Opinion
Civ. No. 17-542 (NLH)
04-02-2019
JEROME FARNVILLE, Petitioner, v. STEVEN JOHNSON, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Respondents.
APPEARANCES: Jerome Farnville, No. 633146/C-270942 New Jersey State Prison PO Box 861 Trenton, NJ 08625 Petitioner pro se Kim L. Barfield Cumberland County Prosecutor's Office 115 Vine Street Bridgeton, NJ 08302 Counsel for Respondents
OPINION APPEARANCES:
Jerome Farnville, No. 633146/C-270942
New Jersey State Prison
PO Box 861
Trenton, NJ 08625
Petitioner pro se Kim L. Barfield
Cumberland County Prosecutor's Office
115 Vine Street
Bridgeton, NJ 08302
Counsel for Respondents
HILLMAN, District Judge
Petitioner Jerome Farnville ("Petitioner"), a prisoner presently incarcerated at New Jersey State Prison in Trenton, New Jersey, has filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (the "Petition"). ECF No. 1. Respondents Steven Johnson and the Attorney General for the State of New Jersey ("Respondents") filed an Answer to the Petition (the "Answer"). ECF No. 4. For the following reasons, the Court will deny the Petition and a certificate of appealability shall not issue.
I. BACKGROUND
In its opinion on direct appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, provided the following summary of the factual background of Petitioner's case:
On September 12, 2005, Hamilton Blackshear (Blackshear) was shot and killed outside of the home of his son, Albert Blackshear (Albert). Prior to the shooting, Albert had been involved in several disputes with Kenneth Bartee (Bartee) about a purported sexual relationship between Albert and Bartee's girlfriend, which culminated in a physical altercation between the two at a party on September 10, 2005. In retaliation, Albert set fire to Bartee's grandmother's house, where Bartee had been living.
On September 12, 2005, Bartee broke into Albert's house and stole his clothing, electronics, and other valuables. Later that evening, Blackshear accompanied Albert to the house to retrieve Albert's remaining property, and change the locks. After Blackshear exited the house, Albert heard "a loud noise like a bang." Blackshear ran back into the house, told Albert he had been shot, and fell to the floor in the living room. Albert called 9-1-1. Blackshear later died from his gunshot wounds.
Detective Rick Pierce of the Bridgeton Police Department responded to the scene of the shooting. Albert told the detective that he had recently been involved in a fight with Bartee at a party, and gave him the names of possible suspects. Detective Pierce narrowed the suspects to defendant, Bartee, Andrew Swinton (Swinton), William Rothmaller (Rothmaller, a/k/a Pop Tart), Archie Perry (Perry), Charles Clark (Clark), and Brian Baldwin (Baldwin).
In a taped statement Clark gave the police on September 27, 2005, he said that he, Bartee, Perry, Baldwin, and Hector Ruiz drove to Albert's house in Perry's van because Bartee wanted to fight Albert. They met defendant, Swinton, and Rothmaller on the way. The men arrived at Albert's house and exited their respective vehicles. As they were walking toward the house, Clark saw that both defendant and Swinton had sawed-off shotguns. When Clark reached the bushes by the side of the house, he saw a man exit the back door, and then heard a gunshot. He did not see who had fired that shot, but said "it was between [Swinton] and [defendant]." Clark saw defendant fire a second shot. After the second shot, Clark and Bartee ran back to Perry's van and left the area. Clark did not know that someone had been killed until he read about it in the newspaper the next day. Swinton threatened to shoot anyone and their family who talked about the shooting, and stated that he was going to shoot Perry and Perry's father because they had already gone to the police.
In a taped statement Perry gave to the police on September 30, 2005, he said that on September 12, 2005, he was at Baldwin's house when Bartee asked Perry to give him a ride to Albert's house so that Bartee could steal Albert's dog. Clark, Baldwin, and Ruiz joined them. As the five men were leaving Baldwin's house in Perry's van, Bartee received a call from Swinton. The men eventually met up with Swinton, who had defendant and Rothmaller in his car. The two vehicles then proceeded to Albert's house.
Bartee had told Perry that there would be no one at Albert's house; however, if Albert was there, Bartee was going to "fight him." When the group arrived at the house, the lights were on, the doors were open, and there was someone in the house. Bartee
called Swinton, and the two decided to "go ahead" with their plan. Perry told Bartee that he did not want to be involved, dropped Bartee and Clark off at Swinton's vehicle, and drove down the street and parked. Perry saw Swinton and two other men get out of Swinton's car, and noticed the man in the back seat reach over and grab a long black object that looked like a sawed-off shotgun. The three men then ran toward Albert's house. Within ten or fifteen minutes, Perry heard two gun shots that sounded exactly the same, indicating they came from the same gun. Bartee and Clark then ran back to Perry's van and got inside. Perry said that they were "[n]ervous, ... they tell me they think Pop Tart shot a victim. They didn't even know who got shot." The three men then drove from the scene. During the drive, Bartee said "this wasn't supposed to happen. I can't believe this happened[,]" and Clark said he was "scared and nervous." The next day, Bartee told Perry that Albert's father had been killed, and "the shooter gave out a message that if anyone tells he was gonna get them before he goes in." Clark told Perry to "just keep your mouth shut. You had nothing to do with this."
Based on Clark's and Perry's statements, Detective Pierce concluded there was probable cause to arrest defendant, Swinton, and Rothmaller, the individuals that Clark and Perry had identified. The three men were arrested on October 5, 2005, brought to police headquarters for questioning, and placed in separate rooms.
Defendant received and waived his Miranda rights prior to any questioning by Detective Pierce and Detective George Chopek. He denied involvement in, or knowledge of, the shooting, and said that he had learned about it from a newspaper article. Detective Pierce told defendant that he had been implicated in the shooting, and Swinton and Rothmaller were giving statements to that
effect. Defendant did not believe the detective and said he would "roll the dice" and not give a statement. Defendant then invoked his right to remain silent and requested an attorney. At that point, all questioning about the case stopped. Thereafter, the detectives "probably made small talk," told defendant they believed he was being untruthful, and "very possibly" said to him "that [they] were interested in hearing his side of the story." Detective Pierce asked defendant to call him if he changed his mind about giving a statement.
Detective Calabrese then took defendant to the processing area, where Swinton was being processed. Detective Calabrese reported to Detective Pierce that defendant overheard Swinton tell another detective that he was going to take the detective to retrieve the guns, and that defendant had a startled look on his face when he heard this. The detectives had not planned for defendant to overhear Swinton's statement.
On October 6, 2005, defendant called the Criminal Investigation Division of the Bridgeton Police Department and asked to speak to Detectives Pierce and Chopek. Defendant did not speak to the detectives that day. He spoke to them on October 7, 2005, at the Prosecutor's Office, where, after receiving and waiving his Miranda rights, he gave a taped statement explaining what had occurred the night of the shooting. According to defendant, Bartee called him and said that he wanted defendant, Swinton, and Rothmaller to go with him to Albert's house to "beat up or rob" Albert. Prior to arriving at Albert's house, the three men, who were in Swinton's car, met up with Bartee, who was in Perry's van. Bartee exited Perry's van, went to Swinton's car, and obtained a loaded shotgun from defendant, who was sitting in the rear seat. Bartee gave defendant a .357 caliber handgun, which defendant put in his
waistband. Swinton may have had a sawed-off shot gun as well. Swinton's car then followed Perry's van to Albert's house. When they arrived there, they squatted down in the nearby brush. Defendant saw a man exit the back door, heard a shot from a shot gun, and then ran back to Swinton's car. Defendant took the gun out of his waistband when he was running back to the car. Defendant was not sure if it was Bartee's or Swinton's shotgun that was fired, but he thought it was Bartee's "[c]ause it ... was his beef[,]" and Bartee was the one who was upset with Albert for trying to burn down his grandmother's house. The next day defendant read in the newspaper that someone had been killed.
Before trial, defendant and co-defendants Bartee, Swinton, Rothmaller, and Baldwin, filed a motion to suppress their statements to the police. Following a Miranda hearing, the trial judge denied defendant's motion, holding that defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally waived his rights. The judge found that the detectives had stopped questioning defendant after he requested an attorney; defendant subsequently re-initiated contact with the detectives and asked to speak to them; defendant received his Miranda rights a second time before giving the statement; and he acknowledged that he understood his rights by initialing the Miranda card.
Defendant was tried separately from his co-defendants. Police Officer Dominick Patitucci testified that he responded to the scene following the shooting. He also executed a search warrant on defendant's residence and seized a .357 caliber handgun containing ammunition, and one shotgun shell.
Detective Michael Donato testified that, with Swinton's sister's consent, he searched her apartment. During the search, Swinton's
sister directed him to a duffle bag containing two shotguns matching the description of the weapons used in the shooting. The officer also discovered shotgun shells.State v. Farnville, No. A-0169-09T1, 2012 WL 469456, at *1-5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 15, 2012).
State Trooper Randolph Toth of the New Jersey State Police Ballistics Unit testified that because of the types of barrels on the guns retrieved during the searches, the bullets that killed Blackshear could not be identified as having come from a particular gun.
Clark and Perry testified about their taped statements, as well as their and defendant's involvement in what had occurred the night of the shooting.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted on count one of first-degree felony murder, on count three of first-degree armed robbery, on count four of second-degree robbery, on count seven of third-degree unlawful acquisition of a firearm, and on counts ten and eleven of second-degree conspiracy to commit robbery and burglary. In convicting defendant on count three the jury did not find beyond a reasonable doubt that he was armed with a shotgun. The jury also found defendant not guilty on count six of possession of a shotgun for an unlawful purpose, and on count twelve of possession of a sawed-off shotgun. At sentencing, the trial judge merged the convictions on counts four and ten with count one and sentenced defendant to an aggregate sixty-year term of imprisonment with an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.Id. at *1.
Petitioner subsequently appealed his conviction and sentence to the Appellate Division, where he raised the following claims:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, TO DEFENDANT'S GREAT PREJUDICE, IN REFUSING TO ADMIT AN EXCITED UTTERANCE THAT A CO-DEFENDANT WAS THE SHOOTER. U.S. CONST., AMEND. XIV; N.J. CONST. (1947), ART. 1, PAR. 10.
POINT II
THE STATE ENGAGED IN MISCONDUCT BY INTENTIONALLY PRESENTING HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL VICTIM-IMPACT TESTIMONY, AND THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ATTEMPT TO REMEDIATE IT, TO DEFENDANT'S GREAT PREJUDICE. U.S. CONST., AMEND[ ]. XIV; N.J. CONST. (1947), ART. 1, PAR. 10.
POINT III
THE OFFICERS VIOLATED THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO SILENCE AND TO COUNSEL BY CONTINUING TO QUESTION HIM AFTER HE HAD REQUESTED COUNSEL, NECESSITATING SUPPRESSION. U.S. CONST., AMENDS. V, VI, XIV; N.J. CONST. (1947), ART. 1, PAR. 10.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT IMPOSED AN EXCESSIVE SENTENCE, NECESSITATING REDUCTION.
Id.
In a pro se submission, Petitioner also raised the following:
POINT IId. (alterations in original).
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR FOR NOT HAVE TAKEN JUDIC[I]AL NOTICE [] THEREBY[] DEPRIVING APPELLATE OF DUE-PROCESS-OF-LAW, U.S. CONST. A[MENDS]. 6, 14; N.J. CONST. (1947), ART. 1, PAR 10. (NOT RAISED BELOW)
The Appellate Division reversed Petitioner's conviction for first-degree robbery, finding that the verdict sheet had been incomplete and had not provided the jury with all of the appropriate questions "that could have led the jury to find defendant guilty of first-degree robbery beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at *10. However, the Appellate Division affirmed the remainder of Petitioner's convictions, as well as his sentence. See id. at *11. The New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification of Petitioner's direct appeal on September 25, 2012. See State v. Farnville, 52 A.3d 177 (N.J. 2012).
Petitioner subsequently filed his petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR") in state court. See ECF No. 4-13 at 2. Petitioner challenged his trial counsel's alleged failure to: (1) file a motion for a new trial based upon a lack of sufficient evidence to support the verdict, and (2) object to numerous prejudicial issues. See ECF No. 4-14 at 18-25. Following oral argument, the court denied Petitioner's PCR on the record. See ECF No. 4-15 at 2. On appeal, Petitioner raised only the following claim:
POINT ONEState v. Farnville, A-3226-13T2, 2015 WL 6697619, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 4, 2015).
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS CLAIM THAT HIS TRIAL ATTORNEY RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of Petitioner's PCR application. See id. On March 30, 2016, the Supreme Court of New Jersey denied certification of Petitioner's PCR appeal. See State v. Farnville, 135 A.3d 147 (N.J. 2016).
In January 2017, Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition, pro se. See ECF No. 1 at 14. Petitioner raises two claims: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for felony murder, and (2) "the Appellate state court's fact finding conclusions were unreasonable and clearly erroneous." Id. at 8-10.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is the proper mechanism for a state prisoner to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement where the petitioner claims his custody is in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011); Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99 (1973). A habeas petitioner bears the burden of establishing his entitlement to relief for each claim presented in the petition. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011).
The standard used in reviewing habeas claims under § 2254 depends on whether those claims have been adjudicated on the merits by the state court. If they have not been adjudicated on the merits, the Court reviews de novo both legal questions and mixed factual and legal questions. See Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001). If the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits, then 2254(d) limits the review of the state court's decision as follows:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding . . . .
If a claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state court, this Court has "no authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus unless the [state court's] decision 'was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,' or 'was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'" Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 40 (2012) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).
"[A] claim has been adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings when a state court has made a decision that finally resolves the claim based on its substance, not on a procedural, or other, ground." Lewis v. Horn, 581 F.3d 92, 100 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 117 (3d Cir. 2009)). "Section 2254(d) applies even where there has been a summary denial." Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 187. "In these circumstances, [petitioner] can satisfy the 'unreasonable application' prong of § 2254(d)(1) only by showing that 'there was no reasonable basis' for the [state court's] decision." Id. (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011); see also Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 301 (2013) ("When a state court rejects a federal claim without expressly addressing that claim, a federal habeas court must presume that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits - but that presumption can in some limited circumstances be rebutted."). --------
A court begins the analysis under § 2254(d)(1) by determining the relevant law clearly established by the Supreme Court. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 660 (2004). Clearly established law "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). A court must look for "the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). "[C]ircuit precedent does not constitute 'clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,' [and] therefore cannot form the basis for habeas relief under AEDPA." Parker, 567 U.S. at 48-49 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).
A decision is "contrary to" a Supreme Court holding within 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), if the state court applies a rule that "contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases" or if it "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a [different result.]" Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06. Under the "'unreasonable application' clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. "[A]n unreasonable application of federal law," however, "is different from an incorrect application of federal law." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Exhaustion
Before reviewing the claims contained in the Petition, the Court must determine whether Petitioner has exhausted them in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To satisfy the exhaustion requirement in § 2254(b), "state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process," including a petition for discretionary review before the State's highest court. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). "[I]f the petitioner fails to satisfy the exhaustion requirement prior to filing a federal habeas petition and none of the exceptions apply, the federal court is precluded from granting habeas relief to the petitioner." Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513-14 (3d Cir. 1997). The Court may, however, deny a habeas petition "on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).
It appears from the record that both of Petitioner's claims are unexhausted. However, because the grounds for relief raised in the Petition may be denied on the merits without regard to exhaustion pursuant to § 2254(b)(2), the Court will decline to engage in an exhaustion analysis as it is unnecessary to the disposition of the Petition.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Petitioner first alleges that his conviction for felony murder was against the weight of the evidence and should be set aside. See ECF No. 1 at 8-9. In support of his claim, Petitioner states: "[T]here was not one shred of evidence (either direct or circumstantial) from which one could reasonably infer that Farnville had any foreknowledge that Bartee was going to rob Albert, let alone attempt to kill him or, that he, Farnville wanted to see Albert killed." Id. at 8. As evidence of that assertion, Petitioner points to a pre-trial statement he gave to police in which he alleged that on the night of the murder he had "no idea where they were going." Id. See also ECF No. 4-7 at 71.
A claim that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence raises a Fifth Amendment due process concern. Only where, "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, [no] rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt" should a writ issue. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). See also Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 4 (2011). This standard must be applied "with explicit reference to the elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324, n. 16. See also Orban v. Vaughn, 123 F.3d 727 (3d Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1059 (1998).
Here, Petitioner was convicted of first-degree felony murder under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-3(a)(3) which states, in relevant part:
a. Except as provided in N.J.S.2C:11-4, criminal homicide constitutes murder when:
[. . .]
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-3.(3) It is committed when the actor, acting either alone or with one or more other persons, is engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, carjacking, criminal escape or terrorism pursuant to section 2 of P.L.2002, c. 26 (C.2C:38-2), and in the course of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, any person causes the death of a person other than one of the participants
In his § 2254 claim, Petitioner emphasizes that he was allegedly unaware that co-defendant Kenneth Bartee ("Bartee") intended to rob or murder Albert Blackshear ("Albert"), and that this lack of intent militated against a conviction for felony murder. See ECF No. 1 at 8-9. Contrary to Petitioner's assertion however, Petitioner admitted in a taped statement to police that he went to Albert's house knowing the intention was to "beat [Albert] up or rob him." ECF No. 4-7 at 65.
[DETECTIVE]: [Albert] [s]et [Bartee's] grandmother's house on fire?
[PETITIONER]: Yea
[DETECTIVE]: and what did Kenny want to do after that?
[PETITIONER]: He wanted to go to his house and, I guess beat him up or rob him.
[DETECTIVE]: So he wanted, [Bartee] wanted to go to Albert's house and beat him up or rob him? And what did he go, call, did [Bartee] call Al, or Andrew to, for back up or to go along with him for help or anything?
[PETITIONER]: I guess he just wanted us there for backup.
[DETECTIVE]: For backup. And that's sort of how you got drug into this, isn't it?
[PETITIONER]: Yea . . . .
Id.
Later in that same statement, Petitioner again admits that he knew Bartee's intent was to rob Albert and steal items from Albert's home.
[DETECTIVE]: Prior to going on tape when we were briefly discussing this you had made mention that [Bartee] had told you that they had been to [Albert's] house before this?
[PETITIONER]: Yea
[DETECTIVE]: What
[PETITIONER]: They said they gonna take a TV from his house
[DETECTIVE]: When did this happen do you know?Id. at 81.
[PETITITONER]: The same night I guess. They said yea, we just left from the house we took a TV from there, we're going back, follow us.
[DETECTIVE]: So [Bartee] had actually said they went to the house.
[PETITIONER]: Yea
[. . .]
[DETECTIVE]: He mention taking anything else from the house?
[PETITIONER]: No
[DETECTIVE]: No?
[PETITIONER]: Said they was going back to get some more stuff
[DETECTIVE]: And that's when you guys went along, or and followed them
[PETITIONER]: Uh huh, yea
This statement to police was played in its entirety at trial. See ECF No. 4-21 at 82. Petitioner's co-defendant Charles Clark ("Clark") also testified at trial. See id. at 8-47. Clark stated that on the night of the murder, he had gone with Bartee, Petitioner, and several other individuals to Albert's house to either "confront" Albert and "take some property," or to "break into [Albert's] house and take the dog and anything else maybe we wanted." Id. at 10-11. Clark testified that upon arriving at Albert's house, he met up with Petitioner and saw that Petitioner was armed with a gun. See id. at 11. After several of the men, including Clark, Bartee, and Petitioner, approached Albert's house, they saw an individual exit the back door. See id. Clark testified that he then saw Petitioner "let off a shot", and that there was no doubt in Clark's mind that Petitioner was the one who had fired his weapon. See id. at 13. Clark stated that, at the time, he was unaware of what had happened to the individual who had come out of the back door of the house, but that he learned the following day Blackshear had died. See id.
The record presented at trial clearly demonstrates that there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find that Petitioner had committed felony murder. Petitioner admitted to joining up with other men to rob Albert, and during this encounter Blackshear was killed. These facts satisfy the elements to sustain a charge of felony murder pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-3(a)(3). Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that "no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. He is not entitled to relief on this claim.
C. Appellate Division's "Fact Finding Conclusions"
Petitioner's second contention is that the Appellate Division's "fact finding conclusions" in their opinion denying his PCR appeal were "unreasonable and clearly erroneous." ECF No. 1 at 10. See also ECF No. 1-1 at 32. Similar to his first claim for relief, Petitioner asserts that the Appellate Division's determination that there was "abundant evidence" to sustain a charge of felony murder was "unreasonable in light of the entire trial record." Id. at 34.
On appeal from the denial of his PCR petition, Petitioner's sole argument was that he should have been granted an evidentiary hearing on whether his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to file a motion for a new trial based upon insufficient evidence. See id. at 4. The Appellate Division held that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary because the record supported the fact that there was "abundant evidence" to sustain Petitioner's felony murder charge. See id.
Petitioner now argues that this determination by the Appellate Division was incorrect because the court "mischaracterized the evidence" and "ignore[ed] [the] evidence" that contradicted Petitioner's guilt. ECF No. 1-1 at 36. Petitioner points to the following as demonstrative of his innocence: (1) he never spoke directly to Bartee; (2) he was never informed of what Bartee had planned; (3) he was not present when Bartee initially "planned his revenge"; (4) he had no motive to conspire to commit robbery or murder; and (5) the jury had rejected Clark's testimony that Petitioner was armed with a gun and "let off a shot", when the jury found Petitioner not guilty of possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose and not guilty of possession of a prohibited weapon. See id. at 34-36.
Although Petitioner phrases his claim in terms of the Appellate Division's "factual findings", Petitioner instead appears to take issue with the Appellate Division's conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to support the charge of felony murder. Petitioner appears to allege that this was an "unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Parker, 567 U.S. at 40 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
As discussed previously, a federal habeas court may only grant a writ if "the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. Significantly, an "unreasonable" application of law is different from an "incorrect" application of law. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101. "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fair minded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Id. (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).
Here, the issue raised before the Appellate Division was whether Petitioner's trial counsel had been ineffective. The Appellate Division was not asked to rule on whether the evidence had been sufficient to sustain a charge of felony murder. Nevertheless, in arriving at its determination that trial counsel had not been ineffective, the Appellate Division did state in its opinion that there had been "abundant evidence" presented at trial to support a felony murder charge against Petitioner. See Farnville, 2015 WL 6697619, at *4. This Court does not find that conclusion was unreasonable, as this Court has already determined that there was indeed sufficient evidence presented for a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
Although Petitioner contends that he never spoke directly to Bartee, that he was never informed of what Bartee had planned, that he was not present when Bartee initially "planned his revenge", and that he had no motive to conspire to commit robbery or murder, Petitioner's taped statement to police demonstrates that he knew Bartee intended to go to Albert's house to either "beat [Albert] up or rob him" and that Petitioner was going to meet Bartee at Albert's house for "backup." See ECF No. 4-7 at 65. This evidence is sufficient to find that Petitioner was in the commission of, or in an attempt to commit, a robbery with Bartee and the other co-defendants. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-3(a)(3).
Moreover, while Petitioner emphasizes the fact that the jury did not find that Petitioner himself had been in possession of a shotgun, this is not required for a felony murder conviction. See id. A felony murder conviction only mandates that during the commission, or attempt to commit a robbery, one of the participants in that robbery causes the death of someone who was not a participant. See id. Even if Petitioner had not been the individual who shot Blackshear, Petitioner admitted during his statement to police that one of the participants had shot Blackshear; thereby satisfying the requirement needed to sustain a charge of felony murder against Petitioner even if he did not fire the fatal shot himself. See ECF No. 4-7 at 73-78. Accordingly, the Appellate Division was not unreasonable in concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support a felony murder charge against Petitioner, and he is not entitled to relief on this claim.
IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
The AEDPA provides that an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from a final order in a § 2254 proceeding unless a judge issues a certificate of appealability on the ground that "the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This Court will deny a certificate of appealability because jurists of reason would not find it debatable that dismissal of the Petition is correct.
V. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the § 2254 habeas petition is denied, and a certificate of appealability shall not issue. An appropriate Order follows. Dated: April 2, 2019
At Camden, New Jersey
s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.