Opinion
14169
November 11, 1935.
Before SHIPP, J., Lee, April, 1935. Affirmed.
Action by Alice E. Ford against W.T. Ball. From an order overruling a demurrer to the complaint, defendant appeals.
The complaint, directed to be reported, follows:
The plaintiff, complaining of the defendant, alleges:
1. That both the plaintiff and defendant are residents and citizens of Lee County, S.C.
2. That some time during the year 1928, the plaintiff purchased from the defendant a tract of land in Lee County, S.C. known as the old Jim Reese tract, containing about 115 acres. That plaintiff gave to the defendant a mortgage on said tract of land for $2,500.00 as a part of the purchase price for the same, and plaintiff went into possession of said tract of land and worked it for the year 1929. That thereafter and some time during the year 1929, the defendant approached the plaintiff and offered that if plaintiff would reconvey to the defendant said tract of land, that the defendant would give to the plaintiff a written statement that he would thereafter reconvey to plaintiff the said tract of land upon the plaintiff's paying to him $421.80 and that plaintiff could pay said $421.80 out of what was made upon the Jim Reese tract at the rate of $200.00 a year rent for same. That plaintiff agreed with the defendant that she would convey to him the said tract of land upon the terms as above stated, and did, in pursuance of said agreement, give to the defendant a deed for said tract of land and fully performed her part of said agreement and retained possession of said tract of land during the year 1930 and farmed same, and defendant took all of the crop made thereon that year, which amounted to more than the sum of $200.00
3. That the defendant, in violation of the terms of said agreement between him and the plaintiff as above alleged, and for the purpose and design of cheating and defrauding the plaintiff out of the benefits due her under said contract, and while plaintiff was in a sick condition, came to plaintiff's home with his attorney with a deed prepared for plaintiff to sign, which plaintiff did sign, and the defendant took said deed and when questioned by the plaintiff's husband as to the written statement above referred to, falsely, knowingly, designed, wickedly, and with intent to deceive the plaintiff, stated to her that he came off from Bishopville without said written statement, and that if plaintiff's husband would come down to Bishopville within the next day or so, he would give him said written statement and would carry out the terms of his contract. That defendant had no intention of giving said written statement at any time and made said promise with intent to break the same and for the purpose of influencing and inducing the plaintiff to sign said deed and deliver it to him.
4. That later, on or about October 1, 1930, the said defendant falsely, knowingly, designedly, wickedly, and with intent to defraud the plaintiff out of her rights under said contract with him as above alleged, sold and conveyed to one Alma Campbell one acre of said land for the sum of $150.00, so plaintiff is informed and believes, with the intent and for the purpose of depriving the plaintiff of her rights under said contract, knowing at the time that he was under contract with the plaintiff to reconvey to her said tract of land and that if he sold off said acre to Campbell it would not be possible for him to comply with the terms of said contract.
5. That said defendant threatened to issue a distress warrant against the plaintiff and her agents for the $200.00 rent due for the year 1930, and caused the plaintiff and her agents to agree that the crop should be turned over to him to apply on said $200.00 rent, and thereafter the said defendant deprived the plaintiff of the possession of said Jim Reese tract of land. That said statements and promises and failure to give the plaintiff the written statement above referred to and the acts of selling and conveying the land to Alma Campbell and the taking of plaintiff's crop and depriving her of the possession of said tract of land were all false and fraudulent acts, and were made and done in connection with breach of said contract between the plaintiff and defendant above alleged.
6. That said contract was breached with the fraudulent acts as hereinbefore alleged, and said defendant has gone into possession of said Jim Reese tract of land and has totally and entirely breached said contract between the plaintiff and the defendant, and the breach of said contract was accomplished by the fraudulent acts and conduct hereinbefore alleged on the part of the defendant, and by reason thereof the defendant has damaged the plaintiff in the sum of $20,000.00, with actual and punitive damages.
Wherefore, plaintiff demands judgments against the defendant for the sum of $20,000.00 and for the costs and disbursements of this action.
Mr. C.B. Ruffin, for appellant, cites: Fraud: 26 C.J., 1167; 5 S.C.L., 31; 6 R.C.L., 943; 13 C.J., 627; 3 Hill, 268; 12 R.C.L., 262; 150 Va., 132; 142 S.E., 363.
Mr. Henry C. Jennings, for respondent, cites: As to fraudulent breach of contract: 70 S.C. 108; 49 S.E., 232; 117 S.C. 137; 108 S.E., 189; 162 S.C. 303; 160 S.E., 721; 173 S.C. 99; 174 S.E., 898; 11 Rich. Eq., 574; 13 L.Ed., 927; 134 S.C. 493; 133 S.E., 437; 60 N.H. 485; 160 S.C. 274; 158 S.E., 693; 124 S.C. 8; 117 S.E., 305; 117 S.C. 137; 108 S.E., 189; 167 S.C. 233; 45 S.E., 154.
November 11, 1935. The opinion of the Court was delivered by
This is an appeal from an order of his Honor, Judge Shipp, overruling a demurrer to the complaint, made on the ground that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The action was brought for the recovery of damages growing out of the alleged breach of a contract affecting the purchase and reconveyance of a tract of land in Lee County, accomplished and accompanied by fraudulent acts.
A careful examination of the allegations of the complaint leads us to the conclusion that it is legally sufficient in its averments. The complaint, which will be reported, contains allegations appropriate to an action for breach of contract accompanied by fraud. The exceptions, imputing error to the trial Judge, direct our attention in the main to Paragraph 3 of the complaint, and stresses the failure of the respondent to demand from the appellant at Bishopville the written statement embodying the alleged agreement for the reconveyance of the tract of land in question, and failure of the respondent to tender to the appellant the amount agreed upon.
Under the agreement alleged in this case, it was the duty of the appellant to deliver the written agreement, whether or not it was called for by the respondent. The demurrer admits the truth of every well-pleaded allegation contained in the complaint. The appellant, therefore, admits that he agreed to reconvey the tract of land upon the terms set forth in the complaint, and that upon receiving a deed for the property from the respondent, he would deliver to her a written statement, binding himself to reconvey. He admits, as alleged in the complaint, that she fully performed her part of the agreement, and that he seized all of the crop made on the property during the year 1930, valued in excess of the sum of $200.00, which, under the agreement, was more than sufficient to pay the first installment on the repurchase agreement. He admits that he violated the terms of the agreement for the purpose and with design of cheating and defrauding her out of the benefits resulting to her under the contract; that he carried the deed to her for execution, without intending to comply with his agreement; and that he had no intention of delivering the written statement of agreement at the time he promised he would do so, but made the promise with intent to violate it, and for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to execute and deliver the deed to him. He admits that with the purpose and intent of defrauding the plaintiff and depriving her of her beneficial rights under the contract, he sold and conveyed away one acre of the land which he was under contract with the plaintiff to reconvey to her, knowing that by making such conveyance it would be impossible for him to comply with the terms of his contract. He further admits that he dispossessed the plaintiff, and has himself gone into possession of the lands in question, and that his breach of the alleged contract was accomplished by the fraudulent acts alleged against him in the complaint.
Welborn v. Dixon, 70 S.C. 108, 49 S.E., 232, 3 Ann. Cas., 407, is in point. In that case the plaintiff conveyed to Dixon a tract of land as security for a debt, with the agreement that upon payment of the debt the defendant would reconvey the land to the plaintiff. Thereafter the defendant conveyed the said land to a third person, and thereby made it impossible for him to comply with the terms of the agreement, and it was held that the conveyance of the land under these circumstances constituted an act of fraud which accompanied the breach of the contract. In this case, as the defendant did in the case of Welborn v. Dixon, supra, the appellant conveyed a part of the land to a third person, thus putting it out of his power to comply with his contract, and this conveyance of a part of said land is one of the fraudulents acts alleged in the complaint, which, if true, would constitute a breach of the contract accompanied by a fraudulent act.
In the case of Palmetto Bank Trust company v. Grimsley et al., 134 S.C. 493, 133 S.E., 437, 439, 51 A.L.R., 42, it was held that:
"`When a promise is made with no intention of performance and for the very purpose of accomplishing a fraud, it is a most apt and effectual means to that end, and the victim has a remedy by action or defense.' Goodwin v. Horne, 60 N.H. 485.
"`A promise is usually without the domain of the law, unless it creates a contract, but if made when there is no intention of performance, and for the purpose of inducing action by another, it is fraudulent, and may be made the ground of relief.' Herndon v. Durham S.R.C., 161 N.C. 650, 77 S.E., 683."
The demurrer admits the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint, and the complaint specifically alleges that the plaintiff has fully performed on her part the obligations of the alleged agreement. This being admitted, the plaintiff has stated a cause of action. Bailey v. Savannah Guano Company, 101 S.C. 445, 86 S.E., 7.
Having reached the conclusion that the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action based on the fraudulent breach of a contract, it follows that the judgment of the Circuit Court should be affirmed.
All exceptions have been considered, and are overruled. It is the judgment of this Court that the judgment of the Circuit Court herein be, and the same hereby is, affirmed.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE STABLER and MESSRS. JUSTICES CARTER, BONHAM and BAKER concur.