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finding res judicata barred an official-capacity claim against a county employee where the same issues had been adjudicated in an earlier action against the county
Summary of this case from Pesce v. City of Des MoinesOpinion
8:17CV292
08-28-2017
BERNARD FRACTION, Plaintiff, v. DENNIS ROOKSTOOL, Douglas County Treasure; Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff filed a Complaint on August 10, 2017. (Filing No. 1.) He has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Filing No. 5.) The court now conducts an initial review of Plaintiff's Complaint to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
I. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
Plaintiff brings this action against Dennis Rookstool ("Rookstool"), the Douglas County Treasurer. Plaintiff alleges that Randy James and Vandelay Investments committed fraud when they obtained a tax deed for Plaintiff's home and later caused him to be evicted from his home, because they did not comply with certain prerequisites required by Nebraska law for issuance of a tax deed. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that "receiving a tax deed without affidavits on file in the treasure[r's] office is considered fraud" under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1837 . He believes that his personal and civil rights were violated. (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF pp. 1-2.) He requests a hearing "to find out what criteria was used to transfer [his] property . . . to Vandelay Investments legally," and unspecified damages. (Id.)
Actually, "[i]n all cases when the owner of real property sold for taxes resists the validity of a tax title, the owner may prove fraud committed by the officer selling the same or in the purchaser to defeat the same, and if fraud is so established, the sale and title shall be void." Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1846 (West). Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1837 (West) provides, in relevant part: ". . . the county treasurer, on application, on production of the certificate of purchase, and upon compliance with sections 77-1801 to 77-1863, shall execute and deliver a deed of conveyance for the real estate described in such certificate as provided in this section."
Plaintiff attached several documents to his Complaint. (Id. at CM/ECF pp. 3-14.) Those documents include an incomplete order from the state district court in Douglas County, Nebraska. (Id. at CM/ECF pp. 13-14.) Plaintiff filed a state district court action against Randy James and Vandelay Investments in Douglas County, Nebraska challenging the tax deed issued on his property. On August 10, 2016, the state district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and dismissed the case, finding the tax deed valid and that Vandelay Investments complied with the notice requirements under Nebraska law because it sent the required notice to Plaintiff via certified mail. It is apparent from Plaintiff's remaining attachments that he disagrees with the state district court judgment, specifically that the notice requirements were met under Nebraska law and because no affidavits are on file with the Douglas County Treasurer's Office. (Id. at CM/ECF pp. 3-14.)
See attached complaint and complete summary judgment order for Bernard Fraction v. Randy James and Vandelay Investments, Douglas County District Case No. CI 15-6268, at https://www.nebraska.gov/justice//case.cgi; Stutzka v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 760 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005) (court may take judicial notice of judicial opinions and public records).
The notice that it intended to apply for a tax deed on the property. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1831 (West).
II. PRIOR STATE COURT JUDGMENT
See attached complaint, order, and judgment on the mandate for Bernard Fraction v. Dennis Rookstool, Douglas County District Case No. CI 16-3090, at https://www.nebraska.gov/justice//case.cgi.
Meanwhile, on April 13, 2016, Plaintiff filed a state district court action in Douglas County, Nebraska against Rookstool, alleging that Plaintiff's due process rights were violated when Rookstool illegally issued the tax deed on Plaintiff's home to Randy James and Vandelay Investments. Plaintiff asserted (1) he was not given personal notice of Vandelay Investments' intention to apply for a tax deed and (2) the certified mail receipts were forged with the signatures of Plaintiff and his wife. On July 14, 2016, the state district court denied Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted Rookstool's motion to dismiss the case. With regard to Plaintiff's first assertion, the state district court found, in relevant part:
The statute did not require that the certified mail receipts be signed by a particular person or by an individual with specific qualifications. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot state a plausible claim to relief under federal constitutional due process for Vandelay Investment's failure to provide personal service of its notice of intention to apply for a treasurer's tax deed to the property because Vandelay Investments was not statutorily obligated to provide him personal service of its notice. This aspect of Plaintiff's due process claim cannot proceed.
With regard to Plaintiff's second assertion, the state district court found, in relevant part:
Plaintiff has not expressly and unambiguously stated that he sues Defendant in his (Defendant's) individual capacity, so the Court must review the Complaint as one asserting only an official capacity claim. [case law omitted]
The Complaint reasonably infers that Defendant is an employee of the County of Douglas, Nebraska ("Douglas County"). Pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978), local governments such as Douglas County are responsible only for their own illegal acts, they are not vicariously liable for their employees' actions. Per Monell, in order for Plaintiff to assert a plausible claim to relief from Douglas County under § 1983 he must show that an official policy or custom was the "moving force" behind the violation of his due process interest. The Complaint is silent as to any official policy or custom of Douglas County's. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim to relief from Douglas County under federal constitutional law that is plausible on its face.The Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment on appeal, and the state district court entered judgment on the mandate on June 28, 2017. A little over a month later, Plaintiff filed this action.
III. APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it that states a frivolous or malicious claim, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Pro se plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to "nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible," or "their complaint must be dismissed." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.").
"The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party 'fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.'" Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)). However, "[a] pro se complaint must be liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties." Topchian, 760 F.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Liberally construed, Plaintiff here alleges federal constitutional claims. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the United States Constitution or created by federal statute and also must show that the alleged deprivation was caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993).
IV. DISCUSSION
The court notes, at the outset, that it does not appear that Plaintiff has standing to challenge the tax deed. Standing . . . is a jurisdictional requirement, and thus "can be raised by the court sua sponte at any time during the litigation." Delorme v. United States, 354 F.3d 810, 815 (8th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff must comply with Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1844 before he has standing to challenge the tax deed. See Hauxwell v. Henning, 863 N.W.2d 798, 802 (Neb. 2015). Section 77-1844 requires Plaintiff to pay taxes due upon the property " ' "before or during the trial, or before final judgment." ' " Id. (citations omitted). Plaintiff does not allege that he ever paid the delinquent taxes on the property. If Plaintiff does not have standing to challenge the tax deed, he cannot rebut the presumption under Nebraska law that the tax deed is valid. Id. at 803 (citing Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1842). The court finds that any amendment to remedy this defect would be futile because, as discussed next, preclusion applies here.
A. Claim Preclusion
The state district court judgment in Fraction v. Rookstool, Douglas County District Court Case No. CI 16-3090, precludes Plaintiff's claims against Rookstool in his official capacity. Where a plaintiff fails to "expressly and unambiguously" state that a public official is sued in his individual capacity, the court "assume[s] that the defendant is sued only in his or her official capacity." Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff's claims against Rookstool in his official capacity are claims against Douglas County. "A suit against a public employee in his or her official capacity is merely a suit against the public employer." Id.
"'In order that parties for or against whom the doctrine of res judicata is sought to be applied may be regarded the same in both actions, the general rule is that they must be parties to both actions in the same capacity or quality.'" McGill v. Lion Place Condo. Ass'n, 864 N.W.2d 642, 655 (Neb. 2015) (citation omitted). In the state district court action, Plaintiff sued Rookstool in his official capacity only.
"[A] federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered." In re Athens/Alpha Gas Corp., 715 F.3d 230, 235 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984)). Claim preclusion bars the relitigation of a claim that has been directly addressed or necessarily included in a former adjudication if (1) the former judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) the former judgment was a final judgment, (3) the former judgment was on the merits, and (4) the same parties or their privies were involved in both actions. The doctrine bars relitigation not only of those matters actually litigated, but also of those matters which might have been litigated in the prior action. The doctrine rests on the necessity to terminate litigation and on the belief that a person should not be vexed twice for the same cause. Hara v. Reichert, 843 N.W.2d 812, 816 (Neb. 2014).
The state district court adjudicated Plaintiff's due process claims against Douglas County with regard to the tax deed, and claim preclusion prohibits Plaintiff from relitigating those claims or pursuing other similar claims against Douglas County (Rookstool in his official capacity) now. The former judgment was rendered by the Douglas County District Court, a court of competent jurisdiction; it was a final judgment on the merits; and the same parties were involved in both actions.
"A ruling is final when no further action of the court is required to dispose of the cause pending." Smith v. Smith, 517 N.W.2d 394, 399 (Neb. 1994); see also Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (West) (final order, defined). "A judgment of dismissal based on the failure of a claimant to state a cause of action is considered a judgment on the merits, even where by amendments a good cause of action might be stated." Cole v. Clarke, 641 N.W.2d 412, 416 (Neb. App. 2002).
B. Issue Preclusion
Issue preclusion bars the relitigation of a finally determined issue that a party had a prior opportunity to fully and fairly litigate. Issue preclusion applies where (1) an identical issue was decided in a prior action, (2) the prior action resulted in a final judgment on the merits, (3) the party against whom the doctrine is to be applied was a party or was in privity with a party to the prior action, and (4) there was an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the issue in the prior action. Issue preclusion applies only to issues actually litigated. Issue preclusion protects litigants from relitigating an identical issue with a party or his privy and promotes judicial economy by preventing needless litigation. Hara, 843 N.W.2d at 816.
The core issue that Plaintiff seeks to litigate here is the validity of the tax deed issued to Vandelay Investments on Plaintiff's home. That issue was finally determined in Plaintiff's suit against Randy James and Vandelay Investments in Douglas County District Court Case No. CI 15-6268. In that prior action, after it heard argument and received evidence from Plaintiff, the state district court found the tax deed valid, entered summary judgment for the defendants, and dismissed the case. Accordingly, because the four elements of issue preclusion are met, Plaintiff cannot relitigate the validity of the tax deed against Rookstool, in either his individual or official capacity, now. "[I]ssue preclusion may be used by a nonparty in a later action, either offensively or defensively." Id. at 817.
This includes Plaintiff's allegation that Vandelay Investments did not file the required affidavits. This is merely another attack on the validity of the tax deed. But, as stated, the state district court found the tax deed valid; in other words, in compliance with Nebraska law. --------
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
1. This matter is dismissed with prejudice.
2. A separate judgment will be entered.
Dated this 28th day of August, 2017.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Richard G. Kopf
Senior United States District Judge
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