Summary
applying Childs to predecessor of RSA 197:3
Summary of this case from Bedford Chapter-Citizens v. Sch. Admin. Unit #25Opinion
Decided April 5, 1932.
A municipal corporation has power to rescind any action previously taken unless third parties have acquired rights thereunder. Unless otherwise provided by statute a proposition may be carried in a town meeting or other legislative assembly by a majority vote. A vote at a special meeting of a school district, rescinding a vote raising money at its annual meeting is valid though the ballots cast for such rescission do not equal half the number of voters in the district.
PETITION, for a writ of mandamus to compel the defendant Hoar as clerk of the school district of the town of Webster to deliver to the selectmen of that town, in accordance with the provisions of P. L., c. 120, s. 19, an attested copy of the vote of the district at its annual meeting to raise and appropriate the sum of $1,500 for the repair and maintenance of a certain school-house. The petition contains a further prayer that the selectmen, who are joined as defendants, be commanded to include the above-mentioned sum in the amount to be raised by taxation.
The annual meeting was held on March 10, 1931. At special meetings held on June 27 and on August 25 it was voted first to reconsider and then to rescind the vote in question. At neither of the special meetings did the ballots cast equal half the number of voters in the district. The trial court, being of the opinion that a vote of at least one half of the registered voters was essential, ruled as a matter of law that the action taken at each of the special meetings was inoperative. Transferred by Burque, J., on the defendants' exception to this ruling.
Willoughby A. Colby and George A. Kidder (Mr. Kidder orally), for the petitioners.
Robert W. Upton, George P. Cofran and Laurence I. Duncan (Mr. Duncan orally), for the defendants.
"No school district shall raise or appropriate money at any special meeting of the inhabitants thereof. . . unless the ballots cast at such meeting shall be equal in number to at least one half of the number of voters of such district entitled to vote at the regular meeting next preceding such special meeting." P. L., c. 120, s. 3; Laws 1927, c. 56, s. 2. A like restriction is in force with respect to the special meetings of towns and village districts. P. L., c. 42, s. 5; P. L., c. 57, s. 4; Laws 1927, c. 56, s. 1.
Ordinarily, where no rights of third parties have attached, as is the case here, a municipal corporation has the power to reconsider or rescind any action previously taken. Sawyer v. Railroad, 62 N.H. 135, 153, 154; Mitchell v. Brown, 18 N.H. 315. And in the absence of express regulation, "a proposition is carried in a town-meeting, or other legislative assembly, by a majority of the votes cast." Attorney-General v. Shepard, 62 N.H. 383, 384; Attorney-General v. Bickford, 77 N.H. 433, 434. The only question presented, then, is whether the action taken at each of the special district meetings was a vote to raise or appropriate money within the meaning of the statute.
"To `raise' money, as the word is ordinarily understood, is to collect or procure a supply of money for use." Childs v. Company, 70 N.H. 318, 324. To appropriate is to set apart from the public revenue a certain sum for a particular purpose. 1 Words Phrases, 471. It was voted at the second special meeting that the school-house in question should not be opened and that "no moneys" should be expended on its maintenance or repair. A vote not to expend can scarcely be deemed a vote to "raise or appropriate," and while these words are used in a broad sense (Childs v. Company, supra, 325), there is nothing to indicate that they are also used in a contradictory sense.
If the "evil which the legislature intended to avoid by the passage of the limitation" (Childs v. Company, supra, 324) included the rescission as well as the making of appropriations, it is probable that this intent would have been expressed with greater exactness. The purposes for which school districts may raise money are enumerated by statute. P. L., c. 119, s. 3. The act under discussion is merely another means of protecting districts against excessive expenditures. The amendment of 1927 providing for emergencies is consistent with this view. Laws 1927, c. 56, s. 2.
Exception sustained.
All concurred.