Opinion
3:23-cv-00462-SB
01-02-2024
RICHARD J. FLORES, Plaintiff, v. KATE BROWN et al., Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
STACIE F. BECKERMAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is Plaintiff Richard J. Flores' (“Flores”) motion for a preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 49.) The Court has jurisdiction over Flores' claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, but not all parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636. For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that the district judge deny the motion.
BACKGROUND
In this case, Flores brings Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a state tort claim against former governor Kate Brown and a long list of Oregon Department of Corrections officials, alleging that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs during the COVID-19 pandemic. (See Am. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 15; Supp. Compl., ECF No. 34.)
Flores now seeks a preliminary injunction to stop alleged retaliation against him and to allow him “to go home and begin working[.]” (Pl.'s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 1, ECF No. 49.) In his related declaration, Flores describes a court order in his favor in a separate habeas corpus proceeding. (Richard J. Flores Decl. (“Flores Decl.”) ¶ 2, ECF No. 50.) Flores states that, after the favorable decision in the habeas corpus case, his release counselor, Mr. Wolny (“Wolny”), changed his release recommendation and did not approve Flores' home address as a location for Flores' residence upon his release. (Id.) Flores has since been released and is now residing in temporary, transitional housing. (Id. ¶ 3.)
LEGAL STANDARDS
“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (citations omitted). “When the government is a party, [the] last two factors merge.” Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)). Preliminary injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy.” Cal. by & through Becerra v. Azar, 950 F.3d 1067, 1105 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 22). “[S]peculative injury” is not enough. Boardman v. Pac. SeafoodGrp., 822 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Caribbean Marine Servs. Co., Inc. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988)). “A plaintiff must do more than merely allege imminent harm sufficient to establish standing; a plaintiff must demonstrate immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief.” Id. (quoting CaribbeanMarine, 844 F.2d at 674).
Importantly, a plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunctive relief must relate to the claims and relief sought in the operative complaint. See Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen's Med.Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 638 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The district court properly ruled that [the plaintiff's] motion for injunctive relief was unrelated to its underlying complaint. [The plaintiff] cannot seek interim equitable relief of a nature [he is] not seeking in the final adjudication of [his] lawsuit.”).
DISCUSSION
Flores' motion for preliminary injunctive relief does not relate to the claims and relief he seeks in his complaint. Specifically, Flores has not alleged any facts or claims related to retaliation. Instead, the instant case involves allegations of inadequate medical care. (See FAC, ECF No. 15; Supp. Compl., ECF No. 34.) Further, Flores has not named Wolny as a defendant in this case.
Additionally, Flores has not alleged any facts supporting the conclusion that Wolny denied his proposed release residence because he filed this case or his habeas corpus case. In fact, Flores acknowledges that his most recent incarceration arose from a “stand-off with law enforcement” at the residence to which he had proposed release. (Flores Decl. ¶ 2.)
For these reasons, the Court recommends that the district judge deny Flores' motion for a preliminary injunction because the relief he requests is unrelated to his underlying complaint. See Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC, 810 F.3d at 638; see also Smith v. Gaulding, No. 2:19-cv-09174-SVW-ADS, 2021 WL 8844647, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2021) (denying motion for a preliminary injunction and recognizing that “the Court lacks authority to grant the preliminary injunction because it has no relationship or nexus to the claims or remedies sought in the [operative complaint]”); Flores v. ODOC, No. 2:22-cv-01399-SB, 2023 WL 2136805, at *3 (D. Or. Feb. 21, 2023) (denying motion for preliminary injunction because “the preliminary injunctive relief [he] now seeks relating to [ODOC] officials is not sufficiently related to the claims in his operative complaint”); Ross v. Blewett, No. 2:20-cv-01338-SB, 2022 WL 3685267, at *2 (D. Or. Feb. 22, 2022) (denying motion for preliminary injunction where “[Plaintiff's] retaliation claim is not properly before the Court because he did not include it in his amended complaint”), findings and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 3683727 (D. Or. Aug. 25, 2022).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court recommends that the district judge DENY Flores' motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 49).
SCHEDULING ORDER
The Court will refer its Findings and Recommendation to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due within fourteen (14) days from service of the Findings and Recommendation. If no objections are filed, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date. If objections are filed, a response is due within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement.