Opinion
No. 05-04-01717-CV
Opinion issued November 10, 2008.
On Appeal from the 116th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 03-10936.
Before Justices WRIGHT, O'NEILL, and FRANCIS.
Opinion By Justice Francis.
MEMORANDUM OPINION ON REMAND
Frymire Engineering Co., Inc. appeals the trial court's take-nothing summary judgment on its defective product claims against appellees Jomar International, Inc. and Mixer S.R.L. On original submission, this Court concluded that appellant lacked standing to asserts its claims because it failed to establish a right of equitable subrogation. The Texas Supreme Court, however, reversed and concluded appellant had established such a right. It remanded the case for us to consider appellant's remaining issues.
We now consider whether appellant produced some evidence to survive appellees' no-evidence motion for summary judgment, asserting there was no evidence of injury or causation. We conclude it did. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings
The facts of his case are adequately set out in the supreme court opinion. Frymire Eng'g Co. v. Jomar Int'l, Ltd., 259 S.W.3d 140, 141-42 (Tex. 2008). Briefly, appellant, as subcontractor in a remodeling project at the Renaissance Hotel in Dallas, installed an "Add-A-Valve" to a chilled water line while working on the air conditioning system. The valve was manufactured by appellees. The water line ruptured at the site of the valve, resulting in extensive water damage to the hotel. Appellant's insurer, Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., paid the hotel's owner $458,496 on appellant's behalf. Appellant, by and through Liberty Mutual, then sued appellees for negligence, product liability, and breach of warranty to recoup the indemnification payment, alleging a design defect in the Add-A-Valve caused the rupture and resulting damages. Appellees' no evidence summary judgment motion was directed at injury and causation.
The standard for reviewing a no-evidence motion for summary judgment is well-established. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 581 (Tex. 2006). A products liability claim requires a different measure of proof of causation depending on whether the claim is based on negligence, breach of warranty, or strict liability theory. See Hyundai Motor Co. v. Rodriguez, 995 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex. 1999). A claim based on negligence or breach of warranty requires a showing of proximate cause, while strict liability requires producing cause. Id. Common to both proximate and producing cause is causation in fact, including the requirement that the defendant's conduct or product be a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's injuries. Id.
Appellees asserted there was no evidence of an actual injury suffered by appellant or of a causal connection between an alleged defect in the valve and an actual injury suffered by appellant. In their brief, they argue that "[n]either the claim by the Renaissance or the settlement payment constitutes an injury to Frymire that was caused by any defect in the Add-A-Valve." Appellees' ground was apparently premised on its belief that equitable subrogation does not apply. As stated previously, the supreme court determined otherwise. Under the doctrine, appellant stands in the shoes of the injured party, i.e., Renaissance. See Mendez v. Allstate Property Casualty Ins. Co., 231 S.W.3d 581, 585 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.) ("Subrogation allows one party to take the place of another so that the new party gains the rights of the former party to pursue a claim.") Thus, the injury at issue is not the claim by Renaissance or the settlement payment, but the water damage suffered by Renaissance. The evidence is undisputed such damage occurred. Moreover, in analyzing whether there was evidence that appellees were primarily responsible for the resulting damages for purposes of equitable subrogation, the supreme court set out appellant's expert evidence and concluded appellant "satisfied its summary judgment burden to provide evidence that a design defect in [appellees'] "Add-A-Valve" primarily caused the rupture. . . ." See Frymire Eng'g, 259 S.W.3d at 244.
We reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.