Opinion
No. CV00-0072030
February 20, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION UPON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant seeks dismissal of plaintiff's action, stating that the Superior Court has no subject matter jurisdiction, which they claim resides exclusively in Probate Court. Plaintiff's suit seeks judicial imposition of a constructive trust upon assets of a decedent, passed via will, citing oral promises made to plaintiff.
Plaintiff is the daughter of the deceased Louis Gardella and the stepdaughter of the deceased Helen Gardella. Stepmother Helen died in 2000 and Louis predeceased her, intestate, on a date not pleaded. This action names as defendants the estate of Helen and two heirs under Helen's will, nieces Alyce Thomas and Gloria Popowchack who is also executrix of Helen's will. Helen's will named only nieces Alyce and Gloria as beneficiaries.
The plaintiff alleges that on several occasions between 1994 and 1996, her father and stepmother orally promised her that she would receive any assets which they owned upon their respective deaths. Instead, when Helen died, after the death of Louis, at the direction of her will, all of the assets in her estate were left to the defendants. Plaintiff asserts that distributing the assets to the defendants will unjustly enrich them, and will be contrary to the oral promises the decedents made to her. In her request for relief, plaintiff asks the court to stay the disposition of all the assets of the estate and to impose a constructive trust in her favor on all of the property that passed from the estate of Louis to the estate of Helen and from Helen to her nieces.
The defendants, as noted, claim this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, stating that the plaintiff was required to raise her claim in Probate Court, which all agree she did not do. The defendants also assert that plaintiff is foreclosed pursuant to the doctrines of full faith and credit and res judicata. Attached to the defendants' motion are various final decrees the Probate Court issued in processing the estates of both decedents, and a copy of a letter, dated November 12, 1998, revealing that a modest distribution of cash went to plaintiff from her father's estate.
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
The defendants insist that following the death of the plaintiff's father, in accordance with the requirements found in General Statutes §§ 45a-353 and 45a-358 (c), the plaintiff was required to present her claim to the Probate Court administering his intestacy. Indeed, plaintiff received a monetary distribution in the amount of $1,044. 10 as an intestate successor to her father's estate, with no claim of the present nature presented. The defendants urge that this failure to prosecute upon the death of Louis is a defect precluding this "collateral claim," which deprives this court of jurisdiction. Defendants cite General Statues § 45a-24 in claiming that a Probate Court's final decree, if rendered after notice with no appeal taken, is conclusive and binding here and deserving full faith and credit.
General Statutes § 45a-353 states in relevant part:
For the purpose of sections 45a-266, 45a-353 to 45a-384, inclusive, 45a-390 and 45a-436, the following terms shall have the following meanings, unless otherwise specifically provided:
. . .
(d) "Claim" means all claims against a decedent (1) existing at the time of the decedent's death or (2) arising after the decedent's death, including, but not limited to, claims which are matured, unmatured, liquidated, unliquidated, contingent, founded in tort, or in the nature of exoneration, specific performance or replevin;
(e) "Creditor" means any person having a claim . . .
General Statutes § 45a-358 states in relevant part:
(a) Every claim shall be presented to the fiduciary in writing.
. . .
(c) No creditor shall be entitled to enforce payment of his claim against assets in the hands of a fiduciary in any proceeding in any court unless his claim is presented in accordance with the provisions of this section.
Emphasis added.
General Statutes § 45a-24 states in relevant part: "All orders, judgments and decrees of courts of probate, rendered after notice and from which no appeal is taken, shall be conclusive and shall be entitled to full faith, credit and validity and shall not be subject to collateral attack, except for fraud."
Defendants further say the plain language of § 45a-24 stands for the proposition that final decrees issued by a Probate Court have a res judicata or collateral estoppel effect on issues already adjudicated or which should have been adjudicated in the probate management of her father's estate. Her failure to lay claim then bars her, defendants say, from advancing her current claim. Our Supreme Court has held that "[r]es judicata does not provide the basis for a judgment of dismissal; it is a special defense that is considered after any jurisdictional thresholds are passed." Labbe v. Pension Commission, 229 Conn. 801, 816 (1994). Therefore, the defendant has improperly raised the issue at this juncture. Accordingly, this portion of the defendants' argument will not be addressed beyond this footnote.
Lastly, the defendants note that the Probate Court later issued notice to plaintiff that the court had commenced proceedings in the estate of her stepmother, Helen. Thus, plaintiff had opportunities then and there, with appellate rights, if rejected.
The notice the defendants refer to was newspaper notice. No specific evidence illuminates whether plaintiff was aware via notice that Helen's will was being probated; however, plaintiff does not claim to be unaware of such notice.
The plaintiff states that her claim is completely exempt from any presentation requirements set forth in Title 45a. First, she argues that she was not required to present it following the first death (that of her father) for it was a "demand payable" contingent upon a "future event," and did not exist or ripen until her stepmother died. Next, plaintiff asserts that she was not required to present her claim in probate following the death of her stepmother, either, because common law would authorize her claim here instead, against the "holder" of "specific property" contained within said estate. Lastly, plaintiff states that pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-98 (b), the Superior Court has jurisdiction because it has "general jurisdiction" concurrent with that of the Probate Court, whose jurisdiction is neither "original" nor exclusive.
The plaintiff cites to LaMonica v. LaMonica, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 99 0079609 (September 26, 2000, Gill, J.) ( 28 Conn.L.Rptr. 189), for this proposition. This assertion on the part of the plaintiff is partially flawed and runs contrary to court's commentary in LaMonica.
In LaMonica, the court distinguishes between a claim for a "demand payable" and a "contingent or after-accruing" claim. The court comments that a "contingent or after-accruing" claim is "exempt from the presentation requirement because [it] either [did] not exist or [was] insufficiently definite or appreciable to be capable of a just and legal adjudication . . . Breen v. Phelps [ 186 Conn. 86, 103 (1982)]"; LaMonica v. LaMonica, supra, 28 Conn.L.Rptr. 190; see also Matey v. Dember, 256 Conn. 456, 477 (2001); whereas a "demand payable . . . [has been deemed to encompass] both debts that are immediately due and payable but also unmatured debts, `for these are . . . existing obligations and capable of proof.' Breen v. Phelps, supra, 102." LaMonica v. LaMonica, supra, 28 Conn.L.Rptr. 190.
The plaintiff is correct in asserting that her claim is a "contingent or after-accruing" claim, which pursuant to the holdings of LaMonica and Breen, was not subject to the presentment requirement, however, it is not because the plaintiff's claim was a "demand payable" upon the death of either Louis J. Gardella or Helen K. Gardella, but instead because her claim either "[did] not exist or [was] insufficiently definite or appreciable to be capable of a just and legal adjudication," LaMonica v LaMonica, supra, 28 Conn.L.Rptr. 190 (internal quotation marks omitted), until after both of the Gardellas died.
Moreover, if the plaintiff's claim were a "demand payable" as she asserts, then in accordance with the holding of LaMonica, her claim could not be deemed a claim for "specific property" by this court because according to the LaMonica court, a "demand payable at a future time" is subject to the presentment requirement pursuant to General Statues § 45a-357 and is not a "contingent debt." (Emphasis added.) LaMonica v. LaMonica, supra, 28 Conn.L.Rptr. 190. In this case, the plaintiff's failure to present her claim to the Probate Court in accordance with § 45a-357, would have barred her from filing a claim in Superior Court against the defendants.
The plaintiff states that her claim is exempt from the presentation requirement of "§ 45a-395 (a) and (b)." (Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Objection to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, ¶ 2.) Note that a review of this statute reveals that § 45a-395 actually applies only to individuals who died before October 1, 1987. Therefore, it appears that the plaintiff mistakenly cited to § 45a-395, when in fact she intended to cite to §§ 45a-357 and 45a-358, both of which contain language similar to that found in § 45a-395, but which apply to individuals who died after October 1, 1987, as did the Gardellas.
General Statutes § 45a-98 states in relevant part:
(a) Courts of probate in their respective districts shall have the power to . . . (2) admit wills to probate of persons who have died domiciled in their districts . . . (3). . . determine title or rights of possession and use in and to any real, tangible or intangible property that constitutes, or may constitute, all or part of . . . any decedent's estate . . . which . . . estate is otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Probate Court, including the rights and obligations of any beneficiary of the . . . estate . . . (4) construe the meaning and effect of any will . . . if a construction is required in connection with the administration or distribution of [an] . . . estate otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Probate Court . . . (7) make any lawful orders or decrees to carry into effect the power and jurisdiction conferred upon them by the laws of this state.
(b) The jurisdiction of courts of probate to determine the title or rights or to construe instruments . . . pursuant to subsection (a) of this section is concurrent with the jurisdiction of the Superior Court as a court of general jurisdiction.
Emphasis added.
DISCUSSION
In order to determine whether this court has subject matter jurisdiction, one must resolve the following issues: 1) what are the applicable presentation-of-claim requirements, and 2) does the Superior Court have authority in the matter?
PART I — The Connecticut "Nonclaim" Statutes
Construing the complaint in favor of nonmovant plaintiff, this court concludes that when Helen died, the plaintiff's claim was exempt from the presentment requirements found in § 45a-357, because her claim is for "specific property" contained within the estate of Helen and not a claim for "money damages" arising out of some personal debt or obligation. Under Connecticut law, there is no prerequisite that claims for "specific property" be presented to Probate Court before they can be heard by the Superior Court, which therefore has subject matter jurisdiction. Moreover, presumably the plaintiff did not present her claim to the Probate Court when her father died because at that time she had an expectation that upon her death, her stepmother would fulfill the promises made, rendering plaintiff the beneficiary of the "specific property" in question here. Therefore, it was only upon Helen's death, when she willed all of her property to her nieces, that the plaintiff's claim ripened.
Our legislature has enacted a statutory scheme whereby creditors are required to present any claims they might have against an estate, or be foreclosed for failing. Certain of these presentation requirements are commonly referred to as "nonclaim statutes." See, e.g., LaMonica v. LaMonica, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 99 0079609 (September 26, 2000, Gill, J.) ( 28 Conn.L.Rptr. 189) ("Section 45a-395 is referred to as [a] statute of nonclaim . . ."); Needle v. Petrarlo, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia/Milford at Milford, Docket No. CV 91 0037816 (Nov. 19, 1992, McGrath, J.) ( 8 Conn.L.Rptr. 9) ("Section 45a-357 [is] known as [a] Nonclaim Statute . . ."). Our Supreme Court has commented that the "purpose of [these nonclaim statutes] is to inform an administrator or executor of what claims may have to be paid out of the estate . . . [thereby permitting] the speedy settlement of estates." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Breen v. Phelps, 186 Conn. 86, 101-02 (1982).
The appropriate application of a particular nonclaim statute is, incidentally, dependent on the date of death of a decedent. Creditors who seek to file against the estate of one who died prior to October 1, 1987 must follow the presentment requirements set forth in § 45a-395 of Title 45a, while creditors who seek to file claims against the estate of one who died on or after October 1, 1987 should follow § 45a-357 of Title 45a. See General Statutes §§ 45a-395 and 45a-357. Both Louis and Helen died after October 1, 1987, therefore, § 45a-357 applies. (Plaintiff has mis-cited the relevant statute, of no consequence.)
General Statutes § 45a-357 states in relevant part:
(a) A fiduciary may at any time give notice to any person such fiduciary has reason to believe may have a claim that, if such person fails to present any such claim to the fiduciary on or before a date specified in such notice which date shall be not less than ninety days from the date of such notice, such person shall be forever barred from asserting or recovering on any such claim from the fiduciary, the estate of the decedent or any creditor or beneficiary of the estate . . .
(b) Any creditor notified in accordance with subsection (a) of this section, who fails to present his claim to the fiduciary on or before the date specified in such notice shall be forever barred from asserting or recovering on such claim from the fiduciary, the estate of the decedent or any creditor or beneficiary of the estate.
In Matey v. Dember, 256 Conn. 456 (2001), our Supreme Court stated that "the word `claim' as used in the [nonclaim statutes] means those obligations which are in the broad sense of the term, debts and would include obligations arising out of contract express or implied . . . A claim which is characterized as an existing obligation of the decedent and would be paid out of the estate as a whole falls within the statute and must be presented. The word [claim] was taken to apply also to claims founded in tort . . . until an amendment in 1967 specifically excepted such claims from the statute. Not only debts already due and payable but also those which have not matured must be presented, for these are nevertheless existing obligations and capable of proof . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Matey, supra, 476-77.
The Matey court also noted that "[n]ot all claims are subject to the nonclaim statute[s]. For instance, tort claims [and] claims to an interest in real estate owned by a decedent at the time of his death and forming part of his estate [and] claims for the recovery of trust assets that have been included in the estate of a decedent [and] claims for the recovery of specific property . . . and claims for after-accrued claims . . . are not subject to the statute . . ." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Matey v. Dember, supra, 256 Conn. 477. To reiterate, "[i]n those cases in which the [claim] is for the recovery of or the determination of interests in specific property and therefore is at least quasi in rem and not in personam, it is not an essential prerequisite that a claim be presented [to Probate Court]." Padula v. Padula, 138 Conn. 102, 107 (1951). This is so because "[a] claim for specific property in the hands of the administrator is deemed to be a claim against the administrator but not against the estate; for such property, though in the hands of the administrator, is not part of the estate and the claim for it is not a debt of the estate." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Breen v. Phelps, supra, 186 Conn. 102-03.
The plaintiff relies primarily on LaMonica v. LaMonica, supra, 28 Conn.L.Rptr. 189, to assert that her claim is exempt from the presentation requirements of the nonclaim statute. The LaMonica court followed the precedent set forth in Breen, supra, and held that all claims for "specific property" were exempt from the presentation requirement of the nonclaim statute. LaMonica v. LaMonica, supra, 28 Conn.L.Rptr. 190. Notwithstanding this decision, however, the LaMonica court ultimately concluded that the plaintiff's claim was not a claim for "specific property" but instead was a "debt in the nature of insurance proceeds, i.e.: money . . . [which actually] stems from a personal obligation of the decedent" and was therefore a debt against the estate itself. Id. Consequently, the plaintiff's claim was dismissed.
In LaMonica, the plaintiff and the defendant were the surviving spouses of two brothers, David and John LaMonica. Prior to their respective deaths, David and John LaMonica were business partners. At some point, the brothers each purchased a life insurance policy, naming the other as a beneficiary and agreed that "the beneficiary under each policy, would, upon the death of one of the parties, use the insurance proceeds to pay the funeral expenses of the deceased and pay the remainder to the widow of the deceased." LaMonica v. LaMonica, supra, 28 Conn.L.Rptr. 189.
Following John's death, his brother used a portion of the insurance proceeds to pay for John's funeral, remitting the remainder to John's widow, the defendant. Upon the death of David, however, the defendant cashed in her husband's policy and refused to pay for David's funeral. Moreover, she refused to remit any of the proceeds to David's widow, the plaintiff. Plaintiff sued in Superior Court seeking the insurance proceeds.
The defendant argued that the plaintiff's claim must fail because plaintiff could not prove that "she presented a claim to the estate of John LaMonica . . . pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-395, within four months of [her husband's] death." LaMonica v. LaMonica, supra, 28 Conn.L.Rptr. 189. In response, the plaintiff asserted that her claim was instituted against the defendant as the "beneficiary and recipient of the insurance proceeds and not the estate of John LaMonica itself, and [was] not, therefore, subject to the presentation requirement." Id., 190.
The LaMonica decision also includes a footnote which states: "This exemption does not, however, apply to constructive trusts which are still subject to the presentation requirement." LaMonica v. LaMonica, supra, 28 Conn.L.Rptr. 189. The court cites Breen v. Phelps, supra, 186 Conn. 86, as the source of this assertion. The holding of Breen, with respect to whether all constructive trusts are exempt from the presentation requirement, is narrower than the LaMonica footnote suggests. The Breen holding applies only to parties seeking the imposition of a constructive trust upon "money damages," as opposed to parties seeking the imposition of a constructive trust upon "specific property."
In Breen, the plaintiff filed an action against the defendant's decedent, asking, inter alia, for either money damages or the imposition of a constructive trust on certain payments to the decedent allegedly made in conjunction with a real estate deal, such as periodic down payments, payment of property taxes and payment for renovations.
The defendant argued that this claim should be stricken because the plaintiff failed to present a timely claim to the Probate Court. The plaintiff countered that his claim was for "specific property" and exempt from the presentation requirement. The trial court determined that the plaintiff's claim was essentially one for "money damages" rather than for the return of "specific property," and therefore, presentation of this type of claim, in writing, was required by the nonclaim statute.
On review, the Supreme Court suggested that the plaintiff was improperly attempting to impose a "constructive trust upon the [decedent's] estate to the extent of the consideration received by the defendant"; Breen v. Phelps, supra, 186 Conn. 86, 104; and stated that "[n]either the complaint nor the affidavits allege[d] that [the decedent] was under any obligation to hold any of the consideration received apart from her general assets . . ." Id. Noting that the "plaintiff's claim in the second count [was] essentially for the restitution of benefits received by the decedent [at the expense of the plaintiff]"; id., 104; the court concluded that "[w]here the relief requested is the recovery of money out of an estate, to require presentation is consonant with the purpose of the [nonclaim] statute." Id. 106. Ultimately, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling and held that the claim should be stricken because, rather than being a claim for "specific property," it "demand[ed] damages that would have to be paid out of the estate as a whole" and therefore, should have been presented to the Probate Court in accordance with the nonclaim statute. Id.
Therefore, this court must consider whether plaintiff's claim is for "money damages" arising out of a personal debt or obligation of the decedent, or a claim for "specific property" within Helen's estate. In the amended complaint, the court is asked to "impos[e] a constructive trust" which ought exist "as a result of [the] oral agreement [between herself, her father and her stepmother], for all assets, including all real and personal property, contained within the estate of Helen." Unlike the plaintiffs in LaMonica and Breen, this plaintiff does not petition for relief in the form of "money damages" arising out of a personal obligation of the decedents; nor does she ask the court to impose a constructive trust upon monies, say, that she might have loaned to the decedents. Instead, construing the language of the complaint in her favor, it appears the claim is one for certain "specific property" and not actually a claim for "money damages." Accordingly, the plaintiff's claim for "specific property" is exempt from the presentment requirements set forth in § 45a-357.
PART II — Jurisdictional Power of the Superior Court Versus the Probate Court
This court is one of general jurisdiction whose authority may be concurrent with Probate Court, unless a controversy falls within the original jurisdiction of the Probate Court. Here, the plaintiff seeks "specific property" and an equitable remedy, imposition of a constructive trust until the court can determine the claim's validity. This does not seem to be the sort of claim deemed to fall within the original jurisdiction of the Probate Court; instead, it fits more closely the type of claim listed in Matey, supra. Thus, the Superior Court may properly exercise subject matter jurisdiction.
To explain more fully, the legislature has pronounced certain jurisdictional powers to be concurrent, General Statutes § 45a-98 (b) and our courts have so acknowledged. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Hartford Trust Co., 104 Conn. 169, 190 (1926); Hall v. Dichello Distributors, Inc., 6 Conn. App. 530, 535-36 (1986), cert denied, 200 Conn. 807 (1987); Salafia v. Salafia, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. CV 95 0249964 (May 22, 1996, Silbert, J.) ( 16 Conn.L.Rptr. 601).
See footnote 3 which sets forth the relevant statutory language contained within General Statues § 45a-98 (b).
General Statutes § 51-164s provides, however, that the Superior Court "shall be the sole court of original jurisdiction for all causes of action except in such actions over which the courts of probate have original jurisdiction, as provided by statute." See also Hall v. Dichello Distributors, Inc., supra, 6 Conn. App. 534. In other words, "the Superior Court cannot exercise a primary jurisdiction which by statute is reposed in the Courts of Probate." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) First National Bank Trust Co. v. McCoy, 124 Conn. 111, 115 (1938); see also Hall v. Dichello Distributors, Inc., supra, 6 Conn. App. 534-35; Salafia v. Salafia, supra, 16 Conn.L.Rptr. 602 (the "Superior Court cannot exercise concurrent jurisdiction over subject matter within the original jurisdiction of the Probate Court").
The Supreme Court has indicated that "[i]n contrast to courts of probate, [t]he Superior Court of this state as a court of law is a court of general jurisdiction. It has jurisdiction of all matters expressly committed to it and of all others cognizable by any law court of which exclusive jurisdiction is not given to some other court. The fact that no other court has exclusive jurisdiction in any matter is sufficient to give the Superior Court jurisdiction over that matter." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Joshua S., 260 Conn. 182, 215 (2002).
With respect to the jurisdiction of the Probate Court, "there are three types of actions in which the Superior Court does not exercise original jurisdiction: those involving the custody of a child not the issue of the marriage involved in a divorce, settlement of an executor's or administrator's account, and the question of due execution of a will." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 216, citing Hall, supra. Thus, in consonance with In re Joshua S., supra, 260 Conn. 216, this is not the type of claim over which Probate would have exclusive or original jurisdiction as the essence of the claim is not rooted in a custody battle, nor is it a request for an accounting of the assets being held within Helen's estate, nor is the plaintiff asking the court to determine if the will was properly executed.
It has been said that, "[a] constructive trust is a flexible equitable remedy whose enforcement is subject to the equitable discretion of the trial court." Wendell Corp. Trustee v. Thurston, 239 Conn. 109, 120 (1996). Moreover, "[t]he authority of a Probate Court `is not co-equal with that of the Superior Court when it is exercising its general equity powers . . .'" Hall v. Dichello Distributors, Inc., supra, 6 Conn. App. 536, quoting Phillips v. Moeller, 147 Conn. 482, 488 (1960). Therefore, because the plaintiff's claim involves a request for the imposition of an equitable remedy and does not fall within any of the three specific areas consigned to the Probate Court's original jurisdiction, the Superior Court may properly exercise jurisdiction.
The defendants' motion to dismiss is denied.
Nadeau, J.