Opinion
No. 3447.
Decided January 4, 1944.
In a libel for divorce, proof of marriage under R. L., c. 338, s. 40, is sufficiently established by the fact that a ceremony was performed and marriage vows taken by the libelant, that subsequent thereto the parties lived together as man and wife for over three years with assurance by the libelee that they were married.
LIBEL FOR DIVORCE. Hearing before a master, who made findings and recommended that there be a divorce on the ground of treatment seriously injuring health, that the libelant have custody of the child, and also that the libelee pay the libelant seven dollars a week for the support of herself and her child. At the close of the libelant's evidence, the libelee moved that the petition be dismissed for want of evidence that any marriage ceremony was performed by the parties, or that there were any acts endangering health. The motion was denied, and the libelee excepted. When the report was received by the Court, the libelee moved that it be set aside as against the law and the evidence. The Court nevertheless accepted and approved it, and a decree was made conformable to the recommendations of the master. To this the libelee excepted. Transferred on the libelee's bill of exceptions, allowed by Lorimer, J. The facts appear in the opinion.
Chester T. Woodbury and Frederick H. Magison (of Massachusetts), by brief, for the libelant.
William H. Sleeper, for the libelee, furnished no brief.
The libelant testified that on the 27th or 28th of March, 1937, a ceremony in which she took marriage vows was performed by somebody whom she could not identify; that thereupon the libelee assured her that they were married; that the parties lived together as man and wife for a little over three years thereafter; that the libelee treated her cruelly, and that subsequent to their last cohabitation his treatment put her in fear of bodily harm and that she left him suffering from a nervous breakdown; that subsequently she bore a child of whom the libelee is the father. The libelee denied no one of the specific facts thus testified to. He simply denied that he ever married the libelant. The master found that the parties were married, and found the facts necessary for a divorce. As to the latter there was clearly sufficient supporting evidence. As to the marriage, R. L., c. 338, s. 40, provides: "In all civil actions, except actions for criminal conversation, evidence of acknowledgment, cohabitation, and reputation is competent proof of marriage." The master could disregard the libelee's testimony, believe the libelant's, and find as he did.
Exceptions overruled.
All concurred.