Summary
In Fliehr v. Fliehr, 56 N.C. App. 465, 289 S.E.2d 105 (1982), we expanded the Stephenson rule to prohibit an appeal from an order for child support, not designated pendente lite, but entered in conjunction with an order for alimony pendente lite.
Summary of this case from Berger v. BergerOpinion
No. 8126DC570
Filed 16 March 1982
Appeal and Error 6.2 — child support order in conjunction with alimony pendente lite — no right of appeal Orders for child support which are entered in conjunction with orders awarding alimony pendente lite are not appealable until entry of a final order on the claim for permanent alimony.
APPEAL by defendant from Lanning, Judge; Order entered 7 January 1981 in District Court, MECKLENBURG County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 February 1982.
Michael S. Shulimson and Marvin Schiller for plaintiff appellee.
Mraz and Michael, by Mark A. Michael, for defendant appellant.
This is an appeal by defendant husband from an award to plaintiff wife of child support and alimony pendente lite.
We hold that this appeal must be dismissed as interlocutory according to this Court's holding in Stephenson v. Stephenson, 55 N.C. App. 250, 285 S.E.2d 281 (1981).
In this case, unlike that in Stephenson, the child support order is not designated pendente lite by the court. However, we conclude that the policy articulated in Stephenson will be largely defeated if we permit appeals of right from child support orders entered in conjunction with orders for alimony pendente lite. As we stated in Stephenson, the backlog of appeals awaiting review by this Court is now so great that usually the only feasible purpose for pursuing appeals from temporary support orders is to delay execution of the orders. It is our intent to eliminate use of this Court to achieve this unacceptable purpose. We conclude, therefore, that orders for child support which are entered in conjunction with orders awarding alimony pendente lite are not appealable until entry of a final order on the plaintiff's claim for permanent alimony. To hold otherwise, moreover, would allow appeal from an order which adjudicates fewer than all claims in violation of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54 (b). The order therefore is not subject to review by appeal and is
Dismissed.
Judges CLARK and WHICHARD concur.