Opinion
No. CIV 2:99-1427-PHX-RCB, No. CIV 2:08-00018-PHX-EHC.
July 17, 2008
ORDER
Currently before the court is a motion by James L. Gagan to transfer Monroe v. Gagan, 2:08-cv-00018-EHC ("Monroe") to this court pursuant to LRCiv 42.1(a)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a). Doc. 369. Additionally, Mr. Gagan "requests an extension [of] time, such as ten days from the date of entry of" this order in which to file his answer in Monroe. Id. at 3. In the exercise of its discretion, for the reasons set forth below, the court GRANTS this motion in all respects.
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Background
I. Gagan v. Sharar
For more than a decade this court has presided over Gagan v. Sharar, 2:99-cv-1427-RCB ("Gagan"), wherein Mr. Gagan was seeking to enforce an Indiana judgment of roughly $1.7 million dollars against James A. Monroe, among others. As part of those enforcement efforts, there was a United States Marshal's sale of Mr. Monroe's real property located at 9795 East Caron Street, Scottsdale, Arizona 85258. See Doc. 347 (U.S. Marshal's Deed). At the time of that sale Mr. Monroe's daughter, Kimberly Monroe Clark, was residing there, but Mr. Monroe was not. See Doc. 5 (2:08-cv-00018-EHC) (Amended Co.) at 5, ¶ 3.The proceeds of that sale were to be applied toward the satisfaction of the Indiana judgment. Doc. 341 (Amended U.S. Marshal's Certificate of Sale) at 1. Mr. Gagan, the highest bidder at the Marshal's sale, bought the subject property for $560,000.00. Doc. 347 at 2. The United States Marshal issued a deed to Mr. Gagan on May 15, 2007. See id. Thereafter, "[i]n June, 2007, [Mr.] Gagan entered into a contract with . . . Ross Miljenovich to sell to him for $750,000 whatever right, title and interest the United States Marshal's Deed had vested in Gagan." Doc. 1 (2:08-cv-00018-EHC) (Monroe Not. of Removal) at 3, ¶ 4.
II. Monroe v. Gagan
Unwilling to concede defeat, on August 31, 2007, Mr. Monroe filed an action in Arizona Superior Court, Maricopa County, against Messrs. Gagan and Miljenovich. In that action, Mr. Monroe alleges that despite the Marshal's sale and subsequent purchase by Mr. Miljenovich, he "is the lawful owner of a fee simple estate" in the subject property. Doc. 5 (2:08-cv-00018-EHC) (Amended Co.) at 2, ¶ 2. Mr. Monroe further alleges that "[u]pon information and belief," the United States Marshal, "act[ing] upon the advice and instructions of Defendants Gagan[,]" refused to pay Mr. Monroe the $150,000.00 statutory homestead exemption. Id. at 5-6, ¶¶ 14-17. The failure to pay that exemption, Mr. Monroe alleges, renders "invalid" Mr. Gagan's May 15, 2007 Marshal's deed. Id. at 6-7, ¶ 19. Mr. Monroe is seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the "Indiana Judgment against [him], domesticated in Arizona . . ., was not renewed and expired and was, therefore, of no further force or effect and that it was, and is, invalid in the State of Arizona[.]" Id. at 7, ¶ A(1). Mr. Monroe is also seeking a declaration that the May 15, 2007 Marshal's Deed "is void and invalid." Id. at 7, ¶ A(2).
Mr. Monroe's daughter is also a plaintiff in that action alleging, inter alia, wrongful eviction.
The cited references in this paragraph are from the amended complaint in this removed action, but these particular allegations are identical to Mr. Monroe's state court complaint.
A few days after Mr. Monroe filed his state court action, Mr. Miljenovich filed a state court action of his own against Mr. Gagan. Eventually those two actions were consolidated. After consolidation, Mr. Gagan removed the action to the United States District Court, District of Arizona. In turn, on January 4, 2008, the consolidated action was randomly assigned to the Honorable Earl H. Carroll, Senior United States District Court Judge.
Discussion
Shortly after removal, Mr. Gagan filed the present motion seeking to have Monroe transferred to this court pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a) and LRCiv 42.1(a)(1). The latter Rule states, in pertinent part, as follows:
Mr. Gagan also mentions consolidation in passing, but he only specifically seeks a transfer. Mot. (doc. 369) at 1 and 3.
The applicability of this particular Rule is questionable here given that it speaks strictly of "consolidation." Arguably the transfer which Mr. Gagan is seeking comes within the ambit of subsection three, however, which allows a court to "issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a)(1)(3).
Whenever two or more cases are pending before different Judges and any party believes that such cases (A) arise from substantially the same transaction or event; (B) involve substantially the same parties or property; . . . (D) calls for determination of substantially the same question of law; or (E) for any other reason would entail substantial duplication of labor if heard by different Judges, any party may file a motion to transfer the case or cases involved to a single Judge.
LRCiv. 42.1(a)(1) (emphasis added). Mr. Gagan stresses that the validity of the Indiana judgment was repeatedly argued in Gagan, and it is again being challenged in Monroe. Accordingly, Mr. Gagan contends that transfer of Monroe to this court is proper because "the exact requirements" of LRCiv 42.1(a)(1) are met in that Monroe "involves substantially the same transaction or event, the same parties and property, calls for the same determination of the same questions of law and could create a . . . substantial duplication of labor" if Judge Carroll were to proceed with Monroe. Mot. (doc. 369) at 3 and 2.
Mr. Monroe's response misses the mark. Rather than addressing these transfer arguments, he focuses primarily upon jurisdictional and other arguments which are germane to the pending motion to remand, but not to this transfer motion.
On January 28, 2008, the same day this transfer motion was filed, the Monroes filed a motion to remand the removed action to state court. Mot. (doc. 7) (2:08-cv-00018-EHC).
"The standard for transfer [pursuant to LRCiv 42.1] is similar to the standard for consolidation under Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and district courts have broad discretion in determining whether to grant such motions." Pangerl v. Ehrlich, 2007 WL 686703, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2007) (citingInvestors Research Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Cent. Dist. of California, 877 F.2d 777 ([9th Cir.] 1989)). By its terms, LRCiv 42.1(a)(1) does not require that each of its subsections be shown before a transfer is proper thereunder. In the present case, though, several of those subsections do apply. First, Monroe "arises from substantially the same transaction or events" asGagan in that both pertain to the validity of the Indiana judgment. Likewise, there is no doubt that Gagan and Monroe involve "substantially the same parties or property" given that Messrs. Gagan and Monroe were parties in Gagan and they are parties in Monroe as well. Additionally, the United States Marshal's sale which Mr. Monroe is challenging in Monroe, arose directly as a result of Gagan.
Furthermore, both Gagan and Monroe involve "substantially the same question of law," i.e. the validity of the Indiana judgment. The court is keenly aware that in Monroe there are also issues pertaining to Mr. Gagan's alleged failure to comply with Arizona state law regarding homestead exemptions. At the same time, however, the court cannot ignore the fact that in Monroe, as noted earlier, Mr. Monroe is explicitly seeking a declaration that the Indiana judgment is invalid — an issue which this court addressed on more than one occasion in Gagan. Thus, while, as Mr. Gagan concedes, Gagan and Monroe do not involve "the exact same question of law," exactness is not the standard under LRCiv. 42.1(a)(1). See Reply (doc. 373) at 2.
Last, but certainly not least, subsection (E), the broad, catch-all provision of LRCiv 42.1(a)(1), provides ample justification for transferring Monroe to this court. Given this court's intimate familiarity with Gagan, gained by presiding over that litigation for more than a decade, the court finds that there would be a "substantial duplication of labor" if Judge Carroll were to retain Monroe. Requiring Judge Carroll to, colloquially speaking, "get up to speed" on this protracted litigation would not be in the interest of judicial economy. Rather, judicial economy and the avoidance of duplicative efforts favors transferring Monroe to this court.
Moreover, although Mr. Gagan does not specifically invoke LRCiv 42.1(a)(1)(4), the factors enumerated therein also weigh heavily in favor of a transfer here. That Rule provides in relevant part as follows:
In determining the Judge to whom the case . . . will be assigned pursuant to subparagraph (a)(1) . . . above, the following factors may be considered: (A) whether substantive matters have been considered in a case; (B) which Judge has the most familiarity with the issues involved in the case; (C) whether a case is reasonably viewed as the lead or principal case; or (D) any other factor serving the interest of judicial economy.
LRCiv 42.1(a)(1)(4) (emphasis added). First, due to the fact thatMonroe was fairly recently removed, Judge Carroll has not yet considered any substantive matters in that case. Second, undeniably this court has "the most familiarity with the issues involved" in Monroe in that this court's rulings in Gagan set the stage for the U.S. Marshal's sale, which is being challenged inMonroe. Third, for these reasons, as well as those previously discussed, transfer and reassignment of Monroe to this court would best serve the "interest of judicial economy."
Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Mr. Gagan's motion to transfer (doc. 369) the case of Monroe v. Gagan, 2:08-cv-00018-EHC is GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Gagan's unopposed request for an extension of time in which to file an answer to the amended complaint in Monroe is GRANTED; he shall have ten (10) days from the entry date of this order in which to file and serve such answer; and
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that a copy of this order shall be provided to Senior United States District Court Judge Earl H. Carroll.