Opinion
UWYCV186038379S
11-22-2019
Jony A. FERNANDEZ v. Stephen PARKIN et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
MATTHEW DALLAS GORDON, J.
The plaintiff, Jony A. Fernandez, claims that he sustained personal injuries during a recreational soccer match on January 26, 2016, when the defendant, Stephen Parkin, kicked him and yelled, "I hope I broke your leg." In counts one and four of his complaint, the plaintiff alleges negligence and assault and battery, respectively. The defendant has moved for summary judgment regarding the negligence count in reliance on Jaworski v. Kiernan, 241 Conn. 399, 696 A.2d 332 (1997), wherein the Supreme Court concluded that "as a matter of policy, it is appropriate to adopt a standard of care imposing on the defendant, a participant in a team contact sport, a legal duty to refrain from reckless or intentional conduct." Id., 412. The plaintiff responds that summary judgment is inappropriate because the defendant was required to act as a reasonably prudent person under all of the existing circumstances. For the reasons explained, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.
Match Saves, LLC d/b/a CFC Arena is also a defendant in this case. For convenience, all references to the defendant in this opinion are to Stephen Parkin.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The plaintiff’s complaint, dated January 23, 2018, alleges that the plaintiff and the defendant were playing soccer when the defendant, "ran into, kicked, and yelled at the [p]laintiff, Jony A. Fernandez, ‘I hope I broke your leg,’ causing the [p]laintiff injuries and damages." The complaint contains two counts against Stephen Parkin: negligence and assault and battery. The negligence count, which is the only count at issue in the motion for summary judgment, alleges that the defendant was negligent and careless in failing to (1) "use appropriate force when engaging in the physical activity of soccer while a patron at the arena"; (2) "keep a safe distance from the Plaintiff so as not to invade the Plaintiff’s space and cause the Plaintiff injury"; (3) "keep a proper lookout given the conditions, so that his bodily appendages did not hit the Plaintiff"; and (4) "exercise reasonable care under the circumstances there and then existing."
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD
Practice Book § 17-49 provides that a trial court may render summary judgment when "the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Practice Book § 17-49. "The fundamental purpose of summary judgment is to prevent unnecessary trials." Stuart v. Freiberg, 316 Conn. 809, 822, 116 A.3d 1195 (2015). "The issue of whether a defendant owes a duty of care is an appropriate matter for summary judgment because the question is one of law." Pion v. Southern New England Telephone Co., 44 Conn.App. 657, 660, 691 A.2d 1107 (1997). "If a court determines, as a matter of law, that a defendant owes no duty to a plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot recover in negligence from the defendant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Maffucci v. Royal Park Ltd. Partnership, 243 Conn. 552, 567, 707 A.2d 15 (1998). "Only if such a duty is found to exist [as a matter of law] does the trier of fact then determine whether the defendant violated that duty in the particular situation at hand." Shore v. Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 151-52, 444 A.2d 1379 (1982).
DISCUSSION
In Jaworski v. Kiernan, supra, 241 Conn. 399, the plaintiff, a female participant in a coed soccer league, sued a fellow male participant for negligent and reckless conduct occurring during a soccer game. In considering the duty of care owed by the defendant, the court concluded that "[p]roof of mere negligence is insufficient to create liability." Id., 412. According to the court: "If simple negligence were adopted as the standard of care, every punter with whom contact is made, every midfielder high sticked, every basketball player fouled, every batter struck by a pitch, and every hockey player tripped would have the ingredients for a lawsuit if injury resulted. When the number of athletic events taking place in Connecticut over the course of a year is considered, there exists the potential for a surfeit of lawsuits when it becomes known that simple negligence, based on an inadvertent violation of a contest rule, will suffice as a ground for recovery for an athletic injury. This should not be encouraged." Id., 409-10. The court also noted that, "[i]n athletic competitions, the object obviously is to win. In games, particularly those played by teams and involving some degree of physical contact, it is reasonable to assume that the competitive spirit of the participants will result in some rules violations and injuries. That is why there are penalty boxes, foul shots, free kicks, and yellow cards." Id., 407. The court also noted that "a recklessness standard will sufficiently protect participants in athletic contests by affording them a right of action against those who cause injuries not inherent in the particular game in which the participants are engaged. In other words, we believe that the reckless or intentional conduct standard of care will maintain civility and relative safety in team sports without dampening the competitive spirit of the participants." Id., 409.
Based on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Jaworski, the court concludes that the defendant did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care based on negligence, and that the defendant’s duty, instead, was to refrain from reckless or intentional conduct.
CONCLUSION
Having carefully considered the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and supporting memorandum of law, the plaintiff’s objection and supporting memorandum, and having entertained oral argument at which both parties had a full opportunity to be heard, the court concludes, as a matter of law, that the defendant did not owe the plaintiff a legal duty to refrain from negligent contact. The defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding the plaintiff’s count of negligence is, therefore, granted.