Opinion
42049.
SUBMITTED JUNE 8, 1966.
DECIDED JUNE 22, 1966.
Re-sentencing. Chatham Superior Court. Before Judge Harrison.
Lewis Javetz, Emanuel Lewis, for appellant.
1. When this case was here before ( Fleming v. State, 113 Ga. App. 113 ( 147 S.E.2d 480)) this court held that the defendant's right to be present when sentence is imposed includes all material portions thereof, and that an attack on a sentence because not imposed on the defendant in his presence was good cause for setting the sentence aside. In accordance with this court's direction, after the remittitur was received by the trial court, sentence was again imposed, this time in his presence, and the defendant now contends that the provision thereof that it shall be served consecutively to another sentence previously imposed is void because at the time of the original sentencing the judge did not include such provision in his oral pronouncement made in the defendant's presence. "Oral declarations of the judge constitute no part of the sentence until they have been put in writing and duly entered as such. Freeman v. Brown, 115 Ga. 23 ( 41 S.E. 385); Alexander v. Chipstead, 152 Ga. 851 ( 111 S.E. 552); Foy v. McCrary, 157 Ga. 461 ( 121 S.E. 804); Conley v. Pope, 161 Ga. 462 ( 131 S.E. 168); Morgan v. Mount, 195 Ga. 281 ( 24 S.E.2d 17)." Long v. Stanley, 200 Ga. 239, 241 ( 36 S.E.2d 785). Indubitably, the original sentence having been set aside at the defendant's instance, and the new sentence being in accordance with law, he can neither complain that he has been sentenced anew nor can he rely upon oral declarations of the trial court made prior to the signing of the original sentence by the court.
Judgment affirmed. Nichols, P. J., and Hall, J., concur.