Opinion
Case No. 1:04cv2503.
February 10, 2006
OPINION ORDER
Before the Court is a Motion for Protective Order (Doc. # 23) filed by the Defendant Board of Trustees of the Teamsters Joint Council No. 41 Severance Plan ("Board of Trustees" or "Defendant"). In this action, brought under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), Plaintiff Terrance Freeman ("Freeman") seeks review of Defendant's denial of his request for severance benefits he claims to have earned for a period of about eighteen years. In the present motion, Defendant requests that the Court limit discovery sought by Freeman only to the administrative record before Defendant when it denied Freeman's benefit claim (which has already been produced), or, alternatively, that the Court close all discovery in this case. For the reasons articulated below, Defendant's motion is DENIED. Because of the unique circumstances of this case, the Court will permit the limited discovery set forth in this order. I. BACKGROUND
This background information includes only the background necessary for the resolution of the present motion; it is not intended to represent a complete record of the case.
The dispute in the underlying severance benefits claim revolves around whether Freeman worked for a "participating employer" during the years 1973 to 1993, such that Freeman was eligible to earn severance credit in Defendant's severance plan ("the Severance Plan") during that time. A participating employer is defined by the relevant documents as a "participating Teamster Union Local which is a member of Teamsters Joint Council 41" (the Teamsters Joint Council No. 41 ("Joint Council") sponsors the Severance Plan). What would normally be a straightforward issue is complicated by the fact that Freeman claims to have worked as a business agent from 1973 to 1993 for Teamsters Local Union No. 507 ("Local 507"), a participating employer, but that he was being paid by the Cleveland Bakers and Teamsters Pension Fund and the Cleveland Bakers and Teamsters Health and Welfare Fund ("the Funds"), which are non-participating employers. A position as a business agent for Local 507 would qualify Freeman for benefits credits under the Severance Plan. According to Freeman, however, he was working pursuant to a "shared employee" arrangement that existed between Local 507 and the Funds, in which employees performed services for Local 507 (and other local unions) but were officially employed by the Funds.
This "shared employee" arrangement was the subject of an action filed by the Department of Labor against trustees of certain employee benefit plans, including the Funds that paid Freeman, as well as certain unions, including Local 507. See Reich v. Friedman, Case No. 1:92cv1875 (N.D. Ohio 1993). The complaint alleged, among other things, that the defendants "permitted personnel employed by the Plans . . . to perform services for the Defendant Unions without commensurate reimbursement." The action resulted in a consent decree in which the unions agreed to pay nearly $2 million to the employee benefit plans. The consent decree came about, in part, because the defendants unilaterally reorganized their operations to eliminate the offending employment arrangement.
Defendant did not count Freeman's employment from 1973 to 1993 as being by a participating employer, and, therefore, calculated his employment for purposes of Freeman's severance credit as beginning in 1993 based on a statement to that effect signed by Freeman himself in 1995. In 1993, Freeman was elected as Secretary-Treasurer of Local 507, which, although unclear, appears to be the reason that his employment with Local 507 was listed as beginning in 1993 on this signed eligibility form. Sometime thereafter, Freeman became the principal officer of Local 507 and withdrew that union from the Joint Council in 1996, such that Local 507 was no longer a "participating employer" for purposes of Defendant's plan. In 2000, Freeman retired, and, in 2002, Local 507 became reaffiliated with the Joint Council. Based on Freeman's employment history, Defendant calculated Freeman's service credit and account balance as encompassing only the years 1993 to 1995.
In 2003, Freeman formally requested that Defendant recalculate his credit based on his employment from 1973 to 1993 pursuant to the "shared employee" arrangement. On June 15, 2004, the Administrative Committee for the Defendant denied Freeman's claim, and Freeman sought review by the Defendant's Board of Trustees. On July 23, 2004, the Board of Trustees affirmed the denial of Freeman's claim. Pursuant to ERISA, Freeman filed this action on December 21, 2004.
The parties have proceeded with some discovery in this case. Freeman has responded to Defendant's requests for production of documents as well Defendant's interrogatories, and Defendant, likewise, has provided responses to Freeman's interrogatories and document requests. Defendant filed the present motion for a protective order (or, alternatively, to close discovery entirely) after Freeman served subpoenas on third parties, asked for supplemental production of documents and revised interrogatory answers, and sought to take three depositions.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
In an ERISA action where a district court is asked to review the denial of benefits, the district court generally is confined to the administrative record that was before the plan administrator. Wilkins v. Baptist Healthcare System, Inc., 150 F.3d 609, 615 (6th Cir. 1998). It necessarily follows that, as a general rule, discovery outside of the administrative record is not permitted, and the district court may not consider any evidence not presented to the administrator. Id. at 619 (Gilman, J., concurring). The Sixth Circuit has articulated the reason for limiting the district court's scope of review:
The standard of review applied by a district court reviewing an ERISA plan administrator's decision to deny benefits depends on the amount of discretion the plan vests in the administrator. Where the administrator has no discretion under the plan to determine benefits eligibility, a district court reviews the administrator's decision de novo. Calvert v. Firstar Finance, Inc., 409 F.3d 286, 291 (6th Cir. 2005). Where the plan gives the administrator "discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan," however, a district court reviews the decision under an arbitrary and capricious standard. Id. at 292; see also Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). In this case, the Severance Plan and Trust Agreement gives the trustees of the Severance Plan "full discretion and authority to make the final decision regarding all areas of Plan interpretation and administration." Accordingly, the arbitrary and capricious standard of review applies in this case. Although the Court is not now reviewing the merits of the administrator's decision and is only resolving the issue of Defendant's present motion, the applicable standard of review is relevant to the issue of whether discovery concerning any conflict of interest should be permitted (see below, section II.A.).
A primary goal of ERISA was to provide a method for workers and beneficiaries to resolve disputes over benefits inexpensively and expeditiously. Permitting or requiring district courts to consider evidence from both parties that was not presented to the plan administrator would seriously impair the achievement of that goal. If district courts heard evidence not presented to plan administrators, employees and their beneficiaries would receive less protection than Congress intended.Perry v. Simplicity Engineering, 900 F.2d 963, 967 (6th Cir. 1989).
In Wilkins, however, the Sixth Circuit detailed an exception to the general rule prohibiting discovery in ERISA actions; specifically, the court in Wilkins laid out an exception for discovery that seeks evidence "offered in support of a procedural challenge to the administrator's decision, such as an alleged lack of due process afforded by the administrator or alleged bias on its part." Wilkins, 150 F.3d at 619. Such an exception makes obvious sense because evidence in support of a procedural challenge does not affect the merits or substance of the claim that was before the administrator; therefore, consideration of such evidence would not result in district courts "function[ing] as substitute plan administrators." Perry, 900 F.2d at 966.
There is a dearth of case law in the Sixth Circuit as to the exact parameters of this exception, but Judge Carter in the Eastern District of Tennessee recently issued a thoughtful opinion discussing what showing a plaintiff must make in order to warrant discovery under the exception laid out in Wilkins. In Bennett v. Unum Life Insurance Co. of America, 321 F.Supp.2d 925, 933 (E.D. Tenn. 2004), Judge Carter held that
where a claimant 1) identifies specific procedural challenges concerning a fiduciary's decision to deny or terminate ERISA benefits, and 2) makes an initial showing to the court that he has a reasonable basis to make such procedural challenges, then good cause exists to permit the plaintiff to conduct appropriate discovery. Appropriate discovery is discovery that is strictly circumscribed to obtain potential evidence concerning the identified procedural challenges.
This Court finds the Bennett court's reasoning as to this issue, and the guidelines it lays out, to be sound. In order to determine what discovery, if any, should be permitted under the exception laid out in Wilkins, the Court must examine the specific procedural challenges that Freeman identifies as well as whether Freeman has a reasonable basis to make those challenges. In this case, Freeman alleges (1) that there is an inherent conflict of interest in the way the plan is structured, (2) that there is an indication that Defendant is biased against him because Freeman withdrew Local 507 from the Joint Council, and (3) that there were additional procedural defects in the denial of his claim.
Freeman also asserts four additional grounds, aside from those rooted in the "procedural challenge" exception found in Wilkins, to support his argument that discovery should not be limited or closed in this case, or, in other words, that he should be permitted to discover material not included in the administrative record. Only one of those grounds, however, merits discussion: Freeman argues that he should be permitted to engage in discovery to determine what was available to or actually considered by Defendant when it decided Freeman's claim but not included in the administrative record.
Therefore, in order to determine what discovery, if any, should be permitted, the Court will consider (1) Freeman's allegations of conflict of interest, (2) Freeman's allegations of bias, (3) the additional procedural defects alleged, and (4) to what extent Freeman can determine, through discovery, what was available to Defendant but not included in the administrative record.
A. Conflict of Interest
As noted above, see infra, n. 3, the Severance Plan grants the Board of Trustees discretion to determine benefits eligibility, and, therefore, the Court ultimately must review the merits of the Defendant's decision to deny Freeman's claim under the arbitrary and capricious standard, rather than the de novo standard. Calvert, 409 F.3d at 291-92. If some or all of the trustees were operating under a conflict of interest, however, "that conflict must be weighed as a factor in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion." Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 115. Freeman must, therefore, be given an opportunity to explore the issue through discovery if he presents a reasonable basis to challenge whether Defendant operated under a conflict of interest. See Bennett, 321 F.Supp.2d at 933. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit in Calvert acknowledged that it was disadvantaged in weighing the alleged conflict of interest because the plaintiff in that case failed to conduct discovery on the issue. Calvert, 409 F.3d at n. 2 (O'Malley, J.). There, the Sixth Circuit noted it "would have a better feel for the weight to accord this conflict of interest if Calvert (the plaintiff) explored the issue through discovery . . ." but noted that plaintiff's counsel erroneously believed that discovery in an ERISA action was never permissible. Id.
In this case, Freeman argues that there is an inherent conflict of interest in the way the Severance Plan is structured and administered. A closer look at the plan's structure is required to assess Freeman's argument. The Severance Plan was established by the Joint Council to benefit employees of unions affiliated with the Joint Council. The officers of those unions report to the Joint Council the number of employees in their union that are participating in the Severance Plan. For purposes of any conflict of interest, it is significant to examine the people who hold the various official posts of the unions, the Joint Council, and the Board of Trustees of the Severance Plan. According to Defendant's Severance Plan and Trust Agreement, the trustees of the Severance Plan are officers, trustees and directors of the Joint Council itself. The officers, trustees, and directors of the Joint Council are, in turn, made up of officers of the participating unions that are affiliated with the Joint Council, and, as such, participants in the plan. It appears, therefore, that some of the same people who are officers of unions are also officers of the Joint Council as well as trustees of the Defendant Severance Plan. As officers of the unions affiliated with the Joint Council, they are participants of the plan. Some, if not all, of the trustees of the Severance Plan, therefore, are also participants of the plan.
Defendant does not deny Freeman's allegations; rather, it points to the fact that trustees of the Severance Plan are bound, by the terms of the Severance Plan and Trust Agreement, to discharge their duties in accordance with the documents governing the Plan. While that may be the case, the question still remains whether the trustees obeyed their duties in the face of any conflict of interest.
Above is a brief overview of the structure of the Severance Plan and Joint Council; also important is how the Severance Plan is operated. Specifically, for purposes of any conflict of interest, it is significant to see whether the same people both fund and administer the plan. See Killian v. Healthsource Provident Administrators, Inc., 152 F.3d 514, 521 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that an administrator that both funded and administered the plan benefitted directly from the denial of benefits and, therefore, had a conflict of interest). In this case, the Board of Trustees of the Severance Plan administers the plan; the trustees are the ones whose final vote determines who is eligible for benefits. For example, in this case, it was the Board of Trustees to whom Freeman appealed the denial of his claim and who ultimately affirmed the denial of his claim. In addition, the Severance Plan is funded directly by the Joint Council, which pays a portion of the per capita tax that it receives from unions to fund the plan. The number of employees who are counted for purposes of the per capita tax to be paid is determined by union officials, who report the number of participating employees to the Joint Council.
As shown above, the structure of these organizations is such that the trustees who administer the Severance Plan are also officers of the Joint Council, which funds the plan. In addition, not only do the same people who fund the plan also administer the plan, albeit "wearing separate hats," it also appears that many of those same people are also participants in the plan. Presumably, therefore, if the trustees of the Severance Plan allowed Freeman's claim and determined that he was eligible for eighteen additional years of severance benefits, those benefits would be paid from the very same pool as some of the trustees' own benefits. See Killian, 152 F.3d at 521 (finding that an administrator that both funded and administered a benefits plan "incurs a direct expense as a result of the allowance of benefits, and it benefits directly from the denial or discontinuation of benefits.")
Given that structure and operation, as alleged by Freeman (and confirmed, in part, by Defendant's Severance Plan and Trust Agreement), the Court finds that Freeman has a reasonable basis to make a challenge that Defendant operated under a conflict of interest. Accordingly, Freeman must be permitted to explore the alleged conflict of interest through discovery to enable the Court to weigh the extent of the conflict. See Calvert, 490 F.3d at n. 2. The unique circumstances of this case, moreover, bolster the Court's conclusion that broader discovery is warranted. The shared employee arrangement in which Freeman participated, and the subsequent action by the Department of Labor regarding that arrangement, see infra n. 2, heightens the Court's concern regarding an already substantial allegation of conflict of interest. It appears that the existence of the shared employee arrangement would facilitate improper denial of those employees' benefits claims, if Defendant had an incentive to do so. Therefore, it is appropriate in these particular circumstances to allow Freeman to discover information related to (1) whether the trustees themselves would incur a direct expense as a result of the allowance of benefits, and (2) whether any "shared employees" received benefits under the Severance Plan.
B. Bias
Freeman also alleges that there is evidence to support a claim of bias on the part of at least some members of the Board of Trustees against him. According to Freeman, bias may be inferred from the fact that Freeman, as principal officer of Local 507 in 1996, withdrew Local 507 from the Joint Council and moved it to a competing Teamsters joint council. In addition, Freeman points to the fact that he refused to employ Defendant's current counsel as counsel for Local 507 after Freeman became principal officer, and it was this counsel that analyzed Freeman's claim for Defendant and advised Defendant to reject it. In response, Defendant argues that Freeman's withdrawal of Local 507 from the Joint Council would not cause ill-will against Freeman because withdrawal of a union also means that those union employees are not entitled to benefits under the Joint Council's Severance Plan.
The Court does not find Defendant's response compelling. It is obvious that after a union is withdrawn from the Joint Council, its employees would no longer receive benefits under the Joint Council's benefit plans. While that may be the case, it does not follow that the Joint Council is apathetic about the departure of unions that constitute its membership. Certainly without any unions as members, the Joint Council likely would not exist. In addition, given the timing of Local 507's withdrawal from the Joint Council and its later reaffiliation, it appears that Freeman himself was the cause of the separation. Soon after Freeman became a principal officer of Local 507, he withdrew it from the Joint Council; thereafter, less than two years after Freeman retired, Local 507 became reaffiliated with the Joint Council. The timing of those events provides a reasonable basis to infer that there was some rift between Freeman and the Joint Council. In addition, Freeman's allegations that the counsel who analyzed his claims had reason for personal ill-will against Freeman, if true, would support a reasonable basis to find bias. It is difficult for the Court to evaluate Freeman's allegations as to bias on behalf of Defendant's council because Defendant does not address the issue, either to challenge or deny it.
The Court, therefore, finds that Freeman has stated at least a reasonable basis to support a challenge of bias. To that end, Freeman is entitled to discover information that might show that he was treated differently by Defendant than similarly situated employees.
C. Other Procedural Defects
Freeman also argues that there are "procedural defects associated with Defendant's decision that also should be developed during discovery." Specifically, Freeman argues that (1) Defendant does not audit the reports by union officials as to how many employees are participating in the Severance Plan even though the union officials have an incentive to under-report that number, (2) Defendant did not inform the "shared employees" about the potential benefits eligibility implications of the Department of Labor's investigation of the "shared employee" program, and (3) Defendant, after it initially denied Freeman's claim, did not give Freeman the information necessary to further pursue or perfect his claim. In response, Defendant argues that the first two challenges are not valid procedural challenges under Wilkins because they do not challenge the due process afforded to Defendant in the actual processing of his claim. As to the third challenge, Defendant argues that it did provide Freeman with sufficient information to pursue his claim.
The Court agrees with Defendant on these points. First, it is not clear that union officials have any incentive to under-report the number of employees participating in the plan because, while those employees would not receive benefits, they also would not be paying money into the Joint Council's Severance Plan. In other words, the pool of available benefits would remain the same. In any event, Defendant is correct that Freeman's challenge is not a challenge to the actual processing of his claim as it is something that would have occurred on an ongoing basis years before his benefits claim. The second procedural defect Freeman alleges, likewise, is not a valid basis to permit broader discovery. This defect again does not relate to the processing of Freeman's claim, and the Court has already considered the unique circumstances of the shared employee arrangement — and subsequent investigation of that arrangement — as it relates to any conflict of interest.
Finally, Defendant is correct that it provided sufficient information to Freeman to pursue his claim. The initial denial letter sent by Defendant to Freeman, dated June 15, 2004, informed Freeman that "[i]f you should disagree with this determination you may request review by the Board of Trustees." The letter indicated where the request should be sent, the timeframe for the request (60 days), and that Freeman has the right to bring a civil action under ERISA. Given that notification, it cannot be said that the Defendant denied Freeman his due process by failing to inform him of his right to pursue the claim. See Vanderklok v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., Inc., 956 F.2d 610, 616 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding inadequate notice of the denial of benefits where the notice did not provide a specific reason for the denial or explain the procedure to submit claim for review). Therefore, these "procedural defects" alleged by Freeman do not provide him with sufficient ground to expand discovery as to those issues.
D. Information Available but not Included in the Administrative Record
Lastly, Freeman argues that he should be permitted to determine, through discovery, what information was available to, or reviewed by, Defendant but was not included in the administrative record. Specifically, Freeman points to certain meeting minutes that he asked Local 507 to send to Defendants but that did not appear in the administrative record. Defendant counters by arguing that it did not exclude any documents from the administrative record, that it has already provided the entire record to Freeman, and that any new discovery goes beyond the bounds of what was considered by Defendant in denying Freeman's claim.
At the time Freeman requested that his severance credits be recalculated, he asked Local 507 to send to Defendant minutes from a Local 507 Executive Board Meeting that occurred on January 26, 1993. According to Freeman's affidavit (also submitted to Defendant), the minutes of that meeting reflect a decision by the Executive Board of Local 507 to credit Freeman with senioritystarting in 1976 for purposes of severance pay and vacation time. Defendant asked Freeman to provide a copy of these minutes. As they were not in his possession, Freeman asked the Secretary-Treasurer of Local 507 to send the minutes directly to Defendant, as well as "any other documents in the possession of Local 507 that the Trustees of the Severance Fund might subsequently require in order to properly adjust the Entry Date and Retirement Fund Balance." Either the minutes and any other documents from Local 507 were never received, or they were received but not included in the administrative record. Freeman seems to argue that either (1) the minutes were not provided because Local 507 was, at the time of the request, reaffiliated with the Joint Council and had incentive not to provide them (see discussion above regarding conflict of interest), and counsel for Defendant also represented Local 507 and had incentive to withhold them (see above regarding bias); or (2) they were provided by Local 507 but deliberately omitted from the administrative record.
Freeman also argues that he is entitled to discover information that was considered by counsel for Defendant and other "professionals" who recommended denying Freeman's claim. Presumably, this was the same information that was considered by the Trustees and, therefore, is subsumed by Freeman's other arguments about the administrative record. Even to the extent that it is different, which the Court finds unlikely, it was the Trustees that made the ultimate decision, and only the material they reviewed is relevant to the present question. The Court, therefore, rejects Freeman's argument as to this sub-issue.
Freeman's request for further discovery to determine what was not included in the administrative record clearly does not fall within the "procedural challenges" exception set forth in Wilkins. However, Freeman does not request anything beyond what was presented to and actually considered by Defendant; he merely questions whether the administrative record actually contains everything that was before Defendant. In that sense, his request is not in violation of the general rule that a district court "may not admit or consider any evidence notpresented to the administrator." Wilkins, 150 F.3d at 619 (emphasis added). As the Sixth Circuit clearly stated, "[t]here can be no dispute that in this circuit, in an ERISA claim contesting a denial of benefits, the district court is strictly limited to a consideration of the information actually considered by the administrator." Killian, 152 F.3d at 522 (emphasis added).
To the extent Freeman argues the minutes or other documents were never turned over as a result of conflict of interest or bias, those arguments are subsumed by other sections of this order.
Defendant cites to Osborne v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company, 2004 WL 2905395 (W.D. Tenn. 2004), in which the district court granted the defendant's motion for a protective order in a benefit denial case. In that case, the plaintiff sought a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition to determine (1) the identity of the actual administrative record, (2) what parts of the record were not used and received by the administrator to deny his claim, and (3) the basis for the denial of his claim. The district court granted the defendant's motion for a protective order, finding first that the plaintiff's "mere allegations" as to conflict of interest, without support, were not enough to justify further discovery. As to the plaintiff's request to discover the identity of the administrative record, the court reasoned that the plaintiff was not entitled to such discovery because "Hartford (the defendant) has repeatedly represented to the court that the administrative record includes all matters considered by the plan administrator." Id. at *3.
The Court finds that Osborne is distinguishable from the present case. First, as discussed above, Freeman has made more than "mere allegations" as to conflict of interest and bias. Second, he has identified specific documents that he requested to be sent to Defendant. If the documents were withheld by Local 507 or intentionally omitted from the administrative record by Defendant, Freeman is entitled to determine that fact through discovery. Again, given the unique circumstances of this case, further limited discovery will be permitted as to this issue.
Certainly, every plaintiff in a benefit denial case is not entitled to determine what was not included in the administrative record because such an exception would swallow the general rule prohibiting discovery in these cases. However, because Freeman has made substantial allegations of conflict of interest and bias, and because he has identified specific documents that would provide significant support to his claim, discovery will be allowed as to this issue. Defendant was aware of the existence of these documents and presumably had access to them as Local 507 had been reafilliated with the Joint Council, the Defendant's sponsor, at the time of Freeman's request. In Warshaw v. Continental Casualty Co., 972 F.Supp. 428, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1997), the district court, in reviewing the denial of benefits, admitted and considered evidence that was not before the administrator but was "reasonably available" to it, finding that the administrator "cannot now exclude records which were available to it, but which it chose not to seek." Id. In the present case, Freeman, at the least, must be able to determine whether the minutes he requested to be sent to Defendant were indeed sent or received.
If it is determined that the minutes and any other documents in the possession of Local 507 were not received by Defendant, but were "reasonably available" to Defendant, the Court may consider whether such documents, if located, might be admissible later in the proceeding. The Court, however, leaves that question for a later time.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated above, Defendant's Motion for Protective Order is DENIED. The Court will allow limited discovery in this case, consistent with the following guidelines. Freeman is permitted to discover information related to:
(1) whether some or all members of the Board of Trustees were operating under and/or affected by a conflict of interest when deciding Freeman's benefit claim;
(2) whether the members of the Board of Trustees were biased against Freeman because of his decision to remove Local 507 from the Joint Council and were affected by that bias in disallowing his claims;
(3) whether any "shared employees" received benefits under the Severance Plan;
(4) whether Freeman was treated differently by Defendant than other similarly situated "shared employees;" and
(5) whether there were any materials presented to or reviewed by Defendant but not included in the administrative record, including the Local 507 Executive Board meeting minutes Freeman requested to be sent to Defendant.
Defendant must respond to Freeman's discovery requests to the extent that the requests relate to the subject areas outlined above. Freeman's discovery, however, will be limited to requests and subpoenas already made or issued at the time Defendant filed the present motion. In considering Defendant's motion, the Court asked counsel for Defendant to submit the precise discovery requests to which he objected because the Motion for Protective Order contained only general references to Freeman's requests. The Court has reviewed those requests and finds that some seek information relating to the subject areas outlined above. Defendant, therefore, is ordered to provide the following, to the extent they relate to those subject areas:
The deadline for non-expert discovery in this case was September 1, 2005, one week after Defendant's present motion was filed. Because only one week remained in the non-expert discovery period at the time Defendant filed its motion, and because the Court is permitting discovery beyond the bounds normally allowed in benefits denial cases brought under ERISA, the Court will not permit any further non-expert discovery that is not detailed in this opinion and that has not already been requested by Freeman.
• Revised answers to Interrogatory numbers 5, 6, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15.
• Additional production of documents in response to Request numbers 5, 10, 11, and 21.
• No more than two depositions limited only to the narrow subject matter laid out in this order.
As to subpoenas served on non-parties, those subpoenas must be complied with to the extent that they seek documents relating to the subject areas outlined above. After reviewing the subpoenas, the Court finds that only the following non-parties must respond to the following requests:
• Teamsters Local Union No. 507: Numbers 15, 16, and 17.
• Teamsters Joint Council No. 41: Numbers 12, 13, and 15.
• Teamsters Local Union No. 507 Pension Fund: Number 11.
• Teamsters Local Union No. 507 Health and Welfare Fund: Number 11.
Defendant and any non-party ordered to comply with discovery in this order may, of course, raise any objections otherwise available and applicable but not addressed in Defendant's Motion for Protective Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.