Opinion
C. A. 5:23-4343-SAL-KDW
09-07-2023
Vincent L. Fields, Petitioner, v. Warden Jansen, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Kaymani D. West, United States Magistrate Judge
Vincent L. Fields (“Petitioner”) is a federal inmate housed at Federal Correctional Institution, Edgefield, a facility of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). He filed this pro se Petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends the district judge dismiss the Petition in this case without prejudice.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On October 17, 2017, Petitioner entered a guilty plea to armed robbery and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. United States v. Fields, C/A No 2:17-cr-00119-JLR-1 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 26, 2018), ECF No. 13. On February 26, 2018, the district court sentenced Petitioner to 180-months imprisonment. Id., ECF No. 40. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on March 5, 2018, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals entered an order on June 28, 2018, granting Petitioner's Motion to voluntarily dismiss his appeal. Id., ECF Nos. 42, 49. Petitioner filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on October 25, 2018. Fields v. United States, C/A No.: 2:18-cv-01572-JLR (W.D. Wash. Sept. 19. 2019), ECF No. 1. The government filed an Answer opposing the § 2255 Motion on January 25, 2019, and the court dismissed Petitioner's § 2255 Motion on September 19, 2019. Id., ECF Nos. 8, 15. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on November 12, 2019, and the Ninth Circuit denied the Motion on June 30, 2020. Id., ECF Nos. 21, 23. Petitioner filed the instant Petition on August 28, 2023, seeking a sentence reduction. ECF No. 1.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of this Petition pursuant to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings for the United States District Court, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, and other habeas corpus statutes. Pro se complaints are held to a less-stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
The Rules Governing Section 2254 are applicable to habeas actions brought under § 2241. See Rule 1(b).
B. Analysis
Petitioner cites to United States v. Vederoff, 914 F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. 2019) and argues that his Washington state second-degree murder conviction is not a crime of violence. ECF No. 1 at 6. In Vederoff, 914 F.3d at 1248, the Ninth Circuit determined that second-degree murder under Washington law was not a “crime of violence” as defined in section 4B1.2(a)(1) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Petitioner, therefore, contends it was unconstitutional for the court to use his murder conviction as a predicate offense to designate him as a career offender. Id. Petitioner argues it was also an unconstitutional error to sentence him as a career offender because his second-degree murder conviction does not match up with the federal generic definition of second-degree murder. Id. at 7. Petitioner also claims the court erred in sentencing him as a career offender because the statute he was convicted under criminalized conduct beyond that covered by the sentencing guidelines. Id. Petitioner claims that regardless of his actual conduct his second-degree murder conviction is not a crime of violence. Id.
“[I]t is well established that defendants convicted in federal court are obliged to seek habeas relief from their convictions and sentences through § 2255.” Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 (4th Cir. 1997)). A petitioner cannot challenge his federal conviction and sentence under § 2241 unless he can satisfy the § 2255 savings clause as follows:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); see also Rice, 617 F.3d at 807 (finding court lacked jurisdiction over § 2241 petition outside savings clause).
The Supreme Court recently issued an opinion in Jones v. Hendrix, 143 S.Ct. 1857 (2023) that addressed when a § 2255 remedy was inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of a prisoner's detention such that a petitioner may bring a § 2241 habeas petition. In Jones v. Hendrix, the Court found that “§ 2255(e)'s saving clause does not permit a prisoner asserting an intervening change in statutory interpretation to circumvent AEDPA's restrictions on second or successive § 2255 motions by filing a § 2241 petition.” Id. at 864. The Court noted that § 2255(h) limited second or successive § 2255 motions to those that contain newly discovered evidence, or a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review. Id. at 1868. Addressing petitions that raised challenges that fall outside of § 2255(h), the Court held “[t]he inability of a prisoner with a statutory claim to satisfy those conditions does not mean that he can bring his claim in a habeas petition under the saving clause. It means that he cannot bring it at all.” Id. at 1869.
Petitioner argues a § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention because the holding in United States v. Vederoff was not available at the time of his sentencing or when he filed his first § 2255 Motion. However, this argument is insufficient to satisfy the § 2255 savings clause. A prisoner asserting an intervening change in interpretation of a criminal statute may not circumvent the restriction on second or successive § 2255 motions by filing a § 2241 habeas petition. The undersigned recommends the court summarily dismiss the Petition.
II. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge dismiss the Petition in the above-captioned matter without prejudice.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. [I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court Post Office Box 2317 Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).