Opinion
C/A 0:23-cv-1263-JFA-JDA
04-03-2023
Calvin L. Gaddy, a/k/a Calvin Lyndale Gaddy, Plaintiff, v. State of South Carolina, Ex. Solicitor Douglas A. Barfield Jr.; Attorney General; U.S. State Magistrate Judge; Sheriff Barry S. Faile, Sheriff for Lancaster County; Lancaster County Clerk of Court, Jeff Hammond; Esquire Attorney General, Alan McCory Wilson, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JACQUELYN D. AUSTIN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Calvin L. Gaddy (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in such pro se cases and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Plaintiff is a state inmate in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections and is currently incarcerated at the Manning Correctional Institution. [Doc. 1 at 2.] Plaintiff files this action requesting leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. [Doc. 2.] However, Plaintiff is subject to the three-strikes rule of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-71 (1996) (“PLRA”). Accordingly, for the reasons explained below, it is recommended that the motion to proceed in forma pauperis be denied and that the Complaint be dismissed unless Plaintiff timely pays the full filing fee.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint on the standard form along with certain attachments. [Docs. 1; 1-1; 1-2; 1-3.] The Court has carefully reviewed all of Plaintiff's submitted documents.
Plaintiff brings this action purportedly against the above-named Defendants. The undersigned notes that Plaintiff makes allegations in this case similar to allegations made by him in other cases filed in this Court including Gaddy v. McCall, No. 8:10-cv-1743; Gaddy v. South Carolina District Courts, No. 8:13-cv-2387; Gaddy v. United States District Court, No. 8:18-cv-1445; and Gaddy v. U.S. District Court, No. 8:19-cv-1700. Indeed, Plaintiff cites those prior cases and includes documents from some of those cases in the present action to support his Complaint. [See, e.g., Docs. 1 at 5-6; 1-2 at 3-4; 1-3 at 3-4, 8.]
While the Complaint is nonsensical and difficult to decipher, Plaintiff makes various allegations related to prior actions that have been litigated in this Court. [Docs. 1; 1-1; 1-2; 1-3.] The crux of this action appears to be a challenge to various prior rulings made by this Court and the state courts in Plaintiff's attempts to challenge his conviction and sentence. [See, e.g., Doc. 1 at 4 (alleging “US district court Magistrate Judge granted [A] favorable summary judgment on behalf of state opp[on]ents with their burden of proof the missing public records . . .”).] For his injuries, Plaintiff asserts as follows:
Injuries occurred. When Remitt[it]ur was sent back lower court's exhausted irrep[ar]able harmed. Los[s] of liberty
interest cause of a[n] unconstitutional grand jury action. True billing activity was true billed in Chester County Jurisdiction not where Lancaster County Sheriff department affidavits arrest warrant K-124617. Said crime committed.[Id. at 8.] For his relief, Plaintiff appears to seek money damages. [Id.]
APPLICABLE LAW
The PLRA, requires this Court to engage in a preliminary screening of any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must identify “cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion [thereof, that] is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Further, the PLRA limits the ability of prisoners to file civil actions without prepayment of filing fees. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203-04 (2007). The three-strikes rule provides:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Thus, “[w]hen a prisoner has previously filed at least three actions or appeals that were dismissed on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Act's ‘three strikes' provision requires that the prisoner demonstrate imminent danger of serious physical injury in order to proceed without prepayment of fees.” McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 393-94 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)), abrogated on other grounds by Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S.Ct. 1721 (2020).
In Lomax, the Supreme Court held that a dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim qualifies as a strike under § 1915(g), abrogating the holding of McLean that a dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim does not constitute a strike. Lomax, 140 S.Ct. at 1724.
The PLRA's three-strikes rule was enacted to bar prisoners, such as Plaintiff, who have filed prior frivolous or meritless litigation in a federal court from pursuing certain types of federal civil litigation without prepayment of the filing fee. Lomax, 140 S.Ct. at 1726. To avoid application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), a prisoner may prepay the filing fee in full. Nevertheless, all civil lawsuits brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity, officer, or employee are subject to screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, even those lawsuits where the full filing fee is paid at the time of filing. See Green v. Young, 454 F.3d 405, 407 (4th Cir. 2006).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff is subject to the three-strikes rule under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Plaintiff is a “frequent filer” who has filed fourteen cases in this Court. At least three of Plaintiff's prior cases have been deemed a strike under the PLRA in accordance with the standard set forth in Lomax:
The Court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff's prior actions filed in this Court. See Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”). In addition to the present action (case number 23-1263), Plaintiff has previously filed actions at case numbers 10-1743, 12-3549, 13-1586, 13-2387, 13-2541, 15-2772, 15-3706, 16-1335, 18-1325, 18-1445, 19-1700, and 20-0737.
In addition to the three cases cited herein, the undersigned notes that some of Plaintiff's other cases likely would qualify for a strike under the PLRA. For example, case numbers 12-3549 and 13-1586 were both dismissed with prejudice on the merits.
1. Gaddy v. U.S. District Court Columbia, No. 0:18-cv-1445, ECF No. 15 (D.S.C. July 9, 2018) (strike because case dismissed as frivolous), aff'd, 745 Fed.Appx. 507 (4th Cir. 2018);
2. Gaddy v. State of South Carolina, No. 0:16-cv-1335, ECF No. 20 (D.S.C. Aug. 9, 2016) (strike because case dismissed as frivolous);
3. Gaddy v. S.C. Dep't of Corr. Office of Gen. Counsel, No. 8:15-cv-2772, ECF No. 25 (D.S.C. Feb. 11, 2016) (strike because case dismissed as frivolous), aff'd, 667 Fed.Appx. 798 (4th Cir. 2016).
Accordingly, in light of his three strikes, Plaintiff cannot proceed with the instant Complaint under the in forma pauperis statute unless his claim satisfies the exception for imminent physical harm provided by the three-strikes rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Torres v. O'Quinn, 612 F.3d 237, 246 (4th Cir. 2010).
This Court previously recognized Plaintiff's three strikes noted above and denied his requests to proceed in forma pauperis in at least two prior cases: Gaddy v. United States Federal Courts, No. 8:20-cv-0737, and Gaddy v. U.S. District Court, No. 8:19-cv-1700.
Plaintiff's claims do not satisfy the § 1915(g) standard of “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” In order to invoke the “imminent danger” exception of § 1915(g), an “inmate must make ‘specific fact allegations of ongoing serious injury, or of a pattern of misconduct evidencing the likelihood of imminent serious physical injury.'” Johnson v. Warner, 200 Fed.Appx. 270, 272 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Martin v. Shelton, 319 F.3d 1048, 1050 (8th Cir. 2003)). Additionally, allegations that are remote, speculative, or hypothetical do not rise to the level of “imminent danger.” See Welch v. Selsky, No. 9:06-cv-00812-LEK-DEP, 2008 WL 238553, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2008) (“The imminent danger an inmate faces, moreover, must be real, and not merely speculative or hypothetical.”); Riches v. Harrelson, No. 6:08-cv-0685-MBS, 2008 WL 1744603, at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 10, 2008).
Plaintiff does not allege, and nothing in the record suggests, that he is in any imminent danger. The alleged misconduct from which Plaintiff seeks relief relates only to past misconduct and the allegations in the Complaint simply do not allege any imminent danger of serious physical injury. See Bryan v. McCall, No. 5:15-cv-871, 2016 WL 529574, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 10, 2016). Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis should be denied.
Plaintiff still may seek to litigate the claims in his Complaint, of course, if he pays the full filing fee. Effective May 1, 2013, the filing fee (set by the Congress and the Judicial Conference of the United States) for a non-habeas civil action is four hundred dollars ($402). As a result, Plaintiff must pay the full filing fee of four hundred dollars ($402). If Plaintiff timely pays the filing fee, the claims in his Complaint will then be subject to review by the undersigned to determine if service of process should be authorized.
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 2] be DENIED. It is further recommended that Plaintiff be given twenty-one (21) days from the date the United States District Judge rules on this Report and Recommendation to pay the filing fee of four hundred dollars ($402) and that the Clerk of Court withhold entry of judgment until such time for payment expires.
If Plaintiff timely pays the filing fee, this action should be sent to the undersigned for further initial review.
If Plaintiff fails to pay the filing fee within the specified time period, it is further recommended that the Complaint be dismissed without prejudice under the three-strikes rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and that the Clerk of Court enter the required final judgment at the close of the twenty-one day period permitted for payment of the filing fee.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).