Opinion
Case No.: 1603009062
02-27-2017
G---- M------, Defendant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Respondent.
REVIEW OF COMMISSIONER'S ORDER
Before the Court is a request for Review of a Commissioner's Order (hereinafter "ROCO") filed on February 6, 2017 by G---- M------ (hereinafter "Defendant"), represented by Monika Germono, Esq., against the State of Delaware (hereinafter "Respondent"), represented by Frank Mieczkowski, Esq., regarding the Commissioner's Order of September 14, 2016 denying the Defendant's Motion to Suppress and the Commissioner's Order of January 5, 2017 finding the Defendant delinquent. On February 8, 2017, the Court received a transcript of the delinquency proceedings. On February 20, 2017, the State filed a Response to the ROCO, requesting the Court deny the Defendant's request and uphold his adjudication.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 11, 2016, the Defendant was charged with Offensive Touching, a misdemeanor, for allegedly touching the thigh of a classmate after she purportedly told him to stop on March 7, 2016. A no-contact order between the victim and Defendant was entered on March 11, 2016, by the Justice of the Peace Court. On March 16, 2016, the Defendant, through his attorney, requested the Court modify the no contact order in order to allow the Defendant to return to school. On March 30, 2016, the Court granted the Motion in part, modifying the no contact order only enough for the Defendant to return to school but prohibiting contact outside of school and ordering that the victim and the Defendant maintain separate lunches and not attend school functions together.
On May 17, 2016, the Defendant, through his attorney, filed a Motion to Compel Discovery, alleging that the State had produced only partial discovery. The Defendant specifically requested the Miranda form used by the police department during his interrogation and any recording made by the police. On May 25, 2016, counsel agreed at the Case Review hearing to withdraw the Motion to Compel and that all discovery would be due at least two (2) weeks before trial. Subsequently, both sides requested separate continuances of the case, which were granted.
On September 2, 2016, the Defendant, through his attorney, filed a Motion to Suppress, alleging that the Officer failed properly advise the Defendant of his rights under Miranda and that, even if he was advised of rights, his waiver of those rights was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The Defendant also alleged that any evidence obtained during the interrogation was the product of coercion and should be suppressed. On September 12, 2016, the State filed a Response to the Defendant's Motion to Suppress, asserting that the Defendant's waiver of Miranda was knowing and voluntary and that the police officer does not need to record the interrogation in order for the waiver to be valid. On September 14, 2016, the Court denied Defendant's Motion to Suppress, finding that the Defendant was seventeen (17) years old, accompanied by his father, not handcuffed, in a school setting, and had prior experiences with the police. The Court denied the Motion to Suppress without holding a fact-finding hearing.
On January 5, 2017, a trial was held regarding the Defendant's charge. At the conclusion of the trial, the Court found the Defendant guilty of the herein charge and ordered the following disposition: Level V secure commitment to Youth Rehabilitative Services (YRS) for an indefinite period of time, suspended for Level III intensive program placement for twelve (12) months with probation. The requirements of probation were as follows: perform twenty-five (25) hours of community service, have no contact with the victim except as part of school attendance, be evaluated for emotional and psychological problems, attend school regularly, and follow a curfew set by probation.
On January 31, 2017, the Defendant requested an extension of time to file the herein ROCO, which the Court denied on February 3, 2017. On February 6, 2017, the Defendant filed the herein ROCO. In the Request, the Defendant asserted that: 1) the Court erred in denying the Motion to Suppress without holding a fact-finding hearing when central facts were in dispute; 2) the Court erred in ruling that the State's failure to provide the Miranda form as requested in discovery was mere "harmless error"; and, 3) the Court abused its discretion in adjudicating the Defendant delinquent.
DISCUSSION
The Court will consider the request to review the Commissioner's Order denying the Defendant's Motion to Suppress and the Commissioner's Order adjudicating the Defendant delinquent separately.
Commissioner's Order Denying Motion to Suppress
The Defendant requests that the Court review the Commissioner's Order denying the Motion to Suppress. The Defendant's original Motion to Suppress asserted that the evidence obtained by the police during the custodial interrogation of the Defendant should be suppressed because the Defendant was not properly informed of his rights under Miranda and, if he was informed of those rights, any waiver of those rights was not done knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The State responded on September 12, 2016, stating that the Defendant was properly advised of his rights under Miranda and that he waived those rights accordingly. On September 14, 2016, the Court denied Defendant's Motion to Suppress, finding that the Defendant was seventeen (17) years old, accompanied by his father, not handcuffed, in a school setting, and had prior experiences with the police. Implicit in the Court's ruling, though not explicitly stated, is that these circumstances listed by the Court imply that the Defendant's waiver of his rights under Miranda was done knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and therefore his statements made during interrogation should not be suppressed.
Therefore, in ruling on the Motion to Suppress, the Court determined the Defendant was properly advised of his rights under Miranda and that he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived those rights. However, in the Motion and the Response, the Defendant and the State allege different facts in support of their respective positions. Specifically, the Defendant's Motion alleged that his father was not present for the entirety of the Defendant's interrogation with the police, whereas the State's Response asserted that his father was present for the "entire interrogation." Additionally, the Defendant's Motion disputed that he had been advised his Miranda rights, whereas the State's Response asserted that he had been advised of those rights. Finally, the Defendant's Motion asserted that the police officer "pressured" him to admit to the offense and informed him that he was "lying" if he did not admit anything, whereas the State's Motion denied that the Defendant was coerced in any way. Therefore, the Motion to Suppress and the Response reflected clear factual discrepancies that question whether the Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights; if so, at what point in the interrogation he was advised of those rights; and, whether he validly waived those rights.
Because the Defendant's statements to the police officer were used to charge him with the herein offense, as well as used at trial to convict him of the herein offense, his waiver of those Miranda rights must be proven by the State by a preponderance of the evidence. In determining whether the waiver of the Defendant's Miranda rights was valid, the Court uses a "totality of the circumstances" standard, which includes analyzing such factors as the Defendant's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence. Juvenile confessions require a "special scrutiny."
Smith v. State, 918 A.2d 1144 (Del. Supr. Ct., 2007).
Smith v. State, 918 A.2d 1144 (Del. Supr. Ct., 2007).
Id., at 1149.
The Court failed to conduct a suppression hearing on those disputed facts. These factual discrepancies question whether the Defendant was properly advised of his rights under Miranda and whether Defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights were valid. Therefore, in order to accurately perform the required "totality of the circumstances analysis," the Court needed to resolve those factual discrepancies that surrounded the interrogation before determining whether the waiver was valid.
The Defendant's ROCO asserts that due to the above factual discrepancies, a fact-finding hearing should have occurred before the Court ruled on the Motion to Suppress. In support of this assertion the Defendant cites State v. Marshall, in which the Superior Court of Delaware reversed a Court of Common Please decision granting a Motion to Suppress stemming from a traffic stop without holding a fact-finding hearing. In Marshall, the Court found that, "absent an adequate factual record, this Court is hard-pressed to reach any determination about the... constitutional arguments the Defendant urges the Court to consider." In its Response to the ROCO, the State cites State v. Manley, which held that an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress need not be held as a matter of course but only if the motion alleges facts that, if proved, would require the granting of relief.
State v. Marshall, 2001 WL 1482236 (Del. Super. Ct., June 29, 2001).
State v. Manley, 706 A.2d 535 (Del. Super. Ct., 1996).
The proper standard of review for denial of a Motion to Suppress is abuse of discretion. To the extent that the Commissioner's decision is based on factual findings, this Court reviews for whether she abused her discretion in determining whether there was sufficient evidence to support those findings and whether those findings were clearly erroneous. However, to the extent that this Court examines the Commissioner's legal conclusions, we review those determinations de novo for errors in formulating or applying legal precepts.
Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1280, 1284-85 (Del. Supr. Ct. 2008).
Id.
Id.
The question of whether the Court should have held a fact-finding hearing before ruling on the Motion to Suppress is a legal determination, rather than a factual one. Accordingly, this Court reviews that question de novo.
The Court finds that the Commissioner erred in not holding a fact finding hearing before ruling on the Motion to Suppress. Delaware Courts have repeatedly held that juvenile confessions and incriminating statements must be afforded "special scrutiny." It is clear from the Motion to Suppress and the Response by the State that there were factual discrepancies that needed to be resolved so that Court could conduct the proper analysis. Therefore, a fact-finding hearing should have occurred before the Court ruled on the Motion. Without that hearing, it is impossible to appropriately determine whether the Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and, if so, whether he validly waived those rights. In not holding a hearing, the Court denied the Defendant the right to have the State prove by a preponderance of the evidence on the record that he was advised of those rights and, if so, properly waived them.
See Brown v. State, 947 A.2d 1062 (Del. 2007); Smith v. State, 918 A.2d 1144, 1150 (Del.2007); Brown v. State, 1991 Del. LEXIS 372 (Del.1991); Marine v. State, 607 A.2d 1185, 1197 (Del.1992); Blankenship v. State, 447 A.2d 428, 431 (Del.1982).
Smith v. State, 918 A.2d 1144 (Del. Supr. Ct., 2007).
This determination is in line with the Delaware Superior Court's ruling in Manley, which held that an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress is only necessary if the facts, if proved, would require that the Motion be granted. The Court acknowledges that it is not bound by the rulings of the Delaware Superior Court, but nonetheless affords weight to those decisions by our colleagues. In the herein case, the Defendant asserted that he was coerced, that he was told he was lying by the police officer, and that his father was not in the room for part of the interrogation. In looking at the totality of the circumstances standard to determine whether a waiver of Miranda is valid, these facts may render the Defendant's waiver invalid, and if so, would necessitate the granting of his Motion to Suppress under Manley.
State v. Manley, 706 A.2d 535 (Del. Super. Ct., 1996).
Deputy v. State, 500 A.2d 581, 590 (Del. Supr. Ct., 1985) (stating that the State's burden of proving a waiver is a "heavy" one and that the Court will indulge all reasonable presumptions against a finding of a waiver).
The State, in its original Response to the Motion to Suppress, asserted that a confession is not inadmissible merely because the person making it is a minor. The State also asserted that although confessions and admissions of a juvenile require special scrutiny, the standard for determining whether there is a knowing and voluntary waiver is the same for adults and juveniles, which is the totality of the circumstances standard. While both of these arguments are true, without a hearing to determine the facts surrounding the circumstances of the Defendant's waiver, it is impossible to determine whether that waiver was valid. In ruling that the Court should have held a fact finding hearing before ruling on the Motion to Suppress, the Court is not determining that the waiver was invalid; rather, the Court is merely determining that the Commissioner lacked the necessary facts to draw that conclusion without a fact-finding hearing.
State v. Singer, 1979 WL 195351, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 6, 1979).
Marine v. State, 607 A.2d 1185, 1197 (Del. Supr. Ct., 1992).
Smith v. State, 918 A.2d 1144 (Del. Supr. Ct., 2007).
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Commissioner erred in not holding a fact-finding hearing before ruling on the Motion to Suppress.
Commissioner's Order Adjudicating the Defendant Delinquent
The Defendant requests that the Court review the Commissioner's Order adjudicating the Defendant delinquent of the crime of Offensive Touching, a misdemeanor. A party may seek a review of a Commissioner's Order pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 915(d)(1) which provides:
In violation of 11 Del. C. §601.
Any party, except a party in default of appearance before a Commissioner, may appeal a final order of a Commissioner to a judge of the Court by filing and serving written objections to such Order, as provided by rules of the Court, within 30 days from the date of a Commissioner's Order. A judge of the Court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the Commissioner's Order to which objection is made. A judge of the Court may accept, reject or modify in whole or in part the Order of the Commissioner. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the Commissioner with instruction.
Pursuant to Family Court Civil Rule 53.1(b), an appeal of a Commissioner's Order must "set forth with particularity the basis for each objection." Upon reviewing the matter, a judge of the Court will make a de novo determination regarding the portions of the Commissioner's Order to which objections are made. A judge will make an independent decision by reviewing the Commissioner's findings of fact determined at the Commissioner's hearing, any testimony and documentary evidence on the record, and the specific objections of the moving party. While the Court is not bound by the Commissioner's findings, the factual findings are accepted unless clearly wrong and justice requires an alternative result. The Court will give particular weight to findings regarding the credibility of witnesses.
Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 53.1(b).
10 Del.C. § 915(d)(1). see also Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 53.1(e).
C.M. v. L. A., 2007 WL 4793042, *1 (Del.Fam.2007).
10 Del. C. § 915(d)(1); see also Moffett v. Archer, 1998 WL 665582 (Del. Fam. 1998).
C.A. v. C.A., 2007 WL 4793921 at *1 (Del. Fam. Ct. Apr. 3, 2007).
In the ROCO, the Defendant asserted two errors made in the adjudication that render the ruling invalid, including: 1) the Court erred in determining that the State's failure to provide an unsigned Miranda form as requested in discovery was mere "harmless error"; and, 2) the Court abused its discretion in adjudicating the Defendant delinquent. The Court will consider each alleged error in turn.
Discovery Error by Not Providing Miranda Form
In his ROCO, the Defendant asserted that the State failed to provide the Miranda form used during the interrogation as requested, a violation of Family Court Rule 16 and Brady. The Defendant specifically requested this form in his Motion to Compel filed on May 17, 2016, but was never provided it by the State. At trial, the State sought to use this form as evidence that the Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights based on the time written on the form by the police officer. Although the State did not seek to admit the form into evidence, the State clearly sought to use the form to provide weight to its assertion that the police officer had advised the Defendant of his rights under Miranda at the time written on the form. However, the Court found that although the State's failure to provide the unsigned Miranda form was in error, it was merely a "harmless error."
Delaware Family Court Rules of Criminal Procedure No. 16 provides, in part:
(b)The person charged may serve upon the Attorney General a request to permit the person charged or someone acting on that person's behalf to inspect and copy or photograph designated books, papers, documents, tangible objects, buildings or places, copies or portions thereof which are within the possession, custody or control of the State, upon a showing that the items sought may be material to the preparation of defense and that the request is reasonable
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment).
The State's failure to produce evidence must be evaluated under the standard set by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland. In Brady, the Court held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." A showing of materiality does not require a "demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the Defendant's acquittal, but rather whether in the absence of the undisclosed evidence the Defendant received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence."
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
J.A.Z. v. State, 2003 WL 22265055, at *2 (Del. Fam. Ct., Jan. 3, 2003); see also Jackson v. State, 770 A.2d 506, 516 (Del. Supr. Ct., 2000) (using the standard outline in Delaware Family Court Rules of Criminal Procedure No. 16).
Although the Court reviews Commissioner's Orders de novo, the Court reviews applications of discovery rules for an abuse of discretion, and will reverse "only if substantial rights of the accused are prejudicially affected." In reviewing a disclosure violation, the Court applies a three-part test: 1) the centrality of the error to the case; 2) the closeness of the case; and, 3) the steps taken by the court to mitigate the results of the error.
Fuller v. State, 922 A.2d 415 (Del. Supr. Ct., 2007) (citing Hopkins v. State, 893 A.2d 922, 926 (Del. Supr. Ct., 2006) (quoting Secrest v. State, 679 A.2d 58, 63 (Del. Supr. Ct., 1996).
Secrest v. State, 679 A.2d 58, 64 (Del. Supr. Ct., 1996).
This case is largely a case based on the respective statements of two adolescents, with little other evidence produced by the State. Therefore, each piece of evidence used to build the case against the Defendant is important and should be evaluated accordingly. Based on the factors outlined above, the Court finds that the Commissioner abused her discretion in determining that the failure to produce the unsigned Miranda form was merely a "harmless error." The evidence against the Defendant in this case was extremely sparse and consisted only of the allegation by the alleged victim that the Defendant touched her leg without her permission. Although the police officer testified that the Defendant admitted to touching the alleged victim's leg, the Defendant stated that the alleged victim never told him to stop. No other evidence was presented at trial to assert that the Defendant touched the alleged victim without her permission. On the other hand, the Defendant produced text messages indicating that the Defendant and the alleged victim had a flirtatious relationship, and the alleged victim admitted during cross-examination that she was holding the Defendant's hand while he touched her leg. Additionally, the alleged victim failed to report this incident on the day it occurred, but rather waited four (4) days to report it to the school's administration. Therefore, the Court finds that the evidence against the Defendant is extremely sparse. Accordingly, the failure of the State to produce the unsigned Miranda form, which the State then used in its case to assert that the Defendant was properly advised of his Miranda rights, was a prejudicial error under the three part test for determining the weight of a disclosure violation. In this case, the Defendant's statement that he touched the alleged victim's leg is vital to the State's case; without his admission, the State's entire case consists of the victim's statement. No witnesses testified who saw the occurrence. Therefore, a central tenant of the Defendant's case is the circumstances surrounding his statement and the validity of that statement. The Defendant could have used this form in its Motion to Suppress to provide evidence that the Defendant was not properly advised of his rights and, if he was, that he did not validly waive those rights. At least, the Defendant would have been on notice when the State sought to use this form to assert that the Defendant had been advised of those rights.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Commissioner abused her discretion in finding that the State's failure to produce the time-stamped, unsigned Miranda form was merely a harmless error. The Court finds that this error was prejudicial to the Defendant and thus his adjudication should be vacated.
Fuller v. State, 922 A.2d 415 (Del. Supr. Ct., 2007) (citing the abuse of discretion standard for a trial court's application of discovery rules).
Order Adjudicating the Defendant Delinquent
The Court will now consider whether the evidence presented was sufficient to adjudicate the Defendant delinquent of the herein offense. No person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of the offense is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In a case against a Defendant charged with offensive touching, the state must prove that the Defendant intentionally touched another person either with a member of his or her body or with any instrument, knowing that the person is thereby likely to cause offense or alarm to such other person. For example, in State v. Wood, the Court determined that a juvenile who threw a shoe and then kicked someone in the leg was guilty of offensive touching.
State v. Wood, 931 A.2d 1008, 1014 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2007). --------
The Court finds that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant knew that the alleged victim would be alarmed by him touching her thigh. The Defendant produced text messages between the victim and himself that were flirtatious; the alleged victim also stated that she was holding the Defendant's hand at the time the touching occurred. These circumstances indicate that the Defendant could have believed that the alleged victim would not be offended if he touched her leg. Additionally, the Defendant claims that the alleged victim never told him to stop touching her leg; the only evidence that she did ask him to stop touching her was her own testimony. No witnesses were offered who testified that they saw the incident. Finally, the alleged victim waited four (4) days to advise the school administration of the situation. The nature of the offense, the school setting, the relationship between the Defendant and the alleged victim, and the extensive period of time between the event and when the alleged victim informed school personnel raises significant questions as to whether this situation occurred in the midst of calamitous teenage relationships that suffer typical ups and downs. The State offered no explanation as to why the alleged victim waited that long to inform anyone other than that she was talking with her friends.
The question before the Court is not whether the Defendant's actions were inappropriate, but whether his actions rose to the level of criminal conduct. The Court finds the State failed to provide evidence that the Defendant knew that him touching the leg of the alleged victim would cause her offense in the context of the testimony. Therefore, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant's actions were intended to offend the alleged victim as required in order to adjudicate a juvenile delinquent of the crime of Offensive Touching.
Therefore, the Court finds that the State failed to meet its burden of proof in this case and that the Commissioner erred in adjudicating the Defendant delinquent of the crime of Offensive Touching.
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that the Commissioner erred in not holding a fact-finding hearing before ruling on the Motion to Suppress. The Court also finds that the State's failure to comply with appropriate discovery requests by the Defendant constituted prejudicial error. Finally, the Court finds that the Court erred in adjudicating the Defendant delinquent of the herein offense. Accordingly, the Defendant's request for Review of Commissioner's Order is hereby GRANTED . The ruling by the Court is hereby REVERSED .
IT IS SO ORDERED.
February 27, 2017
Date Written Order Issued
/s/ _________
ARLENE MINUS COPPADGE, Judge AMC/cap xc: Petitioner and Respondent via regular mail
Date mailed: