Opinion
No. 1D20-695
03-11-2021
Hannah FINE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Lori A. Willner, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant; and Hannah Fine, pro se, Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Lori A. Willner, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant; and Hannah Fine, pro se, Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Rowe, J.
This is an Anders appeal of Hannah Fine's judgment and sentence following her plea to attempted first-degree murder, aggravated battery with great bodily harm, and burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery. Fine sought sentencing as a youthful offender and also asked for a downward departure sentence. But the trial court sentenced Fine as an adult and denied her downward departure request. After sentencing, Fine moved to modify or reduce her sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c). The trial court denied the motion. Our review of the record reveals no error warranting reversal.
Facts
From the age of six, Fine lived with her father. But when she turned sixteen, she moved in with her mother, Candie Walker. Walker, unlike Fine's father, allowed Fine to drive without a license, date anyone she wanted to date, and skip school.
After Fine began living with her mother, Walker confided in Fine that she wanted J.C. dead because J.C. was dating Walker's ex-husband. Walker persuaded Fine to kill J.C. In preparation for the murder attempt, Walker gave Fine a disguise to wear during the attack on J.C. Fine then obtained a machete to use as the murder weapon.
Soon after, Fine went to J.C.’s home. As she approached the front door, Fine tried to cover her face and hair to conceal her identity, but she decided not to wear the mask she brought with her. When J.C. came out to her front porch to smoke a cigarette, Fine attacked her with a machete. J.C. screamed for help. J.C.’s twelve-year-old daughter, J.S., ran outside and tried to protect her mother. Fine attacked J.S. with the machete, too. Fine then fled the scene on foot. J.C. suffered several lacerations to the right side of her body, including her kneecap, arm, and face. J.S. suffered an acute laceration that almost severed her thumb from her left hand.
After the victims called the police and reported Fine as the attacker, the police detained Fine and transported her to the police station for interrogation. During questioning, Fine confessed to the murder attempt. She admitted that she attacked J.C. and J.S. with a machete. She told the police that Walker threatened to ground her if she did not kill J.C. Fine told investigators that her boyfriend drove her to J.C.’s house. After the attack, Fine fled the scene on foot. And then she and her boyfriend abandoned the vehicle used to drive to J.C.’s house. Fine then called her grandmother and asked her to pick her up.
Based on Fine's confession, investigators searched the grandmother's car. They found a long machete, a hoodie, gloves, and a mask—all covered in blood. Fine continued to assist the police with the investigation and her cooperation led to the arrest of several co-defendants. She also agreed to testify at her mother's trial. Fine's testimony was instrumental in obtaining convictions against her mother.
When it came to Fine's prosecution, the State exercised its discretion to charge the sixteen-year-old as an adult under section 985.557(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2018). The State charged Fine with attempted first-degree or felony murder with a weapon or firearm, aggravated battery with great bodily harm or a deadly weapon, and burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery.
But based on Fine's confession and cooperation in the prosecution of her co-defendants, the State entered into a plea agreement with Fine. She agreed to plea to the lesser-included offense of attempted first-degree murder and to counts two and three as charged—with the understanding that she could not be sentenced to more than twenty years in state prison. The trial court conducted a plea colloquy and found that Fine voluntarily and knowingly entered her plea. Before imposing the sentence, the court ordered the Department of Juvenile Justice to conduct a predisposition investigation and prepare a predisposition report. It also requested a presentence sentence investigation by the Department of Corrections.
DJJ recommended that the trial court impose juvenile sanctions and that Fine be placed in a high-risk commitment facility. DOC recommended that if the trial court decided to impose a prison sentence, the sentence should be near the lower limits of an acceptable sentence. Fine's scoresheet provided a lowest permissible sentence of 156.75 months in state prison. Fine's counsel sought more lenient sentencing for Fine, asking the trial court to impose juvenile sanctions or to impose a youthful offender sentence.
In considering Fine's sentencing requests, the trial court heard from several witnesses. J.C. testified at the sentencing hearing and explained how the attack affected her and her family. She testified that when her daughter, J.S., tried to protect her, Fine almost cut off her thumb. Before the attack, J.S. played the violin and the flute and made straight A's in school. Her grades slipped after the attack, and J.S. could no longer play her instruments.
As to J.C., she spent the first eight months after the attack in bed and was unable to move. She suffered from depression and PTSD. J.C. was a single mother. Because of her injuries from the attack, J.C. lost both of her jobs. She was limited in her ability to find work due to her injuries. Even so, when it came to Fine's punishment, J.C. did not want to see Fine sentenced to twenty years in prison. But she also did not want Fine to serve only two years.
Next to testify at the sentencing hearing was John Bingham, a licensed mental health counselor, who conducted a forensic mental health evaluation of Fine. He testified on what he learned about Fine's upbringing and family dynamics. Bingham concluded that Fine was easily influenced, gullible, and naïve. He explained that Fine's mother tried to control her and that Fine sought her mother's acceptance.
Last to testify at the hearing was Fine. She expressed remorse for her actions.
Before imposing Fine's sentence, the court observed: "There is a lot of mitigation that would support a certain range of a sentence, but one thing your attorney can't do or you could not do through a level of cooperation, although you may wish you could, is change what occurred that night." The court added:
There was much potential that you had and I am fully aware of the statement made by your counsel, and I think it's accurate, but for your mother, you
wouldn't be here; but, there's nothing in the record and nothing I've heard or seen to indicate that notwithstanding great pressure, or somebody may consider great distress, then you could have chosen otherwise. Not all of the guilt and blame can be pointed to the mother. That's not to suggest that pointing fingers and blame is somehow not legitimate, it just means that it's not going to exonerate you for your actions.
The trial court did not impose juvenile sanctions or grant Fine's requests for a youthful offender sentence or a downward departure. Instead, the trial court sentenced Fine to concurrent sentences of 200 months in state prison on counts one and three and a concurrent sentence of 180 months in state prison on count two.
After sentencing, Fine filed a rule 3.800(c) motion seeking a modification or reduction of her sentence. She argued that her sentence should be reduced because the victim believed that a shorter sentence would have been appropriate. The trial court denied the motion, stating in its order that it had considered the victim's testimony and the points raised in Fine's motion when it imposed the original sentence. This timely appeal follows.
Analysis
In this Anders appeal, Fine's appointed counsel was unable to present any good-faith assertions of reversible error. Based on our independent review of the record, we find no error by the trial court.
As to Fine's plea, the record shows that her plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered and that she did not preserve any issues for appellate review. Sections 924.051(4) and 924.06(3), Florida Statutes (2018), provide that a defendant who pleads no contest or guilty generally may not appeal her judgment and sentence unless she has reserved the right to appeal a legally dispositive motion. See also Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A).
Fine entered her plea without reserving the right to appeal and may therefore only raise on appeal issues that fall within one of certain limited exceptions. See Robinson v. State , 373 So. 2d 898, 902 (Fla. 1979) ("A plea of guilty cuts off any right to an appeal from court rulings that precede the plea in the criminal process including independent claims relating to deprivations of constitutional rights that occur prior to the entry of the guilty plea."). These exceptions include challenges to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction, a violation of the plea agreement, an involuntary plea, or a sentencing error. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii). But Fine does not raise any of these challenges. And the record shows that the trial court conducted a plea colloquy that substantially complied with the requirements of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172. The court explained the statutory maximum for each of the charged offenses and that Fine's plea agreement meant that she could not receive more than twenty years in prison. Fine represented that she had ample time to discuss the plea with her counsel and that she understood the rights she forfeited by entering a plea. The court repeatedly informed Fine that her sentence was up to the court's discretion. Based on Fine's representations, the court properly accepted her plea as knowingly and voluntarily entered.
As to her sentences, the record shows no error in the trial court's imposition of Fine's sentences. Each sentence is within the statutory maximum for the offense. Attempted first-degree murder is a first-degree felony punishable by up to thirty years in prison. §§ 775.082(3)(b), 777.04(4), 782.04(1)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2018). The trial court sentenced Fine to 200 months in prison for this offense. Aggravated battery with great bodily harm or a deadly weapon is a second-degree felony punishable by up to fifteen years in prison. §§ 775.082(3)(d), 784.045(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018). The trial court sentenced Fine to 180 months in prison for this offense. Burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery is a first-degree felony punishable by life imprisonment. §§ 775.082(3)(b), 810.02(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018). The trial court sentenced Fine to 200 months in prison for this offense. And so, the trial court did not err in imposing Fine's sentences.
Nor did the trial court err when it denied Fine's request for the court to impose a youthful offender sentence. An appellate court reviews a trial court's decision on whether to impose a youthful offender sentence for an abuse of discretion. See McKinney v. State , 27 So. 3d 160, 161 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). Unless the court believes that such a sentence would be appropriate, a trial court is under no obligation to impose a youthful offender sentence. Id. Here, the court considered Fine's request, but declined to impose a youthful offender sentence due to the seriousness of the crimes Fine committed and the lasting effects of Fine's actions on the victims. On these facts, we find no abuse by the trial court in its decision not to sentence Fine as a youthful offender.
As to the remaining sentencing decisions by the trial court—its denial of Fine's request for a downward departure sentence and its order denying her rule 3.800(c) motion—neither decision is subject to appellate review. An appellate court may review a trial court's denial of a request for a downward departure only in limited circumstances. Wilson v. State , 306 So.3d 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020). Only when a trial court misconceives its discretion to impose a departure sentence or when the court has a policy to refuse to impose any downward departure sentences may a defendant obtain appellate review of the trial court's decision. Id. Neither circumstance is present here. And so, this Court may not review the trial court's discretionary decision not to downwardly depart in this appeal.
Similarly, we may not review the trial court's discretionary decision to deny Fine's postconviction challenge to her sentences. Fine filed a timely rule 3.800(c) motion asking the court to reduce her sentences. The trial court denied the motion on the merits. And thus, that decision is not subject to appellate review. See Mitchell v. State , 719 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (explaining that a rule 3.800(c) motion is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and that an appellate court has no jurisdiction to review the correctness of the decision).
For these reasons, finding no reversible error by the trial court, we AFFIRM .
M.K. Thomas and Nordby, JJ., concur.
Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).