Opinion
Civil Action No. 96-2575 (NHP).
July 27, 2000
Glenn D. Curving, Esq., RIKER, DANZIG, SCHERER, HYLAND, PERRETTI, LLP, Morristown, N.J., for Plaintiff Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
William B. McGuire, Esq., TOMPKINS M.C. GUIRE WACHENFELD BARRY, Newark, N.J., for Defendant National Union Fire Insurance Corporation.
THE ORIGINAL OF THIS LETTER OPINION IS ON FILE WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT
Dear Counsel:
This matter comes before the Court on the appeal by plaintiff Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation from a discovery Order dated May 30, 2000 wherein Magistrate Judge G. Donald Haneke denied plaintiff Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's application to compel the production of certain documents withheld by defendant National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa. This matter was decided without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons stated herein, Judge Haneke's determination as contained in the May 30, 2000 Order is AFFIRMED.
DISCUSSION
After an in camera review, Judge Haneke denied plaintiff Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's application to compel the production of certain documents withheld by defendant National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa. on the basis of attorney-client privilege.
The legal standard of review applicable to a determination made by a magistrate judge depends on whether the issue to be addressed is dispositive or non-dispositive of the case. Pursuant to the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, a United States Magistrate Judge may "hear and determine any [non-dispositive] pretrial matter pending before the court." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (West 2000). If a magistrate judge directly rules on a non-dispositive pretrial matter and issues an order, a United States District Court Judge may reconsider the order only where it has been shown that the magistrate judge's order is "clearly erroneous or contrary to law." See id.
The Federal Magistrate Act was enacted in 1968 and was referred to simply as the "Federal Magistrates Act." Since 1968, the Act has been amended several times "to expand the scope of the duties of magistrate judges in order to alleviate the increased burdens on district courts." Cooper Hospital/ University Medical Center v. Sullivan, et al . , 183 F.R.D. 119, 126 (D.N.J. 1998) (referencing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1609 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6162)). In 1979, Congress amended the Act and provided that the short title to the Act be referred to as the "Federal Magistrate Act of 1979."
The standard of review governing non-dispositive pretrial matters provided in § 636(B)(1)(A) is mirrored in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: "The district judge to whom the case is assigned shall consider such objections and shall modify or set aside any portion of the magistrate judge's order found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a). The "clearly erroneous or contrary to law" standard governing non-dispositive matters also has been adopted in this jurisdiction and is provided in Local Civil Rule 72.1(c)(1)(A): "A Judge shall consider the appeal . . . and set aside any portion of the Magistrate Judge's order found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law."
By way of comparison, a magistrate judge may also "conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings," into dispositive matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (West 2000). However, since a magistrate judge cannot directly rule on a dispositive issue, he must submit to a district judge "proposed findings of fact and recommendations" for disposition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). If, within ten days after being served with a copy of the magistrate judge's proposed findings of fact and recommendations, a party files written objections, a district court judge must make a de novo determination of those portions of the report and recommendation to which objection is made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that issues concerning whether a civil action will be remanded to State court are considered "dispositive." See In re U.S. Healthcare, 159 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 1998). "An order of remand simply cannot be characterized as nondispositive as it preclusively determines the important point that there will not be a federal forum available to entertain a particular dispute. In our view, a magistrate judge may not, without the consent of the parties, decide this critical issue at the core of the exercise of federal judicial power."Id. at 145.
Matters concerning pretrial discovery matters are invariably treated as non-dispositive pretrial motions by courts in this jurisdiction and elsewhere. See, e.g., Williams v. American Cyanamid, 164 F.R.D. 615, 617 (D.N.J. 1996); Doe v. Marsh, et al., 899 F. Supp. 933, 934 (N.D.N.Y. 1995); United States v. Premises Known as 281 Syosset Woodbury Road, 862 F. Supp. 847, 851 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd, 71 F.3d 1067 (2d Cir. 1995); Schwartz v. Marketing Publishing Company, 153 F.R.D. 16, 22 (D.Conn. 1994). Accordingly, this Court may only set aside the Magistrate Judge's Order if it is found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
"A finding is `clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). See also United States v. W.R. Grace Co.-Conn., 185 F.R.D. 184, 188 (D.N.J. 1999); Cardona v. General Motors Corporation, et al., 942 F. Supp. 968, 971 (D.N.J. 1996), motion to certify appeal denied, 939 F. Supp. 351 (D.N.J. 1996); South Seas Catamaran, Inc. v. Motor Vessel "Leeway", 120 F.R.D. 17, 21 (D.N.J. 1988), aff'd, 993 F.2d 878 (3d Cir. 1993). A district judge's simple disagreement with the magistrate judge's findings is insufficient to meet the clearly erroneous standard of review. See Toth v. Alice Pearl, Inc., et al, 158 F.R.D. 47, 50 (D.N.J. 1994) (citingAnderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) (opining that, "[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.") (citations omitted)).
Recognizing that the Magistrate Judge's determination is entitled to great deference, this Court must be satisfied that the Order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. See Cooper Hospital/University Medical Center v. Sullivan, et al., 183 F.R.D. 119, 127 (D.N.J. 1998); Kresefsky v. Panasonic Communications and Systems Co., et al., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J. 1996); Exxon Corporation v. Halcon Shipping Co., Ltd., et al., 156 F.R.D. 589, 591 (D.N.J. 1994); Harter v. GAF Corporation, 150 F.R.D. 502, 508 (D.N.J. 1993); Miller v. Beneficial Management Corporation, 844 F. Supp. 990, 997 (D.N.J. 1993).
The Court has reviewed the entire record of this case, including but not limited to conducting its own in camera review of the subject documents, and agrees with the conclusion reached by Judge Haneke that the documents should not be produced inasmuch as they are privileged.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Letter Opinion.