Opinion
A114377
5-9-2007
DARREN FERGUSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. JONNY POSADAS, Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff and appellant Darren Ferguson, a tenant in defendant and respondent Jonny Posadass rooming house, appeals the courts denial of his request to enter a default judgment against Posadas. On appeal, Ferguson contends the trial court erred because it required him to show evidence of liability, rather than simply damages, at the prove-up hearing. We conclude that because Ferguson failed to allege a basis for liability, the trial court properly denied his request for a default judgment; thus, we affirm the judgment.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case stems from an attack on Ferguson by Warren Harvey and another man, John Toews. Both Ferguson and Harvey rented rooms from Jonny Posadas at a dwelling at 1095 West California Avenue in Mill Valley.
The following facts are taken from the complaint and from Fergusons testimony at the prove-up hearing
On January 22, 2003, at about 4:00 a.m., Ferguson complained to Harvey about Harveys late-night partying. Harvey came into Fergusons room, sat down on Fergusons futon, and indicated that he wanted to know what was going on. After Ferguson lodged eight or nine complaints about him, Harvey charged at Ferguson, swinging. The pair tussled, and then Ferguson got up and told Harvey to leave his room. Instead of exiting when Ferguson showed him the door, Harvey began to punch Ferguson in the face. Toews then came into the room. Ferguson pleaded with Toews not to hit him, but Toews ignored the pleas and kicked Ferguson in the head and kidneys.
After fifteen or twenty seconds of beating, Ferguson managed to extract himself from the fracas, run out of his room, and head upstairs to the door of his landlord, Posadas. Ferguson beat on the door and screamed, but Posadas did not immediately intervene. Several minutes later, Posadas let Ferguson in, but Posadas still refused to call the police because he was worried they would eject everyone from the house. Ferguson then drove himself to the hospital.
A year later, Ferguson sued Posadas for negligence and premises liability, claiming that Posadas should have prevented and rescued him from the beating. He also sued Toews and Harvey for assault and battery. Ferguson set forth three allegations against Posadas, who owned and managed the premises: (1) that Posadas failed to maintain the premises in reasonably safe condition by allowing Harvey to live there and failing to take other steps to prevent his violent conduct; (2) that he failed to warn Ferguson of danger presented by the presence of Harvey, even though he knew of Harveys past violent behavior; and (3) that he failed to call the police when Harvey became violent.
Posadas answered, denying all allegations. However, he failed to appear at three scheduled case management conferences, despite warnings from the court that his answer would be dismissed if he did not attend. By the time a fourth case management conference was held, defaults had been taken against both Posadas and Harvey, who also had failed to appear. Meanwhile, Posadas reached a settlement with Toews, the other attacker.
The court then held a prove-up hearing on February 24, 2006. At the hearing, the court ruled that Ferguson had proven damages against Harvey, the fellow tenant, and awarded him $34,000. The court, however, ruled in favor of Posadas, saying there was no evidence Posadas failed to maintain the premises safely or failed to warn Ferguson of any danger. In doing so, the court said of the allegations: "I have no evidence its true or not." The court also said there was no evidence that Posadas failure to call police allowed Harvey to continue his violent conduct. The court held that without such evidence of liability, it could not enter a default judgment against Posadas.
The court denied Fergusons motion for a new trial, and this timely appeal followed.
Posadas did not file a respondents brief.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law
Ferguson contends the trial court erred because it denied his request for a default judgment on the ground that he failed to prove liability at the hearing. In making this argument, however, Ferguson ignores the general rule that, on appeal, we are concerned with the courts ruling, not its reasoning and "uphold judgments if they are correct for any reason, `regardless of the correctness of the grounds upon which the court reached its conclusion. " (United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 925, 933).
We note, however, that it is not at all clear from the record that the trial court intended to impose a requirement that Ferguson proffer evidence to prove the facts alleged in his complaint. Rather, we read the courts statements as evincing a concern that Fergusons complaint did not make out a claim in negligence against Posadas.
In determining whether the trial court properly denied Fergusons request for a default judgment, we look first to well-established California law regarding the showing a plaintiff must make in order to secure such a judgment. Code of Civil Procedure section 585, subdivision (b), provides that, upon default, a plaintiff "may apply to the court for the relief demanded in the complaint; the court shall hear the evidence offered by the plaintiff, and shall render judgment in his or her favor for such sum . . . as appears by such evidence to be just. If the taking of an account, or the proof of any fact, is necessary to enable the court to give judgment or to carry the judgment into effect, the court may take the account . . . ." In other words, the plaintiff must demonstrate sufficient evidence of damages to support entry of the default judgment. Such evidence can take the form of testimony, affidavits, medical bills, sales slips, copies of notes or bonds, or other proof of the amount of damages suffered. (See, e.g., § 585, subd. (b); Heidary v. Yadollahi (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 857, 867 (Heidary); Johnson v. Stanhiser (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 357, 361.)
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise noted.
However, when it comes to liability, courts have not required similar proof. In fact, courts have long held that a defaulting defendant admits the truth of all well-pleaded material facts and allegations in the complaint: "The default of the defendant in an ordinary action . . . admits, so far as such defaulting defendant is concerned, the absolute verity of all the allegations of the complaint. No amount of evidence could establish the facts more effectually for the purpose of rendering the judgment, as against such defendant." (City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Farming and Milling Co. (1907) 150 Cal. 647, 649 (Los Angeles Farming and Milling ); see also Bristol Convalescent Hospital v. Stone (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 848, 859.)
For example, in Los Angeles Farming and Milling, the defendant, who had failed to appear, claimed a default judgment against him was void because the court did not hear proof of the plaintiffs cause of action. (Los Angeles Farming and Milling, supra, 150 Cal. 647.) The court disagreed, holding that "no such proof is required." (Id. at p. 649.) Later cases also have further refined the concept that the defendant admits allegations of liability, and proof is not needed. For example, the court in Bristol Convalescent Hospital v. Stone, supra, 258 Cal.App.2d at p. 859, citing Los Angeles Farming and Milling, held that the defaulting defendant admits all the allegations of the complaint "giving rise to liability." (Ibid.)
Even in Taliaferro v. Hoogs (1963) 219 Cal.App.2d 559—a case sometimes cited for the proposition that a default judgment without sufficient evidence may be void—the court was concerned with the proof of damages, not liability. (Id. at p. 560.) In that case, the plaintiff accused the defendant of conspiring to withhold money from him, an action he claimed caused him to lose some property because he could not keep up with some payments. (Ibid.) However, the court said there was no evidence to support a default judgment claim of $18,000 because the plaintiff had offered no proof that damages were sustained. (Ibid.) The court said without such proof, the court must assume there were no damages. (Ibid.) As the court put it in Heidary, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 868, the court in a default case must act as a "gatekeeper" and ensure that the damages sought are not more than or inconsistent with the complaint.
Thus, because courts have held that a defaulting defendant admits the material allegations against him, the plaintiff does not have to prove the allegations a second time at a prove-up hearing. In short, a plaintiff at a prove-up hearing is not required to prove evidence of liability.
However, a plaintiff may not recover damages if his or her complaint fails to state a cause of action. (Rose v. Lawton (1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 18,29 (Rose); Morehouse v. Wanzo (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 846 (Morehouse); Vasey v. California Dance Co. (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 742, 749 (Vasey); Williams v. Foss (1924) 69 Cal.App. at p. 707 (Williams).) The failure to state a cause of action can be raised at any time. (Falahati v. Kondo (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 823, 831 (Falahati).) As Witkin succinctly puts it, "[i]f the complaint fails to state a cause of action or the allegations do not support the demand for relief, the plaintiff is no more entitled to that relief by default judgment than if the defendant had expressly admitted all of the allegations. Such a default judgment is erroneous and will be reversed on appeal." (6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Proceedings Without Trial, §160, p. 574.) Therefore, if Posadas complaint failed to state a claim, relief cannot be granted.
We are aware of authority that may suggest that a default judgment can stand as long as the complaint merely apprises the defendant of the nature of the relief sought. (Molen v. Friedman (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1149 (Molen ).) However, when examined more closely, these cases do not stand for this broad proposition. For example, Molen limited the "mere apprisal" standard to collateral attacks by defendants. (Id. at p. 1156) In Molen, the defendants, guarantors of a Hooters restaurant that did not pay rent, failed to respond to a complaint for unpaid rent. After the court entered a default judgment against them, the defendants collaterally attacked the action, claiming, among other things, that the original complaint did not state a cause of action and did not support an award for damages. (Ibid.) The court said the judgment would stand because the original complaint apprised defendants of the relief sought, but it limited its finding to similar collateral attacks. (Ibid.)
Moreover, many of the cases using the "apprisal only" standard are early California Supreme Court cases. (Molen, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th 1149.) Later cases have read this language to hold that plaintiffs are not entitled to default when their complaints failed to state a cause of action. (Rose, supra, 215 Cal.App.2d 18, 29; Morehouse, supra, 266 Cal.App.2d 846; Vasey, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d 742, 749; Williams, supra, 69 Cal.App. 705, 707.)
B. The Landlords Duty
The trial court correctly denied Fergusons request for a default judgment because he failed to state a cause of action against Posadas. In general, to establish a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff must show the defendant "owed the plaintiff a legal duty, that the defendant breached the duty, and that the breach was a proximate or legal cause of injuries suffered by the plaintiff." (Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 673.) (Ann M. ).)
Duty is a question of law for the courts. (Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 674.) Therefore, in order to determine whether the trial court erred, we consider, de novo, whether Posadas owed Ferguson a duty to prevent and rescue him from the beating.
It is well settled that California landlords owe a general duty to tenants to maintain land they possess and control in a reasonably safe condition. (Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th at 674.) This includes a duty to "take reasonable steps to secure common areas against foreseeable criminal acts of third parties that are likely to occur in the absence of such precautionary measures." (Ibid.) Thus, a landlord is only responsible for the acts of third parties if they are reasonably foreseeable.
Although it was not a case principally concerning pleadings, the facts of Ann M. provide some guidance. There, a woman working in a photo processing shop at a strip mall was raped during business hours by an unknown assailant. (Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 670.) The court held that the landlord who owned the shopping center did not owe the plaintiff a duty to provide security guards. (Ibid.) In so doing, the court held there was no evidence of prior similar violent acts on the premises, and the landlord had no reason to anticipate the crime. In fact, the court said that "the requisite degree of foreseeability rarely, if ever, can be proven in the absence of prior similar incidents of violent crime on the landowners premises." (Id. at p. 679.)
Ann M, of course, involved a store in a strip mall open to the public, but courts also have refused to find a duty in the case of a landlord of a private apartment complex, even when tenants had complained that they felt threatened by another residents action. (Davis v. Gomez (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1401, 1403.) In Davis, for example, the court ruled that a landlord involved in a wrongful death action had no duty to control the alleged psychotic behavior of a tenant who talked loudly to herself and acted as if she were casting spells on people walking by. (Id. at p. 1406.) The landlord heard complaints that people were scared to walk past her apartment because they believed she brandished a gun. (Id. at p. 1403.) Eventually the tenant shot and killed a man as he walked past her door. Nevertheless, the court held that the landlord owed no duty because the violent incident was not foreseeable, and it was not clear what the landlord could have done even with notice. (Id. at p. 1406.) In so doing, the court noted that the case was "`distinguishable from the situation where a landlord neglects to provide adequate lighting or security in a known high-crime area. " (Id. at p. 1405.)
The cases Ferguson cites to support his argument that Posadas owed him a duty all fall into that latter category, i.e., instances where a landlord knew of repeated past criminal acts or was aware of foreseeable dangers yet failed to provide adequate security or warnings. In Penner v. Falk (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 858, 866, cited by Ferguson as a leading case in this area, a court upheld a negligence action against a landlord where two intruders robbed a tenant in a common hallway. Noting that a landlord had a duty to exercise reasonable care, the court said the pleadings were adequate to state a cause of action because the complaint alleged ongoing problems that a reasonable landlord should have fixed. (Ibid.) These included long-standing criticisms about inadequate lighting and defective locks in the common areas. (Id. at p. 863.) The complaint also stated that the landlords knew that unauthorized people entered the building and that violent crimes and rape and had already occurred on the premises. (Ibid. )
In the two other cases cited by Ferguson—and relied on by the court in Penner—the landlords also had notice of dangerous conditions that a reasonable landlord should have warned of or fixed. (OHara v. Western Seven Trees Corp. (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 798 (OHara); Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trading Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 324 (Kwaitkowski).) In OHara, the landlord knew that a man had raped several tenants in the apartment complex. (OHara, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d at pp. 802-803.) Despite possessing a police sketch of the rapist and warnings he might strike again, the landlord assured the plaintiff, a prospective tenant, that the premises were safe. (Ibid.) The same assailant raped the woman three months later, and the court held that the plaintiff stated a cause of action for negligence because landlords must protect against a crime if there is sufficient notice and it is likely to recur. (Ibid.) In Kwaitkowski, the court ruled that a sufficient cause of action existed where a defendant-landlord knew that unauthorized people entered and exited an apartment building, but failed to respond to complaints about a broken lock, and a woman was raped. (Kwaitkowski, supra, 123 Cal.App.3d 324.)
In those cases, the court reasoned that a reasonable person in the landlords position should have responded to the complaints or warned about expected dangers. Nevertheless, "[l]iability does not make the landlord an insurer of the tenants safety; the duty is merely to exercise reasonable care." (OHara, supra, 75 Cal. App. 3d. at pp. 802-803.)
Thus, even if the trial court assumes Fergusons three allegations to be true—that Posadas failed to adequately maintain the premises, failed to warn of Harveys violent behavior, and failed to call the police—the landlord is not liable because he did not owe a duty to prevent this random act of unforeseeable violence. Fergusons complaint contains no allegations that Harveys attack would have been foreseeable to a reasonable person. No long-standing complaints about his behavior or the safety of the complex were alleged that would give rise to a duty. The only evidence Ferguson offered was a rent check containing a note asking the landlord to "please speak to" Harvey.
The pleadings before us do not allege a threat of violence that gives rise to a duty on the part of Posadas. Fergusons pleading does not contain any allegations that Posadas failed to install lighting, fix locks, respond to complaints, or warn of reasonably foreseeable violent acts. It also contains no allegations that Posadas knew of similar violent acts on the premises in the past or of Harveys propensity for future violence. At most, the complaint alleges that Posadas knew of Harveys prior violent conduct. However, there is no requirement that a landlord warn residents of another tenants past behavior absent a foreseeable need. To do so could unfairly stigmatize a tenant who might never act violently again. At any rate, as the trial court said here, there are no details alleging Harveys previous history of violence and how it would relate to future acts. Nor is it clear what action Posadas could have taken to prevent the attack.
Finally, even if the court takes as true allegations that Posadas failed to call the police despite Fergusons pleas, he was not required by law to do so because he had no duty to come to the rescue of another citizen or to call the police on his behalf. (Harris v. Smith (1984)157 Cal.App.3d 100.) As the lower court stated here, "it is a harsh rule, but they need not." Therefore, Ferguson is unable to show that Harvey would not have assaulted him had his landlord acted differently or provided other reasonable precautions. Because, therefore, Ferguson, the plaintiff-tenant, has not stated a cause of action against his landlord, the trial court did not err in refusing to enter a default judgment against Posadas.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur:
Lambden, J.
Richman, J.