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finding venue appropriate when "a significant portion of the services under the alleged agreement were to be performed in New York"
Summary of this case from Schindler v. LyonOpinion
No. 02 Civ 7077 (CSH)
January 7, 2003
OPINION AND ORDER
I. Background and Procedural Posture
Plaintiff, a trainer of professional prize fighters, filed suit on September 5, 2002, seeking recovery in breach of contract or quantum meruit for training services allegedly provided to the defendant in the course of his career as a competitive boxer. (Compl. at 7-8.) Plaintiff also seeks a declaratory judgment that he is entitled to 10% of future purses won by defendant. Id. Defendant responded with a Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue, or, in the Alternative, to Transfer Venue. In this Motion, defendant argues that the case must be dismissed because the Southern District of New York is not a proper venue for this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and, in the alternative, argues that the case should be transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404 or § 1406.
In accordance with the Initial Scheduling Order issued in this case, the parties filed a report pursuant to Rule 26(f), Fed.R.Civ.Proc., on December 6, 2002. As the parties evinced disagreement with regard to various points contained in their 26(f) report, the Court held a telephone status conference with the parties on December 19, 2002, in an attempt to resolve some of the disputed issues. In its order dated December 23, 2002, the Court declined to issue a ruling with regard to the discovery disputes raised in the parties' 26(f) report and instead indicated that it would rule on the underlying Motion to Dismiss or Transfer Venue no later than January 15, 2003. This Opinion accordingly resolves the Motion to Dismiss or Transfer Venue.
II. Discussion
The plaintiff in this case resides in New Jersey and the defendant resides in Delaware. (Compl. at 2-3.) The events underlying the dispute between the parties involve training services allegedly provided by the plaintiff in connection with a series of prize fights in which the defendant was a participant. The primary training facility used by the defendant is located in Philadelphia, within the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and other training facilities used by the defendant to prepare for fights specified in the Complaint are located in Miami and in the Las Vegas area. (Def.'s Mem. at 3-5.) Two of the specified prize fights took place in New York and one took place in Philadelphia. Id. Finally, the exact location of any payment agreement or contract between the parties is unclear. Defendant submits that "any alleged payment agreement between [plaintiff] and [defendant] would have been negotiated and agreed upon in Philadelphia," Def.'s Reply Mem. at 2, and further that "any payments to [plaintiff] were made in either Philadelphia or Delaware." (Def.'s Mem. at 3.) Plaintiff submits that a contract between the parties (a training agreement) was signed on April 29, 1998, but does not give a location where the contract was signed, noting instead that "the agreement was reaffirmed by [defendant] and Plaintiff in September 2001 in New York County, New York." (Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n. at 5.)
When a defendant challenges whether venue is proper in the judicial district wherein the plaintiff has filed suit, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that venue is appropriate in the judicial district that it has selected. Saferstein v. Paul, Mardinly, Durham, James, Flandreau Rodger, P.D., 927 F. Supp. 731, 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Defendant argues that plaintiff has not shown, pursuant to § 1391(a)(2), that "a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim" occurred in this judicial district, the Southern District of New York. Additionally, defendant argues that transfer is mandated by § 1406(a) and/or warranted as an exercise of this Court's discretion pursuant to § 1404(a). Each of these issues is discussed in turn.
In order for venue to be appropriate under § 1391(a)(2), "a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim" must have occurred in the judicial district where venue is sought. It is true that, as emphasized by defendant, where a contract forms the basis of the claims, one of the factors to be considered in determining if venue is proper is whether the agreement was substantially negotiated, drafted, and/or executed in that district. TBV Holdings Limited v. Schey, No. 02 Civ. 1122, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13682, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2002). It is likewise true, however, that "[i]n determining what events give rise to breach of contract claims [another factor that] courts interpreting 1391(a)(2) generally look to . . . [is] where services under the contract are to be performed. . . ." Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger Harrison, et al., No. 92 Civ. 9002, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2551, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. March 7, 1994). See also Spanierman Gallery v. Arnold, No. 95 Civ. 4467, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4113, at *13-14 (S.D.N.Y. April 3, 1996) (emphasis added) ("Because the contract was made and performed in New York City, venue is proper here in the Southern District under 1391(a)(2)."); PI, Inc. v. Quality Prods., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 752, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("In determining whether venue is proper for a breach of contract action under 1391(a)(2), courts consider . . . where the contract was negotiated or executed, where it was to be performed, and where the alleged breach occurred.").
In this case, two of the three fights for which the plaintiff seeks compensation for training services provided took place in New York. (Def.'s Mem. at 4-5.) Although defendant argues that the type of services provided by a trainer in the period immediately preceding and during a fight are de minimis, Def.'s Reply Mem. at 4, plaintiff has submitted the affidavit of an active trainer who testifies that "the most important service any trainer can provide a boxer is "working the corner' during an actual fight." (Bloodworth Aff. ¶ 2.) This evidence is afforded significant weight as it has been previously held that "[o]n a motion to dismiss for improper venue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3), the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor." Dolson v. New York State Thruway Authority, No. 00 Civ. 6439, 2001 WL 363032, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). While the Bloodworth affidavit is not a part of the pleading, I am prepared to consider its commonsense appraisal, and conclude that a significant portion of the alleged agreement was to be performed in New York. Defendant also emphasizes that many aspects of the employment arrangement or alleged agreement, including its negotiation and execution, would have occurred in Pennsylvania. (Def.'s Mem. at 7.) ("[A]ny negotiations regarding [any type of compensation or employment scheme] . . . occurred in Philadelphia.") However, "[t]he venue statute . . . does not require venue in the district with the most substantial contacts to the dispute. Rather, it is sufficient that a substantial part of the events occurred in the challenged venue, even if a greater part of the events occurred elsewhere." Astor Holdings, Inc. v. Roski, III, No. 01 Civ. 1905, 2002 WL 72936, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2002). See also Rothstein v. Carriere, 41 F. Supp.2d 381, 387 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), citing Neufeld v. Neufeld, 910 F. Supp. 977, 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("And plaintiff need not establish that the Eastern District of New York has `the most substantial contacts to the dispute; rather it is sufficient that a substantial Part of the events occurred [here], even if a greater part of the events occurred elsewhere.'"). Thus, it is not controlling that another judicial district has more contacts with the dispute; to sustain the selected venue, it is required only that "a substantial part of the events" relating to the dispute occurred in this judicial district.
Defendant correctly notes that venue must be established with regard to each claim asserted and that one of the fights specified in the Complaint for which recovery is sought occurred in Philadelphia. (Def.'s Reply Mem. at 4-5.) However, the training relationship and alleged payment agreement underlying this action connect the three fights. Although presented as three separate causes of action in the Complaint, they arise from the same factual relationships between the parties, involve the same dispute, and are properly considered together.
Applying the standards set out above, this Court concludes (1) that a significant portion of the services under the alleged agreement were to be performed in New York; (2) that although New York may not have the most substantial contacts to the dispute, a substantial part of the events underlying the dispute occurred in New York; and, therefore, (3) that "a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred" in this judicial district and venue is appropriate pursuant to § 1391(a)(2).
B. § 1406(a) and § 1404(a)
In the alternative, defendant posits that the case must be transferred pursuant to § 1406(a), which provides that "[t]he district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought." As the Court has ruled above that this case is not before the "wrong . . . district," this section mandating dismissal or transfer does not apply and the motion to transfer venue pursuant to § 1406(a) is accordingly denied.
Finally, defendant appeals to this Court's discretionary power pursuant to § 1404(a) to transfer the present case to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Section 1404 provides that "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." In considering a motion to transfer venue, a court must first determine whether the case could have properly been brought in the court to which transferred is sought. Defendant's primary training facility is located in Philadelphia, one of the three specified prize fights occurred in Philadelphia, and defendant has submitted that any employment arrangement was likely negotiated in Philadelphia. Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the present action could properly have been brought in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
The Court's next step is to evaluate substantively the request to transfer venue. A court should consider the following factors to determine whether transfer is warranted:
(1) the convenience of witnesses, (2) the convenience of the parties, (3) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof, (4) the locus of operative facts, (5) the availability of process to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses, (6) the relative means of the parties, (7) the forum's familiarity with the governing law, (8) the weight accorded the plaintiffs choice of forum, and (9) trial efficiency and the interest of justice. based on the totality of the circumstances.Handler v. Regents of the University of Michigan, No. 00 Civ. 6314, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15826, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2002). The backdrop against which these factors are to be weighed is that "the plaintiff's choice of forum is accorded great weight and must be deferred to unless the balance of conveniences strongly favors defendants." Spanierman Gallery, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4113, at * 14, quoting Editorial Musical Latino Americana, S.A. v. Mar Int'l Records, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 62, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
Applying the above factors in the present case, it does not appear to this Court that the balance of conveniences "strongly" favors defendants. Counsel for plaintiff has submitted that few witnesses will be required to testify and that the amount of documentary evidence is limited. Additionally, with regard to the convenience of potential witnesses and the parties, the distance between plaintiffs selected forum (New York) and the venue to which defendant seeks transfer (Pennsylvania) is easily traveled and does not impose significant hardship. With regard to the relative means of the parties, the cost of travel in this case would hardly be prohibitive and plaintiff has submitted that cost concerns motivate his choice of forum. In light of the foregoing, the Court does not find it necessary to weigh individually each of the aforementioned factors. It is clear that although there may be some convenience and efficiency attained by transferring the present action, "some" is not enough to overcome the presumption in favor of honoring plaintiffs choice of forum. The motion to transfer venue pursuant to § 1404(a) is denied.
Specifically, plaintiff avers that he has entered into a contingency fee agreement with his New York counsel, an agreement necessitated by plaintiffs economic circumstances. (Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n. at 4.) If the case is transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the services of local counsel will subject plaintiff to additional expenses. This is a legitimate consideration in § 1404(a) analysis.
The Court will address the remaining issues arising out of the parties' Rule 26(f) report in a separate Opinion.