Opinion
No. X03 CV 03 4022297 S
April 9, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO STRIKE
Two of the defendants in this case, Stanley Prymus and Thompson Peck, Inc., have filed a motion to strike the sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth counts of the plaintiff's revised complaint, as well as paragraphs two and three of the prayer for relief. A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading. Macomber v. Travelers Property Casualty Corp., 261 Conn. 620, 629, 804 A.2d 180 (2002). The court must take the facts alleged in the second revised and amended complaint and construe them in the manner most favorable to sustaining this complaint's legal sufficiency. Id. The court assumes the truth of both the specific factual allegations and any facts fairly provable thereunder. Id. In doing so, the court reads the allegations broadly, rather than narrowly. Id.
While Prymas and Thompson Peck have provided several grounds for granting their motion to strike the claims directed against them, they first argue that they are entitled to absolute immunity for the conduct alleged as the factual basis for all of the plaintiff's claims against them. While absolute privilege or immunity may be alleged as a special defense, it may also be raised upon a motion to strike. Dlugokecki v. Vieira, 98 Conn.App. 252, 255-56, 907 A.2d 1269, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 951, 912 A.2d 483 (2006). The court finds this ground to be dispositive as to all of the plaintiff's claims as to Prymas and Thompson Peck based upon the conduct alleged in the revised complaint.
The plaintiff alleges in count six that the defendants tortiously interfered with the plaintiff's business relationships based upon the alleged financing by the defendants of meritless grievances filed by Charles Flanagan against the plaintiff, who is an attorney. The plaintiff alleges that Charles Flanagan, who is not a defendant in this action, and Prymas directed Thompson Peck to pay for the legal representation to prosecute the grievances filed by Flanagan. The plaintiff alleges that Prymas and Thompson Peck opposed the appointment of the plaintiff as counsel to the unsecured creditors' committee in Charles Flanagan's bankruptcy proceeding based upon the pending grievances and, after the plaintiff's appointment, sought his removal on the same grounds. The defendants argue that they are entitled to absolute immunity under Field v. Kearns, 43 Conn.App. 265, 682 A.2d 148, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 942, 684 A.2d 711 (1996). In Kearns, the court held that "the trial court correctly opined [t]hat the public policy of protecting the courts and the public from unethical and unprofessional attorneys is so strong that there is absolute immunity for the complainant in filing or otherwise causing the institution of attorney disciplinary proceedings." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 277. The plaintiff himself notes in his memorandum in opposition that if the person or entity paying for the filing of the allegedly meritless grievances actually signed and filed the grievances, they would be entitled to immunity. The court finds that the same public policy reasons exist to extend absolute immunity to one who hires counsel or provides the funds to file a grievance if it is not the same person or entity who actually files the grievance. The court further finds that the plaintiff's claim that these defendants used the pending grievances to oppose the plaintiff's appointment in a bankruptcy proceeding does not constitute conduct that falls outside the scope of the absolute immunity accorded to the defendants for their role in instituting the grievance proceedings. Furthermore, the claim that the defendants used the fact that there were pending grievances to oppose the plaintiff's appointment by the bankruptcy court, does not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient factual basis for a finding of liability on the part of these defendants for tortious interference with the plaintiff's business relationships, or indeed any of the other causes of action asserted by the plaintiff.
The seventh, eighth, ninth, thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth counts incorporate the factual allegations against Prymas and Thompson Peck contained in the sixth count. Because these defendants are entitled to absolute immunity for the conduct alleged by the plaintiff in the sixth count, and that conduct is the sole factual basis alleged for the other causes of action against them in the other counts, the motion to strike is granted as to all of the counts against Prymus and Thompson Peck.
The motion to strike is granted as to the allegations in the sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth counts as against Prymus and Thompson Peck on the ground that these defendants are entitled to absolute immunity for the conduct alleged. Because the motion to strike is granted as to all of the above counts as against Prymus and Thompson Peck, the motion to strike is also granted with respect to the corresponding paragraphs of the prayer for relief with respect to these defendants.
So ordered,