Opinion
No. 7:01-CV-125-R
January 29, 2002
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
ON THIS DATE, came onto be considered the papers and pleadings filed in this action, and the Court finds and orders as follows:
This is a petition for habeas corpus relief brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by an inmate confined in the James V. Allred Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice in Iowa Park, Texas. Frazier seeks to challenge the validity of a disciplinary action taken against him at the Allred Unit. As a result of the disciplinary proceeding, Frazier lost 240 days of good time credits, suffered a reduction in his custodial status and was placed in solitary confinement for 15 days. Petition ¶ 18.
In support of his petition. Frazier presents the following grounds for relief:
1. His right to freedom of speech was violated because disciplinary action was taken against him for stating his opinion as to what happened to a TDCJ officer, and;
2. A prison official refused to return an answer to his Step One grievance.
The due process rights of prisoners are generally limited to freedom of restraint which "impose atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995). Restrictions which alter
the conditions of confinement do not implicate due process. See Maichi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 958 (5th Cir. 2000) (commissary and cell restrictions); Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1997) (same). A prisoner has a protected liberty interest in the loss of accrued good time only if he is eligible for release to mandatory supervision. Maichi, 211 F.3d at 957-58; see also Creel v. Keene, 928 F.2d 707, 712 (5th Cir) (finding that Texas prisoners have no protected liberty interest in early release on parole), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1210, 111 S.Ct. 2809 (1991).
When a prisoner has a protected liberty interest in the loss of accrued good time credit, the revocation of such credit must comply with minimal procedural due process. Henson v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 213 F.3d 897, 898 (5th Cir. 2000); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975 (1974) (holding that prisoners are entitled to "those minimum pictures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated"). These minimal requirements are: (1) written notice of the alleged disciplinary violation at least 24 hours prior to a hearing; (2) the ability to call witnesses and present documentary evidence when not unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals; and (3) a written statement of the hearing officer as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for any disciplinary action taken. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-66, 94 S, Ct. at 2979. Federal habeas review of the sufficiency of the evidence is extremely limited. Due process requires only "some evidence to support the findings made in the disciplinary hearing." Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454, 105 S.Ct. 2768; see Smith v. Rabalais, 659 F.2d 539, 545 (5th Cir. 1981) (requiring the court to determine whether "any evidence at all" supports disciplinary action taken by prison officials), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 992, 102 S.Ct. 1619 (1982).
The Court initially observes that Petitioner's reduction in custody status level and 15 days of solitary confinement do not implicate due process concerns. See Maichi, 211 F.3d at 958; Madison, 104 F.3d at 768. However, Petitioner also lost 240 days of good time credit. Because Frazier claims to be eligible for release to mandatory supervision, it appears that he has a constitutionally protected liberty interest sufficient to justify the consideration of his claims on the merits. Malchi, 211 F.3d at 958-59.
Unfortunately, Frazier has failed to present a claim that raises any issue of constitutional magnitude with regard to the disciplinary action. He does not claim to have been denied written notice of the alleged disciplinary violation prior to the hearing and he makes no claim that he was denied witnesses, denied the right to present evidence or that he was denied a written statement from the hearing officer as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-66, 94 S.Ct. at 2979. Furthermore, Frazier does not claim that the evidence against him was insufficient to support the finding of guilt. His claim that prison officials can not take action against him for stating his opinion about a TDCJ officer, without more, presents no issue of constitutional magnitude.
Absent a claim that a plaintiff that he has been deprived of some right secured to him by the United States Constitution or laws, neither habeas nor civil rights relief may be had. Thomas v. Torres, 717 F.2d 248, 249 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1010, 104 S.Ct. 1008 (1984). To the extent, if any, that Frazier asks this Court to retry his disciplinary case on the merits, we are without such authority. "[This] court is not required to examine the entire record, make an independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weigh evidence." Hudson v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 2001) (Pogue, J., specially concurring). Federal courts hold no appellate authority over prison disciplinary proceedings and may intervene only to correct errors of constitutional magnitude. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221, 102 S.Ct. 940, 948 (1982). Federal courts "do not sit as a super state supreme court in habeas corpus proceedings to review errors under state law." Cronnon v. State of Alabama, 587 F.2d 246, 250 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974, 99 S.Ct. 1542 (1979). In the case at bar, Frazier has failed to present a ground for relief which could show that the disciplinary action taken against him was constitutionally infirm.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the petition for writ of habeas corpus is hereby DENIED.
A copy of this order shall be mailed to Petitioner.