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concluding that court-appointed guardian "functioned as an agent of the Superior Court and therefore is immune from suit"
Summary of this case from Hester v. DickersonOpinion
Civil Action No. 04-0350 (RMU), Dkt. # 15, 16, 20, 21, 22, 24, 32, 44, 46, 47.
March 24, 2005.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
This matter comes before the court on the defendants' motions to dismiss. Having considered the motions, the plaintiffs' opposition, and the entire record of this case, the court (1) dismisses the plaintiffs' claims under the Fair Housing Act, for defamation, and for negligent infliction of emotional distress, and (2) dismisses Curtis Abod, Kenneth Welch, and Patrick Welch as parties to this action and all claims against them.
I. BACKGROUND
Nothing about the complaint is brief or simple. Having struggled through the plaintiffs' prolix documents, the court gleans the following pertinent facts. Plaintiff Ivan Ficken ("Ficken") adopted Ciprian Ivanof ("Ivanof"), a minor from Romania. Compl., ¶ 1. They moved to the District of Columbia in 1992 so that Ivanof could attend a bilingual (French and English) school. Id., ¶ 20. Because Ficken's financial resources were limited, he rented a fourth-floor apartment at 1418 W Street, N.W., a poorly maintained building near Ivanof's school owned by Kenneth and Patrick Welch. Id. Later, Ivanof enrolled in the French International School in Montgomery County, Maryland. Id.
The plaintiffs are advised that LCvR 7(e) limits a memorandum of points and authorities in support of or in opposition to a motion to 45 pages, and limits a reply memorandum to 25 pages, without prior approval of the court. The plaintiffs' pro se status does not relieve them of their obligation to comply with the court's rules.
Ficken attributes his financial difficulties to his unlawful termination in 1987 from federal employment for discriminatory reasons, and he asserts that his economic losses stem from "the conspiracy orchestrated by Ms. Lundebye, Ms. David at CFSA, and Abod." Compl., ¶¶ 20, 42. He claims that he was forced to accept a meager settlement on his employment discrimination claim, thus abandoning litigation, because the government forced him "to cho[o]se between litigating the employment action and getting custody of Ivanof back." Id., ¶ 42.
According to the plaintiffs, the root cause of their woes was a visit from a social worker, Tracey Banks, from the District's Child and Family Services Agency ("CFSA") in November 1998. Compl., ¶ 21. Ms. Banks deemed the plaintiffs' apartment unsafe and refused to allow Ivanof to remain there. Id. Ficken hastily arranged for his son to reside with Carolina and Stein Lundebye ("Lundebyes") while he sought alternative housing. Id. Another condition for Ivanof's return was a psychological evaluation to which Ficken reluctantly agreed. Id., ¶¶ 21-23. Ficken found a ground-floor apartment in the same building that was free from rat infestation. Compl., ¶ 21. Ms. Banks approved of this apartment, and Ivanof returned home before Christmas in 1998. Id.
The apartment building had "intractable cockroach and rat infestations." Compl., ¶ 25. "Homeless transients" sought shelter there, and others "wandered in in search of a less public place where they could use illicit drugs." Id., ¶ 26.
Ivanof's case was transferred to another CFSA social worker, Rose Montgomery David, in January 1999. Compl., ¶ 24. Contrary to the findings of her colleague, Ms. David concluded that the first-floor apartment was unacceptable. Id. Again, Ivanof stayed with the Lundebyes. Id. Ficken underwent a second psychological examination, during which the living conditions at 1418 W Street, N.W., were discussed. Id.
Ficken, fearing that no apartment at 1418 W Street, N.W., would satisfy Ms. David, decided to seek other accommodations. Compl., ¶ 25. His search for a new home was complicated, however, by District government building inspectors who condemned two units at 1418 W Street, N.W., including the fourth-floor apartment where Ficken and Ivanof had lived. Compl., ¶ 25. The Welches allegedly used the building's partial condemnation "as an excuse . . . to force Ficken to vacate all of the property which Plaintiffs had" in the fourth-floor unit. Id., ¶¶ 25-26.
Ficken alleges that he and Ivanof were the only white tenants at 1418 W Street, N.W. Compl., ¶ 25. He makes much of the fact that no Black or Hispanic tenant with children was subjected to CFSA scrutiny, or was forced to vacate the building "under threat of having their children taken away from them." Id. He alleges that this is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Id., ¶ 42.
The plaintiff blames the Welches for the theft, loss and destruction of property. Compl., ¶¶ 26-27, 165.
According to Ficken, Ms. David "reassured [him] that she would not petition the case into court so long as Ivanof had an approved place to stay." Compl., ¶ 29. He was surprised to learn that, allegedly under pressure from Carolina Lundebye, Ms. David filed a neglect petition in the Superior Court. Compl., ¶ 29. Ficken accused Ms. Lundebye of "orchestrating a conspiracy to destroy the familial relationship which Ivanof had with his father and birth family" by pressuring the social workers to pursue a neglect case and by presenting letters to the family court from others (including Ivanof's teachers at the French International School) advocating against Ivanof's return to his father. Id., ¶ 31, 32-33. The Lundebyes' unwillingness to continue as Ivanof's caretakers without court intervention allegedly was the premise upon which the neglect petition was filed. Id., ¶ 32. A trial was scheduled for August 1999. Id., ¶ 31.
Ficken made arrangements to rent a condominium in Aspen Hill, Maryland for a three-month period. Compl., ¶¶ 29, 42. Ms. David argued to the presiding judge that a three-month tenancy showed a lack of stability, and the judge did not approve of the arrangements. Id., ¶ 42. Ficken claimed that securing alternative living arrangements was an expensive and pointless exercise designed solely "to financially destroy all of Ficken's financial resources until he was so impoverished that the conspirators would use that as an excuse to bar Ivanof from returning home to his father." Id.
Ficken was represented by appointed counsel at the neglect proceedings, and the court appointed a guardian ad litem, Curtis Abod, for Ivanof. See Compl., ¶¶ 30-31.
Presumably at the direction of the presiding judge, Ficken underwent two sessions with David Missar, a psychologist at Youth Forensics. Compl., ¶ 36. Ficken described Youth Forensics as a "one stop adverse psychological testing service," which produced whatever results the CFSA social workers wanted. Id. Missar's report called for long-term therapy with the possible use of psychotropic drugs. Id. Ficken vigorously debated these results and drafted two rebuttal statements. Id. Ficken's court-appointed counsel arranged for another psychological evaluation, the results of which contradicted Missar's conclusions. Id., ¶ 37.
Ivanof's performance at school worsened. Compl., ¶ 39. Ficken blamed both the French International School and CFSA's social workers for Ivanof's decline. The school assigned Ivanof to "the most intimidating and mean teacher" there. Id. This same teacher wrote a letter to the Superior Court judge case stating that Ivanof's work "substantially improved after he had been in Ms. Lundebye's care." Id. Ficken attributed Ivanof's lower academic performance to his inability to concentrate due to the stress of being separated from his father. Id., ¶¶ 38, 184. School officials refused to promote Ivanof to the next grade, supposedly in furtherance of the Lundebye-inspired conspiracy to destroy the familial relationship between Ficken and Ivanof. Id., ¶ 40.
Ficken also faults the CFSA social workers and French International School staff for their failure to understand Ivanof, "who is an intellectually gifted child with a tested I.Q. in excess of 150." Compl., ¶ 41. He alleges that parents nationwide "do battle with schools that their children are attending because the school refuses to recognize that the needs of an intellectually gifted child substantially differ from those of a child with only normal intelligence." Id. This lack of understanding, Ficken alleges, rose to the unprecedented level in his case, with the threat of separating him from his son "because the superior intellectual values of both the child and the parent don't conform with what seems to be the norm of people and children who have only average intelligence." Id.
In order "to prevent his family from being broken up and/or to avoid the risk of worthless and harmful long term psychological `therapy', solely because CFSA, Abod, and Ms. Lundebye didn't agree to [Ficken's] values," Ficken arranged for Ivanof to live with Ficken's sister and brother-in-law in Eau Claire, Wisconsin before the school year began in the fall of 1999. Compl., ¶ 44. The Superior Court judge required Ficken to surrender Ivanof's passport. Id. Before the judge ordered the return of the passport, Ivanof's Romanian birth mother died. Id., ¶ 48. Ficken asserted that the defendants Abod, the social workers, and Superior Court judge "brought about this unforgivable atrocity of confiscating a child's passports to deny him the opportunity to even see his mother again before she was dead and buried." Id.
The social worker then assigned to the case, Mr. Mbadiugha, sent CFSA's file, "complete with false reports of alleged mental illness," to the authorities in Wisconsin. Compl., ¶ 45. The Superior Court retained jurisdiction until the case ended on February 12, 2001, returning Ivanof to Ficken's custody. Id., ¶ 48. In order to close the case, Ficken allegedly was coerced into entering a "stipulation which, for record purposes, is tantamount to an admission of `neglect' . . . which is in a system of records accessible by such investigative agencies as the FBI, INS and others, which bars Ficken from entire classes of employment, thereby constituting a financial `taking' of his reputation, good name, and future employability." Compl., ¶ 51.
The plaintiff had been granted a top security clearance, which allowed him to do investigative work. Compl., ¶ 51. Evidence in public records of psychological problems, Ficken alleges, would bar his future employment. Id.
In 2000, months after the plaintiffs moved, the District government condemned the entire apartment building at 1418 W Street, N.W. Id., ¶ 55. Defendant Rigsby (former the District's Corporation Counsel) announced a plea bargain with the Welches pursuant to which, among other things, ownership of the building was transferred to the remaining tenants in exchange for nominal compensation. Id., ¶ 56. The tenants later sold the property a developer, and received $114,000 per household. Id., ¶ 60. By virtue of the plaintiffs' seven-year tenancy, they claim an entitlement to a portion of the benefits afforded to the other tenants of the building. Id. The impermissible denial of such benefits, the plaintiffs suggest, was because of their Caucasian race. Id., ¶ 59.
Ficken moved with Ivanof to Romania in 2001 so that Ivanof might attend a French school in Bucharest. Compl., ¶¶ 52-53. Because Ivanof was not allowed to return to the French International School and because the CSFA defendants "ran him out of town," Ivanof has lost fluency and did not pass his competency exams for admission to the French school in Bucharest. Id., ¶¶ 53, 182.
II. ANALYSIS A. The Court Denies Without Prejudice the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Claims under RICO, the Constitution, and for Negligence, Breach of Contract, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress The District of Columbia defendants and the Lundebyes argue that certain of the plaintiffs' claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. A defendant may raise the affirmative defense of statute of limitations in a motion filed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) when the facts giving rise to the defense are clear from the face of the complaint. Smith-Haynie v. District of Columbia, 155 F.3d 575, 578 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Because statute of limitations issues often depend on contested questions of fact, however, the court should hesitate to dismiss a complaint on statute of limitations grounds based solely on the face of the complaint. Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Rather, the court should grant a motion to dismiss only if the complaint on its face is conclusively time-barred and if "no reasonable person could disagree on the date" on which the cause of action accrued. Id.; Smith v. Brown Williamson Tobacco Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1473, 1475 (D.D.C. 1998) (citing Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Am. Sec. Bank, N.A., 890 F.2d 456, 463 n. 11 (D.C. Cir. 1989)); Doe v. Dep't of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1985).First, the defendants argue that the plaintiff's claims of negligence, breach of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress are barred under District of Columbia law by a three-year statute of limitations. See D.C. Code § 12-301(3), (7), (8) (limitation period of 3 years for recovery of damages for an injury to real or personal property, on an express or implied contract, and a claim "for which a limitation is not otherwise specially prescribed"); Cooke-Seals v. District of Columbia, 973 F. Supp. 184, 188 (D.D.C. 1997) (limitation period of 3 years for recovery on claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress). Additionally, civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be brought within three years. See Carney v. Am. Univ., 151 F.3d 1090, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1998); D.C. Code § 12-301(8).
The matters about which the plaintiffs complain stem from a social worker's visit to the plaintiffs' home at 1418 W Street, N.W., in November 1998. That initial visit led to the filing of a neglect petition in the Family Division of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia in early or mid-1999, resulting in emotional distress and financial losses for which the defendants allegedly are to blame. The chronology of events is not entirely clear from the complaint. A liberal reading, however, suggests that the latest date on which the plaintiffs' claims accrued was February 12, 2001, the date on which the neglect case concluded in the Superior Court. The defendants argue, then, that the plaintiffs' failure to file the instant complaint on or before February 12, 2004 is fatal.
A review of the court's records indicates that the plaintiffs indeed met the deadline. Although the Clerk of Court did not file the complaint officially until March 4, 2004, the original complaint and application to proceed in forma pauperis are stamped "received" by the Clerk on February 12, 2004. The delay was caused by the court's internal processes for the review and approval of the IFP application.
The court notes that Ivanof is a minor. The statute of limitations is tolled while Ivanof is under 18 years of age. See D.C. Code § 12-308(1) (allowing minor or his proper representative to bring action within the time limited after the disability is removed).
Second, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs failed to file their RICO claims within its four-year statute of limitations period. See Hargraves v. Capital City Mortgage Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7, 16 (D.D.C. 2000) (noting statute of limitations for a RICO claim is four years); see also Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff Assoc., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987) (borrowing four-year statute of limitations for Clayton Act violations). The limitations period begins running upon the plaintiff's knowledge of an injury, not his knowledge of a pattern of RICO activity. See Hargraves v. Capital City Mortgage Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d at 16. Given the confused state of the plaintiff's complaint, the date on which the plaintiff RICO action accrues is not clear. The motion will be denied without prejudice.
The court presumes without deciding that the plaintiffs state a viable RICO claim.
When ruling on a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court does not test a plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits; rather, it tests whether a plaintiff properly has stated a claim. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). The factual allegations of the complaint are presumed to be true and liberally are construed in plaintiff's favor. See, e.g., United States v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2001). The court, however, is not obligated to draw an inference that is not supported by the facts presented. Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
1. Fair Housing Act Claim
In Count Three, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants Williams and Rigsby, "[i]n orchestrating or otherwise bringing about the criminal plea bargain with Defendants Kenneth Welch and Patrick Welch . . ., negligently violated the terms of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3604, 3605 . . . in not giving consideration to the interests of Plaintiffs in having lived in the building [at 1418 W Street, N.W.] for nearly seven years . . ., from which Plaintiffs were forced to leave, not of their own volition, but by being forced out by the actions of CFSA and other city officials." Compl., ¶ 73.Under the Fair Housing Act, it is unlawful "to refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). Further, it is unlawful to "discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). It also is "unlawful for any person or other entity whose business includes engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate against any person in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a). Generally, the alleged illegal actions must lead to discriminatory effects on the availability of housing. See Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass'n v. County of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1984) (plaintiffs failed to state a claim under § 3604(a) where they failed to allege they were "hindered in an effort to acquire a dwelling").
The plaintiffs do not articulate a connection between the Welches' plea agreement and a violation of the Fair Housing Act. Nothing in the complaint suggests that defendant Williams or Rigsby was in the position of a landlord, with the ability to refuse to sell or rent a dwelling at 1418 W Street, N.W. Nor is Williams or Rigsby alleged to be in a real estate-related business as contemplated by the Fair Housing Act. Rather, it appears that the plaintiffs invoke the Fair Housing Act for the sole purpose of reaping benefits to which they have no apparent entitlement. For whatever reasons, the plaintiffs vacated the premises at 1418 W Street, N.W., in 1999, months before the Welches' plea agreement. It does not appear that the plaintiffs have standing to claim any interest in property they neither owned nor occupied at the time of the Welches' plea bargain, at the time the remaining tenants obtained ownership interests in the building, or at the time those tenants sold their interests to a developer.
To establish standing under Article III, a plaintiff must establish the following: 1) that the plaintiff suffered an "injury in fact"; 2) that the injury is "fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant"; and 3) that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). Without a property interest in 1418 W Street, N.W., the disposition of the premises caused plaintiffs no injury in fact.
Even if the plaintiffs had stated a cognizable claim under the Fair Housing Act, they failed to file a complaint timely. A plaintiff seeking relief from an allegedly discriminatory housing practice must seek relief "not later than 2 years after the occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice." 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (a)(1)(A). The plaintiffs lived at 1418 W Street, N.W., from 1992 until they were "forced" to leave in 1999. Compl., ¶¶ 25, 57. The complaint was filed in February 2004, more than 2 years after the plaintiffs moved. The statute of limitations bars the claim.
The plaintiffs arguments for tolling the statute of limitations are not persuasive. The act of which plaintiffs complain, their "forced" move in 1999, starts the running of the statute of limitations. It matters not that the plaintiffs learned of the Welches' plea agreement in January 2004 from a newspaper article. See Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment which Motion was Filed April 14, 2004 at 16.
2. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
In Count Twenty, the plaintiffs raise a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress against the French International School stemming from its alleged negligence in supervising children on the playground, in supervising its teachers, and refusing to promote Ivanof to the next grade. Ficken especially takes exception to the action of a particular teacher, whom he accuses of making "intentionally misleading, erroneous and hurtful" remarks in a letter prepared at Ms. Lundebye's urging for the Superior Court judge handling the neglect proceeding. See Compl., ¶ 178. The plaintiffs' claim fails under Maryland law. Maryland does not recognize the separate and distinct tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. See Lapides v. Trabbic, 758 A.2d 1114, 1122 (Md. 2000). "Recovery may be had in a tort action for emotional distress arising out of negligent conduct. In such case, the emotional distress is an element of damage, not an independent tort." Hamilton v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 502 A.2d 1057, 1066 (Md. 1986).3. Defamation
Although the claim is not set forth as defamation in a separate count, the plaintiffs allege that Carolina Lundebye "committed multiple acts of defamation against Ciprian Ivanof, calling him `a time bomb waiting to explode' . . . in Judge Broderick's Court as well as many other instances of defamation against both Ciprian Ivanof and Ivanof in the statements she made to others and the letters which she sent to social workers in CFSA . . . and the social workers in Wisconsin." Compl., ¶ 145. The statute of limitations for a defamation claim is one year. See D.C. Code § 12-301(4) (establishing one-year limitations period on claim of libel or slander). Assuming that the last date on which the alleged defamation occurred is February 12, 2001, upon the closing of the Superior Court proceeding, Ficken's claim is untimely.4. Claims Against Guardian Ad Litem
In Count Sixteen, Ficken and Ivanof allege, generally, that Curtis Abod failed to perform fairly and competently his duties as Ivanof's guardian ad litem. Ficken accuses Abod of misleading the Superior Court, thwarting the plaintiffs' efforts to visit Ivanof's birth family in Romania, imposing unreasonable demands as conditions for Ivanof's return to Ficken's custody, failing to understand the special needs of a gifted child like Ivanof, and prolonging the neglect proceedings in order to collect additional compensation. See Compl., ¶¶ 155-62.
Ficken's allegations show little more than dissatisfaction of a parent who disagrees with a guardian ad litem's methods and conclusions. The complaint fails to set forth allegations of Abod's actions beyond the scope of his court-appointed role. Accordingly, the court concludes that Abod functioned as an agent of the Superior Court and therefore is immune from suit. See Sarkisian v. Benjamin, 820 N.E.2d 263, 266-67 (Mass. 2005) (insofar as counsel appointed to represent children in custody matter performed functions of guardian ad litem, she was entitled to absolute immunity from child's claims for damages); Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1989) (guardian ad litem, as non-judicial person fulfilling quasi-judicial functions, acted as agent of the court and therefore has "quasi-judicial immunity for those activities integrally related to the judicial process"); Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir. 1984) (absolute immunity for guardian ad litem representing child's interests in neglect proceeding).
5. Claims Against Kenneth J. Welch and Patrick E. Welch
It does not appear from the record that defendants Kenneth J. Welch and Patrick E. Welch properly were served with process. The docket shows that service on defendant Patrick E. Welch was attempted on March 26, 2004 when a Deputy United States Marshal "left process at [1246 10th Street, N.W., Washington, DC] in an enclosed foyer." See Dkt. #12 (Process Return and Receipt). Nothing on the docket indicates that service was attempted or effected on defendant Kenneth J. Welch. Neither Welch filed any response to the complaint. Accordingly, the court will dismiss without prejudice the Welches as parties to this action and will dismiss without prejudice all claims against them.
C. The Court Denies the District Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
Under District of Columbia law,
An action may not be maintained against the District of Columbia for unliquidated damages to person or property unless, within six months after the injury or damage was sustained, the claimant, his agent, or attorney has given notice in writing to the Mayor of the District of Columbia of the approximate time, place, cause, and circumstances of the injury or damage.
D.C. Code § 12-309. The District defendants move for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs failed to submit proper notice to the Mayor as is required under this provision.
The court may grant a motion for summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Factual assertions in the moving party's affidavits may be accepted as true, unless the opposing party submits his own affidavits or documentary evidence that contradict the movant's assertions. Neal v. Kelly, 963 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Cir. 1982)); LCvR 7.1(h).
In support of the motion, the defendants submit an affidavit stating that neither the Office of the Mayor nor the Office of Corporation Counsel received a claim letter from or on behalf of Ivan Ficken, or his son Ciprian Ivanof, relating to their potential claim against the District government. Wilburn Decl., ¶ 3. The plaintiff counters by asserting that he sent a 13-page letter to the Mayor and to the Corporation Counsel by facsimile on or about August 11, 2000. Compl., ¶ 59; Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendants' (Golden, David, Barber, Mbadiugha, Missar, Weissman, and Anthony) Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, Which Motion was Filed April 4, 2004 at 42 Attach. 1. This showing is sufficient to defeat summary judgment.
III. CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, it is this 24th day of March, 2005,ORDERED that the District of Columbia defendants' motions to dismiss [Dkt. #15, 21] are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the District of Columbia defendants' motion for summary judgment [Dkt. #16] is DENIED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion to compel [Dkt. #20] is DENIED, and motion for an extension of time [Dkt. #20] is DENIED as moot; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the French International School's motion to dismiss [Dkt. #22] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Lundebyes' motion to dismiss [Dkt. #24] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Curtis Abod's motion to dismiss [Dkt. #32] is GRANTED, and defendant Abod is DISMISSED as a party to this action; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Curtis Abod's motion to strike [Dkt. #44] is DENIED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's motions to amend the complaint, for appointment of counsel, for leave to file, and for reconsideration [Dkt. #46] are DENIED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion for leave to file response [Dkt. #47] is DENIED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that defendants Kenneth and Patrick Welch are DISMISSED without prejudice as parties to this action, and all claims against them are DISMISSED without prejudice; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiffs' claims under the Fair Housing Act and for negligent infliction of emotional distress, and Ficken's claim for defamation are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.