Opinion
No. 54367-9-I
Filed: March 21, 2005 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of King County. Docket No: 04-2-01285-6. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 05/04/2004. Judge signing: Hon. Richard W. Bathum.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Vanessa Soriano Power, Stoel Rives LLP, 600 University St Ste 3600, Seattle, WA 98101-3197.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Michael Bobrycki (Appearing Pro Se), 304 Bell Street, Apt. 1, Seattle, WA 98121.
Phyllis Fletcher and Michael Bobrycki live in the same apartment building. In August 2000, Bobrycki complained to Fletcher about noise. Fletcher told Bobrycki to contact the building manager or call the police. Bobrycki did not call the police, but Fletcher did. The police came and talked to both Fletcher and Bobrycki, but took no action. Bobrycki complained to Fletcher about noise again, once in 2003, and on April 21, 2004. After the last incident, Fletcher petitioned the King County Superior Court for a protection order. She alleged that when Bobrycki complained to her about her noise in 2000, he yelled at her and persistently rang her doorbell. She said that the police told her then that Bobrycki had agreed he would no longer telephone or approach her and in the future would complain to the building manager or the police about her noise.
The court granted a temporary restraining order and set a date for a hearing. After the hearing, the court found Bobrycki's actions regarding Fletcher's noise to be legitimate and denied Fletcher's petition: Respondent's actions relating to noise complaints are legitimate. Even if nasty argument(s) ensue, arguments between neighbors do not constitute harassment under the statute. Any actions occurring four years ago are barred by statute of limitations.
Clerk's Papers at 11.
This appeal followed.
Standard of Review
A trial court's findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal if they are supported by substantial evidence. City of Seattle v. Megrey, 93 Wn. App. 391, 394, 968 P.2d 900 (1998). Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Megrey, 93 Wn. App. at 393.
Bobrycki's Contact Did Not Constitute Harassment
Fletcher argues that the trial court erred by improperly limiting the nature and scope of the harassment statute. But Fletcher's argument disregards a critical part of the statute.
The civil harassment statute is directed at serious, intentional, and ongoing harassment:
The legislature finds that serious, personal harassment through repeated invasions of a person's privacy by acts and words showing a pattern of harassment designed to coerce, intimidate, or humiliate the victim is increasing. The legislature further finds that the prevention of such harassment is an important governmental objective. This chapter is intended to provide victims with a speedy and inexpensive method of obtaining civil antiharassment protection orders preventing all further unwanted contact between the victim and the perpetrator.
RCW 10.14.010. Consequently, a pattern of conduct that causes substantial emotional distress without serving any legitimate purpose is unlawful: "Unlawful harassment" means a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such person, and which serves no legitimate or lawful purpose. The course of conduct shall be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and shall actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner, or, when the course of conduct is contact by a person over age eighteen that would cause a reasonable parent to fear for the well-being of their child.
RCW 10.14.030 sets forth factors to consider in determining whether a course of conduct serves a legitimate or lawful purpose. One such factor is whether the respondent's `course of conduct appears designed to alarm, annoy, or harass the petitioner'. RCW 10.14.030(3). Another factor to consider is whether the respondent has been given `clear notice that all further contact with the petitioner is unwanted.' RCW 10.14.030(2). Fletcher argues that the legitimacy of Mr. Bobrycki's noise complaints was not the issue before the trial court. She contends that the issue was `whether Ms. Fletcher had presented sufficient evidence to establish that, in continuing to contact Ms. Fletcher directly, Mr. Bobrycki's unwanted contact constituted harassment.'
Other factors set forth in RCW 10.14.030 that the courts may consider in deciding if a course of conduct serves a legitimate or lawful purpose are whether
`(1) Any current contact between the parties was initiated by the respondent only or was initiated by both parties;
`. . .
`(4) The respondent is acting pursuant to any statutory authority, including but not limited to acts which are reasonably necessary to:
`(a) Protect property or liberty interests;
`(b) Enforce the law; or
`(c) Meet specific statutory duties or requirements;
`(5) The respondent's course of conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the petitioner's privacy or the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive living environment for the petitioner;
`(6) Contact by the respondent with the petitioner or the petitioner's family has been limited in any manner by any previous court order.'
Brief of Appellant at 7.
But even unwanted contact is not unlawful unless it `serves no legitimate or lawful purpose.' RCW 10.14.020(1). To determine whether Bobrycki had a legitimate reason for contacting Fletcher, the trial court properly considered whether Bobrycki's course of conduct appeared designed to alarm, annoy, or harass Fletcher.
Fletcher essentially acknowledged that Bobrycki's reason for contacting her was not to harass her. She said Bobrycki contacted her to complain about noise:
Four years ago, he came to my door with a noise complaint and wouldn't leave. . . .
. . .
[Three years passed and then] he came to my door. I assume it was about the noise, but it was my radio, I think but I didn't open the door because I remembered what had happened last time.
Clerk's Papers at 16.
Later, in response to a question from the court, Fletcher responded, `I believe that he does have a legitimate purpose to complain about my noise.' The trial court's consideration of Bobrycki's reason for contacting Fletcher was not erroneous.
Clerk's Papers at 17.
Fletcher further asserts, however, that the trial court erroneously held that the harassment statute does not apply to disputes between neighbors. The court stated in its written decision: `Even if nasty argument(s) ensue, arguments between neighbors do not constitute harassment under the statute.'
Clerk's Papers at 12.
If the court's conclusion were that the harassment statute never applies to neighbors, we would agree that the court erred. See McIntosh v. Nafziger, 69 Wn. App. 906, 851 P.2d 713 (1993) (Court of Appeals affirmed grant of anti-harassment protection order against neighbor). But we do not agree that the trial court so held.
The court's written decision is better understood by looking at its oral ruling. See Thompson v. Thompson, 9 Wn. App. 930, 934, 515 P.2d 1004 (1973). The judge's oral decision reflects his conclusion that Bobrycki's actions did not constitute harassment because Bobrycki contacted Fletcher for a legitimate reason the two were neighbors and her noise was disturbing him:
Anything that Mr. Bobrycki did in terms of complaining about noise is legitimate, in fact, by Phyllis Fletcher's own words, so the complaints are legitimate, she just doesn't like the way he's complaining. The bottom line here is we have neighbors arguing, arguments do not constitute harassment in the statute. Therefore, the matter is dismissed.
Clerk's Papers at 20.
Thus, the court did not hold that neighbors' acts may never constitute harassment. Rather, under the circumstances, when the record established that Bobrycki contacted Fletcher only three times in four years, and each time he contacted her only to complain about noise, his contacts did not constitute harassment.
Fletcher did not establish that Bobrycki's contact was unlawful.
Therefore, we need not address Fletcher's second argument that the trial court erred by applying a three-year statute of limitations. The decision of the trial court is affirmed.
GROSSE, and COX, J., concur.