Opinion
NO. 2015-CA-000827-MR
04-14-2017
EDWARD H. FLINT APPELLANT v. COACH HOUSE, INC. APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Edward H. Flint, Pro se Louisville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Harold W. Thomas Louisville, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JUDITH E. MCDONALD-BURKMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 12-CI-003106 OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: ACREE, CLAYTON AND MAZE, JUDGES. ACREE, JUDGE: This matter represents Appellant Edward H. Flint's twenty-sixth appeal to this Court since 2009 involving Appellee Coach House, Inc. and/or its Board of Directors. We must determine if the Jefferson Circuit Court rightly granted Coach House a permanent injunction preventing Flint from filing additional lawsuits against Coach House without first obtaining leave of court. We are also called upon to determine whether the circuit court erroneously denied Flint interest on monies garnished by Coach House and subsequently returned. After a careful review of the record, we find no error and affirm.
Flint owns a condominium unit at the Coach House condominium complex in Louisville, Kentucky. All unit owners are members of the Coach House condominium association. The association is run by a seven-member Board of Directors; board members are elected from among all unit owners pursuant to duly enacted bylaws.
There are sixty-eight condominium units total in the complex.
In September 2007, Flint ran for election to one of four vacant positions on the condominium's Board. He was not elected.
Believing the election had been rigged against him, Flint filed a civil action against Coach House and its directors in Jefferson Circuit Court on October 24, 2007. The circuit court granted summary judgment against Flint. This Court affirmed.
Flint then embarked on a campaign against Coach House and its directors. Between 2007 and 2012, Flint filed six lawsuits against Coach House, its Board of Directors, individual board members, and/or its managing agent. Each case was summarily dismissed and the dismissal eventually upheld on appeal. Flint v. Coach House, Inc., 2009-CA-000136-MR, 2009 WL 3878145, at *1 (Ky. App. Nov. 20, 2009); Flint v. Coach House, Inc., 2010-CA-001166-MR, 2011 WL 4502348, at *1 (Ky. App. Sept. 30, 2011); Flint v. Marx, 2011-CA-001057-MR, 2012 WL 3236310, at *1 (Ky. App. Aug. 10, 2012); Flint v. Coach House, Inc., 2012-CA-000580-MR, 2013 WL 869649, at *1 (Ky. App. Mar. 8, 2013); Flint v. Coach House Inc., 2012-CA-001056-MR, 2014 WL 354650, at *1 (Ky. App. Jan. 31, 2014); Flint v. Wine, 2012-CA-001722-DG, 2014 WL 7006968, at *1 (Ky. App. Dec. 12, 2014).
In June 2012, Coach House, exasperated by Flint's repeated filings and allegedly having lost an insurance carrier because of the litigations and suffering a decrease in property values, filed an action seeking a permanent injunction against Flint to preclude future court action against it without leave of court. The circuit court conducted a hearing. After Coach House presented its arguments at the hearing, the circuit court refused to allow Flint to present any argument because he was not an attorney and was acting pro se. The circuit court ultimately granted a permanent injunction against Flint and awarded Coach House attorney fees and court costs expended in defending lawsuits filed by Flint. Coach House garnished Flint's bank account in accordance with the judgment.
Flint appealed to this Court. Despite recognizing the circuit court's plenary power to enter an injunction restricting a pro se plaintiff from filing abusive, frivolous, or repetitious actions, we found that the circuit court erred when it denied Flint an opportunity to present arguments at the injunction hearing solely due to his pro se status. Flint v. Coach House, Inc., 2012-CA-001371-MR, 2014 WL 6093113, at *2 (Ky. App. Nov. 14, 2014). A pro se litigant is no less entitled, we reasoned, to full access to the court system and must be given an opportunity to fully participate in the merits hearing before a permanent injunction is issued. Id. Consequently, this Court vacated the injunction and remanded the case to the circuit court to conduct a proper hearing.
The circuit court complied, conducting evidentiary hearings on February 10, 2015 and February 25, 2015. Three witnesses testified on Coach House's behalf: (1) Chris Gandansky, Coach House's attorney; (2) Kathleen Wine, a former board member; and (3) Beth Holt, co-owner of Mulloy Properties, LLC, Coach House's managing agent.
Gandansky described the litigation history between Coach House and Flint. Notably, Gandansky testified that between January 1, 2007 and February 10, 2015, Flint had filed sixteen lawsuits against Coach House, present and past board members, and/or Mulloy Properties. All of those suits were summarily dismissed and the dismissal upheld on appeal. Gandansky also described the repetitive nature of the various lawsuits.
Gandansky further explained that Flint had filed numerous lawsuits in federal court against a host of state and federal trial judges who had ruled against Flint during various court proceedings. In 2011, District Judge John Heyburn warned Flint to cease filing frivolous and insubstantial litigation against state and federal judges or face sanctions. Gandansky testified Flint failed to heed the district court's warning and, upon filing another pro se action against a trial judge in federal court in 2012, District Judge Charles Simpson, III, sanctioned Flint.
As of 2011, Flint had filed eight cases in federal court against state and federal judges. See Flint v. Whalin, 3:11CV-316-H, 2011 WL 2471550, at *2 (W.D. Ky. June 21, 2011) (collecting cases). Our research revealed Flint has filed three additional federal lawsuits against state and federal judges since Whalin. Flint v. McDonald, 3:12-CV-613, 2013 WL 211077, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 18, 2013); Flint v. McKinley, 4:15CV-130-GNS, 2015 WL 5943443, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 13, 2015); Flint v. Burkman, 3:15CV-439-JHM, 2015 WL 6940128, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 9, 2015). In each of those cases, the presiding judge issued sanctions against Flint in light of his "lengthy history of filing frivolous and burdensome lawsuits targeting state and federal court judges" despite previous warnings against such suits. Burkman, 2015 WL 6940128, at *6.
Kathleen Wine testified that she served as secretary for the Board of Directors. She described Flint's attempts to intimidate her and prevent her from serving on the Board. While serving as a board member, Flint sued her three times, twice as a member of the board and once individually. All of the lawsuits were summarily dismissed, but she was turned down for a second mortgage due to the lawsuits.
Finally, Beth Holt testified that as a result of Flint's ongoing lawsuits, Coach House's insurance carrier had cancelled its insurance coverage. Replacement insurance was ultimately obtained but at a substantially higher premium. Holt also testified that, if a condo owner decides to sell his unit, he must disclose current lawsuits against the homeowners' association to prospective buyers, which impairs the owner's ability to sell the unit and can cause issues with the mortgage companies. Since 2012, it has become difficult to find people willing to serve on the Board because of the fear of being sued by Flint.
It was now Flint's turn to present his case. In its subsequent order, the circuit court made clear:
Flint advised the Court that he intended to call several witnesses and the Court assured him he would be given adequate time to do so. The Court placed no limitation on who or how many witnesses he could call. However, he only called himself as a witness.(R. at 159). Flint's testimony focused on his displeasure with how the Board conducts business and the judiciary's refusal to follow the law and give him a trial under § 7 of the Kentucky Constitution.
By order entered May 27, 2015, the circuit court granted Coach House's petition for an injunction, ruling:
Defendant Edward H. Flint is hereby permanently enjoined from filing, or threatening to file, lawsuits against Plaintiff, Coach House, Inc., its present and past officers and directors, its present and past employees, its present and past attorneys, its present and past managing agents, the present and past employees of managing agents or any present or past unit owner, without first obtaining leave of this court to do so;(R. at 161-62). Flint appealed this order.
Plaintiff Coach House, Inc., is awarded judgment against Defendant Edward H. Flint for attorney fees and court costs expended in defending against lawsuits filed by Defendant Edward H. Flint against Plaintiff Coach House, Inc. and/or the members of the board subsequent to June 4, 2012, the reasonableness of the amount to be established by Counsel's affidavit(s);
Plaintiff Coach House, Inc., is awarded judgment against Defendant Edward H. Flint for its attorney fees and court costs expended in this action; and
Interest on the judgment from the date of entry until paid at the rate of 12% per annum.
There is a second order at play in this case. Upon remand following the first appeal in this matter, Flint requested that the money garnished from his bank account pursuant to the now-vacated 2012 injunction be returned. The circuit court granted his motion and Coach House quickly complied. Flint also demanded that Coach House pay 12% interest on the monies garnished that were later reimbursed. By order entered May 27, 2015, the circuit court denied his request for interest. It reasoned:
KRS 360.040 permits 12% interest on judgments. Flint has not obtained a judgment against Coach House in this action. The monies garnished by Coach House were done so pursuant to a judgment. Once that judgment was vacated by the Court of Appeals, the funds were returned to Flint. This is not the same as obtaining a judgment against Coach House. Therefore, the funds are not subject to post-judgment interest.(R. at 155). From this order, Flint also appeals.
Before this Court, Flint contends that the circuit court erred by granting Coach House a permanent injunction. He claims there is no basis in fact or in law for the circuit court's decision. Flint also argues the circuit court erroneously denied him 12% interest on the monies garnished by Coach House. We will address the injunction argument first.
In this Commonwealth, a court may enter an injunction restricting a pro se litigant from filing abusive, frivolous, or repetitious actions. See Calhoun v. Lenahan, 261 Ky. 601, 88 S.W.2d 288 (1935); Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 354 S.W.3d 582 (Ky. App. 2011); 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 181 (2d ed. 2014). "[E]very paper filed in court exhausts some of the court's resources. Thus, to best utilize its resources, where a pro se litigant files repetitious and frivolous claims, a court may bar prospective filings to prevent the deleterious effect of such filings on scarce judicial resources." Cardwell, 354 S.W.3d at 585 (citing In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184, 109 S.Ct. 993, 103 L.Ed.2d 158 (1989)). Simply put, Kentucky courts retain the inherent authority to protect themselves from vexatious litigants and to curb meritless, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits.
We agree with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' view that "[t]here is nothing unusual about imposing prefiling restrictions in matters with a history of repetitive or vexatious litigation." Feathers v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 141 F.3d 264, 269 (6th Cir. 1998). This is particularly so when, "[t]he general pattern of litigation in a particular case may be vexatious enough to warrant an injunction in anticipation of future attempts to relitigate old claims." Id. (citation omitted).
Flint is no stranger to Kentucky courts. Since 2009, he has filed sixteen lawsuits against Coach House, its directors, its attorneys, and/or its managing agent culminating in twenty-six appeals to this Court, of which thirteen remain active, and multiple requests for discretionary review by the Kentucky Supreme Court. As noted by District Judge Simpson, "[t]o say that Flint is an experienced litigator despite his pro se status would be an understatement." Flint v. McDonald, 3:12-CV-613, 2013 WL 211077, at *3 (W.D. Ky. 2013).
Several courts have noted the vexatiousness of Flint's litigation. In a lengthy concurrence, Judge Maze stated that "[i]t is my hope that the members of the Court of Justice, at both the trial and appellate levels, will take reasonable steps in the future to ensure that an inordinate amount of these extremely limited resources are not exhausted on a single unappeasable plaintiff." Flint v. Jackson, No. 2014-CA-000426-MR, 2014 WL 7206835, at *5-6 (Ky. App. Dec. 19, 2014) (Maze, J., concurring). Of Flint's twenty-six appeals to this Court, only two - the predecessor appeal in this case and one other - were found by this Court to have even a scintilla of merit. In the remaining matters, this Court upheld the summary dismissal of Flint's claims or dismissed Flint's appeal for failure to appeal from a final and appealable order.
A defamation suit against Dennis Stilger, an attorney representing Coach House's Board of Directors, was reversed and remanded to the circuit court for a determination of whether Stilger acted with actual malice. Flint v. Stilger, 2009-CA-000475-MR, 2010-WL-199566 (Ky. App. Jan. 22, 2010). The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed in Stilger v. Flint, 391 S.W.3d 751 (Ky. 2013). Upon remand and after discovery was conducted on the matter, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Stilger and this Court affirmed in Flint v. Stilger, No. 2014-CA-000683-MR, 2015 WL 3936808 (Ky. App. June 26, 2015). --------
We have also noted Flint's willingness to "'manipulate the court system' by suing any judge who hands down a contrary ruling and later seek their recusal." Flint v. Coach House, Inc., No. 2010-CA-001166-MR, 2011 WL 4502348, at *4 (Ky. App. Sept. 30, 2011).
[W]e believe it important to note that Flint makes several unsubstantiated, defamatory and derogatory accusations regarding corruption within the membership of the judiciary and the bar in an apparent attempt to garner support for his position. Such bluster, seeking only to vilify, discredit or agitate other participants, fails to address the substantive issues and provides no support for [...] Flint's position. It is therefore unnecessary, ineffective and offensive. These tactics will not be condoned or tolerated.Flint v. Coach House Inc., No. 2012-CA-001056-MR, 2014 WL 354650, at *4 (Ky. App. Jan. 31, 2014). Recently, Flint was sanctioned by this Court in two separate matters for continuing to file frivolous appeals. Flint v. Coach House, No. 2015-CA-000391-MR, --- WL --- (Ky. App. Nov. 25, 2015); Flint v. Coach House, No. 2015-CA-000888-MR, --- WL --- (Ky. App. Nov. 25, 2015).
Given Flint's repeated attempts to manipulate the judicial process through meritless actions, we cannot say that the injunction in this case is unwarranted. Coach House and the individuals connected to it have experienced actual repercussions stemming from Flint's actions. They have been denied mortgages and had to pay higher insurance premiums as a result of one man's exploitation of the justice system. Further, this Court, like the federal courts, has repeatedly warned Flint against the repeated filing of vexatious, duplicative, and baseless lawsuits. He continues to ignore our warnings.
In sum, the circuit court conducted a lengthy hearing on this matter and determined that an injunction imposing prefiling restrictions upon Flint was warranted. We cannot say, and confidently decline to say, that the circuit court abused its discretion.
That leaves us with Flint's claim he is entitled to 12% interest on the funds garnished by Coach House and subsequently returned following the first appeal in this matter. Flint cites to no authority entitling him to such interest. Instead, he argues, "Appellant Flint believes that if the Appellees were entitled to interest, he should be entitled also." (Appellant's Brief at 5). Having provided this Court with no sustainable legal basis to disrupt the circuit court's decision, we refuse to further entertain this argument.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Jefferson Circuit Court's May 27, 2015, orders imposing a permanent injunction against Flint and denying Flint interest on monies previously garnished and returned.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Edward H. Flint, Pro se
Louisville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Harold W. Thomas
Louisville, Kentucky