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holding that Eleventh Amendment did not bar Section 1983 action against individual defendants where, among other things, the complaint sought compensatory and punitive damages and defendants raised issue of qualified immunity
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-1616
December 16, 2003
MEMORANDUM INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Harold L. Floyd, an inmate at the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institute at Graterford, filed a complaint against defendants, Lieutenant Michael Dugal, Lieutenant Robert Zahn, and former Graterford Unit Manager Glen Yanis, alleging retaliation for plaintiffs exercise of his constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In February 2002, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. I denied the first motion for summary judgment without prejudice while I secured counsel for plaintiff. Before me now is defendants' renewed motion for summary judgment and plaintiff's response thereto.
Dugal currently holds the rank of Captain; however, I will refer to him as Lieutenant because that is the rank he held during the relevant period.
BACKGROUND
When the alleged retaliation occurred, plaintiff was employed in the prison's dry cleaning plant where he was earning 41 cents per hour plus a bonus. In April 1997, a search of the dry cleaning facility revealed numerous items of contraband. In light of the discovered contraband a prison officer requested a support team hearing regarding the continued employment of plaintiff and other inmate workers in the dry cleaning plant. The evidence presented at the hearing included testimony from Elliott Bennett, head supervisor of the dry cleaning plant, who stated that there was suspicion of drugs being transported throughout the dry cleaning plant. The support team voted to allow plaintiff to retain his employment at the plant with stricter supervision and direction. Two other inmates lost their jobs at the plant as a result of the support team hearings.
Because I am ruling on defendants' motion for summary judgment, all of the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff.
On June 4, 1997, defendant Dugal visited the dry cleaning plant to find out why two of his shirts had been pressed improperly. The civilian supervisor of dry cleaning directed Dugal to ask plaintiff about his shirts. The content of the conversation between plaintiff and Dugal is in dispute. Dugal asserts that when he inquired about why his shirts were pressed improperly plaintiff stated that he did not do Dugal's shirts but stated that he made sure Dugal's clothes were wrinkled because on one occasion plaintiff had wanted to get out of his block and Dugal ignored his request. Plaintiff claims that Dugal requested military pleats, which are more intricate than a normal shirt press. Plaintiff states that he denied this request because he did not have to, and did not want to, take extra time and care with Dugal's shirts.
Dugal filed a misconduct report against plaintiff after their interaction on June 4. In the misconduct report Dugal alleged that plaintiff was "threatening another person" and "refusing to work or encouraging others to refuse to work." The text of the misconduct report filed by Dugal stated:
On 6/4/97 at approx. 0830 hr I, Lt. Dugal, went to the dry cleaning area to inquire why my uniforms are so messed up to [Floyd's supervisor, Robert] Lee. Mr. Lee stated that [Floyd] does the white shirts and asked him. [Floyd] came over to me and when I asked [Floyd] why my shirts look so bad [he] stated "do you remember a couple of weeks ago when I was banging on a door to get you out and you — flagged me off?" Then [he] state[d] that he was ill and wanted to go to the dispensary and I — waved him off. Floyd then state[d] that is why your clothes are messed up.
PL's Resp. to Defs.' Renewed Mot. for Summ. J., ex. C.
An examiner held a misconduct hearing to determine whether any disciplinary action would be taken as a result of the misconduct report. It is undisputed that plaintiff presented written testimony at the hearing in which he denied the charges. Defendants allege that plaintiff did not present oral testimony at the hearing while plaintiff alleges that he did. Dugal was not present at the hearing; however, the examiner did look at Dugal's written report. The examiner dismissed the charges against plaintiff without prejudice, stating in the disciplinary hearing report that he "must dismiss [the] misconduct [charges] without prejudice" because the misconduct "report is not conclusive." PL's Resp., ex. F. Due to that dismissal, plaintiff was allowed to return to his dry cleaning plant job.
On the same day, Dugal learned that plaintiff had prevailed at the hearing and had been returned to his employment at the dry cleaning plant. Dugal then filed a support team hearing request to attempt to remove plaintiff and another inmate from the plant. Dugal presented this request in a memorandum to Yanis, plaintiff's block supervisor, that set forth reasons why plaintiffs work assignment should be reconsidered. Those reasons were:
1. The brashness and arrogance that they portray in deciding who gets what done to their uniforms is completely astonishing.
2. They feel that they are above both staff and other inmates in this position and can control this area.
3. With the audacity that they both projected by their statements mentioned above, they think that they can get and do things that would be against policy.
4. With Floyd . . . displaying this type of attitude, I personally feel that [he is] way too familiar with staff, and the Dry Cleaning areas is a place where a majority of staff are in getting their clothes or checking out to see if their clothes are done.
PL Resp., ex. G.
A support team hearing was conducted on June 16, 1997. The hearing panel consisted of Yanis, Zahn, Employment Coordinator John Henschel, Dry Cleaning Unit Supervisor Robert Lee, Block Counselor Michael Margolis, and Block Counselor Robert Rogers. It is unclear whether Dugal participated as a voting member of this panel. It is undisputed that Dugal appeared before the panel and gave a statement concerning plaintiff. Dugal maintains that the misconduct charge and the outcome of the misconduct hearing were not mentioned at the support team hearing, but that the facts provided to the support team hearing panel were the same.
Plaintiff contends that the misconduct charges and the outcome of the hearing were discussed at the subsequent support team hearing. None of the defendants recall the misconduct hearing or its outcome being discussed at the support team hearing. Whether the misconduct hearing was discussed or not is a disputed fact. As a result of the support team hearing, plaintiff was removed from the dry cleaning plant and reassigned to the position of janitor on A block, where he earns 18 cents per hour without bonus.
Plaintiff alleges that defendants retaliated against him because he exercised his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights at the misconduct hearing. The alleged retaliation consists of the support team hearing and the resulting dismissal of plaintiff from his job. Plaintiff alleges a $700 to $800 loss in annual wages that resulted from his employment reassignment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact," the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue is genuine if the fact-finder could reasonably hold in the non-movant's favor with respect to that issue and a fact is material if it influences the outcome under the governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). It is my obligation to determine whether all the evidence can reasonably support a verdict for the non-moving party.See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Brown. 834 F. Supp. 854, 856 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
In making this determination the facts must be reviewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Further, the non-moving party is entitled to all reasonable inferences drawn from those facts. Id. However, the non-moving party must raise "more than a mere scintilla of evidence in its favor" in order to overcome a summary judgment motion and cannot survive by relying on unsupported assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere suspicions. Williams v. Borough of W.Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989). Although the moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of genuine issues of material fact, the non-movant must establish the existence of each element of his case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
DISCUSSION
Defendants have filed this renewed motion for summary judgment on the grounds that they are not "persons" subject to suit under section 1983 and that the Eleventh Amendment provides them with immunity from suit; that plaintiff's claims cannot proceed against defendants in their individual capacities because none of the defendants caused plaintiff to lose his work assignment in retaliation for his First Amendment activity; and that plaintiffs claims against defendants in their individual capacities are barred by qualified immunity and should therefore be dismissed.
I. The Eleventh Amendment does not protect defendants from suit
In their renewed motion for summary judgment defendants argue that they are protected by the Eleventh Amendment from suit in their official capacity. The Eleventh Amendment provides states and state agencies with immunity from suit. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida. 517 U.S. 44, 54-55 (1996); Laskaris v. Thornburgh. 661 F.2d 23 (3d Cir. 1981) (recognizing that Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to agencies or departments that have no existence apart from the state). This immunity extends to suits against state officials in their official capacities for money damages and can only be abrogated by Congress or with the consent of the state.See Alabama v. Pugh. 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978). Pennsylvania has expressly withheld such consent. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8521(b). Suits against state officials for injunctive relief, however, are not prohibited, nor are suits against state officials for actions in their personal capacities. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991); Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). As Floyd's suit is for money damages only and his complaint does not specify in what capacity defendants are sued, I will review the nature of his claims and the submissions of the parties to determine whether the complaint can fairly be read to state claims against the defendants in their personal capacities.
In Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991), the Supreme Court stated: Personal-capacity suits . . . seek to impose individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken under color of state law. Thus, on the merits, to establish personal liability in a § 1983 action, it is enough to show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right. While the plaintiff in a personal-capacity suit need not establish a connection to governmental `policy or custom,' officials sued in their personal capacities, unlike those sued in their official capacities, may assert personal immunity defenses such as objectively reasonable reliance on existing law.
Three factors have been identified to determine whether a state official is acting in his or her official capacity when the matter is unclear:
(1) plaintiff's failure to allege that defendant acted in accordance with a governmental policy or custom;
(2) plaintiff's request for compensatory or punitive damages, because such relief is unavailable in official capacity suits; and
(3) the nature of any defenses raised in the complaint.See Jones v. Culinary Manager II. 30 F. Supp.2d 491, 496 (E.D. Pa. 1998), citing Biggs v. Meadows. 66 F.3d 56, 61 (4th Cir. 1995). These three factors are present in this action.
Plaintiff has failed to allege in his complaint that defendants acted in accordance with governmental policy or custom. Plaintiff has requested both compensatory and punitive damages from defendants. Defendants have asserted the defense of qualified immunity, among other defenses, in their answer. Although plaintiff's original complaint is not clear about the capacity in which defendants are being sued, plaintiff's response to defendants' renewed motion for summary judgment clearly states that plaintiff has sued defendants in their individual capacities. Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar this action. Therefore, the issue of whether defendants are protected from suit under the doctrine of qualified immunity must be answered.
II. Defendants are not Entitled to Qualified Immunity
Under section 1983, qualified immunity will be granted to a public official who has performed a discretionary function when he has not violated a clearly established federal statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In a civil suit where there is an issue of qualified immunity, the first inquiry is whether plaintiff has alleged that defendant violated plaintiff's constitutional or statutory rights. See Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786 (3d Cir. 2000). If the violation of such a right has been alleged, then the second inquiry is whether the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct such that a reasonable individual would have known that the conduct was a violation of that right. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999). Summary judgment for defendant is proper when no reasonable person can conclude that a clearly established right of plaintiff has been violated. See Russo, 212 F.3d at 786.
A. The alleged actions of defendants, if proved, would constitute a violation of plaintiff's First Amendment rights.
Plaintiff contends that Dugal requested a support team hearing for plaintiff in retaliation for plaintiff's exercise of his constitutional rights at the misconduct hearing. As a result of the support team hearing, in which defendants Yanis and Zahn participated, plaintiff was subjected to a job reassignment with a lower pay scale. Plaintiff alleges that defendants' actions were retaliation for plaintiffs exercise of his First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights and that the retaliation itself violated plaintiff's constitutional rights.
To make a claim of retaliation a prisoner must show:
(1) that the conduct which led to the alleged retaliation was constitutionally protected,
(2) that he suffered an adverse action by prison officials "sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his [constitutional] rights," and
(3) that there is "a causal link between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the adverse action taken against him."Mitchell v. Horn. 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003), citing Rauser v. Horn. 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001). If all three elements of the retaliation claim are met, plaintiff has proved that defendant unconstitutionally retaliated against plaintiff.See Rauser. 241 F.3d at 333. The burden of proof then shifts to defendant to show that the adverse action would have occurred regardless of the protected activity exercised by plaintiff due to a legitimate penological interest. Id. at 334.
In this case, defendants argue that plaintiff has no right to prison employment. Defendants are correct in contending that prison employment is not a constitutionally protected right, but this is not the right that plaintiff claims has been violated. The rights that are the focus of this action are plaintiffs First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances and right to free speech along with his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process.
The constitutional rights asserted by plaintiff may have been violated if defendants retaliated against plaintiff for exercising those rights. This Court has held specifically that "[a]lthough there is no right to a job or a particular position in a prison, prison officials cannot punish or retaliate against a prisoner who exercises his First Amendment rights by filing an administrative grievance or a civil action." Hill v. Blum, 916 F. Supp. 470, 473-74 (E.D. Pa. 1996), citing Williams v. Meese. 926 F.2d 994, 998 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Justice v. Coughlin. 941 F. Supp. 1312 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that prison grievances are constitutionally protected conduct).
Plaintiff exercised his right to petition the government for redress of grievances by presenting his version of the facts at the misconduct hearing in an attempt to prove that the charges brought against him were false. Plaintiff defended himself against the misconduct charges brought by Dugal in the form of written testimony. There is a factual dispute between the parties as to whether or not plaintiff provided oral testimony at that hearing; however, it is irrelevant whether plaintiff exercised his rights verbally because it is undisputed that he exercised his rights in writing.
Although a prisoner's rights are limited within the prison setting, First Amendment rights are retained if they are not inconsistent with the person's status as a prisoner or the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). In this case, plaintiff's right to free speech during a disciplinary hearing does not contradict his status as a prisoner or the legitimate penological objectives of the Graterford prison facility. If Dugal requested a support team hearing regarding plaintiff's employment with the intent to punish plaintiff for defending himself at the misconduct hearing and in retaliation for the dismissal of plaintiff's misconduct charges, Dugal is liable for unconstitutional retaliation.
B. The alleged actions of defendants, if proved, would constitute a violation of plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The minimum procedural due process rights that are afforded to a prisoner who is accused of misconduct in prison include:
(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges;
(2) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when it is consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals; and
(3) the fact finder's written statement of the evidence relied on and the reasoning for the disciplinary action.Griffin v. Spratt, 969 F.2d 16, 19 (3d Cir. 1985), citingWolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-67 (1974).
It is undisputed that plaintiff was provided with these minimum procedural due process rights at the misconduct hearing. His procedural due process rights may have been violated, however, if defendants retaliated against plaintiff for exercising his right to procedural due process at the misconduct hearing. The alleged retaliation is the support team hearing at which there was an effort to remove the plaintiff from his prison employment on similar grounds alleged in the previous misconduct hearing.
C. The law regarding retaliation for a prisoner's exercise of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights was clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct such that a reasonable official would have known that the alleged conduct violated plaintiff's constitutional rights.
Because the alleged facts would support a conclusion that defendants violated plaintiff's constitutional rights, the next inquiry is whether the law concerning this particular situation was clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct such that a reasonable official would have known that the conduct was a violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Wilson. 526 U.S. at 614. The Court of Appeals has defined clearly established rights as "those with contours sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." McLaughlin v. Watson. 271 F.3d 566, 571 (3d Cir. 2001). It continued: "a plaintiff need not show that the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but needs to show that in light of preexisting law the unlawfulness was apparent." Id., citing Shea v. Smith. 966 F.2d 127, 130 (3d Cir. 1992). Although plaintiff in this case has not been able to show that defendants' particular actions were previously held unconstitutional, he has shown that under preexisting law retaliatory actions violate a prisoner's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The law concerning prisoners' constitutional rights, especially those concerning a prisoner's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, was clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct. These rights, though limited, are reasonably known by correctional officers. A reasonable official would have known that retaliating against a prisoner for the exercise of his First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances and of his right to free speech constitutes a violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. Hill, 916 F. Supp. at 473-74, citing Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 998 (10th Cir. 1991); Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1996) (reaffirming that retaliation against prisoner filing grievance violates First Amendment right to petition government for redress of grievances).See also, Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974) (holding that prison inmate retains First Amendment rights consistent with status as prisoner or with legitimate penological objectives of prison system); Thaddeus-X v. Blatter. 175 F.3d 378, 391-92 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that "contours" of First Amendment right to free speech less clear in prison context but protected when consistent with prisoner status or legitimate penological interests);Hannon v. Speck. 1988 U.S. Dist Lexis 13914, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 19898), citing Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977) (holding prison officials who impaired right to free speech through retaliatory actions acted unconstitutionally). A reasonable officer would have known also that retaliating against plaintiff for the exercise of his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process is a violation of constitutional rights.See Griffin v. Spratt, 969 F.2d 16, 19 (3d Cir. 1985), citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-67 (1974) (establishing prisoner's minimum procedural due process rights).
Thus, the law related to retaliation against a prisoner for the exercise of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights was clearly established at the time of the defendants' conduct such that a reasonable official would have known that retaliation was a violation of constitutional rights. Consequently, defendants are not protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity.
III. There is no genuine issue of material fact and defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law
In this Circuit prisoner claims of retaliation for exercise of constitutional rights are governed by Rauser v. Horn. 241 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2001). The Rauser Court enumerated three elements a prisoner must prove to establish such a claim. First, the prisoner must show that the alleged retaliation responded to the prisoner's exercise of some constitutionally protected right. Id. at 333. Second, the plaintiff must prove that defendants took some action adverse to the prisoner's rights and that the adverse action was "sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his [constitutional] rights."Id.; Allah v. Seiverling. 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000). Third, the plaintiff must show a causal link between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the adverse action taken against him.Rauser. 241 F.3d at 333.
I have already decided that the facts alleged in plaintiffs complaint, if proved, would constitute violations of plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Therefore, plaintiff has fulfilled the first requirement of the Rauser test.
The alleged retaliation was sufficiently adverse to plaintiff's interests that it fulfills the second requirement of the Rauser test. In Suppan v. Dadonna. 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000), the Court of Appeals held that being placed lower on a list of persons eligible for promotion qualified as adverse action. Plaintiff in this case testified that the loss of his job in the dry cleaning facility caused him a significant loss in pay and forced him into jobs in less interesting environments. A reasonable factfinder could find that such adverse action would deter a prisoner of ordinary firmness from exercising his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Although the Suppan plaintiffs were public employees rather than prisoners it is appropriate to rely on the case here because the Court of Appeals did so in Allah. 229 F.3d at 225, in which the plaintiff was a prisoner.
The third Rauser requirement involves shifting burdens. First plaintiff must prove that his constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for defendants' alleged retaliation.Rauser. 241 F.3d at 333. If plaintiff meets this burden a prison official can avoid liability by showing that his actions were reasonably related to legitimate penological interests and would have been taken in the absence of plaintiff's exercise of his constitutional rights. Id. For clarity I will split this discussion into two sections.
A. There is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff's participation in his misconduct hearing was a substantial or motivating factor in the loss of his dry cleaning job
Plaintiff presents no evidence that his exercise of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights at his misconduct hearing was a substantial or motivating factor in the holding of a support team hearing or in its result. Plaintiffs own testimony reveals that he has no personal knowledge of retaliatory motive of defendants. When asked what connection he perceived between the misconduct and support team hearing plaintiff testified "[t]hat Lieutenant Dugal, Lieutenant Zahn and Yanis conspired to take me from my job." PL dep. p. 64. Specifically regarding Dugal, plaintiff testified that he believed Dugal had a retaliatory motive for requesting the support hearing because he was the officer who wrote the misconduct that was dismissed. Id. When asked how he knew Zahn and Yanis were involved the alleged retaliation, plaintiff answered that Zahn "ran" the support team hearing and Yanis testified at the hearing. Id. at 64-66. Plaintiffs testimony contains no more than a bare allegation that defendants conspired to remove him from his position in retaliation for his exercising his rights at the misconduct hearing. I cannot credit bare allegations on a motion for summary judgment. Williams. 891 F.2d at 460.
Plaintiff next argues that the timing of the events is evidence of retaliation. There is no doubt that plaintiff's exercise of his constitutional rights at his misconduct hearing on June 8 was quickly followed by his support team hearing on June 16. Such close temporal proximity has been used as proof of causation. Marvel v. Snyder, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10299, at *30 (D. Del. July 24, 2001),Rivers v. Horn. 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *5 (E.D. Pa. March 29, 2001). Unlike the facts in Marvel and Rivers. however, the facts in this case show that the series of events began with alleged misconduct by plaintiff on June 4, rather than with the exercise of his constitutional rights. In Marvel, the first pertinent event was the prisoner's filing of a personal injury lawsuit.Marvel. 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10299, at *30. The Rivers plaintiff alleged retaliation for having filed a grievance against an officer in the prison. Rivers. 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *5. In neither Marvel nor Rivers was the act alleged to be retaliatory in nature based on the same facts that led the prisoner to exercise his constitutional rights. In this case, however, the alleged retaliatory act, the support team hearing, was based on the same facts that led plaintiff to exercise his constitutional rights. All three pertinent events happened in quick succession: the alleged misconduct on June 4, the misconduct hearing and exercise of constitutional rights on June 8 and the support team hearing on June 16. Therefore, the temporal proximity of the exercise of rights and the alleged retaliation is not probative.
In an attempt to present favorable evidence plaintiff points to Dugal's testimony that he asked for the support team hearing because the misconduct hearing did not result in plaintiff's dismissal from his job in the dry cleaning facility. Dugal dep. pp. 188-89. Throughout his deposition, however, Dugal maintained that his actions were motivated by a concern that plaintiff's continued employment in the dry cleaning compromised security in the facility. Id. at 123-24, 148-49, 157-162, 178-79. The motivating factor for Dugal was not the fact that plaintiff exercised his constitutional rights at the misconduct hearing, but the fact that plaintiff was again working in the dry cleaning facility. Dugal's testimony does not support the proposition that he requested the support team hearing in retaliation for plaintiff's defense at the misconduct hearing.
B. Alternatively, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendants' decision to remove plaintiff from his dry cleaning job was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests
Defendants have presented evidence that regardless of plaintiff's exercise of his rights at the misconduct hearing he would have been removed from the dry cleaning facility for legitimate penological reasons. All six voting members of the support team, including four non-defendants, have testified that they made their decision to terminate plaintiff from his job based solely on the facts presented at the support team hearing, that they do not remember a dismissed misconduct being mentioned at the hearing and that even if the misconduct had been mentioned they would have made the same decision based on other facts presented at the hearing. Yanis Decl. ¶¶ 5, 7. Zahn Decl. ¶¶ 4-5. John Henschel Decl. ¶¶ 3, 6, 7. Robert Lee Decl. ¶¶ 2-3. Michael Margolis Decl. ¶¶ 2, 5. Robert Rogers Decl. ¶¶ 2, 5, 6.
It is unclear whether Dugal voted. Whether or not Dugal voted the support team unanimously voted for plaintiff to be dismissed from his job in the dry cleaning. Therefore, it is irrelevant whether Dugal voted.
Dugal testified during his deposition about the incident that led to his filing of the misconduct and the request for a support team hearing. Dugal listed several concerns that were raised by his conversation with plaintiff on June 4. The interaction led Dugal to believe that plaintiff was exercising authority over another inmate, which is forbidden by the prison code of ethics. Dugal dep. pp. 119-20. Dugal also believed that plaintiff threatened him with poor dry cleaning in an effort to get favors from Dugal. Id. at pp. 139-40. Plaintiff's conduct indicated to Dugal that the inmates working in the dry cleaning created a security issue. Id. at pp. 148-49. He saw plaintiff asserting control over other inmates and attempting to trade favors with prison staff and thought that it was very important that plaintiff, and another inmate worker, be removed from their positions in the dry cleaning facility. Id. at 157-58. The motivating factor for Dugal was not the fact that plaintiff exercised is constitutional rights at the misconduct hearing, but the fact that plaintiff was again working in the dry cleaning facility. Dugal's testimony establishes that he had legitimate penological reasons for trying to remove plaintiff from his job, first with the misconduct hearing and then with the support team hearing.
Yanis explained why he voted to remove plaintiff from his job in his deposition. He considered Dugal's explanation of the interaction between plaintiff and Dugal on June 4 to raise serious security concerns. Yanis Dep. pp. 96-100. Yanis saw problems with fraternization and bribery. Id. Although plaintiff spoke at the support team hearing and contradicted Dugal's description of their conversation at issue, Yanis believed Dugal's allegations. Id. 101, 111. On the vote sheet from the support team hearing Yanis noted "he [plaintiff] is entirely too familiar [with the] staff." Id. ex. 8.
Zahn also testified about his reasons for voting to remove plaintiff from the dry cleaning plant. Zahn stated that, after listening to Dugal and plaintiff, he believed Dugal. Zahn dep. p. 45. Zahn was also influenced by the fact that Lee, plaintiff's supervisor, did not speak on behalf of plaintiff at the support team hearing. Id. at pp. 47-48.
In addition to the testimony of the defendants and other voting members of the support team, defendants have presented evidence that security concerns in the dry cleaning facility involving inmate employees began well before the June 4 incident between plaintiff and Dugal. In April of 1997 Yanis convened support team hearings at the request of Elliott Bennett, the supervisor of the dry cleaning and laundry area of the prison. Yanis dep. pp. 75-76. Bennett requested that all inmates employed in the dry cleaning and laundry be the subjects of support team hearings because numerous items of contraband were found in those areas in March of 1997. Id. at pp. 77, 80-83. The panel that participated in the April support team hearing regarding plaintiff's employment voted 5-to-2 to allow plaintiff to retain his position in the dry cleaning facility. Id., ex. 4. Yanis testified that "we as a support team did not feel that Mr. Bennett provided enough evidence for us to release Mr. Floyd. Specifically, we didn't think that he had really tied any of that [contraband] to Mr. Floyd and we didn't feel that the issue was with Mr. Floyd." Id. p. 85. According to Yanis, the support team believed that the problems in the dry cleaning could be resolved with more effective supervision of the inmate employees. Id. pp. 85-86. Two other inmates were removed as a result of the March finding of contraband in the dry cleaning. PL dep. pp. 88-89.
Furthermore, plaintiff was not the only inmate to lose his job as a result of the support team hearing request submitted by Dugal. In the same memorandum in which he requested a support team hearing for plaintiff Dugal requested a hearing concerning an inmate named Logan. Pl's Resp., ex. 1. Logan had worked with plaintiff in the dry cleaning and lost his job at the same time as a result of his own support team hearing. PL dep. pp. 56-62.
Plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed because he fails to meet one of the requirements of a retaliation claim, proof of a causal link between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the adverse action taken against him. Rauser. 241 F.3d at 333. Taking all of the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff there is no genuine issue of material fact and it is clear that there was not a causal link between plaintiffs exercise of his constitutional rights at the misconduct hearing and the later support team hearing that resulted in plaintiff's loss of his job.
An appropriate order follows.