Opinion
No. C 04-01309 SI.
August 10, 2004
On August 6, 2004, this Court heard argument on defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's First Amended Class Action Complaint for failure to state a claim. Having carefully considered the argument of counsel and the papers submitted, the Court hereby (i) GRANTS the motion in part; (ii) DISMISSES the Complaint, with leave to amend; and (iii) ORDERS the transfer of this case to the District Court for the Central District of California, where it was filed originally.
This case was transferred to this Court from the Central District of California (The Hon. Dean D. Pregerson) on April 7, 2004. See infra.
BACKGROUND
On September 6, 2000, plaintiff Elveta Louise Francis was convicted of a crime in state court, received a three-year prison sentence and was ordered to pay $79,442.60 in restitution to the victims of her crimes. First Am. Compl. at ¶ 11. She was subsequently transferred to the California Community Correctional Center ("the 4Cs") in Los Angeles, a work-release correctional facility which houses inmates who are gainfully employed in the private sector and are paying restitution as ordered by the courts. Id. at ¶¶ 4c, 11. Pursuant to Cal. Pen. Code § 6231, wages earned by an inmate are paid directly to the Department of Corrections. Id. at ¶ 15. These monies are administered through Inmate Trust Accounts ("ITAs"), which are managed by the Director of the Department of Corrections or his designee under the authority of the Department of Finance. Id. at ¶¶ 4d-e. Section 6231 provides that one third of the inmate's wages are to be transferred to the Department of Corrections for the running of the 4Cs; one third is to be paid as restitution to the victims of the crimes for which the inmate was convicted; and one third is to be placed in a savings account for the inmate, to be used for the inmate's personal needs or to provide her family with support. Id. at ¶¶ 15a-c. In August, 2002, Francis's probation officer informed her that, according to the Statement of Restitution Obligations issued by the Office of Victim Services and Restitution, the balance owing on her restitution account was $79,370.50. Id. at ¶ 12. Her restitution obligation had thus decreased by only $72.10 over approximately two years. Id. at ¶ 13. However, records obtained from the accounting office of the 4Cs showed that $6,323.80 had been deposited into the State restitution account from her earnings during the same period. Id. The difference between these two amounts remains unaccounted for. Id.Francis brings suit as an individual and in her capacity as a class representative of other 4Cs inmates, alleging that defendants have failed to maintain accurate accounts of inmates' earnings and restitution accounts, to transmit funds to the Office of Victim Services and Restitution, to credit inmates for monies earned for the purpose of reducing their restitution debt, and to reimburse inmates for their necessary expenses, or that they have condoned or failed to correct such failures. Id. at ¶ 17a-h. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants' practice of paying interest earned on individual ITA accounts into a fund for the general welfare of the inmate population as a whole is unlawful. Id. at ¶ 17i. Plaintiff asserts federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violation of her rights under the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 19 of the California Constitution. Id. at ¶¶ 26-40, 44-54. Plaintiff further alleges violations of Article I, § 7 of the California Constitution and Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1, unlawful handling of funds, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, negligent supervision, fraud and misappropriation of funds, and unlawful conversion. Id. at ¶¶ 41-43, 55-104. In addition to actual damages, plaintiff asks for punitive damages against the individual named defendants, for triple damages under Cal. Civ. Code § 52, for punitive damages against the individual named defendants, and for attorney's fees and costs as allowed by 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and California statutes. Id. at ¶¶ 105-09. Plaintiff further asks for declaratory and injunctive relief, and for a proper accounting of her trust and restitution accounts.Id. at 110-113.
Plaintiff has submitted an ex parte motion to the Central District court for leave to amend her complaint to name additional plaintiffs and defendants, following defendants' refusal to stipulate to the proposed amendment. Again, defendants have not filed a response with this Court, and the Court will not rule until they have had an opportunity do so.
As observed by defendants, Mot to Dismiss at 4:7-8, plaintiff does not clearly allege the precise relationship between the ITAs and the Restitution Accounts. However, the substance of her complaint is that defendants are responsible for this confusion.
Francis filed her first complaint in this action on September 20, 2003, in Los Angeles County Superior Court and, on November 24, 2003, she filed her First Amended Class Action Complaint with the same court. See Pl.'s ex parte Mot. to Amend, 3:18-21. On January 2, 2004, defendants removed the case to the federal district court for the Central District of California. See id. at 3:22-23. They subsequently moved to relate the action to litigation currently pending before this Court, in which California inmates have challenged the State's policy of paying the interest earned on moneys deposited in their ITAs into a general inmate welfare fund. Schneider v. California Dep't of Corrections, 957 F. Supp. 1145 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (Schneider I),rev'd and rem'd, 151 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (Schneider II); 91 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (Schneider III),vac. and rem'd, 345 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 2003) (Schneider IV);see Pl.'s ex parte Mot. to Amend at 3:23-26. On April 7, 2004, on defendants' motion, the case was transferred to this Court. See Pl.'s ex parte Mot. to Amend at 4:14-16. The transferred materials include defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's first amended complaint on the grounds that plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 1:19-21 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)). That motion is now before the Court.
The First Amended Complaint alleges fourteen causes of action, of which two are captioned "Fourth." These are referred to as the "fourth (1st)" and "fourth (2d)" claims.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The question presented by a motion to dismiss is not whether the plaintiff will prevail in the action, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of the claim. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1686 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 104 S. Ct. 3012 (1984). In answering this question, the Court must assume that plaintiff's allegations are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). Even if the face of the pleadings suggests that the chance of recovery is remote, the Court must allow plaintiff to develop her case at this stage of the proceedings. See United States v. City of Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 1981).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require plaintiff to set out in detail the facts on which she bases her claim, but only that she offer "a short and plain statement of the claim," giving defendants fair notice of what her claim is and the grounds on which it rests. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 103 (1957). Because the Federal rules allow liberal opportunity for discovery and other pretrial procedures to develop the grounds of both claims and defenses, such simplified "notice pleading" is sufficient.Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-48, 78 S. Ct. at 103. Hence, a complaint should not be dismissed unless it is apparent that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle her to relief. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421-422, 89 S. Ct. 1843, 1849 (1969); Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S. Ct. at 102. In accordance with the principle that "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice," Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f), courts should "reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits." Conley, 355 U.S. at 48, 78 S. Ct. at 103.
For these reasons, "[i]t is axiomatic that 'the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted,'" Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice Procedure § 1357, at 598 (1969)). If the Court nonetheless finds it necessary to dismiss a complaint, it must then decide whether to grant leave to amend. The Ninth Circuit has "repeatedly held that a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Lopez v. Smith, 203 F. 3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
In federal court actions based on state law claims, state substantive law determines whether a claim exists and what defenses are recognized, but the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the manner and time in which claims and defenses may be raised. Taylor v. United States, 821 F.2d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987); Perry v. O'Donnell, 749 F.2d 1346, 1353 (9th Cir. 1984). Hence, although state law may impose a requirement of detailed pleading on certain types of claims, the heightened standard does not apply in federal court. Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 417 (7th Cir. 1997). Under the Federal Rules, a heightened pleading standard applies only to claims alleging fraud or mistake, where the circumstances are to be "stated with particularity." Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). The United States Supreme Court has specifically rejected the view that a heightened pleading standard applies to Section 1983 claims. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 167-169, 113 S. Ct. 1160, 1163 (1993).
DISCUSSION
I. Defendants' first and second objections misconstrue the complaint
Defendants' first ground for dismissal is that plaintiff has sued state officers (the "Public Employee Defendants," First Am. Compl. ¶ 5) in their official, as well as individual, capacities for money damages under Section 1983. Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 5:3-7:2. Such a suit would be barred, since Section 1983 applies only to "persons" acting under color of law. State officers acting in their official capacity are not "persons" within the meaning of the Act and a suit against such officers "is no different from a suit against the State itself." Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (1989). Defendants' objection is based on plaintiff's statement that the public employee defendants "are sued in their individual and official capacities." First Am. Compl. at ¶ 5. Defendant takes this to mean that plaintiff is suing these individuals in both capacities for money damages. Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 5:10-13. Plaintiff explains that her claims for money damages are directed against these persons only as individuals. Pl.'s Opp'n Br. at 7:7-8:10. As such, they are "persons" within the meaning of Section 1983 and claims against them for money damages are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 112 S. Ct. 358 (1991). Moreover, such persons may be sued in their official capacities for prospective relief. Will, 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S. Ct. at 2312;Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441 (1980). Plaintiff states that she is suing the public employee defendants in their official capacities for prospective relief only. Pl.'s Opp'n Br. at 8:26-27, n. 3.
Defendants' argument is based on a misreading of the language of the complaint. See Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish Game Comm'n, 42 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that "[w]here state officials are named in a complaint which seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is presumed that the officials are being sued in their individual capacities"). The objection is, therefore, without merit.
Defendants' second argument for dismissal is similarly misdirected. Here, defendants object to the language of plaintiffs' fourth (1st), fifth and sixth causes of action, alleging Section 1983 claims for violation of plaintiff's Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. See First Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 41-54. Although the captions to these causes of action make it clear that they are directed against the public employee defendants, defendants note that the text reads "governmental defendants." Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 7:6-15;see First Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 42, 45, 53. Since plaintiff has earlier indicated that the expression "Governmental Defendants" includes both "Public Employee Defendants" and "Public Entity Defendants," First Am. Compl. at ¶ 9, defendants express concern that plaintiff "may be attempting to advance claims against the State" and its agencies. Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 7:11-13. Plaintiff denies that such claims are intended. Pl.'s Opp'n Br. at 8:15-16. The Court finds no lack of clarity as to who is being sued and in what capacity. See again, Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 42 F.3d at 1284. However, plaintiff has expressed willingness to amend her complaint so as to correct the supposed ambiguity. Pl.'s Opp'n Br. at 9:10-12. She has leave to do so, at her own choice.
II. Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support her Section 1983 claims
Defendants next argue that plaintiff's federal claims against the individual public employee defendants are barred because the First Amended Complaint does not allege facts sufficient to show either personal involvement or supervisory liability by the named defendants. Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 7:20-10:15 (objections III and IV). Plaintiffs respond that, under the liberal standard of notice pleading, their factual allegations are sufficient to support Section 1983 claims based on causal connections between the named defendants' actions and the alleged violations of plaintiff's civil rights. Pl.'s Opp'n Br. at 9:13-11:14. The Court agrees. See Mackinney v. Nielsen, 69 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 1995); Johnson v, Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978); cf. Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323-24 (2nd Cir. 1986). By asserting a requirement that plaintiffs allege specific facts showing supervisory liability with regard to each named defendant, defendants seek to impose an evidentiary standard more appropriate to later stages of litigation, as is clearly indicated by their citation of the Model Jury Instructions. Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 10:10-14; see Pl.'s Opp'n Br. at 12:20-11:2. Although it is true that plaintiff's allegations, at their present stage of development, would not withstand a motion for summary judgment, no such heightened pleading standard applies to Section 1983 claims. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 510-15, 122 S. Ct. 992, 997-99 (2002); Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 167-169, 113 S. Ct. at 1163; Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2002).
III. Plaintiff may not base a Section 1983 claim on a violation of the California Constitution and has leave to amend her complaint accordingly
In her third cause of action, plaintiff asserts a Section 1983 claim on the basis of an alleged violation of Article I, § 19 of the California Constitution. First Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 34-37; see Defs.' Opp'n Br. at 10:17-23. Because Section 1983 may not be used to redress state law violations, no such cause of action can be stated. Picray v. Sealock, 138 F.3d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 1998); Ybarra v. Bastian, 647 F.2d 891, 892 (9th Cir. 1981),cert. denied, 454 U.S. 857, 102 S. Ct. 309 (1981). Plaintiff concedes the error and states that her intention was to bring this claim directly under the California Constitution, Art. I, § 19. Pl.'s Opp'n Br. at 13:8-17. She may amend her complaint accordingly.
IV. Because the law requiring the State to account for interest accrued to individual inmate trust accounts was not settled at the time of the official actions that are the subject of this dispute, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this issue
Plaintiff's first seven causes of action include the allegation that defendants have violated her rights under the United States and California Constitutions by withholding the interest earned on her ITA. First Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 28, 32, 36, 39, 42, 46, 53. It was for this reason that defendants successfully moved to associate this case with Schneider, in which plaintiff inmates challenged the State's policy of paying the interest earned on moneys deposited in their ITAs into a general inmate welfare fund on the ground that the policy amounted to an uncompensated taking of their property for a public purpose in violation of the Fifth Amendment. See Pl.'s ex parte Mot. to Amend at 4:14-16; cf. Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 11:1-13:12. In Schneider I, this Court found that, under State law, California inmates have no property right to the interest on their ITAs. 957 F. Supp. at 1147-48. The Court therefore dismissed the complaint, without leave to amend, for failure to state a claim. Id. at 1149. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, with instructions to permit discovery as to whether interest on the individual ITAs had, in fact, accrued and, if so, to allow plaintiffs to pursue their Fifth Amendment claim.Schneider II, 151 F.3d at 1197-98. In Schneider III, this Court found that the individual ITAs did not currently bear interest and that, if the funds were to be deposited into interest-earning accounts, the systemic costs of administering such accounts would exceed the total interest generated, while the benefit to most inmates would, at best, be miniscule. 91 F. Supp. 2d at 1321-23. On this basis, the Court granted summary judgment for defendants. Id. at 1327. The Ninth Circuit held that, even if the systemic costs of administering the interest on individual ITAs exceeded the systemic benefits, an individualized inquiry was required to determine whether an inmate was deprived of net interest on his or her account. Schneider IV, 345 F.3d at 720-21. On this basis, the court vacated Schneider III and remanded the case for further factual development. Id. at 722. The Schneider IV decision followed McIntyre v. Bayer, 339 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2003), where inmates of the Nevada prison system raised the identical issue of "whether a state statute, requiring interest generated by inmate trust accounts to be retained by prison authorities and expended for the benefit of the prison population as a whole, effects an unconstitutional taking." Id. at 1098. In McIntyre, as in Schneider, the evidence indicated that, "in the aggregate, the prisoners' property fund generates no net gain at all, but rather a substantial loss." Id. at 1101 (emphasis original). Nonetheless, the McIntyre court held that an individualized inquiry was necessary to determine "whether the interest earned by [the individual inmate's] principal is exceeded by his share of the costs of administering the prisoners' personal property fund." Id. at 720-21. TheMcIntyre court's analysis was, in turn, controlled by Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 237, 123 S. Ct. 1406, 1420 (2003), where the Court held that an inquiry into the difference between the earnings of a pooled legal trust fund and the costs to each individual account holder was necessary to determine whether an unconstitutional taking had occurred.
These seven causes of action include all of plaintiff's Section 1983 and State Constitutional claims.
By interlocutory order, this Court dismissed Department of Corrections and its then Director, James Gomez, from theSchneider litigation on grounds of qualified immunity. See Schneider III, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 1318. In granting summary judgment, the Court held that the protection of qualified immunity extended to the current Director, Cal Terhune, who is also a defendant in the present case. Id. at 1325-26. TheSchneider IV court upheld these rulings. 345 F.3d at 721 n. 2. In this case, Terhune and the other public employee defendants claim the same protection of qualified immunity with regard to plaintiff's claims concerning nonpayment of interest allegedly owing on her ITA and her restitution account. Defs.' Mot to Dismiss at 11:1-13:12. On this basis, they move for dismissal of those claims. Id.
The defense of qualified immunity protects "government officials . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982); cf. Schneider III, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 1325-26. Qualified immunity "'provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'"Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 494-95, 111 S. Ct. 1934 (1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S. Ct. 1092 (1986)). "Therefore, regardless of whether the constitutional violation occurred, the [official] should prevail if the right asserted by the plaintiff was not 'clearly established' or the [official] could have reasonably believed that his particular conduct was lawful." Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff bears the burden of proving the existence of a "clearly established" right at the time of the allegedly impermissible conduct. See Maraziti v. First Interstate Bank, 953 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir. 1992). If plaintiff meets this burden, defendant assumes the burden of establishing that, even if he violated plaintiff's constitutional rights, his actions were reasonable. Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 54 F.3d 1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1995); Neely v. Feinstein, 50 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995); Maraziti, 953 F.2d at 523.
Thus, in deciding whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, a court must ask first, whether the law governing the official's conduct was clearly established at the time of that conduct and second, whether a reasonable state official could, under that law, have believed his conduct to be lawful. Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002); Schneider IV, 345 F.3d at 721 n. 2. In order to determine whether the law was clearly established, it is necessary to conduct an inquiry "in light of the specific context of the case." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001). "If the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate." Id., 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S. Ct. at 2156-57.
Despite the need for a case-specific inquiry, the Supreme Court has emphasized the desirability of a ruling at the earliest possible stage of litigation in order to avoid the cost and expense of an unnecessary trial. Id., 533 U.S. at 200, 121 S. Ct. at 2156; Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 116 L. Ed. 2d 589, 112 S. Ct. 534 (1991) (per curiam). The privilege of qualified immunity is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 2185 (1985).
In confirming this Court's ruling that the public officials in the Schneider litigation were entitled to qualified immunity, the Ninth Circuit observed that, prior to the decisions inBrown and McIntyre, "[i]t is quite obvious that the constitutionality of withholding interest on pooled financial accounts has been in a state of flux." Schneider IV, 345 F.3d at 721 n. 2. Since the official actions at issue were previous to those holdings, the Schneider defendants "could have reasonably believed that failure to account for any interest accrued to individual inmate accounts from ITAs did not violate a clearly established constitutional right." Id.
Francis maintains that whether defendants in this case are entitled to qualified immunity on the same basis "will boil down to an intense question of fact." Pl.'s Opp'n Br. at 15:11-12 She argues that "since the group of individual defendants inSchneider includes many of the same individual defendants . . . it may be reasonable to conclude that these individual defendants had notice that withholding interest from the inmate trust accounts was constitutionally suspect" at an early stage of theSchneider litigation. Pl.'s Opp'n Br. at 14:14-16. The Court sees no reasonable basis for such a conclusion. Since the official actions challenged by Francis are earlier than theBrown, McIntyre and Schneider IV decisions, the defense of qualified immunity must apply to these claims. Defendants' motion to dismiss is, therefore, GRANTED. Plaintiff's amended complaint should not include claims for interest prior to March 26, 2003, the date on which Brown was decided.
V. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged compliance with the California Tort Claims Act
Next, defendants argue that plaintiff's state law claims should be dismissed because she has failed to adequately allege compliance with the California Tort Claims Act. Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 6:7-18. Plaintiff stated in her complaint that she submitted an administrative claim to the State prior to initiating this action, as required by the Act. First Am. Compl. at ¶ 16. Defendant observes that plaintiff neglected to state that her claim was rejected, that she filed her original complaint within six months of that rejection, or that there are no substantive differences between the administrative claim and this lawsuit. See Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 13:26-15:3; Reply 6:10-8, 7:1-4.
Plaintiff argues that, under California law, she is not obliged to present affirmative evidence of tort claim rejection before proceeding with her suit. Id. at 16:8-18. The Court agrees.See Gibson v. County of Riverside, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1085 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that a suit against the State may not be filed unless the Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board has acted on a claim or the claim "has been deemed to have been rejected by the board").
Defendants are correct in their assertion that plaintiff may not, in her complaint, assert theories of recovery or factual circumstances that were not included in her administrative claim.Nelson v. State, 188 Cal. Rptr. 479, 483-84 (Cal.Ct.App. 1982). However, defendants cite no authority in support of their proposition that plaintiff has an affirmative duty to affirm or demonstrate absence of variance when pleading her complaint.See Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 14:6-3. Moreover, the purpose of an administrative claim is simply to provide the public entity defendant with sufficient information to enable it to investigate and settle claims. Phillips v. Desert Hosp. Dist. 780 P.2d 349, 353 (Cal. 1989); City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 525 P.2d 710, 706-07 (Cal. 1974); cf. MacLean v. Golden Gate Bridge, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18638 (N.D. Cal.) at *17. Plaintiff has subsequently provided a copy of her administrative claim letter, which is dated February 10, 2003. Pl.'s Req. for Judicial Notice, Ex. 1. The Court finds that there is no substantial difference between the content of that letter and her complaint. Plaintiff has also stated that the Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board rejected her claim at its meeting of March 20, 2003 and that her counsel received notice of this rejection on March 31, 2003, less than six months previous to the filing of her first complaint on September 20, 2003. Pl.'s Opp'n Br. at 16:21-23.
It goes without saying that defendants are entitled to contest the adequacy of plaintiff's compliance with the California Tort Claims Act and to offer evidence in support of their contention. They have done neither. Although plaintiff has expressed willingness to amend her complaint so as to meet defendants' objections, she is not obliged to assume the unreasonable burden of proving or alleging every detail of her compliance with the Act. Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint on these grounds is DENIED.
VI. Defendants' eighth objection, to plaintiff's state law claims, repeats the substance of their objection to her Section 1983 claims and is based on the same misreading of her complaint
In their eighth objection, defendants again misread the complaint and suggest that plaintiff "may be" trying to assert state law claims for money damages against the State and its agencies. Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 15:8-18. Defendants raised the same objection to plaintiff's Section 1983 claims. Here, as there, the Court rejects the objection.
VII. Plaintiff's claims underthe Equal Protection Clause of the California Constitution, as stated, fail because they are directed against the public employee defendants, whereas the controlling statute assigns liability to public entities
In her fourth (2d) cause of action, plaintiff alleges that defendants, by depriving her of monies owing to her as reimbursement for the necessities of daily living, treated her differently from other members of the inmate population as a whole and thereby violated her right to equal protection under Article I, § 7 of the California Constitution. Compl. at ¶¶ 41-43. Defendants correctly point out that California law does not recognize a due process cause of action under Art. I, § 7.Katzberg v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 58 P.3d, 339, 351-54 (Cal. 2002); Gates v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 489, 510-17 (Cal.Ct.App. 1995). Plaintiff acknowledges that Art. I, § 7 is not self-executing but seeks to assert a claim under Cal. Gov't Code § 815.6, which states that "[w]here a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty." This statute creates a cause of action even where the "predicate" enactment is not self-executing. Haggis v. City of Los Angeles, 993 P.2d 983, 987-98 (Cal. 2000); see Pl.'s Opp'n Br. at 18:13-19:12. Defendants observe that plaintiff "cites no cases holding that Art. I, § 7(a) is a mandatory enactment for purposes of Section 815.6." Defs.' Reply at 8:9-11. However, defendants cite no authority holding that it is not.
More to the point is defendants' objection that Section 815.6 creates public entity liability, whereas plaintiff has alleged this cause of action against the public employee defendants.Id. at 8:1-9; see Bradford v. State of California, 111 Cal. Rptr.852, 854-55 (Cal.Ct.App. 1973). For this reason only, the claim is DISMISSED, with leave to amend.
VIII. Plaintiff's claim under Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 fails because she has not alleged acts of threat, intimidation, or coercion by defendants
Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1, which authorizes a cause of action against any person who, "whether or not acting under color of law, interferes . . . or attempts to interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state." Id. § 52.1(a). Section 52.1 is a part of California's Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, which was enacted in response to an increase in hate crimes against ethnic and other minorities. Jones v. Kmart Corp., 949 P.2d 941, 946-47 (Cal. 1998); In Re Michael M., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 10, 15 (Cal.Ct.App. 2001). On this basis, defendants maintain that Section 52.1 "is a hate crimes statute and requires factual allegations showing that one or more of the Defendants interfered or attempted to interfere with a constitutional or statutory right by threatening or committing violent acts." Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 18:1-6.
This claim would, if successful, allow plaintiff to recover treble damages under Cal. Civ. Code § 52, as incorporated by § 52.1(b). See First Am. Compl. at ¶ 108.
Some California courts have, indeed, held that Section 52.1 may only be invoked by a plaintiff who has suffered violence due to his or her membership in a protected group. Cabesuela v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 65 (Cal.Ct.App. 1998); Boccato v. City of Hermosa Beach, 35 Cal. Rptr. 282, 290 (Cal.Ct.App. 1994). However, this interpretation of the statute has been specifically overruled by legislative action. 2000 Cal. Stat. 98 § 1 (Assemb. B. 2719); see Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 87 P.3d 1, 13-14 (Cal. 2004); letter dated July 6, 2000, by California Att'y Gen. Bill Lockyer to Governor Gray Davis re: Assemb. B. 2719 (Pl.'s Req. for Judicial Notice, Ex. 3). Plaintiff is, therefore, correct in maintaining that she is not required to allege that she is the victim of a hate crime, or that she is a member of a protected group, in order to assert a Section 52.1 claim. Pl.'s Opp'n Br. at 20:6-22.
However, the California legislature has not overruled the requirement that a Section 52.1 plaintiff must prove "interference with a legal right accompanied by a form of coercion." Jones, 949 P.2d at 944. In interpreting the legislative intent behind the revised statute, the California Supreme Court has explained that Section 52.1 "does not extend to all ordinary tort actions because its provisions are limited to threats, intimidation, or coercion that interfere with a constitutional or statutory right." Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 87 P.3d 1, 14 (Cal. 2004). Even by the liberal standard of notice pleading, plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to show threats, intimidation, or coercion, as those terms are commonly understood. See City of Petaluma v. County of Sonoma, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 617, 619 (Cal.Ct.App. 1993) (holding that "[w]here the statute is clear, the 'plain meaning' rule applies); cf. Duty v. Abex Corp., 263 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17 (Cal.Ct.App. 1989). Plaintiff's Section 52.1 claim is, therefore, DISMISSED. Moreover, unless plaintiff can allege threatening, intimidating, or coercive acts by defendants, any attempt to reassert this claim must inevitably fail. Allegations of failure to provide an adequate accounting of her ITA and restitution trust accounts do not meet the required standard.
IX. Plaintiff has failed to plead her claim of intentional misrepresentation with particularity as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b)
Of plaintiff's remaining causes of action under state and common law, defendants challenge only her claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, and intentional misrepresentation (fraud and misappropriation). Plaintiff concedes that she has failed to plead the tort of intentional misrepresentation "with particularity," as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b), and asks leave to amend, which is GRANTED.
Defendants do not contest the adequacy of the following claims: unlawful handling of funds; negligence; negligent supervision; and conversion.
X. Plaintiff's allegations regarding defendants' conduct and its effect are sufficient to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress
With regard to intentional infliction of emotional distress, defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to allege the extreme, outrageous conduct by defendants that this tort requires. Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 21:1-5; see Christensen v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 181, 202 (Cal. 1991); Davidson v. City of Westminster, 649 P.2d 894, 900-01 (Cal. 1982); Fletcher v. Western Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 90 (Cal.Ct.App. 1970). However, the question "[w]hether alleged behavior is sufficiently extreme to constitute outrageous behavior is properly determined by the fact finder after trial or possibly after discovery upon a motion for summary judgment." Angie M. v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197, 203 (Cal.Ct.App. 1995);cf. Abelson v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 13, 20 (Cal.Ct.App. 1994); Kardly v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co, 255 Cal. Rptr. 40, 43 (Cal.Ct.App. 1989).
Defendants also reason that "the most plaintiff could have expected under Cal. Pen. Code § 6231 was that her restitution obligation would have been paid down by $2,274.60 (i.e., one-third of her wages), or a little under 3% of her total debt." Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 21:13-17. On this basis, they argue that plaintiff's alleged loss was too small to have inflicted "emotional distress of such substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure it." Id. at 21:19-15 (citing Fletcher, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 90). The Court disagrees. Even if defendant's calculation is accepted, plaintiff alleges that the figure represents her earnings over two years. First Am. Compl. at ¶ 13. It is not difficult to imagine that, when she discovered that those earnings were unaccounted for, and that her restitution debt was not even marginally reduced, she experienced distress. Whether that distress rose to the level required by this tort is not, as yet, established. Nonetheless, plaintiff's allegations regarding defendants' conduct and its effect on her emotional state are sufficient to support this claim and, at the present stage of litigation, dismissal would be inappropriate. XI. Because dismissal of plaintiff's claims alleging unlawful taking of interest negates the basis for association with Schneider, there is no further reason to pursue this litigation in this Court
Having granted defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims on the issue of interest, the Court sees no further reason to associate this case with the Schneider litigation, which concerns that issue only. The primary issue in this case is the alleged shortfall in plaintiff's restitution account and in the accounts of other inmates of the 4Cs, which is located in Los Angeles. For this reason, Northern California may be an inconvenient forum in which to pursue this dispute. The Court has consulted with counsel on this question. Counsel for plaintiff expressed a preference to return this case to the Central District. Counsel for defendants did not oppose this request, which is, therefore, GRANTED.
Defendants should, therefore, submit their responses to plaintiff's motion to strike and ex parte motion for leave to amend (see nn. 2 and 3 supra) to the Central District court.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby:(i) GRANTS defendants' motion in part; and
(ii) DISMISSES the First Amended Complaint, with leave to amend; and
(iii) ORDERS that this action be transferred to the Central District of California for further proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED.