Opinion
37014.
DECIDED JANUARY 28, 1958.
Action on employment contract. Fulton Civil Court. Before Judge Camp. November 1, 1957.
Otis L. Davis, Paul Webb, Jr., Bertram S. Boley, for plaintiff in error.
Lokey Bowden, Charles M. Lokey, contra.
It is an essential element of an employment contract that it clearly stipulate the nature and character of the services to be performed by the employee.
DECIDED JANUARY 28, 1958.
James H. Farr filed a suit against Barnes Freight Lines, Inc., on a contract of employment.
The petition alleged in part that: the plaintiff was employed by the defendant to deliver freight; the plaintiff and B. C. Barnes, president of the defendant corporation, entered into the following agreement, "In consideration of petitioner's taking a reduction in salary from $105 per week to $76.25 per week, and in the further consideration of petitioner's agreeing to do all the work required of him regardless of how many hours in excess of 50 per week without claiming overtime rate for time worked in excess of 50 hours; that petitioner thereafter would not be required to, or expected to, punch a time clock; that thereafter and from said date petitioner would have a life time job at a salary of $76.75 per week; that in the event of sickness or disability, or if for any other reason, petitioner should become unable to work, he would continue to receive $76.75 each and every week thereafter for the remainder of his natural life; and that if petitioner should become disabled to the extent that he was not able to call at the office for his check it would be delivered to him; and in addition to the payment of $76.75 per week, a bonus of $100 would be given petitioner at the end of each year"; the plaintiff was injured on the job and is totally and permanently disabled; the defendant discharged the plaintiff and has failed to comply with the contract; the plaintiff is entitled to $77,606.27 on the contract because of the alleged facts.
The defendant filed a general demurrer to the petition which the judge sustained and dismissed the petition. It is to that ruling exception is taken.
1. The nature and character of the services to be performed, the place of employment and the amount of compensation to be paid therefor are all essential elements of an employment contract and must be stated with sufficient definiteness to enable one to ascertain the intent of the parties as to these vital features of the contract. Mosteller v. Mashburn, 64 Ga. App. 92, 96 ( 12 S.E.2d 142). "If any portion of the proposed terms is not settled, or no mode is agreed on by which it may be settled, there is no agreement." 17 C. J. S. 359, § 31.
The defendant insists that the contract was void because the character of the plaintiff's duties was not definitely stipulated. The contract provided that plaintiff was "to do all work required of him." In Weill v. Brown, 197 Ga. 328, 333 ( 29 S.E.2d 54), the Supreme Court in construing an employment contract pursuant to which services had been rendered, held a clause which provided: "The nature of the duties and the employment of second party, under this contract, shall be such as shall be assigned to him, from time to time during his term of said employment," was uncertain and indefinite. The clause ruled upon in that case being so similar in meaning to the phrase in question, we are constrained to hold that the contract is void for uncertainty and unenforceable. Oliver Construction Co. v. Reeder, 7 Ga. App. 276 ( 66 S.E. 955); Chappell v. F.A.D. Andrea, Inc., 41 Ga. App. 413 ( 153 S.E. 218); Henderson v. Curtis, 57 Ga. App. 892 ( 197 S.E. 65); Harrison v. Wilson Lumber Co., 119 Ga. 6 ( 45 S.E. 730); Prior v. Hilton Dodge Lumber Co., 141 Ga. 117 ( 80 S.E. 559); Bankers Trust Audit Co. v. Farmers Merchants Bank, 163 Ga. 352 ( 136 S.E. 143); Pepsi-Cola Co. v. Wright, 187 Ga. 723 ( 2 S.E.2d 73).
While it is true that the petition alleges that the plaintiff has fully complied with the contract, in the Brown case services had also been rendered pursuant to the employment contract. In ruling on that point the opinion states (p. 333): "We have examined the cases of Brown v. Floding, 173 Ga. 400 ( 160 S.E. 604), Webb v. Pullman Co., 57 Ga. App. 776 ( 196 S.E. 477), and Brown v. Bowman, 119 Ga. 153 ( 46 S.E. 410), cited by the plaintiffs in error, and find nothing in them in conflict with the rulings here made. In those cases incomplete contracts were held to be binding on the theory that sufficiently definite offers and proposals had been made by one party and acted upon by the other party, so that the incomplete contract had been made complete by the act of performance. In the case now under consideration the offer or proposal is so indefinite as to make it impossible for courts to determine what, if anything, was agreed upon, therefore rendering it impossible to determine whether there has been performance."
The contract being too uncertain for enforcement the judge did not err in sustaining the general demurrer and dismissing the action.
Judgment affirmed. Felton, C. J., and Nichols, J., concur.