Opinion
Docket No. 015583-2013 Docket No. 013961-2014
01-14-2015
RE: Dr. Ruben Fleurantin & Sharon Jones v. South Orange Village Township
CHRISTINE M. NUGENT JUDGE
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE TAX COURT COMMITTEE ON OPINIONS
Dr. Ruben Fleurantin
Sharon Jones Fleurantin
324 Scotland Road
South Orange, NJ 07079
Jill Daitch Rosenberg, Esq.
Wolff & Samson P.C.
One Boland Drive
West Orange, NJ 07052
Dear Counsel:
This letter constitutes the court's decision on defendant's motion to dismiss the 2014 complaint with prejudice for untimely filing. For the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion is granted.
This matter arises out of two separate property tax appeals filed on behalf of plaintiffs Dr. Ruben Fleurantin and his wife, Sharon Jones Fleurantin, owners of two lots in South Orange, New Jersey, one of which includes an improvement. Plaintiffs are represented by counsel in the matter docket no. 015583-2013 (block 1102, lot 2) and are self-represented in the 2014 case (block 1102, lot 1). Plaintiffs filed a motion asking the court to conduct the trial of both matters on the same trial date, and defendant responded with a motion to dismiss the 2014 appeal for untimely filing.
At oral argument, defendant agreed that if both matters remain pending at the conclusion of defendant's motion to dismiss, it would not oppose plaintiff's request to combine the trial dates.
In its filings with the court in these matters, defendant produced certified facts that on July 18, 2014, the Essex County board of taxation ("county board") mailed a Judgment, via ordinary mail, to Dr. Ruben Fleurantin and Mrs. Sharon Jones Fleurantin dated July 18, 2014. The Fleurantins filed a complaint with the Tax Court challenging the tax board Judgment, on September 8, 2014, which falls 52 days after the July 18 date.
In support of the motion to dismiss the 2014 appeal as untimely filed, defendant Township argues that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1(a) and R. 8:4-1(a)(2) of the New Jersey Court Rules, the appeal was filed four days late.
N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1(a) states:
Any party who is dissatisfied with the judgment, action or determination of the county board of taxation may seek review of that judgment, action or determination in the Tax Court by filing a complaint in the Tax Court, pursuant to rules of court.
R. 8:4-1(a)(2) reads:
[a] complaint to review a judgment of a County Board of Taxation shall be filed within 45 days of the service of the judgment of the County Board of Taxation. Service of the judgment of the County Board of Taxation, when by mail, shall be deemed complete as of the date the judgment is mailed, subject to the provisions of R. 1:3-3.
According to R. 1:3-3,
when service of a notice or paper is made by ordinary mail, and a rule or court order allows the party served a period of time after the service thereof within which to take some action, 3 days shall be added to the period.
Since the county board judgment was mailed on July 18, defendant adds 45 days, per R. 8:4-1(a)(2), as computed by the New Jersey Lawyers Diary and Manual's Table for Computing Expiration Dates, arriving at a filing deadline of Monday, September 1, 2014. Defendant then adds three additional days as provided by R. 1:3-3, to reach a final deadline of Thursday, September 4, 2014. Since plaintiffs filed their complaint on Monday, September 8, defendant argues that they are four days late, and their complaint should be dismissed. Defendant is correct in result, but the method stated in its briefs could be slightly misleading to a reader inexperienced with the New Jersey Court Rules. Defendant adds three days to September 1, to reach a final deadline for plaintiffs of September 4, 2014. In reality, the phrase "subject to the provisions of R. 1:3-3" modifies only the mailing of the county board Judgment, and not the filing of the complaint. The phrase "3 days shall be added to that period," therefore, extends the total number of days in which to file from 45 to 48. To achieve the utmost clarity, therefore, defendant should have added three days to July 18, and then computed 45 days from the date July 21. That serves as the clearer method since that is the portion of the statute that is subject to R. 1:3-3. Similarly, this results in a deadline of Thursday, September 4, 2014.
At oral argument, plaintiff argued for the first time that the additional three day period allowed by R. 1:3-3 applies both when the county board mails its decision to the taxpayer, and when the taxpayer files a tax court complaint by mail. A plain reading of R. 8:4-1(a)(2), however, reveals that R. 1:3-3 only applies to the service of the Judgment upon the taxpayer, rather than the mailing of the complaint to the Tax Court Management Office. The legislature attached the phrase "subject to the provisions of R. 1:3-3" to the sentence concerning service of the county board Judgment, and not to the sentence concerning filing of the complaint.
This court has consistently upheld strict filing deadlines for tax appeals. The Tax Court dismissed a local property tax appeal when it was postmarked on the August 15 deadline, but not received until August 16. Mayfair Holding Corp. v. Township of North Bergen, 4 N.J. Tax 38, 39-40 (Tax 1982). See also Prospect Hill Apartments v. Borough of Flemington, 1 N.J. Tax 224, 227-28 (Tax 1979) (dismissing appeal of taxpayer who mailed his complaint on August 14, which reached the Tax Court on August 16, one day after the August 15 deadline). Further, the Court declined to equitably extend the deadline. Id. at 41.
"The doctrine of estoppel is not lightly invoked against government, especially in tax matters, where the public interest is so vitally affected." Airwork Service Div. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 2 N.J. Tax 329 (Tax 1981). "To invoke the doctrine against a governmental agency the circumstances must be extreme." Pennyton Homes, Inc. v. Stanhope Planning Bd., 78 N.J. Super. 588, (App. Div.1963); Feldman v. Urban Commercial, Inc., 70 N.J. Super. 463 (Ch. Div. 1961). See additional law, infra.
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Plaintiff here further argued that on September 4, he attempted to mail the tax court complaint via Federal Express, but that since he only had a post office box for the recipient, he could not complete the transaction until the next day. The Court does not accept this argument for two reasons. First, since the deadline pursuant to R. 8:4-1(a)(2) and R. 1:3-3 would have been September 4, even if plaintiff had been able to mail the complaint on September 4, the Federal Express presumably would have taken at least one day and the complaint would have arrived late. Moreover, there is no "timely mailed, timely filed" rule in New Jersey. Secondly, this court has long held that due diligence is required to of taxpayers when filing complaints. Judge Conley ruled that, for a taxpayer who mailed his complaint on August 14, whose complaint reached the Tax Court on August 16 (one day late of the August 15 deadline), "[d]ue diligence would have required either an earlier mailing of the complaint or a direct filing of the complaint by August 15." Prospect Hill Apartments,1 N.J. Tax at 227-28 (Tax 1979).
"Statutes of limitations in tax statutes are strictly construed in order to provide finality and predictability of revenue to state and local government." F.M.C. Stores v. Borough of Morris Plains, 100 N.J. 418, 424 (citing Princeton Univ. Press v. Borough of Princeton, 35 N.J. 209, 214 (1961)); see also Bonanno v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 12 N.J. Tax 552, 556 (Tax 1992). "Where appeals have not been filed with this court within the time limit set forth in the statutes, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear them." Township of Bass River v. Driscoll, 3 N.J. Tax 177, 183 (Tax 1981); see also Estate of Frankel v. Borough of Hillsdale, 10 N.J. Tax 213, 215 (Tax 1988) ("failure to file a timely appeal is a fatal jurisdictional defect."). "The right of appeal in tax matters is governed by statute and all statutory requirements must be strictly complied with to invest the reviewing tribunal with subject matter jurisdiction. The failure to file a timely appeal is a fatal jurisdictional defect. The policy behind strict time limitations in tax appeals manifests the Legislature's objective to set out a well-organized time table which will allow municipalities to determine the value of their tax ratables and enable them to adopt a responsible and reasonably accurate budget." McMahon v. City of Newark, 195 N.J. 526, 539 (2008).
The purpose of the policy requiring strict adherence to statutes establishing filing deadlines as a jurisdictional prerequisite to having tax matters heard and subjecting tax determinations to review in a mandatory manner in strict conformity with statutory time limits is to provide a point at which decisions become final and litigation comes to an end. Township of Franklin v. State, Dep't of Environ. Prot., 7 N.J. Tax 224 (Tax 1984), aff'd 7 N.J. Tax 657. Thereby, the court finds that the plaintiffs' untimely filing deprives this court of jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case.
Lastly, plaintiffs raise the argument that the tax burden imposed on them is unbearable and inequitable. While equitable doctrines such as laches, waiver, and equitable estoppel can be considered by this court, and have been sought as a means of tolling the filing deadline, they are rarely if ever applied against a taxing jurisdiction. On the occasions that this court has considered the issue relief has generally been denied. See Lenox, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 19 N.J. Tax 437, 452 (Tax 2001) (complaint was filed one day late, the fact that plaintiff mailed the complaint even several days before the deadline was not sufficient cause to equitably extend the deadline). Estate of Ehringer v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 24 N.J. Tax 599, 617 (Tax 2009) (when the plaintiffs' excuse amounts to only a lack of due diligence, equitable tolling of a filing deadline is not available). As the court in M.J. Ocean, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 23 N.J. Tax 646, 652-53 (Tax 2008) noted, "[c]onsequently, even though courts may have indicated that, under certain circumstances, statutes of limitation can and should be relaxed, those rulings do not apply to tax matters where such relaxation is unavailable except in the most extraordinary circumstances. Those circumstances are not present here." Indeed, plaintiffs here raise no facts that merit application of an equitable remedy to extend the filing deadline.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs' complaint filed under docket number 013961-2014 is dismissed with prejudice for untimely filing.
The Court will proceed to trial on the matter 015583-2013 on January 22, 2015 as previously scheduled.
Very truly yours,
/s/
Christine M. Nugent, J.T.C.