Opinion
00-CV-0998E(Sc)
September 19, 2002
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
This decision may be cited in whole or in any part.
Federspiel filed this action November 29, 2000 against defendant Frederick Blank, as President of the Niagara Frontier Sheet Metal Workers' Union for alleged violations of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. ("LMRDA"). Both parties currently seek summary judgment. For the reasons discussed herein, defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment will be denied.
Inasmuch as this Court finds that Federspiel is not a member of the Union, discussion will be generally limited to those facts related to plaintiff's standing to bring this action. Federspiel joined the Union in 1976 when he first became employed by an employer that had a collective bargaining agreement with it. Federspiel Dep., at 17. At some point thereafter, Federspiel worked outside the Union`s jurisdiction — i.e., for an employer that did not have a collective bargaining agreement with it. Although Federspiel never received a notice of termination of membership from the Union when he left its jurisdiction — sometime around 1980 (Federspiel Dep., at 18) —, he was subsequently reinstated to membership in the Union after resuming work for a Union shop in November 1992. The Union soon thereafter reinstated Federspiel. Federspiel Dep., at 21-22. Since April 1, 1995 Federspiel has been employed by ESAB, which is not a signatory to any collective bargaining agreement with the Union. Id. at 32. Federspiel has also been a member of the PACE union since April 1, 1995. Id. at 33.
See Def.'s Statement of Uncontested Facts, at ¶¶ 12, 15.
To the extent that there is a discrepancy as to the dates of Federspiel's relevant employment and union membership, such is irrelevant because Federspiel does not dispute that he at one point left employment and thereby left the Union — which necessitated his reinstatement in 1993. See Federspiel Aff., at ¶¶ 3-4. With respect to the dates of his employment, Federspiel testified in his deposition that he had been employed at Union shops for the period 1980-1983 (Federspiel Dep., at 7) which was contradicted by his subsequent testimony that he left the Union in 1980 when he became employed by Carborundum and subsequently joined a different union (Federspiel Dep., at 18).
Federspiel's Complaint alleges various violations of the LMRDA and the Union's governing documents. Specifically, Federspiel unsuccessfully attempted to obtain certain financial disclosures from the Union in 2000 by purportedly invoking its constitution and by-laws in an attempt to organize a special meeting. The Union met with Federspiel and other former members of the Union on July 19, 2000. The Union distributed publicly available financial information but disbanded the meeting when Federspiel asked for additional financial disclosures and asked the Union to dismiss its legal counsel. Federspiel received a letter July 20, 2000 indicating that his membership rights, if any, were terminated. This litigation ensued.
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCvP") states that summary judgment may be granted only if the record shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In other words, after discovery and upon a motion, summary judgment is mandated "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment is thus appropriate where there is "no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Of course, the moving party bears the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)). If the moving party makes such a showing, the non-moving party must then come forward with evidence of specific facts sufficient to support a jury verdict in order to survive the summary judgment motion. Ibid.; FRCvP 56(e).
With respect to the first prong of Anderson, a genuine issue of material fact exists if the evidence in the record "is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, at 248. Stated another way, there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact" where there is a "complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, at 323. Under the second prong of Anderson, the disputed fact must be material, which is to say that it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law * * *." Anderson, at 248.
See also Anderson, at 252 ("The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [movant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [movant].")
Furthermore, "[i]n assessing the record to determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact, the district court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." St. Pierre v. Dyer, 208 F.3d 394, 404 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Anderson, at 255). Nonetheless, mere conclusions, conjecture, unsubstantiated allegations or surmise on the part of the non-moving party are insufficient to defeat a well-grounded motion for summary judgment. Goenaga, at 18.
See footnote 4.
Turning to the merits, Federspiel purports to invoke rights provided by the LMRDA, which grants union members certain democratic rights. See 29 U.S.C. § 411 (union bill of rights) and § 412 (private right of action). Indeed, the LMRDA was designed to "correct widespread abuses of power and instances of corruption by union officials, and to encourage democratic self-governance in unions." Franza v. Int'l Broth. of Teamsters, Local 671, 869 F.2d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1989) (citations omitted); see generally Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 435-437 (1981) (discussing LMRDA). Federspiel attempted to invoke these rights when he petitioned the Union in 2000.
The issue of standing must first be addressed. In other words, it must be determined whether Federspiel was a member of the Union in 2000 when he attempted to invoke its constitution and by-laws in an attempt to organize a special meeting for the purpose of seeking financial disclosure from the Union. See Phelan v. Local 305, 973 F.2d 1050, 1055-1057 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that, on remand, a plaintiff's LMRDA claims should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because he was not a member of the defendant union), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 972 (1993); Alliance of Am. Insurers v. Cuomo, 854 F.2d 591, 605 (2d Cir. 1988) ("subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised sua sponte by the district court"); cf. Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000) ("A plaintiff asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists.").
At all relevant times, Federspiel was employed by ESAB — who did not have a collective bargaining agreement with the Union. Blank Aff., at ¶¶ 15, 22. Indeed, Federspiel left the Union's jurisdiction no later than April 1, 1995 — as he had previously around 1980 — which necessitated his readmission in 1993. Moreover, Federspiel has been a member of the PACE union since April 1, 1995.
Inasmuch as Federspiel left the Union's jurisdiction no later than April 1, 1995, there is no need to address whether Federspiel's failure to pay dues since 1993 constituted sufficient grounds for the July 20, 2000 termination letter.
The LMRDA defines "member" or "member in good standing" as
"any person who has fulfilled the requirements for membership in such organization, and who neither has voluntarily withdrawn from membership nor has been expelled or suspended from membership after appropriate proceedings consistent with lawful provisions of the constitution and by-laws of such organization." 29 U.S.C. § 402(o) (emphasis added).
Federspiel makes the conclusory contention that "[a]t no time between March 1993 and July 19, 2000 did the Plaintiff withdraw from membership" in the the Union. Pl.'s Statement of Uncontested Material Facts, at ¶ 6. Plaintiff's subjective view of his union status, however, is not controlling, especially in light of objective evidence to the contrary. See Helmer v. Briody, 747 F. Supp. 1020, 1026 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
The Union by-laws provide in relevant part that
"[e]ach applicant for membership must be of good moral character and must be a worker at one or more branches of the trade of this UNION." By-Laws, Art. VI, § 1 (emphasis added).
The Union interprets such section to mean that continued membership requires its members to maintain employment with an employer that has a collective bargaining agreement with the Union. Blank Aff., at ¶¶ 5-6, 15, 19-20, 22. It is well established that "courts should be exceedingly reluctant to substitute their judgment [sic] for that of union officials in the interpretation of the union's constitution and rules." Assoc. of Contracting Plumbers, Inc. v. Local Union No. 2, 676 F. Supp. 523, 529 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 841 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1988); Mason Tenders Local Union 59 v. Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO, 924 F. Supp. 528, 543-544 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that a "union's interpretation of its own constitution is entitled to `great deference' and will be upheld unless `patently unreasonable'). Accordingly, this Court grants great deference to the Union's interpretation of its by-laws and governing documents. Moreover, its interpretation is not patently unreasonable inasmuch as it seeks to have union governance controlled by members who are directly affected by union affairs. Cf. Taylor v. Great Lakes Seamen's Union, Local 5000, 701 F.2d 590, 590-592 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding "nothing `unreasonable' about a rule which, in effect, guarantees that internal union affairs will be governed by those whose interests are most at stake — workers presently employed in the steel industry").
Federspiel contends that this language means that any sheet metal worker is eligible for membership in the Union. Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Opposition, at 2. This position, however, is unreasonable inasmuch as it is overinclusive. In any event, the Union's interpretation is afforded great deference as is discussed below.
Indeed, evidence in the record suggests that this action is being funded by Local 71 — a competitor of the Union — for the purpose of effectuating some sort of hostile takeover of or merger with the Union. See Federspiel Dep., at 40-63, 69-82; Ronald Lindemann Dep, at 11-22, 31-34. The Union represents only five individuals employed at Croisdale, which is the sole signatory to its collective bargaining agreement. Blank Aff., at ¶¶ 3-4.
In Taylor, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a ruling in favor of a union that adopted a position similar to that of the Union — "that members who voluntarily resign their `union' jobs automatically cease to be members." Taylor, at 591. Notably, the union constitution construed in Taylor was substantively similar to Art. VI, § 1 of the Union's By-Laws in that it defined eligible members as "working men and working women * * * employed in and around * * * mills, factories and establishments, or in any other place now or hereafter within the jurisdiction of the International Union." Ibid. Furthermore, Taylor rejected an argument similar to one made by Federspiel — that 29 U.S.C. § 402(o) prohibits unions from premising membership on continued employment. Id. at 591-592 (quoting section 402(o)'s definition of "member" as "any person who has fulfilled the requirements for membership"). Federspiel's argument to this effect is likewise rejected.
Furthermore, Federspiel's own employment history confirms his and the Union's interpretation of Art. VI, § 1. Indeed, after leaving its jurisdiction in the 1980's Federspiel was re-admitted to membership upon his resumption of bargaining unit work in 1993 — i.e., when Federspiel became "a worker at one or more branches of the trade of this UNION." By-Laws of the Union, Art. VI, § 1. Accordingly, Federspiel ceased being a member of the Union when he stopped doing bargaining unit work no later than April 1, 1995 and was not subsequently readmitted to it. See By-Laws, Art. VI, § 1; 29 U.S.C. § 402(o); Taylor, at 590-592.
Indeed, Federspiel concedes that, "[i]f the Union can demonstrate that the Plaintiff voluntarily withdrew from membership * * * then the Court would be required to find that the Plaintiff was not a member." Pl.'s Reply Mem., at 1.
Federspiel was not a member of the Union in 2000 because he was not "a worker at one or more branches of the trade of this UNION" within the meaning of Art. VI, § 1 of its By-Laws. Moreover, Federspiel joined a new union — PACE. Accordingly, Federspiel voluntarily withdrew from membership in the Union within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 402(o) no later than April 1, 1995. Accordingly, he lacks standing to bring the present action because the LMRDA "`regulates only the relationship between the union and its members' and does not grant [federal courts] power to hear a claim against other unions or their officers." See Phelan, at 1055-1057 (citation omitted).
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this action is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, that defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted, that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied, and that the Clerk of this Court shall close this action.