Opinion
Case No. CV 19-2002 JVS (JDEx)
10-21-2021
Christone FELTZS v. COX COMMUNICATIONS CAL., LLC, et al.
David P. Myers, Jason T. Hatcher, Myers Law Group APC, Cassandra Ariana Castro, The Myers Law Group, A.P.C., Rancho Cucamonga, CA, for Christone Feltzs. Paul Berkowitz, Rachel Howard, Thomas R. Kaufman, Sheppard Mullin Richter and Hampton LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Cox Communications Cal., LLC, Cox Communications, Inc.
David P. Myers, Jason T. Hatcher, Myers Law Group APC, Cassandra Ariana Castro, The Myers Law Group, A.P.C., Rancho Cucamonga, CA, for Christone Feltzs.
Paul Berkowitz, Rachel Howard, Thomas R. Kaufman, Sheppard Mullin Richter and Hampton LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Cox Communications Cal., LLC, Cox Communications, Inc.
Proceedings: [IN CHAMBERS] Order Regarding Motion for Reconsideration
James V. Selna, United States District Court Judge
Defendants Cox Communications California, LLC ("Cox California") and Cox Communications, Inc. ("Cox Communications") (together, "Cox") filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's order denying Cox's motion to strike the PAGA representative meal period claim. Mot., Dkt. No. 66. Plaintiff Christone Feltzs ("Feltzs") filed an opposition. Opp'n, Dkt. No. 69. Cox replied. Reply, Dkt. No. 74.
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion for reconsideration and GRANTS the motion to strike the PAGA representative meal period claim.
I. BACKGROUND
Cox is one of the nation's primary cable companies. Serrano Decl., Dkt. No. 35-3 ¶ 2. Cox employs Universal Home Technicians ("Technicians") to support its residential cable customers. Id. Technicians perform services such as installing and troubleshooting issues concerning residential internet, telephone, and video service. Id. Technicians work in the field at customer residences without direct supervision. Id. During the relevant time period for this action, Cox employed more than 500 Technicians in California. Id. These Technicians serviced customers in San Diego, Orange County, Los Angeles, and Santa Barbara. Id.
Cox conducted time and motion studies to assess how much time different common tasks that Technicians perform typically require. Id. ¶ 3. Based on these studies, Cox assigned a certain number of "points" to different types of assignments, with each point representing five minutes of expected work. Id. In the event a project takes longer than expected based on its assigned points, the Technician can contact a dispatcher for assistance or to reassign other work. Id. Cox does not discipline employees for having too few points completed in a day, but it generally expects Technicians to average about 100 points of work per 10-hour shift, which translates into about 50 minutes of productivity per hour. Id.
At all times relevant to this action, Cox has scheduled appointments for Technicians in windows of time, which are typically 8:00 to 10:00 a.m., 1:00 to 3:00 p.m., and 3:00 to 5:00 p.m. Id. ¶ 4. No appointments are scheduled from noon to 1:00 p.m. to facilitate Technicians having an opportunity to take a one-hour off-duty meal period starting in the first five hours of their shift (the shift typically starts at 7:45 a.m.). Id. Technicians are given discretion regarding when in those first five hours they will start their meal period, and they are not required to take it precisely from noon to 1:00 p.m. Id. If necessary, they are also authorized to stop working in the middle of an assignment to take a one hour off duty meal period and then return to finish afterwards. Id. Supervisors discuss the meal and rest period rules periodically during weekly meetings with Technicians. Id. ¶ 5. Although Technicians are always permitted to start their meal period within the first five hours of a shift, if a Technician believes that he needs to work through a meal period to address a customer issue, Cox will pay the Technician an hour of pay on any day that the Technician indicates he or she was unable to take a compliant meal period. Id. ¶ 6. The same is true for an inability to take a compliant paid rest period. Id. 7.
Technicians often work more than 10 hours in a day, although it is rare for them to work more than 12 hours in a day. Id. ¶ 7. Technicians have the option—and the vast majority take the option—of signing an advanced written waiver of the right to take a second off-duty meal period on those days where they work 10-12 hours in a workday. Id. Except in situations where they have agreed to waive a second meal period, Technicians have the right to take a second off-duty meal break of at least 30 minutes in any shift in excess of 10 hours. Id.
At all relevant times, Cox has rounded non-exempt employee time entries recorded in the timekeeping system to the nearest 15-minute increment. Kavanagh Decl., Dkt. No. 35-3 ¶ 4. Thus, for example, a clock entry of either 7:57 a.m. or 8:03 a.m. would be rounded to 8:00 a.m. Id.
Cox operates under an honor system with respect to Technician time tracking. Id. ¶ 7. Technicians enter their time through an app on their Cox phones or tablets. Id. They also certify the accuracy of their time each pay period, which includes an acknowledgment that they recorded their hours accurately and notified their managers if they were unable to take their meal or rest periods. Id.
On March 26, 2018, Cox hired Feltzs as a Technician trainee. Feltzs Depo., Dkt. No. 35-3, at 13-14, 30. Feltzs spent the first month in classroom training, and then spent the next three months in field training working with and shadowing other Technicians. Id., at 35, 57-59. Cox discharged Feltzs effective July 31, 2018 before he finished his training. Id., at 13-14.
On July 26, 2019, Feltzs filed a Class Action Complaint in Orange County Superior Court asserting the following claims for: (1) violation of Labor Code §§ 510, 1194, 1194.2, and Wage Order 4-2001; (2) violation of Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512, and Wage Order 4-2001; (3) violations of Labor Code §§ 200, et seq. ; (4) violation of Labor Code § 226 (waiting time penalties); and (5) violations of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq. See Notice of Removal., Dkt. No. 1. On October 16, 2019, Feltzs filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC") adding a Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA") claim pursuant to Labor Code §§ 2699, et seq. Id.
On October 18, 2019, Cox removed the case to this Court. Id. On February 18, 2020, Feltzs filed a Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"). See SAC, Dkt. No. 18. On June 1, 2021, the Court granted a motion to certify the class with respect to the time shaving/rounding and wage statement clams and denied a motion to certify the class with respect to meal period issues. See Order, Dkt. No. 56. On August 27, 2021, the Court denied Cox's motion to strike the PAGA representative meal claim. See Order, Dkt. No. 63. II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion for Reconsideration
Motions for reconsideration are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). A motion for reconsideration "is an ‘extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.’ " America Unites for Kids v. Lyon, 2015 WL 5822578, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2015) (citation omitted). Thus, "a motion for reconsideration should not be granted absent highly unusual circumstances," such as where a district court "is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law." 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999). Motions for reconsideration cannot "be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation." Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003).
"Courts in this district have interpreted Local Rule 7-18 to be coextensive with Rules 59(e) and 60(b)." The grounds for reconsideration are set forth in Local Rule 7-18, which provides:
A motion for reconsideration of the decision on any motion may be made only on the grounds of (a) a material difference in fact or law from that presented to the Court before such decision that in the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have been known to the party moving for reconsideration at the time of such decision, or (b) the emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the time of such decision, or (c) a manifest showing of a failure to consider material facts presented to the Court before such decision. No motion for reconsideration shall in any manner repeat any oral or written argument made in support of or in opposition to the original motion.
L.R. 7-18. The Court has discretion in determining whether to grant a motion for reconsideration. See Navajo Nation v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003).
See also School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993) (reconsideration appropriate if the movant demonstrates clear error, manifest injustice, newly discovered evidence, or an intervening change in controlling law).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Grounds for Reconsideration
A motion for reconsideration is appropriate when the previous order in question is demonstrably wrong, or if new developments would affect the outcome of the motion. "As long as a district court has jurisdiction over the case, then it possesses the inherent procedural power to reconsider, rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be sufficient." City of Los Angeles, Harbor Div. v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation and emphasis omitted). Here, Cox seeks reconsideration based on intervening case law. See Dkt. No. 65 (citing to Wesson v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC, 68 Cal. App. 5th 746, 283 Cal.Rptr.3d 846 (2021) ). Cox argues that Wesson necessitates reconsideration of the Court's earlier order because it is controlling authority holding that courts do have inherent authority to strike PAGA claims if the trial of the action would be unmanageable.
i. Timeliness
The Court's initial Order regarding the motion to strike was entered on August 27, 2021. The decision in Wesson was published on September 9, 2021. Cox met and conferred with opposing counsel as soon as the decision was released and filed the instant motion as soon as allowable under the Local Rule 7-3 requirements. Mot. at 7. Cox also notified the Court of the pending decision while the earlier motion was being considered. Accordingly, the Court finds that Cox made every effort to bring this issue to the Court's attention as soon as practicable.
ii. Binding Precedent
Cox argues that Wesson is binding precedent on this Court. The general principle is that federal district courts applying state law are bound by decisions of the state's highest court, but in the absence of such a decision, "where there is no convincing evidence that the state supreme court would decide differently, a federal court is obligated to follow the decisions of the state's intermediate appellate courts." Vestar Dev. II, LLC v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 249 F.3d 958, 960 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation omitted). While Feltzs agrees with the proposition of law, he maintains that there is a contrary California Supreme Court decision on point. Opp'n at 5-7.
In Arias, the California Supreme Court considered the question of "whether class action requirements must also be satisfied" when an employee seeks civil penalties under PAGA for alleged Labor Code violations. Arias v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th 969, 980, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 209 P.3d 923 (2009). The court held that class action requirements "need not be met when an employee's representative action against an employer is seeking civil penalties" under PAGA. Id. at 975, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 209 P.3d 923. Feltzs argues that this shows that the California Supreme Court has already considered the issue of whether PAGA imposes a manageability requirement and expressly decided it did not. Opp'n at 6. Alternatively, he maintains that it provides evidence that the California Supreme Court would in fact decide the issue differently than the California Court of Appeals did in Wesson. Opp'n at 7.
The plaintiff in Wesson made the same argument that imposing a manageability requirement would conflict with Arias, but the court determined that there was in fact no conflict after fully considering the issue. See Wesson, 283 Cal.Rptr.3d at 860-62. In Arias, the defendants were seeking a ruling from the court on whether PAGA claims "must be brought as class actions." Arias, 46 Cal. 4th at 992 n.5, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 209 P.3d 923. While Arias "stands for the proposition that PAGA claims need not qualify as class actions ... nowhere did the court suggest that trial courts could not limit or preclude an unmanageable PAGA action if necessary." Wesson, 283 Cal.Rptr.3d at 861-62.
The Court agrees with the analysis in Wesson. There are a number of distinctions between a representative action that is brought as a class action and one that is not. See Arias, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d at 593 n.2, 209 P.3d 923 (discussing the differences between the two types of representative actions). Holding that a plaintiff does not need to comply with every class action requirement does not expressly bar the application of any one individual requirement. Arias is neither incompatible with Wesson, nor does it provide convincing evidence that the California Supreme Court would decide differently. Accordingly, this Court agrees with Cox that Wesson is binding precedent on this Court.
iii. Effect on the Outcome of the Motion
The Court next turns to the question of whether this intervening change in controlling law would change the analysis in the Court's initial Order regarding the motion to strike. After reviewing the arguments presented by Cox, the Court stated that it was unconvinced "that imposing a manageability requirement is appropriate for a PAGA claim." Order at 7. In part, the Court noted that "[d]enying claims where individualized assessment is required ‘would obliterate’ the purpose of PAGA because ‘every PAGA action in some way requires some individualized assessment regarding whether a Labor Code violation has occurred.’ " Id. at 6 (quoting Plaisted v. Dress Barn, No. 2:12-cv-01679-ODW, 2012 WL 4356158, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2012) ). The Court also reasoned that imposing a manageability requirement for PAGA claims would erect burdens that the state would not face in bringing those actions by itself. Id. at 5. Accordingly, the Court "decline[d] to find that due process requires striking the representative PAGA claim on manageability grounds." Id. at 7.
In Wesson, the court held that "courts have inherent authority to ensure that PAGA claims can be fairly and efficiently tried and, if necessary, may strike a claim that cannot be rendered manageable." Wesson, 283 Cal.Rptr.3d at 859. The court found that this was neither inconsistent with PAGA's procedures and objectives, nor with applicable precedent. Id. at 857. The court reasoned that "courts may exercise their inherent authority to fashion procedures and remedies as necessary to protect litigants’ rights and the fairness of trial," id. at 858, and that California courts have exercised that power "to preclude representative claims where a trial of those claims would be unmanageable." Id. at 858. The court found that this does not affect substantive rights, but instead merely precludes the use of a particular aggregation procedure. Id. at 859. The court held that because PAGA actions involve comparable or greater manageability concerns than other representative claims, courts may exercise their inherent authority to ensure manageability. Id.
In response to objections that this would contradict the purpose of PAGA, the court emphasized that ensuring the manageability of claims would not require discarding every complaint that draws an objection. Id. at 860-63. "[T]rial courts have discretion in assessing claims’ manageability at trial but should not lightly strike even procedurally challenging claims." Id. at 862. The court noted that the same authority to intervene would presumably still exist if a state agency chose to bring an unmanageable claim for labor violations instead of a PAGA plaintiff. Id.
The holding in Wesson directly contradicts this Court's earlier Order. Wesson found that "as a matter of due process, defendants are entitled to a fair opportunity to litigate available affirmative defenses, and a court's manageability assessment should account for them." Id. at 852. This Court's analysis rested in part on concerns that a manageability requirement would contradict the purpose of PAGA and impose a burden that state agencies would not face. Wesson directly considered those same issues and reached the opposite conclusion.
Accordingly, the Court determines that reconsideration of its prior ruling is appropriate given the intervening change in controlling law.
B. Reconsideration of Cox's Motion to Strike
Wesson holds that "trial courts have discretion in assessing claims’ manageability at trial but should not lightly strike even procedurally challenging claims." Id. at 862. The Court evaluates the manageability of Feltzs’ PAGA meal period claims under that standard.
i. Manageability of the Current Trial Plan
Cox argues that despite multiple opportunities, Feltzs has not presented a trial plan that would allow for full presentation of affirmative defenses. Mot. at 8. Cox maintains that under Feltzs’ proposed trial plan, after Feltzs introduces records identifying all prima facie meal period violation, Cox would be required to rebut every specific instance by showing that it provided a meal period to that specific employee consistent with California law. Mot. at 8-9. Cox asserts that this would require a highly individualized affirmative defense involving determination of the employee's work schedule for the day, productivity level, whether they had prior discussions with Cox about meal periods, and individual credibility. Mot. at 9. Additionally, it claims that Feltzs has not provided a statistical expert, nor any concrete plan for representative sampling. Mot. at 10.
The Court agrees with Cox that the PAGA meal period claims require an individualized defense. In an earlier ruling, the Court denied class certification of the meal period claims based on a finding that they did not meet the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). Dkt. No. 56, at 10-12. The Court found that in the absence of a class-wide policy or practice, the individualized inquiry to determine liability would "require an unmanageable individualized analysis that precludes a finding of predominant common issues." Id. at 11. Those same reasons apply in this context as well.
The Court also agrees with Cox that Feltzs has not yet provided a concrete plan that is workable. The only trial plan submitted by Feltzs was in connection with the motion for class certification. In that trial plan, Feltzs merely states that if Cox seeks to rebut the presumption of liability, "[r]epresentative testimony, surveys, and statistical analysis, along with other types of evidence, are available as tools to render manageable determinations of the extent of liability." Trial Plan, Dkt. No. 36-21, at 4. Feltzs emphasizes that the burden is on the employers to negate the inference drawn from the employee's evidence. Id. at 4-5.
Feltzs argues that because Cox failed to list witnesses in its initial Rule 26(a) disclosures, it would be barred from presenting the affirmative defense that would allegedly make the trial unmanageable. Opp'n at 8. However, Cox notes that Feltzs has included all of the Technicians at issue on his own witness list. Reply at 4; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) (creating an exception allowing for the use of a witness that was not disclosed pursuant to Rule 26 if the failure to disclose was harmless); 1993 Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (noting the "harmless" exception is intended to avoid unduly harsh penalties in a variety of situations, including where the witness is listed by the opposing party). Cox would thus be able to cross-examine every Technician, and subsequently introduce impeachment evidence if necessary, without running afoul of the disclosure requirements. Reply at 5. This would render the trial plan as currently constituted unmanageable.
Additionally, Feltzs argues that for a subset of the claims where Cox already paid a meal period premium, there is already an admission of liability, thus no individualized defense is required. Opp'n at 7. Under the California Labor Code, if an employer fails to provide a meal period in accordance with state law, "the employer shall pay the employee one additional hour of pay at the employee's regular rate of compensation for each workday that the meal or rest or recovery period is not provided." Cal. Labor Code § 226.7(c). Separately, for provisions of the Labor Code where a civil penalty is not specifically provided, there is a civil penalty for employers of "one hundred dollars ($100) for each aggrieved employee per pay period for the initial violation and two hundred dollars ($200) for each aggrieved employee per pay period for each subsequent violation." Cal. Labor Code § 2699(f)(2). The civil penalties that Feltzs seeks to recover under PAGA are distinct from the statutory damages. See Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 381, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 289, 327 P.3d 129 (2014).
Cox admits to paying "hundreds of meal premiums during the relevant period" to technicians who "obtain premium pay in the rare circumstance (if any) where they feel unable to take a timely meal period." Dkt. No. 59 at 5. The Court agrees with Feltzs that there is no need for individualized affirmative defenses in these specific instances, as Cox has already acknowledged these specific violations by paying the meal period premiums. "[I]n a PAGA action, ... recovery on behalf of the state and aggrieved employees may be had for each violation, whether pursuant to a uniform policy or not." Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 5th 531, 559, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 472, 398 P.3d 69 (2017). The Court discusses whether this requires different treatment below.
ii. Feltzs’ Request to Prepare Another Trial Plan
Wesson is silent on which party bears the burden of showing that there is a manageable trial plan. See Wesson, 283 Cal.Rptr.3d at 863-65. In that case, the court found the PAGA claims unmanageable when the potential for statistical analysis was first raised on appeal, and "nothing in the record suggested that these were feasible means" of proving the affirmative defense. Id. at 867. As a general rule, "if possible, the court should work with the parties to render a PAGA claim manageable by adopting a feasible trial plan or limiting the claim's scope." Id. at 864.
Feltzs requests the opportunity to submit another trial plan if the Court were to find the current trial plan to be unworkable. Opp'n at 9-10. Feltzs notes that discovery closed on August 27, 2021, and thus seeks reopening of discovery to allow the parties to "identify statisticians or other experts to address the use of statistical sampling, representative testimony, etc. for [Cox's] affirmative defense of ‘waiver.’ " Opp'n at 10. Feltzs argues that up to this point Cox has refused to use any statistical tools to streamline the presentation of its affirmative defense, and that a manageability requirement did not exist until after the discovery period closed.
However, the Court notes that Feltzs has been aware of Cox's planned affirmative defenses since it moved to deny class certification on April 23, 2021. Cox presented extensive argument that the meal period claims should not be certified as a class because a trial would require individualized determinations of liability. Dkt. No. 35 at 11-18. Feltzs’ response did not present any additional information on how the trial plan could be adapted. On June 1, 2021, the Court denied class certification on the meal period claims based on the individualized determinations that would be required. Again, Feltzs took no action to suggest any alternatives to the initial trial plan.
On July 30, 2021, Cox initially moved to strike the PAGA meal period claims based on the same lack of manageability. In response to the motion to strike, Feltzs defended the manageability of the same proposed trial plan. Dkt. No. 60 at 17-23. But at no point did Feltzs designate an expert or provide any additional description of what would be involved in crafting a workable trial plan other than repeatedly stating that statistical methods exist.
Feltzs relies heavily on Duran v. U.S. Bank National Association as support for the proposition that statistical analysis may be permissible. 59 Cal. 4th 1, 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 371, 325 P.3d 916 (2014). That case, however, expressly highlights the limits on the ability of statistical sampling to prove liability in the class context. Duran overturned the trial court decision because "the sample relied upon must be representative and the results obtained must be sufficiently reliable to satisfy concerns of fundamental fairness." Id. at 49, 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 371, 325 P.3d 916. Duran found that the statistical plan employed by the trial court used a sample size that was both too small and not random, thus creating an intolerably large margin of error and requiring reversal. Id. at 41-49, 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 371, 325 P.3d 916. The court contrasted statistical methodology upheld in prior cases, such as where "both sides’ experts had worked for months to develop a mutually acceptable sampling plan." Id. at 42, 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 371, 325 P.3d 916 (citing to Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 115 Cal. App. 4th 715, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 544 (2004) ).
By contrast, while Feltzs repeatedly cites to case law for the proposition that representative testimony, surveys, and statistical analysis all are available as tools to render manageable determinations of the extent of liability, he does not provide any substantive discussion of how they could be applied in this case. The closest he comes is declaring that "[w]ith an approximate aggrieved employee count in the mid-300s, statistical sampling through surveys and representative testimony from a small sample of the aggrieved employees is easily conducted and proper." Dkt. No. 60 at 22. This is not sufficient to survive the inquiry into statistical methods that is clearly required by Duran.
While prior holdings have not expressly stated that one party bears the sole burden of developing a statistical sampling plan, they do provide useful guidance. "[R]eliance on statistical proof cannot be used to bar the presentation of valid defenses." Duran, 59 Cal. 4th at 49, 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 371, 325 P.3d 916. Additionally, "the court should work with the parties to render a PAGA claim manageable by adopting a feasible trial plan." Wesson, 283 Cal.Rptr.3d at 864. Here, after Feltzs presented an initial trial plan, Cox described how it planned to argue the affirmative defense of individual waiver, and expressed concerns that this would be unmanageable. The Court agreed that Cox both had the right to present those defenses and that the resulting trial would be unmanageable. In response to the concerns expressed by both Cox and the Court, Feltzs has not engaged in the process of developing a feasible trial plan that would allow for the presentation of valid defenses.
While the Court is not requiring Feltzs to present a fully formed workable trial plan, he is also not able to sit back and wait for Cox to do the same. At no point did Feltzs designate a statistical expert or suggest which techniques he thought would be appropriate given the facts of this case. The lack of a workable trial plan was already central to two separate motions in this case, including one that was still pending at the time of the close of discovery. Feltzs had ample opportunity to present a concrete statistical alternative and engage in the process of negotiating a plan that is acceptable to all parties and meets the requisite legal requirements. Instead, Feltzs does not show any subsequent work that he has done to render the claim manageable, nor has he attempted to negotiate a more limited scope of the claims to make trial more reasonable. Neither party has even designated a statistical expert. The Court declines to reopen discovery when it is readily apparent that this should have been addressed during the discovery process.
Accordingly, since Feltzs has not designated a statistical expert that would be essential to the development of a workable trial plan, the Court finds that it would be futile to grant him another opportunity to submit a proposed trial plan. However, "[a] trial court's finding that a claim is unmanageable as presented will not always result in striking the claim." Wesson, 283 Cal.Rptr.3d at 864. In addition to striking a claim or adopting a modified trial plan, a trial court may limit the scope of a claim.
Here, the manageability analysis is different for the subset of claims where Cox has already acknowledged a violation by paying a meal period premium. Cox has not presented any argument regarding why these specific violations would require individualized affirmative defenses. Thus, the Court declines to strike the entirety of Feltzs’ PAGA meal period claims. Feltzs will be limited to presenting evidence and seeking penalties regarding meal period violations for which Cox has already admitted liability by paying the statutory meal period premium. The Court strikes the PAGA meal period claim to the extent that it seeks penalties for meal period violations for which Cox has not yet admitted liability by paying the statutory meal period premium.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion for reconsideration and GRANTS the motion to strike the PAGA meal period claim to the extent that it seeks penalties for meal period violations for which Cox has not yet admitted liability by paying the statutory meal period premium. The Court finds that oral argument would not be helpful in this matter. Fed R. Civ. P. 78 ; L.R. 7-15.