Opinion
(9327)
Argued December 10, 1991
Decision released March 3, 1992
Application, in the first case, to confirm an arbitration award, and application, in the second case, to vacate that award, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford and referred to Hon. Harold M. Mulvey, state trial referee; judgment denying the application in the first case and granting the application in the second case, from which the plaintiff in the first case, the defendant in the second case, filed a consolidated appeal to this court, which reversed the judgment and remanded the case with direction to confirm the arbitration award, from which the named defendant in the first case, named plaintiff in the second case, on the granting of certification, appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed the judgment and remanded the case to this court for reconsideration. Affirmed.
Elizabeth A. Gallagher, for the appellant (plaintiff in the first case, defendant in the second case).
George J. DuBorg, for the appellee (named defendant in the first case, named plaintiff in the second case).
Daniel P. Scapellati, with whom, on the brief, was John W. Lemega, for the appellee (State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company).
This case returns to this court on remand from our Supreme Court so that we may reconsider our decision reversing the judgment of the trial court in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Covenant Ins. Co. v. Coon, 220 Conn. 30, 594 A.2d 977 (1991).
The facts of the present case are set forth in Forsberg v. New Hampshire Ins. Co. 24 Conn. App. 655, 667, 591 A.2d 147, remanded for reconsideration, 220 Conn. 922, 597 A.2d 342 (1991), and do not warrant repetition here. The dispositive question before us in that case was "whether the trial court. correctly determined that Staci Forsberg's vehicle was an `underinsured motor vehicle' under General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) 38-175c (b)(2) (now 38a-336 [d]). Id., 656. We determined that the vehicle was not an underinsured vehicle as defined by the relevant statute and that the plaintiff, Forsberg, should be allowed to stack her uninsured-underinsured motorist coverage under policies held by her individually and by her parents. Id., 659-61 Accordingly, we remanded the case to the trial court with direction to render judgment confirming the arbitration award, which was in accordance with our decision.
The parents' policy covered the plaintiff as member of her parents' household
Subsequent to our decision, our Supreme Court decided in Covenant Ins. Co. v. Coon, supra that, in determining the liability limit for purposes of underinsured motorist insurance, the relevant amount to be examined is the per person limit available to the victim, and that, for the purpose of determining whether a tortfeasor's vehicle is underinsured, the uninsured motorist, insurance statute, General Statutes 38a-336, limits consideration of underinsured motorist coverage to each individual policy available to the claimant separately. Id., 34. Under this analysis, our decision in Forsberg, which directly conflicts with Covenant, must be changed to conform to that recent Supreme Court case.