Opinion
C/A No.: 6:20-1067-RMG-KFM
04-09-2020
Rodercus Freeman, Petitioner, v. S.W. Phelps, Respondent.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The petitioner, proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for habeas relief. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
The petitioner's § 2241 petition was entered on the docket on March 16, 2020 (doc. 1). Upon review, the undersigned recommends that the instant matter be dismissed without requiring the respondent to file an answer or return.
ALLEGATIONS
The petitioner is currently serving a 24-month sentence for a supervised release violation, which was imposed in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. See United States v. Freeman, C/A No. 2:0-cr-20082-SHL-1 (W.D. Tenn.). In Ground One, the petitioner indicates that it is not safe for him to remain at FCI Edgefield and argues that he is entitled to an inner regional transfer (doc. 1 at 8). In Ground Two, the petitioner asserts that his requests to transfer to another BOP facility have been denied (id.).
Phillips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts "may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record."); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We note that '[t]he most frequent use of judicial notice . . . is in noticing the content of court records.'").
For relief, the petitioner seeks to be transferred so he can complete his rehabilitation prior to his release, which he contends is set for August 2020 (id. at 8, 9).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The undersigned has reviewed the petition pursuant to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214; and other habeas corpus statutes. As a pro se litigant, the petitioner's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The mandated liberal construction means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the petitioner could prevail, it should do so. However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
The petitioner filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (doc. 1). Because the petitioner is incarcerated in the District of South Carolina and he names the warden of FCI Edgefield as the respondent, his § 2241 petition is properly filed in this court. The petitioner seeks a transfer to another BOP facility and alleges it is unsafe for him to stay at FCI Edgefield (doc. 1 at 8). For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends dismissing the petition without prejudice and without requiring the respondent to file an answer or return.
Prisoners have two main avenues for challenging their incarceration: civil rights claims and petitions for habeas corpus. See Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006). The Supreme Court, in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), set forth that challenges to the fact or duration of a prisoner's physical imprisonment (seeking a determination that a prisoner is entitled to immediate or speedier release) must be pursued in a habeas corpus action. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500; Rice v. Lamanna, 451 F. Supp. 2d 755, 758 (D.S.C. 2006) (noting that "[g]enerally, a § 2241 petition 'attacks the execution of a sentence rather than its validity'") (quoting Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir. 1996)). Unlawful confinement in the wrong institution could fall within the ambit of § 2241 habeas relief when "a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody." Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499-500. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has not issued a published decision finding that habeas relief is inapplicable to conditions-of-confinement claims; however, the Court of Appeals has addressed the matter several times in unpublished opinions. See Wilborn v. Mansukhani, 795 F. App'x 157, 163-64 (4th Cir. 2019) (unpublished per curiam opinion) (collecting cases). As such, here, the petitioner's assertion that he is entitled to an inner regional transfer is not cognizable in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus because, even if successful, it will be of no effect on the fact or duration of his sentence. In light of the foregoing, the court finds that the petitioner's claim does not fall within the scope of habeas corpus. Rodriguez v. Ratledge, 715 F. App'x 261, 265-66 (4th Cir. 2017) (per curiam unpublished decision); see Hill, 547 U.S. at 579 (finding that "Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus. An inmate's challenge to the circumstances of his confinement, however, may be brought under § 1983"); Preiser, 411 U.S. at 498 (recognizing that the core of habeas corpus involves challenges to "the fact or duration of [a prisoner's] physical confinement itself," and the relief sought is immediate or speedier release from such confinement). Nevertheless, even presuming § 2241 provided relief for the petitioner in this context, the petitioner's claims are subject to dismissal on the merits. See e.g., Wilborn, 795 F. App'x at 164.
Because the petitioner is a federal prisoner, civil rights relief is available to him pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 399 (1999). A Bivens claim is analogous to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; federal officials cannot be sued under § 1983, however, because they do not act under color of state law. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814-20 (1982). Case law involving § 1983 claims is applicable in Bivens actions and vice versa. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839 (1994); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).
Here, the petitioner's assertions that he is entitled to an inner regional transfer to another prison and that he is not safe at FCI Edgefield do not provide a basis for relief. Indeed, Congress has delegated decisions regarding inmate custody classification and placement in the BOP programs and facilities to the full discretion of federal prison officials. See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 217 (1976). Moreover, the petitioner has no protected constitutional interest in being housed in a particular institution, at a particular custody level, or in a particular unit of a correctional institution. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250-51 (1983) (holding that inmates have no due process right to choose their place of confinement). As such, even presuming the petitioner could bring the claims in the instant action in a habeas proceeding, he seeks relief that this Court cannot grant. As such, the instant petition is subject to summary dismissal.
RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned is of the opinion that the petitioner cannot cure the defects identified above by amending his petition. Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, 807 F.3d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 2015). As noted in more detail above the instant action is not cognizable as a habeas petition, the petitioner has no constitutional right to be housed in a specific institution, and the court cannot grant the relief requested. Thus, the undersigned recommends that the court decline to automatically give the petitioner leave to amend his petition. Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that the District Court dismiss this action without prejudice and without requiring the respondent to file a return. The petitioner's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Kevin F. McDonald
United States Magistrate Judge April 9, 2020
Greenville, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).