Summary
finding contractual limitations on bringing of FMLA claims valid
Summary of this case from Madry v. Gibraltor National Corp.Opinion
CV 03-1480-BR.
August 19, 2004
SCOTT N. HUNT, Busse Hunt, Portland, OR, Attorneys for Plaintiff.
MARK A. TURNER, JAMES M. BARRETT, Ater Wynne LLP, Portland, OR, Attorneys for Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (#12).
Plaintiff brought this action against Defendant for wrongful constructive discharge and violation of both the Oregon and federal Family Medical Leave Acts. In response, Defendant asserted counterclaims against Plaintiff for breach of contract and attorneys' fees. Plaintiff, in turn, asserted a claim of misrepresentation as a counter to Defendant's counterclaims.
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion against Plaintiff's claims.
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant did not address its counterclaims. The Court, therefore, does not make any ruling regarding the counterclaims and will resolve them in due course pursuant to the existing case management schedule.
FACTS
The facts are stated in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the nonmoving party.
As part of the hiring process, Plaintiff, along with several other applicants, attended one of several group orientations held by Guardsmark. The meeting was conducted by Natasha Douglas, a Guardsmark Human Resources representative, with assistance from Jeff Hadley, another Guardsmark employee. Large packets of paperwork were handed out to the applicants at the meeting. Each packet consisted of approximately 50 pages and included an application and a psychological exam.
Douglas told the applicants all of the papers had to be completed and signed or the applicants could not work. The applicants were rushed through the paperwork, and Douglas told them they had to get through it all before lunch. While Plaintiff was filling out the papers, she was interrupted to be fitted for a uniform and to be fingerprinted. Plaintiff admits she did not read everything she signed because she was rushed to complete the paperwork.
Douglas repeatedly told the applicants the paperwork was "a standard application" and "everything is standard." Douglas also told the applicants they would get copies of the documents and have time to go over them later. Plaintiff, however, did not receive a copy of the documents she signed until after she brought this action. In any event, the paperwork given to Plaintiff at the orientation meeting included an Employment Agreement, which is dated March 20, 2002.
Plaintiff was hired by Guardsmark on April 10, 2002. The Employment Agreement consists of four pages of single-spaced type. The Agreement provides any action by the employee against Guardsmark arising from her employment must be brought within six months of the date the cause of action arises or it will be timebarred. Claims filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or arising under any statutes enforced by the EEOC are expressly excepted from this provison.
On her employment by Guardsmark, Plaintiff was assigned to work at Boise Cascade. Her duties consisted primarily of monitoring and controlling access to the Boise Cascade facility. Plaintiff initially worked the graveyard shift. Starting on or about April 17, 2002, Plaintiff worked mostly the day shift from 4 a.m. to noon, but she occasionally filled in on other shifts. From June 2002 through November 2002, Plaintiff worked the day shift and was assigned primarily to the nonunion contractor's gate position (Post 4) at Boise Cascade.
In October 2002, Plaintiff requested medical leave for a surgery she anticipated would occur in December. Plaintiff went on medical leave on November 19, 2002, and returned to work on February 4, 2003. While she was on leave, Plaintiff spoke with Debbie Fields, her supervisor, several times. Plaintiff told Fields she would be on light duty for a while after she returned to work. Fields assured Plaintiff this would not be a problem.
Plaintiff returned to work February 4, 2003, and informed Fields of her work restrictions, which included lifting no more than 15 pounds, walking no more than a mile, and "no flag raising." Guardsmark did not reinstate Plaintiff to her previous position at Post 4, but instead assigned her to work 10-hour shifts at Post 2, Tuesday through Friday, from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m.
Plaintiff was not allowed to take regular meal breaks or other breaks while working these 10-hour shifts. It appears Plaintiff had to get permission from Roxanne Anderson before going on a break. Permission, however, was not forthcoming, and when Plaintiff called to request a break, Anderson often hung up on her.
On February 12, 2003, Plaintiff saw her doctor and was given a new restriction limiting her to standing for a maximum of 30 minutes each hour. Plaintiff told Fields of this new restriction. Nonetheless, from February 13 through February 24, Plaintiff was rarely able to take breaks nor was she allowed to work in a sitting position for 30 minutes out of every hour. Anderson continued to harass Plaintiff about her breaks and grew increasingly hostile toward Plaintiff.
On February 24, 2003, Plaintiff returned to her doctor and again was told to limit her standing to 30 minutes out of every hour. On returning to work on February 25, Fields told Plaintiff that Plaintiff's doctor had called and advised Fields that she had to find a way to allow Plaintiff to sit more. Later that day, Anderson came to relieve Plaintiff so she could take a break. Anderson "harassed" Plaintiff about her doctor's phone call, said she hated the "truckgate," and told Plaintiff to hurry up. Anderson also told Plaintiff she had better get off of light duty or they were going to fire her. Plaintiff told Anderson to "forget it," she would sit for a few minutes and do some paperwork instead. After Anderson left, Plaintiff called Fields and told her what had happened. When Plaintiff left her shift that day, she told someone named Thompkins that she would not be coming back, and she gave Thompkins her keys.
A few weeks later, Plaintiff asked Fields for a copy of her personnel file, but she never received it.
STANDARDS
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) authorizes summary judgment if no genuine issue exists regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party must show the absence of an issue of material fact. Leisek v. Brightwood Corp., 278 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2002). In response to a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and show there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id.
An issue of fact is genuine "`if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Villiarmo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). The court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. A mere disagreement about a material issue of fact, however, does not preclude summary judgment. Jackson v. Bank of Haw., 902 F.2d 1385, 1389 (9th Cir. 1990). When the nonmoving party's claims are factually implausible, that party must come forward with more persuasive evidence than otherwise would be required. Blue Ridge Ins. Co. v. Stanewich, 142 F.3d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
The substantive law governing a claim or a defense determines whether a fact is material. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). If the resolution of a factual dispute would not affect the outcome of the claim, the court may grant summary judgment. Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2001).
When Oregon law applies to an issue, this Court must interpret and apply Oregon law as the Oregon Supreme Court would apply it. See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 253 F.3d 461, 473 (9th Cir. 2001). If no decision by the Oregon Supreme Court is available to guide the Court's interpretation of state law, the Court must predict how the Oregon Supreme Court would decide the issue by using intermediate appellate court decisions, decisions from other jurisdictions, statutes, treatises, and restatements as guidance. Id.
DISCUSSION
I. The Contractual Limitation Period.A. Oregon law allows contractual limitations on filing actions arising from the contract.
Defendant contends the six-month limitation period set forth in the Employment Agreement bars each of Plaintiff's claims. The Agreement provides:
Except for charges or claims filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or under any of the statutes enforced by said agency, any legal action or proceeding relating to or arising our of this Agreement or the employment of Employee by GUARDSMARK must be brought by Employee within six months of the date the cause of action arose or it shall be time-barred.
The parties agree Plaintiff's claims do not arise under any statutes enforced by the EEOC. The parties also agree the Court must apply Oregon law to determine the applicability of the contractual limitation.
Under Oregon law, contracting parties may "stipulate that an action for a breach of an agreement must be brought within a certain period, and, if such limitation is reasonable, it will be upheld." Ausplund v. Aetna Indemnity Co., 47 Or. 10, 22 (1905). See also Biomass One, L.P. v. S-P Const., 102 Or. App. 521 (1990). The contractual provision at issue here, however, differs from those examined by the courts in both Ausplund and Biomass One. In those cases, the contract expressly limited the time for bringing an action for breach of the contract. In contrast, the Employment Agreement in this case purports to limit any action arising from Plaintiff's employment and is not restricted to actions for breach of the Agreement.
Although Oregon appellate courts have not addressed a contractual provision that purports to limit the time for filing a statutory or common law employment action, neither party cites any Oregon authority that suggests the Oregon Supreme Court would decline to extend the holdings in Ausplund and Biomass One to an employment contract. Courts in other jurisdictions have upheld similar contractual limitations in employment actions. See, e.g., Soltani v. Western Southern Life Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying California law); Timko v. Oakwood, 625 N.W.2d 101 (Mich.App. 2001); Taylor v. Western and Southern Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 1188 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying Illinois law). This Court finds persuasive the reasoning in these decisions, and, accordingly, predicts the Oregon Supreme Court would reach a similar conclusion in circumstances such as those presented there. The Court, therefore, concludes Oregon law does not prohibit enforcement of the contractual limitation.
B. Equitable defenses to enforcement of the contractual limitation.
Plaintiff asserts various equitable defenses to enforcement of the Employment Agreement's six-month limitation. Plaintiff contends the limitation cannot be enforced because 1) Defendant has unclean hands, 2) the doctrine of equitable estoppel bars enforcement, and 3) enforcement would be unconscionable.
1. Unclean Hands.
Plaintiff contends Defendant has unclean hands because "Defendant violated the law by failing to give Plaintiff a copy of her employment contract when she first signed it and again when her employment ended, Defendant misrepresented the agreement's terms and legal significance, and the employment agreement was signed under procedurally unconscionable circumstances of Defendant's own making."
The doctrine of unclean hands "applies to any party who seeks either the affirmative or defensive intervention of the court for equitable relief." Rise v. Steckel, 59 Or. App. 675, 681, 652 P.2d 364, 369 (1982). The fundamental principle of the unclean hands doctrine is expressed in the maxim, "He who comes into a court of equity must come with clean hands." Id. Defendant, however, does not seek equitable relief from this Court. Defendant seeks only the legal enforcement of the limitation period set forth in the Agreement. The doctrine of unclean hands, therefore, does not apply.
2. Unconscionability.
Plaintiff also argues the Agreement should not be enforced because it is unconscionable. Under Oregon law, unconscionability is a legal issue that must be assessed at the time of contract formation. W.L. May Co. v. Philco-Ford Corp., 273 Or. 701, 707 (1975). Oregon courts have not adopted a universal definition for what constitutes sufficiently unconscionable conduct to prevent enforcement of a contract. The Oregon Supreme Court, however, has looked to the Uniform Commercial Code and noted the basic test of unconscionability in a commercial context is whether "`in light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract. * * * The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power.'" W.L. May Co. v. Philco-Ford Corp., 273 Or. 701, 707 (1975) (quoting U.C.C. § 2-302, Cmt. 1).
Plaintiff contends the Agreement is procedurally unconscionable because Plaintiff was denied any opportunity to opt out of the Agreement or to negotiate its terms. Plaintiff relies on California case law to support her unconscionability argument. Under California law, a contract is considered procedurally unconscionable if it is a standard form drafted by the party with superior bargaining power and presented on a takeit-or-leave-it basis without the opportunity to negotiate. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2329 (2002). In other words, Plaintiff describes an adhesion contract. Under Oregon law, however, an adhesion contract is not considered unconscionable. Such contracts are fully enforceable provided they are not ambiguous, in which case the ambiguous terms are construed against the drafter. Derenco v. Benj. Franklin Fed. Savings and Loan Ass'n, 281 Or. 533 (1978).
Plaintiff also argues, again citing California law, that the Agreement is substantively unconscionable because its terms are "so one-sided as to shock the conscience." See Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003). Under California law, however, a contractual six-month limitation period in an employment contract is not considered substantively unconscionable. Soltani v. Western Southern Life Ins., 258 F.3d 1038, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 2001).
Having already concluded that Oregon law does not prohibit enforcement of the Agreement's six-month limitation period, the Court also concludes the Oregon Supreme Court would not find the provision unconscionable.
3. Equitable estoppel.
"The doctrine of equitable estoppel is employed to prevent a party from alleging a crucial fact to be other than what by act or omission that party previously led another party justifiably to believe." In re Marriage of Menard, 180 Or. App. 181, 186 (2002). The elements of equitable estoppel are: (1) a false representation, (2) made by someone having knowledge of the truth, (3) to one who was ignorant of the truth, (4) made with the intention that the other party act upon it, and (5) the other party acted upon it. Id. at 187. Plaintiff asserts Defendant should be equitably estopped from enforcing the six-month limitation provision in the Employment Agreement because Douglas misrepresented the terms and legal significance of the Agreement when she told Plaintiff the paperwork was a "standard application" and "everything is standard." Plaintiff also apparently contends Douglas's failure to inform Plaintiff of the contents of the Agreement constitutes a misrepresentation.
Plaintiff, however, has not identified any evidence to support her assertion that Defendant made a false representation of a crucial fact. In addition, Plaintiff does not contend Defendant told her the Agreement did not contain any limitation on the time for bringing an action nor does she contend Defendant told her the limitation period was anything other than six months. Moreover, she does not contend she would have refused to sign the Agreement if Defendant had given her more information about its contents. The Court, therefore, concludes Plaintiff has not established a jury question concerning the elements of equitable estoppel.
For the same reasons, Plaintiff's misrepresentation claim also fails.
C. Validity of the Employment Agreement.
Plaintiff also argues the Employment Agreement is not a valid contract due to lack of consideration. Plaintiff contends she did not sign the Agreement as a condition of an offer of employment, and Defendant did not make any promises to her in exchange for her execution of the Agreement. Plaintiff, however, does not cite to any evidence in the record to support her assertion. The evidence, in fact, reflects the contrary. In her Affidavit, Plaintiff states Douglas told her "all the forms had to be filled out and signed or we could not work." Moreover, by signing the Agreement, Plaintiff acknowledged receipt of consideration.
The Agreement provides: "NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and his (her) employment by GUARDSMARK, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged by Employee, Employee and GUARDSMARK do hereby agree, covenant, and warrant as follows: . . ."
In addition, Plaintiff argues the Agreement is invalid because she was unaware she was signing an Employment Agreement and, therefore, no meeting of the minds occurred. Plaintiff, however, had an obligation to read the documents she signed, and her failure to do so does not render the Agreement invalid. See Knappenberger v. Cascade Ins. Co., 259 Or. 392, 398 (1971) (absent special circumstances, a party's failure to read a contract is not a defense to enforcement).
Based on this record, the Court concludes Plaintiff has not presented any valid legal or equitable defenses to preclude enforcement of the Employment Agreement and, in particular, its six-month limitation term. Accordingly, the Court holds Plaintiff's action is barred because it was filed more than six months after her cause of action arose.
II. Plaintiff's FMLA and OFLA Claims.
As noted, Plaintiff alleges Defendant retaliated against her for taking medical leave by creating a hostile work environment. Even if the six-month contractual limitation were not enforceable, however, the Court concludes Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claims brought under the federal Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., and the Oregon Family Leave Act (OFLA), Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.112, et seq, in any event.
A. FMLA
In response to Defendant's Motion, Plaintiff concedes she cannot prevail on her FMLA claim. The Court, therefore, grants Defendant's Motion as to Plaintiff's Second Claim for violation of the FMLA.
B. OFLA
OFLA, Oregon's counterpart to the FMLA, entitles employees to family leave that is substantially similar to the FMLA. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.171. OFLA is to be construed "to the extent possible in a manner that is consistent with any similar provisions of the [FMLA]." Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.186(2). See also Price v. Multnomah County, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1295-96 (D. Or. 2001). OFLA, however, does not provide an employee with a claim for relief for retaliation based on an employee's invocation of his right to take the leave. The only claim for relief authorized by the Oregon Legislature under OFLA arises from an employer's denial of an employee's leave request. Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.183. Accordingly, the Court concludes Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's OFLA claim.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (#12) against all of Plaintiff's claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED.