Opinion
No. 03-2099 Ma/A.
March 18, 2004
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ALTER JUDGMENT
Before the court is Plaintiff's February 9, 2004 motion to alter judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b). Defendant filed a response on February 17, 2004. For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.
On January 29, 2004, the court entered an order denying Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment. In its order, the court held that Plaintiff was not entitled to file as a single taxpayer and that certain payments to his estranged spouse were child support rather than alimony. Plaintiff now contends that the court's decision that the payments were child support was the result of oversight, omission, mistake, or inadvertence.
Plaintiff moves for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which provides that "[a]ny motion to alter or amend a judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry of the judgment." A plaintiff should be afforded relief from a judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) under only limited circumstances:
First, the movant may demonstrate that the motion is necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment is based. Second, the motion may be granted so that the moving party may present newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence. Third, the motion will be granted if necessary to prevent manifest injustice. . . . Fourth, a Rule 59(e) motion may be justified by an intervening change in controlling law.
The Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments, or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment. Also, amendment of the judgment will be denied if it would serve no useful purpose.
11 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1 (2d ed. 1995) (footnotes omitted); see GenCorp, Inc. v. Am. Int'l Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that Rule 59(e) motions may be granted if there is a clear error of law, newly discovered evidence, an intervening change in controlling law, or to prevent manifest injustice). The court should use its "informed discretion" in deciding whether to grant or deny a Rule 59(e) motion. See Huff v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 119, 122 (6th Cir. 1982).
Plaintiff attempts to raise arguments and present evidence that could have been raised before the entry of judgment. In his motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff argued that, although his attorney had characterized certain payments as child support before the divorce referee, he and his wife had later amended their agreement and agreed that the payments were alimony rather than child support. To support his argument, Plaintiff directed the court to the consent order approved by the state court, which used the term "as and for support" rather than child support. The court held that this choice of terms, standing alone, was insufficient to raise an issue of fact about whether the parties had agreed to amend their previous agreement. In ruling against Plaintiff on this issue, the court stated "[t]he only evidence Plaintiff cites in support of his contention is the consent order itself." Plaintiff's motion to alter the judgment cites portions of the record that Plaintiff contends further support his argument that the parties agreed to amend their agreement, thus creating a genuine issue of fact for trial. The depositions he cites, however, are not new evidence and were available to Plaintiff at the time the earlier motions were filed. The court will not revisit this issue based on evidence available to Plaintiff at the time the previous motions were filed.
To the extent Plaintiff argues that the court should have found this evidence on its own, he is incorrect. See Interroyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir. 1989) ("A district court is not required to speculate on which portion of the record the nonmoving party relies, nor is it obligated to wade through and search the entire record for some specific facts that might support the nonmoving party's claim.")
Plaintiff then makes two arguments he did not previously make in his motion for summary judgment or his response to Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Both of these arguments could have been made before the court granted summary judgment to Defendant. Consideration of these arguments would be inappropriate under Rule 59(e).
Rule 60(b)(1), which allows relief from judgment due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, also does not justify setting aside the court's judgment. Rule 60(b)(1) relief encompasses mistakes that constitute inadvertent judicial oversight. Barrier v. Beaver, 712 F.2d 231, 234-35 (6th Cir. 1983) (allowing motion for reconsideration to correct court's mistake of law and recognizing that Rule 60(b)(1) allows for correcting the court's mistakes or errors if motion is filed within normal time for taking an appeal); Wright, Miller Kane,Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2858 (interpreting Rule 60(b)(1) to allow relief due to inadvertent judicial oversight, especially when the motion is filed within the time for appeal) (collecting cases). Here Plaintiff has not demonstrated a mistake or oversight on the part of the court entitling him to relief under Rule 60(b)(1). The court's failure to analyze the specific passages of deposition testimony now cited by Plaintiff was not inadvertent judicial oversight because Plaintiff did not direct the court to those passages until after the grant of summary judgment. Nor was it a mistake for the court to fail to consider arguments not made to it.
The court does not mean to suggest that Plaintiff would have succeeded had he brought these facts or arguments to the court's attention earlier.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion to alter judgment is DENIED.
So ORDERED.