Opinion
Argued February 6, 1997.
Decided March 10, 1997.
Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Delaware County, No. 95-6670.
Linda J. Laub, Harrisburg, for appellant.
Daniel Finnegan, Drexel Hill, for appellees.
Before FRIEDMAN and LEADBETTER, JJ., and LORD, Senior Judge.
The Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency (PHEAA) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County (trial court), dated December 18, 1995, directing that PHEAA take no further action against Lauren Finnegan (Finnegan) to collect on student loans upon which PHEAA alleged Finnegan was in default.
Lauren M. Loden (Finnegan's maiden name) obtained a school loan from Provident Bank on September 25, 1966 in the amount of $500.00; she obtained a second school loan from Provident Bank on August 24, 1967, also in the amount of $500.00. Both loans were guaranteed by PHEAA.
In 1984, PHEAA filed a Statement of Claim in its records against Finnegan alleging that the loans had not been repaid. Because PHEAA received no response from Finnegan, PHEAA entered an order of default against Finnegan in its records. Finnegan received a copy of this order on May 12, 1995. On May 26, 1995, in response to PHEAA's attempt to attach her wages, Finnegan filed a Petition for Review with the trial court in which she claimed that the loans had been repaid.
At the hearing, Finnegan testified that her mother repaid the loans in 1971 or 1972, after which Finnegan received no more statements from PHEAA indicating that she owed anything further. Indeed, Finnegan testified that she had never been contacted by PHEAA in any manner until she received a phone call from PHEAA in December 1994; moreover, she did not receive notice of her alleged default until May 12, 1995. Finnegan stated that she lived at the address listed on her loan papers until 1975 and that, after that time, her mother continued to live there and forward Finnegan's mail; however, Finnegan never received anything from PHEAA. Finally, Finnegan maintained that she never received any of the letters which PHEAA mailed to her new address under her maiden name of Lauren M. Loden, indicating that her daughter, Lauren L. Loden, may have received those letters instead.
Finnegan also presented the testimony of her mother, Edna Sylvester. Although acknowledging that she could not remember the specific details, Sylvester testified that she had repaid Finnegan's loans in either 1971 or 1972 because Finnegan was about to take a trip to Norway and Sylvester wanted to make certain that all of Finnegan's bills were paid.
PHEAA, on the other hand, claimed that Finnegan defaulted on the loans in 1968 and that it entered a default judgment on that claim during its July 26, 1984 board meeting. PHEAA also contended that Finnegan's Petition for Review, filed on May 26, 1995, was not timely filed because it was not filed within thirty days of the entry of the default judgment, as required by Rule 1512(a)(1) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. PHEAA called as a witness Garrison Lebo, who explained the standard collection procedures used by PHEAA in collecting on defaulted student loans and who provided an overview regarding PHEAA's attempts to collect from Finnegan. Lebo indicated that PHEAA began its collection attempts in 1977, and that, until 1988, PHEAA sent all the letters by first-class mail to Finnegan's previous address, incorrectly addressed to Lauren Loden, rather than Lauren Finnegan.
The trial court credited the testimony of Finnegan and Sylvester and, while not specifically discrediting Lebo, found that his testimony consisted merely of ineffectual attempts to contact Finnegan and was void of any evidence connected with Finnegan's receipt of PHEAA's claim or the order of default. Thus, on the basis of the foregoing testimony, the trial court found that Finnegan's Petition for Review had been timely filed and that her loans had been repaid.
On appeal to this court, PHEAA argues that the trial court erred in holding that Finnegan's Petition for Review was timely filed and in finding that Finnegan had established by a preponderance of the evidence that the debt in question had been satisfied. We disagree. Because we believe that the trial court thoroughly analyzed these issues and correctly answered them in the affirmative, we affirm the trial court's order and adopt the well-reasoned opinion of Judge Joseph F. Battle in Finnegan v. Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency, Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, Civil Division, No. 95-6670, filed May 17, 1996.
Our scope of review of a trial court's decision is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, committed an error of law, or whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Hammer v. Nikol, 659 A.2d 617 (Pa.Commw. 1995).
PHEAA also argues that the trial court erred by conducting an evidentiary hearing and by applying the statute of limitations to a Commonwealth agency such as PHEAA; however, because PHEAA failed to raise these issues in its Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, these issues are waived. See Lower Paxton Township, Board of Supervisors v. Okonieski, 620 A.2d 602 (Pa.Commw. 1993).
In support of the trial court's analysis, we note our supreme court's discussion in Carter v. Ridge Turnpike Co., 208 Pa. 565, 57 A. 988 (1904):
More than twenty years had elapsed before this equitable ejectment was instituted, and in it there can be no recovery unless the money to enforce the payment of which it was brought has not been paid. With a continuing right to collect the same, barred by no statute and defeated by no adverse possession, there is, nevertheless, the presumption after twenty years from the time the right to the damages accrued, that they have been paid. The rule that, after the lapse of twenty years, mortgages, judgments and every species of security for the payment of money are presumed to be paid is unbending, universal and invariable. It is applicable both at law and in equity, in the common pleas and the orphans' court. . . . .
The contention of the appellants, sustained by the common pleas, is, that the land had been paid for. This would be so if twenty years — the period unbendingly fixed as raising a presumption of payment — had not passed before any steps were taken against the appellee. . . . What would not have been a burden on those before the twenty years, becomes so thereafter; and what would have been required of the defendant before that time is not called upon to prove after.
Id. at 567-68, 57 A. at 988-89. (Emphasis added and citations omitted.)
We believe that the presumption that a debt has been paid when no action has been taken on a claim for over twenty years applies to this case and reinforces the decision of the trial court here.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 10th day of March, 1997, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, dated December 18, 1995, at 95-6670, is affirmed.