Opinion
1:06CV191.
June 28, 2006
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; Plaintiff has filed response in opposition.
I. FACTS
This matter arises from a dispute surrounding two leaseholds held by Plaintiff Fairfield Resorts, Inc. The property subject to the leases is owned by Defendant Fairfield Mountains Property Owners Association, Inc. ("Defendant" or "POA"). Each lease is for a period of 25 years, with approximately 12 years remaining. In a letter dated March 30, 2006, Defendant declared its belief that the leases were a "nullity" and demanded that Plaintiff begin paying rent that is approximately four times the monthly amount paid over the preceding 13 years of the lessor-lessee relationship. When Plaintiff asserted the validity of the leases and refused to acquiesce to the increase, Defendant informed Plaintiff that it had "thirty (30) days from May 29, 2006" to vacate the premises. Plaintiff subsequently filed this action seeking a declaration that the leases are valid and injunctive relief preventing Defendant from evicting Plaintiff from the property. See , Complaint and attachments, filed June 20, 2006.
Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that the amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction has not been met. See , Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, filed June 23, 2006. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has simply made a "bald assertion" that the jurisdictional amount is satisfied, and asserts that "[t]here are no factual allegations in the Complaint regarding any amounts in controversy other than references to monthly lease payments[.]" Id. , ¶¶ 1-2.
II. STANDARD
"The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue" which must be addressed before the merits of the case. Jones v. American Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 1999). Rule 12(b)(1) provides for dismissal where the Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the lawsuit. See, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Questions regarding subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by either party at any time or sua sponte by the Court. See, Plyler v. Moore , 129 F.3d 728, 732 n. 6 (4 th Cir. 1997) (citing North Carolina v. Ivory , 906 F.2d 999, 1000 n. 1 (4 th Cir. 1990)). The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction is on the party asserting its existence. See Lovern v. Edwards , 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4 th Cir. 1999) (citing Thomson v. Gaskill , 315 U.S. 442, 446 (1942)); Adams v. Bain , 697 F.2d 1213, 1218 (4 th Cir. 1982).Where diversity jurisdiction is alleged, the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. A party's good faith allegation of the amount in controversy generally will be sufficient to establish that the amount in controversy requirement of § 1332 is met. See, Cale v. Covington , 586 F.2d 311, 313 (4 th Cir. 1978). However, "where a defendant or the court challenges the plaintiff's allegations regarding the amount in question, the plaintiff who seeks the assistance of the federal courts must produce sufficient evidence to justify its claims." Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Tarbuck , 62 F.3d 538, 541 (3d Cir. 1995).
If the relief sought is injunctive or declaratory, rather than monetary, "it is well established that the amount in controversy is measured by the value of the object of the litigation." Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n , 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977); see also, Agency Ins. Co. of Maryland, Inc. v. Smith , 161 F.3d 1 (table), 1998 WL 567843, at *1 (4 th Cir. 1998) (quoting Hunt, supra ); Hoffman v. Vulcan Materials Co. , 19 F.Supp.2d 475, 479 (M.D.N.C. 1998). In determining whether the "value of the object of the litigation" is sufficient to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement, the Court should grant a dismissal only where it appears to a legal certainty that the controversy involves less than $75,000. See, e.g., Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 112-13 (4th Cir. 1995); Nutter v. New Rents, Inc. , 945 F.2d 398 (table), 1991 WL 193490, at **4 (4 th Cir. 1991).