From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Finden v. Klaas

Supreme Court of Minnesota
May 22, 1964
268 Minn. 268 (Minn. 1964)

Summary

concluding that insufficient prejudice established by delay and added expense incurred by reason of the default proceedings, "coupled with the inconvenience and distress understandably caused by an adversary who changes his position from an attitude of conciliation and negotiation to an attitude of resistance"

Summary of this case from Takuanyi v. Savage

Opinion

No. 39,132.

May 22, 1964.

Judgment — by default — when court should vacate.

Where it appears that entry of a default judgment was occasioned solely by neglect of counsel and defendant with due diligence moves to vacate the judgment and interpose an answer alleging a meritorious defense, and it appears that no substantial prejudice will result to plaintiff, the court should relieve defendant from the judgment upon such terms and conditions as are deemed just.

Action in the Dakota County District Court on behalf of Dennis Finden by his father and natural guardian, Harold E. Finden, and by said father on his own behalf for personal injuries and consequential damages allegedly resulting from an assault by defendant. Upon defendant's default, the court, R. C. Nelsen, Judge, ordered judgment for plaintiffs, and thereafter defendant appealed from an order denying his motion to vacate the judgment entered and for permission to file an answer. Reversed and remanded.

D. D. Daly, for appellant.

LeVander, Gillen, Miller Durenberger, for respondents.


Defendant appeals from an order denying his motion to vacate a default judgment and for leave to answer plaintiffs' complaint in an action for damages arising out of a willful assault.

Plaintiffs commenced their joint action on February 20, 1962, by personal service upon defendant. The complaint alleged that on January 7, 1962, defendant willfully assaulted plaintiff Dennis Finden, the 19-year-old son of plaintiff Harold E. Finden, causing severe and permanent bodily injuries, and that by reason thereof, plaintiff Dennis Finden sustained damages of $30,000 and plaintiff Harold E. Finden sustained damages of $1,750 for past medical expenses and would incur further medical expense of $1,000.

The brief record before us reveals that before the time to answer expired defendant retained Ray Flader, an attorney, to represent him. The attorney assured defendant that he would answer the complaint and conduct the defense. He discussed the case with plaintiffs' counsel and, upon request, was furnished with information concerning the basis for the complaint. Plaintiffs' counsel was advised that an answer would be interposed as soon as defendant's attorney completed his investigation. Defendant relied upon his attorney's assurance that he was making progress with the investigation and that an answer had been filed. On March 23, 1962, Mr. Flader was served by mail with a note of issue placing the case on the calendar for trial at the spring term. Further telephone conferences and correspondence were had between counsel but no answer was interposed. Apparently, the action was not called for trial at the spring term. On June 30, 1962, plaintiffs' counsel wrote Mr. Flader advising that the action was being placed on the July special term calendar to be heard as a default. A copy of this letter was mailed to defendant. Subsequently, Oscar H. Ahlberg, an attorney whose office is near defendant's place of business and who was held out to plaintiffs' counsel by defendant as his attorney before he retained Mr. Flader, telephoned plaintiffs' counsel and was informed of the status of the matter. Receiving no further communication from defendant, his attorney, or Mr. Ahlberg, plaintiffs' counsel filed an affidavit of no answer. On July 19, 1962, following proof of their claim and findings by the court, judgment was entered for $30,000 in favor of plaintiff Dennis Finden and $3,048.09 in favor of plaintiff Harold Finden.

After two attempts had been made to levy execution on August 23 and August 31, defendant, on September 17, 1962, served his motion to vacate the judgment and for leave to answer. The motion was submitted on the affidavit of defendant wherein he asserted that his first knowledge of the entry of the default judgment was when the sheriff made a levy on August 23. In accord with the answering affidavit of plaintiffs' counsel, the court found that on June 30 a letter was in fact mailed to defendant and his attorney informing them that the matter would be heard at the July special term as a default. The court further determined in denying defendant's motion that, under the Rules of Civil Procedure, defendant was in default for want of an appearance or answer and was not entitled to be relieved from his default upon his claim of mistake or excusable neglect.

Contrary to defendant's contention on this appeal, we are of the opinion that plaintiffs were fully justified in applying for and securing judgment by default.

Under Rule 55.01(2), Rules of Civil Procedure, in a tort action a party who "has appeared in the action" is entitled to written notice of the application for judgment by default at least 3 days prior to the hearing on such application. Rule 5.01 provides: "* * * A party appears when he serves or files any paper in the proceeding." The court found that defendant had received informal notice of the application, but concluded that defendant had not appeared within the contemplation of the rules and thus formal notice was unnecessary. Since we are persuaded that the court erred in refusing to relieve defendant from the judgment, we deem it unnecessary to decide whether defendant herein was entitled to the formal notice contemplated by Rule 55.01(2).

The important and decisive question is whether or not upon the facts before us defendant should have been granted relief from the judgment under Rule 60.02, Rules of Civil Procedure. Among other things this rule authorizes the court, "upon such terms as are just," to relieve a party from a judgment upon the ground of "excusable neglect" or for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."

Defendant has made no attempt to explain his attorney's failure to answer the complaint, to respond to the note of issue, or to take any action following his receipt of the letter informing him of plaintiffs' intention to submit the matter as a default. Thus, the court had no choice but to conclude that such neglect was inexcusable. Under basic principles of agency, such neglect was chargeable to defendant.

Cf. Slatoski v. Jendro, 134 Minn. 328, 159 N.W. 752.

Merritt v. Putnam, 7 Minn. 399 (493). See, Rodgers v. United States and Dominion Life Ins. Co. 127 Minn. 435, 149 N.W. 671.

However, it is a cardinal rule that, in keeping with the spirit of Rule 60.02, in furtherance of justice, and pursuant to a liberal policy conducive to the trial of causes on their merits, the court should relieve a defendant from the consequences of his attorney's neglect in those cases where defendant —

"* * * (a) is possessed of a reasonable defense on the merits, (b) has a reasonable excuse for his failure or neglect to answer, (c) has acted with due diligence after notice of the entry of judgment, and (d) [shows] that no substantial prejudice will result to the other party."

Hinz v. Northland Milk lce Cream Co. 237 Minn. 28, 30, 53 N.W.2d 454, 456; Johnson v. Nelson, 265 Minn. 71, 73, 120 N.W.2d 333, 335.

It cannot be disputed that defendant, in his proposed answer, alleges that he acted in self-defense. Clearly, this is a complete defense to the merits if it is established. It also appears that defendant entrusted the matter entirely to his attorney and relied upon assurances that he was being protected in resisting plaintiffs' claims. We must, and do, accept the court's finding that defendant received a copy of the letter informing him of plaintiffs' intention to apply for a default judgment. But, since the contents of the letter are not a part of this record, we are unable to discern any basis for assuming that defendant was thereby made aware of his attorney's neglect. Under these circumstances, it would be difficult indeed to charge defendant himself with such indifference to the proceedings as would amount to inexcusable neglect within the contemplation of the rule or Randall v. Randall, 133 Minn. 63, 157 N.W. 903, and Slatoski v. Jendro, 134 Minn. 328, 159 N.W. 752, relied upon by plaintiffs.

Conceding that prejudice is always inherent when the trial of a case is delayed, we are persuaded that plaintiffs would not have suffered substantial prejudice had the court vacated the judgment and permitted defendant to answer. In plaintiffs' opposing affidavit, no prejudice was claimed except delay and the added expense incurred by reason of the default proceedings. The prejudice now asserted by way of argument does not appear to be different except in degree, coupled with the inconvenience and distress understandably caused by an adversary who changes his position from an attitude of conciliation and negotiation to an attitude of resistance.

In our opinion, defendant acted with reasonable diligence in serving and presenting his motion after he became aware of the significance of the judgment. As authorized by the rule and as suggested by plaintiffs in their opposing affidavit, the court could have alleviated the prejudice resulting from the delay and default proceedings by requiring as a condition to vacate the judgment that defendant pay costs and disbursements, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Inasmuch as it is now suggested that defendant has transferred title to some of his property in an effort to escape payment of the judgment, the court is empowered under the rule to impose further conditions requiring defendant either to deposit security for the payment of any judgment plaintiffs may obtain or to effect a restoration of his financial ability to respond in damages.

Rule 60.02, Rules of Civil Procedure.

See, Roinestad v. McCarthy, 249 Minn. 396, 82 N.W.2d 697; Pasich v. Polga, 112 Minn. 510, 128 N.W. 669.

We hold, therefore, that the court erred in denying defendant's motion and remand with directions to vacate the judgment and grant leave to answer upon such terms and conditions as the court, after hearing, deems just.

Reversed and remanded.


Summaries of

Finden v. Klaas

Supreme Court of Minnesota
May 22, 1964
268 Minn. 268 (Minn. 1964)

concluding that insufficient prejudice established by delay and added expense incurred by reason of the default proceedings, "coupled with the inconvenience and distress understandably caused by an adversary who changes his position from an attitude of conciliation and negotiation to an attitude of resistance"

Summary of this case from Takuanyi v. Savage

vacating a default judgment

Summary of this case from Pelletier Corp. v. Chas. M. Freidheim Co.

reversing district court's denial of relief from judgment entered after attorney failed to answer complaint when party had relied on assurances that attorney would respond

Summary of this case from Orr v. Britten

reversing district court's denial of relief from judgment entered after attorney failed to answer complaint when party had relied on assurances that attorney would respond

Summary of this case from Cole v. Wutzke

reversing district court's denial of relief when all factors met

Summary of this case from Cole v. Wutzke

reversing denial of motion to vacate because defendant met three factors and, on fourth — absence of reasonable excuse — attorney's neglect was not attributable to defendant

Summary of this case from THAO v. KARMA ENTERTAINMENT, LLC

reversing denial of motion to vacate because defendant met three factors and, on fourth — absence of reasonable excuse — attorney's neglect was not attributable to defendant

Summary of this case from Northland Tem. v. Turpin

explaining that self-defense is a “reasonable defense” because, “if it is established,” it is a complete defense on the merits

Summary of this case from Cole v. Wutzke

noting that mere delay and added expense do not constitute substantial prejudice

Summary of this case from Cole v. Wutzke

interpreting Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 and creating a four-part rule analyzing when a defendant should be relieved of a final judgment against him due to his attorney's neglect

Summary of this case from TC/American Monorail, Inc. v. Custom Conveyor Corp.

In Finden v. Klaas, 268 Minn. 268, 128 N.W.2d 748 (1964), a default judgment was entered against the defendant after his attorney failed to answer the complaint, respond to the note of issue, or respond to a letter notifying him of the plaintiff's intention to submit the case as a default.

Summary of this case from Conley v. Downing

explaining that the defendant must establish a reasonable defense on the merits, a reasonable excuse for failure to answer, due diligence, and absence of prejudice to the other party

Summary of this case from Nguyen v. Knapper

explaining court should vacate default judgment when defaulting party has reasonable defense on the merits, has reasonable excuse for failing or neglecting to answer, has acted with due diligence upon notice of entry of judgment, and shows no substantial prejudice will result to other party

Summary of this case from Banks v. Dakota Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs

listing a reasonable defense on the merits, a reasonable excuse for failure or neglect to answer, that the party seeking relief acted with due diligence after notice of the entry of judgment, and that no substantial prejudice will result to the other party

Summary of this case from Life Clinic PA v. Anderson

setting forth factors for deciding whether to grant relief when default judgment is entered solely because of "neglect of counsel"

Summary of this case from In re Johnson

discussing Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 and factors that party must demonstrate to be relieved from consequences of attorney's neglect

Summary of this case from In re M. R.

stating that party seeking relief must show that factors are met

Summary of this case from In re M. R.

In Finden, the appellant's attorney failed to answer the respondent's complaint and a default judgment was entered against the appellant.

Summary of this case from Brown v. MSP Servs. LLC

In Finden, the supreme court reviewed a district court's denial of a defendant's motion to vacate a default judgment based on rule 60.02.

Summary of this case from 650 N. Main Ass'n v. Frauenshuh, Inc.

establishing these requirements

Summary of this case from Larsen v. Tessier

noting inherent prejudice when trial is delayed and concluding that delay and added expense were not substantial prejudice

Summary of this case from Cole v. Wutzke

reaffirming the Hinz standard

Summary of this case from Gams v. Houghton

reaffirming the Hinz test

Summary of this case from Gams v. Houghton

requiring a meritorious defense as an essential element of a motion to reopen a judgment

Summary of this case from In re E.D.S.

laying out a four-pronged standard for relieving a party from a judgment or adverse ruling

Summary of this case from Sitek v. Sitek
Case details for

Finden v. Klaas

Case Details

Full title:DENNIS FINDEN, BY HIS FATHER AND NATURAL GUARDIAN, HAROLD E. FINDEN, AND…

Court:Supreme Court of Minnesota

Date published: May 22, 1964

Citations

268 Minn. 268 (Minn. 1964)
128 N.W.2d 748

Citing Cases

Charson v. Temple Israel

Under basic agency principles, an attorney's neglect is chargeable to the party. Finden v. Klaas, 268 Minn.…

Lund v. Pan Am. Mach. Sales

Reasonable Excuse Initially, we note that since the case of Finden v. Klaas, 268 Minn. 268, 128 N.W.2d 748…