roof." He did not specify the defect and, at his deposition, he was unable to identify either the nature of the alleged defect or even how the awning gave way as he stood upon it. In responding to defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff argued the roof collapse "was the result of a defect in construction, or due to disrepair and deterioration." He supported his contention with Frauenhoffer's affidavit and averments that the minimum load-bearing requirement for a roof the size of the awning was 500 pounds, and if there was a "collapse after a 200[-]pound man stepped onto it, then there was a defect or severe deterioration and disrepair in the roof." Further, on appeal, plaintiff argues Dilger's inspection report provided defendant with either actual or constructive knowledge of a defect in the awning. He contends the inspection provided notice to defendant that the roof was in "general disrepair," and that the condition of the secondary roof was "poor as it had signs of rotten wood and water leakage at the fascia."
¶ 37 We disagree with plaintiff's arguments. Here, assuming a defect or dangerous condition existed in the awning (which plaintiff never identified with any particularity), nothing demonstrates defendant had actual or constructive knowledge that the awning posed a danger to plaintiff. The evidence showed defendant purchased his home in 2012, approximately one year prior to plaintiff's fall. At the time defendant purchased the home, Dilger performed a home in
spection and authored an inspection report. Dilger's report did not refer to the awning. Rather, it addressed issues he found with respect to the main roof, which he described as being in "fair" condition, and issues he found on the "secondary roof," which he described as being in "poor" condition. Dilger testified references to the "secondary roof" referred to the back porch area of defendant's home and not the awning. During his inspection, Dilger observed the awning and testified he "did not see any structural issues with [its] connection [to the house] at the time he was looking at it." Further, defendant testified that Dilger's inspection failed to identify any issue with the awning and that the sellers of the property fixed any problems that had been identified. Moreover, the awning had been utilized by at least one other person prior to plaintiff's fall without incident, and plaintiff himself testified he looked at the awning before he stood on it and determined it was safe.
¶ 38 On appeal, plaintiff argues defendant's constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition was demonstrated by Dilger's "statement to [defendant] that [Dilger] could not specify the defective portion of the roof because the main portion of the roof was so extensively damaged that the inspector could not even walk on it to closely assess it." After reviewing the record, we find plaintiff misstates Dilger's testimony.
¶ 39 First, the record fails to reflect Dilger made any such express statement to defendant. Rather, the portion of the record plaintiff cites in support of his assertion shows that, during his deposition, Dilger identified damage on the awning from photographs that were taken after plaintiff's fall. Dilger asserted he would have noted such damage if he had observed it during his inspection. He went on to testify that he "[p]otentially" could have observed that portion of the awning from where he walked on the main roof but "may not have been able to visually see that
that clearly." He testified he "d[i]dn't know if [he] could have seen [that portion of the awning] that clearly from the top." In any event, Dilger did not document any damage to the awning in his report and never specifically identified the awning as being inaccessible to him. Second, contrary to plaintiff's statement, both Dilger's testimony and his report reflect that he did, in fact, walk on the main portion of the roof when performing his inspection. Third, as stated, Dilger's inspection report described the condition of the main roof as "fair" and recommended monitoring certain areas, routine maintenance, and patching. Such evidence refutes plaintiff's assertion that the main roof was "extensively damaged."
¶ 40 Plaintiff also argues that because Dilger's report identified the secondary roof as in poor condition, plaintiff should have been on notice that the awning, which was made from the same material, was also in poor condition. He further contends, "Frauenhoffer was prepared to testify that '[i]f one portion of the roof was in deterioration or disrepair, it is reasonable to believe that the rest of the roof is in a similar condition.' " Initially, we find there is nothing in the record to show that, prior to plaintiff's fall, defendant knew of any similarities or dissimilarities the awning had with other portions of the roof. The record does show, however, that the awning was not referenced in Dilger's report and that defendant believed that problems noted in the report had been repaired by the sellers at the time he purchased the property. Further, the record does not demonstrate that the awning was ever found to have been in the same condition as the secondary roof at the time of the inspection. Finally, the record fails to show Frauenhoffer made the statement plaintiff attributes to him. In his brief, plaintiff cites a portion of the record in which Frauenhoffer's affidavit appears, but the affidavit simply does not contain the statement quoted by plaintiff.
¶ 41 Given the circumstances presented, we find defendant lacked either actual or constructive knowledge that the awning presented a danger to plaintiff at the time of his fall. As a result, it was not reasonably foreseeable to defendant that the awning would give way underneath plaintiff when he accessed it to perform electrical work on defendant's home. Defendant owed no duty to plaintiff, and the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in defendant's favor. In so holding, we find it unnecessary to address defendant's alternative argument that any danger posed by the awning was open and obvious.
¶ 42 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 43 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 44 Affirmed.