Opinion
Civil Action No. 02-43-C.
March 21, 2005
ORDER
This matter is before the court on the motions of the defendants, Lear Corporation ("Lear") and Local 43-7 of the United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America ("Union"), for summary judgment. Lear and the Union previously filed motions for summary judgment which were denied without prejudice until the administrative proceedings were concluded. Upon conclusion of those administrative proceedings and the plaintiff's indication that she intended to pursue this action, the defendants renewed their motions for summary judgment. Per this court's order, the plaintiff responded to the renewed motions for summary judgment. The Union has also renewed its motion to strike attachments to the plaintiff's original response brief. The court, having reviewed the record and being otherwise sufficiently advised, will grant both motions for summary judgment, and the court will deny the motion to strike as moot, as the documents filed by the plaintiff, even if taken into consideration, do not affect the court's decision on the summary judgment motions.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following factual allegations are stated in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as she is the non-moving party:
The plaintiff is an employee at Lear. She began working there on August 2, 1999, as an up-grader, which is a job that required her to fill in for absent employees. In February 2000, the plaintiff complained that a fellow employee, Kevin Kneriem, sexually harassed her by touching her buttocks. As a result of her complaint, Lear suspended the employee who harassed her for two-and-one-half days. On February 13, 2001, the company doctor placed medical restrictions on the plaintiff and put her on light duty because she began to experience pain in her right arm.
The plaintiff has been suspended three times. The first occurred on March 26, 2001, when she was given a one-day suspension. The stated reason for her suspension was "poor workmanship" due to missing bolts which caused the assembly line to go down.
On May 3, 2001, the plaintiff was disciplined with a three-day suspension. The stated reason for the second suspension was a violation of Shop Rules #15, #16, and #17, all related to poor workmanship. Specifically, the plaintiff brought the wrong trim cart to the line, forcing a production stoppage. Tim Bowe, the plaintiff's supervisor, cursed at her and threw a box of headrests at her feet immediately after the incident and was disciplined for this behavior.
On May 9, 2001, the plaintiff again caused production to be stopped because she brought the wrong trim cart to the assembly line. She was disciplined for this error on May 18, 2001, charged with violating Shop Rules #15, #16, and #17; she received a five-day suspension for the infractions.
On Saturday, August 4, 2001, the plaintiff re-injured her right arm, but did not report it because she thought that the pain would go away. The following Monday, she reported the injury to Human Resources ("HR"), which told her that she was supposed to file a written report within 24 hours. She responded by explaining that she was unable to report the injury within this time frame because the injury occurred on Saturday. She went to see Lear's doctor at Baptistworx on Monday, and she brought a note from him to HR. Due to this injury, the plaintiff was placed on medical leave instead of light duty.
The plaintiff attempted to file grievances with the Union about the suspensions and the medical leave, but the union representatives refused. She was told that she could appeal the refusal to the local union, which she did. In September 2001, the local union voted to drop the appeal. Then, the plaintiff brought this action under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 ("LMRA"), alleging that Lear violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") by subjecting her to disparate treatment due to her race and by retaliating against her for having complained about sexual harassment. She also named the Union as a defendant, claiming that it breached its duty of fair representation. In addition to her claims under the LMRA, the plaintiff alleges that Lear violated her rights under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. She does not claim violations of federal civil rights laws.
In November 2003, the defendants filed motions for summary judgment arguing that the plaintiff had not exhausted her administrative remedies prior to filing this action. This court denied the motions without prejudice and told the parties to file a joint status report after the appeals process was completed. In response to that order, the local union held a second hearing, where it voted to deny the plaintiff's appeal 27 to 1. The plaintiff attended the hearing and presented evidence to support her claim about her grievances over her suspension and medical leave. Then, the international union reviewed the local union's decision and the process it used. The international union upheld the local union's denial, finding no errors to support the plaintiff's claims. Now, the defendants have renewed their motions for summary judgment. Upon the court's order, the plaintiff filed responses to the defendants' motions.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Summary judgment is proper where there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761, 769 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). "One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. . . ." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. In deciding the motion, the court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. A judge is not to "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). A genuine issue exists only when there is sufficient "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Browning, 283 F.3d at 769 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). The initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests on the moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party must present "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
The moving party does not have to support its motion with evidence disproving the non-moving party's claim. Instead, the moving party need only point out that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 799 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325). The ultimate question is whether the party bearing the burden of proof has presented a jury question as to each element of its case. Id.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
The plaintiff argues that Lear violated the CBA because it discriminated against her based on her race and wrongfully retaliated against her. Specifically, the plaintiff cites her suspensions for shutting down the production line and the denial of her request to work light duty for five weeks. As explained in the rest of the order, the plaintiff has not presented evidence that Lear subjected her to disparate treatment due to her race or wrongfully retaliated against her, so there is no breach of the CBA based on those grounds.
Further, the suspensions and denial of light duty are permissible under the CBA. The CBA provides that managers may create "reasonable shop rules." Shop Rules 15 and 17 are reasonable shop rules, and the plaintiff was suspended in accordance with those shop rules. Thus, Lear did not violate the CBA by suspending the plaintiff. Putting her on medical leave instead of light duty also did not violate the CBA, because the plaintiff failed to comply with the company procedures to receive light duty.
B. Hybrid Claim for Breach of Duty of Fair Representation
The plaintiff commenced this "hybrid § 301 action," arguing that Lear violated the CBA by suspending her for shutting down the production line and denying her the right to work light duty for five weeks and that the Union breached its duty of fair representation by failing to represent her diligently.
A hybrid § 301 suit implicates the interrelationship among a union member, her union, and her employer. White v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 899 F.2d 555, 561 (6th Cir. 1990). The union member must prove both (1) that the employer breached the CBA and (2) that the union breached its duty of fair representation. Id. at 559. If the union member fails to prove that the union breached its duty, she will recover nothing from the union. If the union member fails to prove that the employer breached the CBA, she will also recover nothing, because the union member's grievance would have failed regardless of the union's representation. As discussed above, the plaintiff has not presented proof of a violation of the CBA. Thus, the plaintiff's claim against the Union for breach of fair representation fails.
C. Discrimination Claims
The plaintiff alleges that Lear discriminated against her by: (1) subjecting her to disparate treatment; (2) retaliating against her for complaining of sexual harassment; and (3) forcing her to work under hostile conditions. She also argues that the Union violated its duty by allowing the hostile working conditions to persist. For the reasons explained below, summary judgment is appropriate on all of the plaintiff's claims.
1. Disparate Treatment
The plaintiff alleges that she was treated in a disparate manner as a result of her race and/or gender. Since there is no direct evidence of race or gender discrimination, the three-part test in McDonnell-Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), applies to the plaintiff's claims under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. The plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Once the plaintiff has done so, the defendant has the burden of articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). "The defendant need not prove a nondiscriminatory reason for [its action], but need merely articulate a valid rationale." Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 800 (6th Cir. 1996). The plaintiff must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's reason is a pretext for racial discrimination. "Pretext" may be established by showing that the discriminatory reason more than likely motivated the employer or by an indirect showing that the employer's explanation is not credible. Kline v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 1997).
Assuming without deciding that the plaintiff met her burden of establishing a prima facie case of race and/or gender discrimination, the court finds that Lear has articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions and the plaintiff has failed to present any evidence to establish that the reason is a mere pretext for racial or gender discrimination. Lear claims to have suspended the plaintiff for her poor work performance in causing the production line to shut down on multiple occasions, which is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. Lear denied her light duty and placed her on medical leave allegedly because she failed to comply with company policies regarding light duty for work-related injuries. Again, this is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason against which, in response, the plaintiff has presented no evidence of pretext. While the plaintiff vigorously maintains that Lear placed her on medical leave instead of light duty and that Lear suspended her because of her race and/or gender, those conclusory allegations alone are insufficient to withstand Lear's motion for summary judgment. McDonald v. Union Camp, 898 F.2d 1155, 1162 (6th Cir. 1990).
2. Retaliation
The plaintiff alleges that Lear wrongfully retaliated against her for reporting sexual harassment in 2000 and for taking light duty in 2001. She has not presented evidence sufficient to avoid summary judgment. She has not established a prima facie case of retaliation and, even if she had met that burden, she has not presented any evidence that Lear's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for these actions were pretextual.
The plaintiff has presented no causal connection between her sexual harassment claim and the suspension. To establish a causal link, the plaintiff is required only to proffer evidence sufficient to raise the inference that the protected activity was likely the reason for the adverse employment action. Zanders v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 898 F.2d 1127, 1135 (6th Cir. 1990). This burden is minimal and less than that required to win a judgment. In this case, however, the plaintiff has produced no evidence to support a causal link between her sexual harassment complaint and her suspensions or between her taking light duty and her suspensions. She has also presented no evidence to support a causal link between her sexual harassment complaint and the denial of light duty. Despite the absence of such evidence, the plaintiff's claims could survive summary judgment if the alleged retaliatory action occurred near in time to her filing the sexual harassment complaint or taking light duty and the suspensions or between her filing the sexual harassment complaint and the denial of light duty status.
The plaintiff filed her sexual harassment complaint in February 2000. She took light duty for her hand in early 2001. The alleged retaliatory action took place when she was denied light duty in late 2001 and when she was suspended in early 2001. The significant lapse of time between the sexual harassment complaint and the suspensions undermines the plaintiff's retaliation claim. See Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001) (twenty-month lapse between adverse action and protected activity suggests no causality); Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 803 (4th Cir.) (thirteen-month interval between protected activity and alleged retaliatory action too long to establish causal link). Since the interval between the plaintiff's protected activity of filing a sexual harassment claim and her suspensions and denial of light duty is too long to imply a causal link and the plaintiff presented no other evidence to support such a causal link, the plaintiff has failed to support the causation element of her retaliation claim. The interval between taking light duty and the suspensions was smaller; however, the plaintiff still fails to establish any connection at all to support a finding that, despite a separation of months, the two are causally connected.
Even if the plaintiff presented a prima facie case of retaliation, her claim fails because she has not proven that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for her suspensions and for the denial of light duty were pretextual. Here, the defendant asserts that it suspended the plaintiff due to poor work performance, which is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The defendant asserts that it denied light duty because the plaintiff failed to comply with company policy. In response, the plaintiff has produced no evidence that these reasons are pretextual. Consequently, summary judgment is appropriate.
3. Hostile Work Environment
The plaintiff alleges that Lear discriminated against her by subjecting her to a hostile work environment at Lear, and she alleges that the Union allowed the hostile work environment to persist by not providing her with fair representation. The plaintiff has failed to establish that a hostile work environment existed, so summary judgment in favor of both defendants is appropriate.
To establish a hostile work environment,
the plaintiff must show that the conduct in question was severe or pervasive enough to create an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and that the victim subjectively regarded it as abusive. . . . The plaintiff must also prove that his employer "tolerated or condoned the situation," or knew or should have known of the alleged conduct and did nothing to correct the situation.Smith v. Leggett Wire Co., 220 F.3d 752, 760 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 659 (6th Cir. 1999)). Whether the alleged conduct rises to an actionable level is a legal question which may be determined by the court at the summary judgment stage. See Stacy, 955 F. Supp. at 755. A list of non-exhaustive factors to consider in making this determination includes "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's performance." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
Although there are numerous disputes of fact in this litigation, the court has viewed the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and focused on the alleged conduct's frequency, severity, threatening or humiliating (versus merely offensive) nature, and the alleged interference with the plaintiff's work performance. Having done so, the court concludes that summary judgment should be granted in favor of the defendants on the plaintiff's hostile work environment claim.
The Supreme Court made it clear in Harris that courts are to consider the totality of the circumstances with regard to hostile work environment claims rather than viewing individual alleged acts in a vacuum. This admonition, however, does not negate the court's duty to hold the plaintiff to her burden of setting forth specific facts in support of her allegation. While the plaintiff alleges a few incidents that she contends were examples of racial discrimination or retaliation, she has adduced no evidence — aside from her personal beliefs — that the incidents had anything to do with her race or her reporting an instance of sexual harassment. She presents no evidence that any of the incidents had anything to do with her gender.
For example, while the plaintiff claims that other employees sabotaged or tampered with her work, she offers no proof that such sabotage ever actually occurred, and she admits that she has no proof that any alleged sabotage was motivated by race, gender, or her filing a sexual harassment claim. (Franks depo. p. 117-18) Additionally, while the plaintiff insists that her supervisor harassed her because she is black, she has adduced no evidence that his actions were racially motivated or that they were motivated by her filing of a sexual harassment claim. She admits that her supervisor never made racial comments or used racial slurs during any alleged altercation, and she does not allege that he made any comments about her sexual harassment claim. (Franks depo. p. 53) Overall, the plaintiff offers no evidence, aside from her subjective beliefs, that any of her supervisor's actions were motivated by race or her sexual harassment claim.
The court finds that the plaintiff's allegations are plainly insufficient to establish that she experienced a hostile work environment at Lear. The court finds that Lear is entitled to summary judgment, as the facts alleged by the plaintiff, even if true, simply do not establish conduct that is either pervasive or severe enough to create an environment that a reasonable person would find abusive. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the defendants' motions for summary judgment (DE 30 and DE 32) are GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion of the defendant, Union, to strike (DE 32) is DENIED AS MOOT.