Opinion
No. 75-527
Decided December 31, 1975.
Workmen's compensation — Claim for benefits — Employee of self-insured employer — Limitations period — R.C. 4123.84 — "Benefits" construed.
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Summit County.
On June 22, 1970, appellant, Dan Francis, allegedly injured his left arm and shoulder while in the course of his employment at Chrysler Corporation, Twinsburg Plant. The plant physician, a salaried employee of Chrysler Corporation, saw appellant at the plant dispensary four days later, diagnosed appellant as suffering from epicondylitis (tennis elbow), and prescribed treatment. On September 16, 1970, appellant again visited the dispensary and reported recurrence of the symptoms, and was treated by the nurse on duty. Thereafter, appellant never sought or received any further medical attention for his elbow.
On October 18, 1972, appellant made written application for workmen's compensation as a result of the June 1970 incident. The claim was disallowed by the Administrator of the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation on the ground that the injury was not sustained in the course of appellant's employment. Upon appeal to the Canton Regional Board of Review, the board ruled that it had no jurisdiction to consider the appeal because the application was not filed within two years of the date of the injury as required by R.C. 4123.84. The Industrial Commission refused further appeal.
Appellant then appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Summit County. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. On September 17, 1974, the court held appellant's claim to be barred by the statute of limitations and rendered final judgment for appellees.
That judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for Summit County, and that court, finding its judgment to be in conflict with the judgment of the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County in the case of Harrison v. Sommer (unreported, February 27, 1973), No. 3982, certified the record of this case to this court for review and final determination.
Rudd, Karl, Sheerer, Lybarger Campbell, Co., L.P.A., and Mr. Benjamin B. Sheerer, for appellant.
Messrs. Buckingham, Doolittle Burroughs and Mr. Walter E. deBruin, for appellee Chrysler Corporation.
Mr. William J. Brown, attorney general, for appellee Administrator, Bureau of Workmen's Compensation.
Appellant's primary contention is that the ordinary and plain meaning of R.C. 4123.84, its legislative history, the special characteristics of self-insurance, and the liberal construction to be given to the Workmen's Compensation Act, include as a "benefit" the furnishing of medical services to an employee by a salaried plant physician, thereby causing such treatment to invoke the tolling aspect of R.C. 4123.84 (A)(2)(b).
As pertinent here, R.C. 4123.84 provides:
"(A) In all cases of injury or death, claims for compensation or benefits for the specific part or parts of the body injured shall be forever barred unless, within two years after the injury or death:
"(1) Written notice of the specific part of parts of the body claimed to have been injured has been made to the Industrial Commission or the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation;
"(2) In the event the employer has elected to pay compensation or benefits directly, one of the following has occurred:
"(a) Written notice of the specific part or parts of the body claimed to have been injured has been given to the commission or bureau;
"(b) Compensation or benefits have been paid or furnished equal to or greater than is provided for in Sections 4123.52, 4123.55 to 4123.62, inclusive, and 4123.64 to 4123.67, inclusive, of the Revised Code.
"(3) Written notice of death has been given to the commission or bureau.
"(B) As used in division (A)(2)(b) of this Section `benefits' means payment by a self-insured employer to, or on behalf of, an employee for:
"(1) A hospital bill;
"(2) A medical bill to a licensed physician or hospital;
"(3) An orthopedic or prosthetic device."
However, as was stated by the Court of Appeals in its opinion:
"Therefore, in light of the statutory history and purpose, we find that there is a meaningful difference between an employer paying a doctor bill and an employer paying a salary to a doctor. This difference lies in the fact that when an employer pays a doctor bill for a specific injury he is on notice of a possible workmen's compensation claim. Whereas, the payment of a salary to a physician does not supply any notice to the employer of any specific accident or injury. Were we to adopt the interpretation urged by the plaintiff we would, in effect, be vitiating the 1963 amendments by the legislature to R.C. 4123.84 and restoring it to the 1959 definition of benefits. Such is the result, in effect, reached by the court in the unreported case of Harrison v. Sommer [ supra] * * *."
Appellant contends further, in the alternative, that an interpretation of R.C. 4123.84 which does not include treatment by a company salaried physician as "benefits" would deny appellant equal protection of the laws, in violation of the state and federal Constitutions.
The Court of Appeals' reply to that contention is well-stated:
"However, we fail to see how R.C. 4123.84(B)(2) invidiously discriminates against the worker in the factory of a self-insurer. He can toll the statute by filing a written claim with the Industrial Commission, whether employed by a self-insurer, or a regular contributor to the fund. As an employee of a self-insurer, the plaintiff (appellant) has the same options as his fellow employees of filing a written notice or submitting a bill of a licensed physician for payment. If he elects to receive treatment in some form other than by a hospital, or a licensed physician, he can still file a written notice. The classifications urged by plaintiff are really artificial sub-classes. In reality, it actually takes less for an employee of a self-insurer to toll the statute, than it does for an employee of a non self-insurer. We do not feel that the reasoning of Fleischman v. Flowers, 25 Ohio St.2d 131 (1971), Emmons v. Keller, 21 Ohio St.2d 48 (1969), or Kinney v. Kaiser Aluminum Chemical Corp., 41 Ohio St.2d 120 (1975) are applicable to this case. * * *"
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
O'NEILL, C.J., HERBERT, CORRIGAN, STERN, CELEBREZZE and W. BROWN, JJ., concur.
P. BROWN, J., concurs in the judgment.